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On May 24, 2024, after 25 years of negotiations, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) member states approved the Treaty on Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional Knowledge. It is the first treaty to link intellectual property, genetic heritage, and the knowledge of indigenous peoples.

Below, we take a closer look at the treaty and its key implications.

Most of the recent intellectual property literature concerns the "enclosure of the public domain"' or the "one-way ratchet" of intellectual property protection.2 While these concerns are significant and rightly placed, a different, and perhaps more important, enclosure movement is currently taking place at the international level. Instead of the public domain, this concurrent movement encloses the policy space of individual countries and requires them to adopt one-size-fits-all legal standards that ignore their local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health conditions. Unlike the movement to enclose the public domain, which "fenc[es] off common land and turn[s] it into private property, 3 the international enclosure movement fences off areas that provide attractive policy options for less developed countries. 4 By virtue of this enclosure, these countries are forced to adopt inappropriate intellectual property systems, and they as a result have also lost their ability to respond to domestic crises within their borders.

Intellectual property systems in developed countries are helping to keep poorer countries trapped in poverty, says a report out this week. Laws on patents and intellectual property need to be relaxed and adapted to help developing countries fight poverty and gain access to technology, medicines, and research. Developing countries should set their own agenda and develop laws that give them easier access to cut-price drugs and generic versions of drugs that are still patented. They should also aim to ensure that diagnostic and surgical methods are excluded from patents, says the report from the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. The commission, which was set up by the British government in May 2001 to see how poor people could benefit from national rules on intellectual property, also suggests that companies that share their technology with poorer countries should be rewarded in some way, perhaps with tax breaks. “Intellectual property systems may, if not used carefully, introduce distortions that are detrimental to the interests of developing countries. Developed countries should pay more attention to reconciling their commercial self-interest with the need to reduce poverty in developing countries, which is in everyone's interest,” says the report. In a foreword to the report, Hugh Laddie, UK High Court Patents Judge, says that TRIPS (trade related aspects of intellectual property)—which allows members of the World Trade Organization to have easier access to cheaper medicines—“has not resulted in a shrinking of the gap that divides those two sides [the developed world and the developing world], rather it has helped to reinforce the views already held.” There are those, mainly in the developed world, who believe that intellectual property rights are good and must be strengthened, whereas developing countries believe they benefit just the developed world and seriously damage industry and technology everywhere else. The principles laid out in TRIPS need to be made more flexible, and the deadline to adopt the treaty should be extended to 2016 for some countries, says the report. “Developed countries often proceed on the assumption that what is good for them is likely to be good for developing countries,” said Professor John Barton, chairman of the commission, and professor of law, Stanford University. “But, in the case of developing countries, more and stronger protection is not necessarily better. Developing countries should not be encouraged or coerced into adopting stronger IP [intellectual property] rights without regard to the impact this has on their development and poor people. They should be allowed to adopt appropriate rights regimes, not necessarily the most protective ones.”

CORVALLIS, Ore. - A new study by an Oregon State University business professor has found that developing countries that adopt major international economic treaties do not necessarily gain more foreign direct investment. In fact, in some cases adopting these treaties can hurt, not help a developing country, contrary to what agencies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) espouse. The study, published in the online version of the Journal of World Business, has major implications for Latin American and Caribbean intellectual policy reform. , an assistant professor in OSU's College of Business, spent more than 12 years in private industry managing intellectual property and research and development strategies at various firms. He is the inventor of 43 issued United States patents and more than 70 international patents in areas related to micro/nanotechnology and semiconductor manufacturing. Khoury wanted to know when developing countries in Latin America adopt intellectual property treaties such as the if their inbound investment from foreign countries increases. Mike Peng from the University of Texas at Dallas contributed to the research. "Basically, I wanted to know when developing countries take on the rules of the wealthy, developed nations, do good things happen to them?" Khoury said. "And in many cases, the answer is no." Khoury looked specifically at the Paris Convention treaty, which was renewed in 1967. He found that countries that did not have a significant invention and scientific research base did not financially benefit from adopting the treaty, and in some cases found their economic situations worsen. The OSU professor pointed out that developed countries such as the United States encourage others to adopt the treaties because they want to be able to file their patents in countries where there may be a market for their product, or perhaps where there may be a manufacturing workforce to make the product. As the inventor of more than 100 domestic and international patents, Khoury saw this issue come up frequently when he was filing for patents in other countries. Companies file international patents to protect their invention and make sure competitors in other countries do not copy the product; and they want to ensure that they can sell, market or manufacture the product overseas. Looking at the data over a 14-year period in 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries, Khoury found that countries that adopted the Paris Convention early - such as Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay - had an inflow of foreign direct investment if they increased innovation, which he measured by the number of scholarly journals published and number of patents filed from that country. So in some cases, adoption of international intellectual property rights treaties may have helped a developing nation. But in countries with the lowest innovation base - including El Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay - early adoption did not increase investment in those countries. "Countries that do not adopt are threatened with sanctions and other types of coercion," Khoury said. "This explains why so many developing nations adopt treaties that are, quite frankly, not beneficial to them and in some cases only helps larger, multinational corporations within more industrialized countries." Khoury explained that developing countries often struggle to stay in harmony with international treaties that are designed as "one-size-fits-all." In many cases, he added, developing nations may see much larger economic benefits from delaying participating with economic treaties such as the Paris Convention and waiting until they have increased their domestic innovation base.

Intellectual property systems in developed countries are helping to keep poorer countries trapped in poverty, says a report out this week. Laws on patents and intellectual property need to be relaxed and adapted to help developing countries fight poverty and gain access to technology, medicines, and research.

Developing countries should set their own agenda and develop laws that give them easier access to cut-price drugs and generic versions of drugs that are still patented. They should also aim to ensure that diagnostic and surgical methods are excluded from patents, says the report from the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights.

The starting point for maximizing global knowledge production and innovation is countries doing the right thing at home in terms of implementing the right policies in ways that maximize their innovation capacity, but without distorting global trade. Countries, regions, and cities around the world are increasingly focusing on what they can do to improve their ability to support innovation, while benchmarking their performance against global competitors on various innovation indices, as they consider reforms that would improve their ranking and overall performance.[156] How countries individually and collectively determine policies that relate to innovation will determine how they contribute to or detract from global innovation, and what this implies in terms of progress toward developing solutions to global challenges.[157] With innovation truly the most important “good” for the future of the global economy and society, policymakers cannot take it for granted.

Trade secrecy can cause harm. First, trade secrecy does not always promote one of its stated policy goals—innovation.42 Rather, it encourages companies to engage in duplicative investment in research and development.43 It also frustrates the disclosure goals of the patent system when companies opt for trade secrecy rather than patent protection. Second, secrecy debilitates judgment.45 If only a select few know the trade secret, then they are the only ones who can make decisions regarding the information at issue. This postpones discovery of errors and effectively shuts out criticism from others who may be able to provide valuable feedback.46 As a result, faulty assumptions about risk may mean that little to no deliberation takes place regarding whether to continue, modify, or cease use of the trade secret.47 Third, secrecy has the capacity to corrupt and to invite abuse.48 Due to others’ lack of knowledge regarding the trade secret, those with knowledge operate in a system free from oversight.49 This lack of accountability coupled with the desire for higher profits (for which they are held accountable) results in a loosening of moral constraints.50 When no one is present to hold a mirror up to their faces, they can downplay the consequences of their actions and disregard any negative impacts the trade secret may have on their employees, their consumers, the general public, or the environment. Corporations assert trade secrecy for a number of reasons,51 some of which are improper. For decades, companies have been introducing new products, such as cigarettes,52 asbestos fibers,53 pesticides (namely, DBCP),54 and lead paint55 into the market. The public later discovered that these products were dangerous. For decades, however, companies used trade secrecy to conceal the dangerous aspects of their products.56 The following examples—perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), vinyl chloride, and benzene—merely scratch the surface of companies’ use of trade secrets to hide known health dangers from the public.57 In 1951, the chemical company DuPont began purchasing PFOA, a man-made biopersistent and bioaccumulative chemical, from the 3M Company to aid in its manufacture of Teflon, a nonstick coating applied to skillets and pans.58 In addition to cookware, PFOA was ultimately used in hundreds of other products, including food containers, clothing, and carpet.59 By 1961, through self-funded, secret medical studies, DuPont became aware that PFOA was dangerous,60 yet the company remained silent.61 Meanwhile, employees regularly contracted “Teflon flu”—exemplified by “fever, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting—after working in one of the PFOA storage tanks.”62 Employees were instructed not to bring their work clothes home anymore.63 3M also reported several concerns to DuPont. In 1978, 3M told DuPont that PFOA had been detected in the blood of workers at a plant that manufactured the chemical.64 In 1981, 3M reported that PFOA caused birth defects in rats.65 Thereafter, DuPont learned that two of its seven pregnant female employees gave birth to children with facial deformities.66 Despite these health concerns and 3M’s recommendations for how to properly dispose of PFOA—through incineration or disposal at chemical waste facilities—DuPont discharged “hundreds of thousands of pounds of PFOA powder” into the Ohio River and stored “7,100 tons of PFOA-laced sludge” in its facility’s digestion ponds, “open, unlined pits . . . from which the chemical could seep into the ground.”67 As a result, PFOA entered the drinking water supply of over one hundred thousand people.68 By 1984, DuPont knew that drinking water across the Ohio River was contaminated.69 However, the health risks were outweighed by the monetary rewards. An internal document dated later in 1984 stated that while the “[l]egal and medical [departments] will likely take the position of total elimination,” the company executives concluded that cutting pollution was “not ‘economically attractive.’”70 Therefore, rather than reducing its use of PFOA, DuPont increased production.71 It also continued to keep the dangers related to PFOA exposure secret.72 Additional studies echoed earlier warnings, yet DuPont continued to put its profit before public welfare. In 1990, a study showed that 3M employees with long-term exposure to PFOA had higher rates of death from prostate cancer than employees who were not exposed. 73 Internal documentation indicated that “DuPont understood that PFOA caused cancerous testicular, pancreatic and liver tumors in lab animals.”74 Rather than developing a less toxic or less risky alternative, DuPont decided to continue using PFOA.75 As the New York Times noted, “[t]he risk was too great” given that PFOA products were “worth $1 billion in annual profit.”

In the field of international transactions, national trade secret laws retain even more importance in the protection of unpatented high-technology items, as statutory protection under copyright or trademark laws may not be formally extended." The international reliance on trade secret protection is clearly reflected in the work produced by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the international organization formed "to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States."' 1 2 For example, the Model Provisions on the Protection of Computer Software, published by WIPO in 1978, rely heavily on trade secret concepts in defining the rights of software proprietors and the acts which constitute infringements of these rights.

The World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations agency, has come under fire from a range of regional and global groups representing key public interest components of the copyright system for unfairly catering to rights holder interests in an ongoing series of regional meetings, resulting in sharply biased outcomes of the meetings.

The groups say they were excluded from participating on equal footing with other stakeholders, giving days of extra time to others to lobby officials from national and regional copyright offices. This provides support for the notion that WIPO and the copyright system are pursuing a mission to protect copyright holders, they argue, ignoring other creators, the public interest, and exceptions and limitations.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is absent without leave (AWOL). The timing couldn’t be worse.

For over 50 years, WIPO has been at the center of intellectual property in the global economy. Its 26 treaties, including the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention, provide content for many of the rights and obligations in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Many of these treaties also feature prominently in trade agreements throughout the world.

A week ago, Smith & Hopen posted an article highlighting the importance of the U.S. patent system to the prosperity of our economy. Yesterday, the Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) released its 2020 International IP Index. The report highlights the continued global dominance of the U.S. intellectual property system, which ranks as the number one in the world. The IP index also shows that our patent system is the second strongest in the world, only behind Singapore. Although Singapore may have a more robust patent infrastructure, its overall size is dwarfed in comparison to the U.S., so the head-to-head comparison is not particularly fair. The U.S. patent system is the cornerstone of a healthy and prosperous American economy. The 2020 International IP Index underscores our position as the global intellectual property leader. The IP Index also shows that other countries are also investing heavily in bringing their national patent systems up to the standards the U.S. has established. Strong international patent infrastructure is excellent for the American economy and allows American innovators to meaningfully secure and enforce their patent rights abroad.

It is increasingly impossible to analyze intellectual property law and policy without reference to international lawmaking. That is not, however, merely because several recent domestic reforms have been prompted by international developments.1 Indeed, because of significant U.S. influence in the formation of contemporary intellectual property treaties, U.S. law has undergone less change than most in order to comply with newly-assumed international obligations. Nor is it simply because, in an era of global trade and technological advances, a state is unable effectively to regulate economic activity on its own. Rather, the need for a broader awareness flows most directly from the integration of the international and domestic lawmaking processes. Consider this historical example. As nations met in Berlin in 1908 to revise the Berne Convention, the United States received an invitation to attend with “full freedom of action.”2 Instead, the Register of Copyrights attended only as an observer.3 The reason might now seem und uly quaint. Thorvald Solberg, the Register of Copyrights explained to the Conference that the United States found it impracticable to send a delegate authorized to commit it to actual adhesion to the Berne Convention since some of the questions to be discussed there were pending before the Congress and premature action at the Convention might embarrass the legislative branch of the Government.4 Today, in contrast, there is a conscious blending of domestic and international lawmaking. International lawmaking demands attention to Washington; and domestic lawmaking cannot be conducted without regard for what is going on in Brussels, Geneva, Tokyo, and elsewhere. Indeed, in some areas of intellectual property, we may be moving toward a single lawmaking process that embodies a series of complex relations among national, regional and global institutions and laws. Within the United States, this biplay between national and international fora – in particular, between executive branch activity at the international level, and legislative activity in Congress – has been treated by some with a certain suspicion.5 This interaction is, however, essential in a global age. And it should not be disconcerting. The Constitution sets out a process for concluding and ratifying treaties,6 and a separate process for enacting legislation.7 Each mechanism has its own limits. It would be somewhat surprising if each branch of government did not use the leverage with which it is endowed by the constitutional scheme. In any event, this blending or integration of lawmaking is a political reality of which we must take account in our assessment of how intellectual property law is made. This Essay addresses the operation of this integrated process in the fields of design and trade dress protection. I will focus on two primary issues, using examples drawn from recent developments in those fields. First, I will discuss the characteristics of what has arguably been the predominant form of international lawmaking in recent years, namely the process of harmonization; and, second, I will identify some current design or trade dress protection issues that may soon be part of this complex lawmaking process.

No economist is in doubt about the positive effects of trade for the national economy welfare (for example Krugman and Obstfeld, 2000). According to the neoclassical perspective, trade renders the division of labor between states more efficient. States that have opened up to international competition use their comparative advantage, and thus can produce and consume more goods than autarkies. In free trading states, prices approach world market prices. Protectionist measures, by contrast, increase the wedge between the national and the international price of a good. Sachs and Warner (1995) show that economically open developing countries grow faster and can better prevent balance of payments crises than comparable closed economies. Plümper (2001) qualifies this argument but does not deny that reducing trade barriers has a positive effect. In order to benefit from the welfare gains, regulative conditions have to be present for flourishing free trade. The degree to which a state shields its economy against foreign competition largely determines to what extent it can realize welfare gains from free trade. Free trade can minimize the risk of domestic conflict in two ways. First of all, trade increases the welfare for the general population, and thus reduces factors that can lead to instability, as stated by the theory of deprivation (Gurr, 1971). According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade, the abundant factors in a country profit from free trade. In developing countries this is, depending on how factors are divided, either labor or unskilled labor (Wood, 1994). In any case, it is the masses of the population that benefit from trade liberalization. However, the question arises whether economic openness increases income inequality. Here the empirical evidence is split. According to Fischer (2001), income inequality declined after economic liberalization in South East Asia, while at the same time it increased in Latin America. Other studies found either no relationship between the two variables or they arrived at the conclusion that countries experienced a fairer distribution of income through openness (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Bussmann et al., 2002; Edwards, 1997). If free trade really leads to more income equality, we can expect an additional reduction in the risk of political conflict. Rich and satisfied citizens are, according to the theory of deprivation, less involved in protests than poor and disadvantaged people. Furthermore, gains from trade increase the interest in maintaining a free trade regime. Violent conflicts would be a hindrance to this commercial spirit. Thus, it is in a country’s interests, as well as in that of its citizens, to guarantee domestic peace and stability. This second line of reasoning is an extension of the liberal and democratic peace literature. In accordance with Immanuel Kant, several researchers argue that democratic states and states that are integrated into the world economy have a lower risk of fighting each other. War disrupts trade flows between countries, and therefore is too costly for a state and its citizens (Russett and Oneal, 2001). In addition, trade enforces liberal norms that are opposite to war and violent conflicts (Kant, 1795 [1987]). This argumentation, as applied to interstate wars, is widely discussed and finds considerable empirical support (Barbieri and Schneider, 1999; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Schneider et al., 2003). The same logic could be transferred to intrastate conflicts. Extreme forms of domestic instability are an obstacle to free trade and reduce potential gains that could be achieved through foreign economic liberalization in the long run. The relevant actors will include free trade in their cost-benefit calculations when they consider domestic strategies. An escalation of quarrels about the foreign economic orientation of a country is thus counterproductive for all participants because it deters foreign investors and trading partners. In case of an escalating domestic conflict, the parties —unions and employers, export-oriented and import-substituting industries— are all in the same boat. Concerning the long-term effects of economic liberalization, we assume that economic openness helps to enhance economic development. The incentives for political opponents to find a peaceful solution for the conflict will be higher. Besides, liberal norms of conflict resolution are widespread, as postulated by transactionalism for half a century already (Deutsch et al., 1957). Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that more open states are less susceptible to political instability.

While innovators have had their intellectual property stolen for centuries, in modern times they face an avalanche of cyber-enabled attempts at theft of their knowhow. Hacking groups, typically operating with consent from state authorities, exploit vulnerabilities in information and communication technology to grab copious amounts of trade secrets and other business information for commercial gain. These attacks are increasing in scale. Between 30 and 40 identified state-sponsored espionage campaigns affected or targeted private entities globally in 2021–22. They involve sectors of the economy across commercial value chains and industrial development priorities. And they’re affecting IP-intensive businesses in advanced economies and emerging economies alike. In 2020, 56 percent of cases struck economies in Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America. State-sponsored theft of IP via cyber means—a practice known as economic cyber-espionage for commercial gain—is an international problem. It still lacks an adequate effort to halt it. When the leaders of the G20 met in Turkey in 2015, they agreed that no state would support or conduct the theft of IP via cyber means with the aim of providing local companies with a competitive advantage. A few years before, in 2013, all UN member countries had already agreed that international law applied to state conduct in cyberspace. Since then, international talks on cyber have progressed insofar as it has concerned international peace and stability. For instance, more detailed agreements were reached on the protection of critical information infrastructure and on understanding how and when international humanitarian law applied in cyber operations. But, if international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace, as the UN member states continue to affirm, then international trade law also should apply to state conduct in cyberspace. The existing trade regime—administered through World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements as well as various World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) conventions—requires states to adhere to non-discrimination. So entities should be able to freely conduct business without the risk of trade secrets and sensitive business information being stolen and leaving them without recourse to legal settlement. Under the TRIPS Agreement, states must maintain minimum standards of IP protection, and they have access to a dispute settlement mechanism. The problem today, however, is that some states operate in cyberspace with the intention to misappropriate trade secrets, innovations and technological knowhow from others, or to create an environment in which this is tolerated or encouraged. Existing trade law does not account for this state-sponsorship element nor for cyberspace as a conduit to engage in unfair competition. While trade law prohibits stealing of any kind, perpetrators of economic cyber-espionage are protected by the inability or unwillingness of their national authorities to investigate and prosecute cases. Current WTO IP protection rules have a territorial-centric focus. This means that malicious cyber activities conducted by one state against another, and with harms materialising on the victim’s territory, are not taken into account. So there’s no incentive for states to take cases of cyber-enabled theft of IP to the WTO. Counterintelligence and law enforcement authorities face other technical challenges, such as the establishment of evidence beyond reasonable doubt and the risk of revealing sources and methods. But these constraints should not be considered a reason for inaction by the international trade community. The foundations of international political and economic stability lie in respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. Yet the very notion of economic sovereignty is under attack by state and non-state actors misusing the cyber domain to gain unfair commercial advantages for economic and strategic gain. There is a growing apprehension among members of the international community of this threat. The Five Eyes countries, the EU, its member states, Japan and even China have all declared that their knowledge- and innovation-intensive industries are vulnerable to economic cyber-espionage by other states. Today, on World IP Day, we’re looking at the WTO and WIPO. What can these bodies do to strengthen international cooperation, and above all to strengthen IP protection in this digital age? First, the WTO and WIPO should require their member states to declare that they are not using cyber tools or proxies to gain an unfair competitive advantage. While this is implied in existing international agreements, the global cybersecurity and economic security environment warrant a more explicit commitment. Government leaders declaring that they are not involved in and do not support IP theft would be the first step in building accountability. Second, state-related issues of cybersecurity should get a firm place within WTO and WIPO forums—for instance, in the council for trade-related aspects of IP rights. The WTO and WIPO should establish a specific group to facilitate dialogue between member states, provide opportunities for the sharing of good practices in building resilience and, most fundamentally, provide opportunities to raise, challenge and dispute cyber operations affecting their economies and fair competition. Finally, the WTO and WIPO should harness the UN secretary-general’s roadmap for digital cooperation. They should invest in building coalitions and operational collaboration between trade authorities, representatives of IP-intensive industries and the cybersecurity sector. This could also involve revisiting WIPO PROOF, a service that was established in 2020, but discontinued shortly thereafter, that provided assurances against tampering of digital files. Additionally, they should build repositories of governmental best practices in protecting IP-intensive industries from sophisticated cyber-attacks, thereby establishing a standard, and offer national regulators and policymakers access to data, resources, capacity building, tools and expert networks. Similar to the International Telecommunication Union, which hosts the Global Artificial Intelligence for Good summit, the WTO and WIPO could offer a regular platform for national experts on cybersecurity, international trade, IP and economic development to come together. The international trade regime was designed to enable states to compete fair and square, while allowing international collaboration and innovation to prosper. When gross violations of this responsible state behaviour remain unaddressed, then the very integrity of the international rules are at stake. States must intervene domestically to protect IP-intensive industries in a first line of defence, but the WTO, the WIPO and other regional trade bodies need to step in now, too, and address the cybersecurity-related shortcomings of the current IP protection regime.

In today’s interconnected and rapidly evolving global landscape, the importance of international law cannot be overstated. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected through trade, technology, and communication, the need for a framework of rules and regulations to govern international relations becomes paramount. In this article, we will explore the role of international law in a globalized world and examine its significance in shaping the behavior of states, promoting cooperation, and addressing global challenges.

Establishing a Framework for Cooperation: International law serves as a framework for cooperation among states, providing a set of rules and norms that govern their interactions in various domains, including diplomacy, trade, and security. By establishing clear guidelines and standards of behavior, international law helps to prevent conflicts and disputes between states and promotes peaceful resolution of disputes through negotiation and diplomacy.

The IP-trade-A2K linkage triad brings some intriguing points into the domain of international copyright law. Whilst the imbroglio about the fragmentation between human rights law and trade law betrays a profound systematic puzzle among the invisible college, that same fragmentary structure featuring the relationship between IP law and human rights law merely manifests a prima facie phenomenon, since both legal fields had once existed for a long time without intervening with each other until the 1990s when it became a burgeoning theme both in practice and scholarly writings.114 Thus, the specious linkage triad has dramatized a linkage of key factors of a possible solution, as the A2K movement thoroughly diagnoses the contemporary international copyright law by channelling it to the IP-welfare recalibration: the crux of the reckless erosion of the welfare disposition of copyright through an unrelenting pursuit of trade interests still lies in the predatory nature of the current IP policy.115 As a matter of fact, the BIRPI,116 the predecessor of WIPO, began to be involved in the embryonic mobilization of A2K for the mandate of development led by the UN in the middle of the twentieth century.117 However, WIPO’s engagement in such initial development agenda was enmeshed in its deterministic cognizance that economic development merely flowed from strong IP protection and technology transfer, ignoring the overall investment environment and country- or sector-specific contingencies for IP enforcement.118 Thus, even under the auspices of the UN to establish a structure of the New International Economic Order to envision A2K for developing countries,119 the concomitant UN actions to concretize such policies and its entrustment of the mission to WIPO overwhelmingly dwelt on the legitimacy of and the reliance on the maintenance of a strong global IP system to bruit knowledge,120 which, albeit the underlying need to retool the global IP structure, only consecrated the philanthropic facilities of developed countries to provide assistance to developing countries.121 Yet, the significance of the new A2K movement and the WIPO Development Agenda as its progeny shall be reinterpreted in a globalized digital milieu. The IP-trade-A2K linkage triad as delineated above has conjured up the question on the legal fragmentation in a world of copyright multi-multilateralism: how to restructure and re-coordinate the normative and the institutional complexities deriving from the traditional and the new IP treaty law, the fledgling global trade regime, and the awakening call of human rights? The Development Agenda has outlined six broad aspects of future programmes in its forty-five recommendations,122 among which the normative and the institutional flexibilities under the backdrop of facilitating A2K in developing countries have been extensively addressed. These policy instruments shall serve as an antidote to the quandary of legal fragmentation in international copyright system. A2K in the cultural dimension of the R2D underscores the responsibility of the states and the international community to cooperate in facilitating development-friendlier normative and institutional mechanism in current knowledge governance. In the past decades, relentless efforts towards amelioration of A2K in the developing world have yielded certain fruits in international IP law fields, especially with regard to patent law.123 In tandem with the legal developments in the WTO, the WIPO Development Agenda symbolizes the reversionary trend to combine IP and social welfare in political coordination and collective actions for the purpose of optimizing the effects of IP on development in the majority of member states,124 thus nesting and carving out the blueprint for possible future reforms of international copyright law. Indeed, the normative pathologies and the institutional deficit embedded in the contemporary copyright doctrines as diagnosed above have manifested the need to invigorate WIPO’s current mandate in global knowledge governance with new ideologies of A2K particularly regarding the norm-setting and the institutional flexibilities. On the one hand, by exploring the normative flexibilities of the current copyright acquis to overcome the systematic market failure where traditional copyright regimes were predominant, global copyright norm-setting activities could encompass the interests of a hybrid spectrum of actors representing the wide public (including but not confined to developing countries) at large seeking access to benefit future creation. On the other hand, by endorsing the institutional flexibilities to alter the polarization of negotiating partners, developed countries would no longer play the charitable role of supplying global knowledge goods to developing countries as the passive beneficiaries of knowledge economy, but both state groups shall be submersed in reconstructing the global copyright milieu to mitigate its current predatory nature. Certainly, the fragmentary structure of the international copyright legal terrains is deeply entrenched in the fragmented structure of the international law characteristic of the “volatility of international law”,125 but its shadow can still serve to provide some clues in evaluations of possible future reforms of the international copyright law. The WIPO Development Agenda establishes the legal conjunction between the new liaison composed of the traditional international copyright law and the world trade law and the human rights law by imbibing the factor of A2K and calling for more coherence in normative and institutional cooperation. Thus, the WIPO Development Agenda shall not be treated simply as assuming an adjunct or peripheral status among the manifold WIPO documents relating to copyright and IP at large, but as a guideline reflexive of the central legal fragmentation.

Of relevance to TRIPS Agreement interpretation is the role of WIPO, the controlling organization of most multilateral intellectual property treaties and an organization that is integral to the development of rules of international law in the intellectual property field. The WTO has turned to WIPO to establish if an existing international property norm exists. In the United States- section 110(5) Copyright Act dispute the panel consulted WIPO on the norm of fair use in copyright standard,190 and in EC- Geographical Indications, the panel consulted WIPO on the interpretation of the Paris Convention.191 It would not only be odd indeed if the WTO ignored any existing international norm in TRIPS Agreement interpretation, but also contrary to the DSU rule that agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Such an approach could not be justified in relation to the incorporated treaties. The interpretation issue is different in connection with treaties not in existence at the time the TRIPS Agreement came into being. It could not be said that the intention of the parties to the TRIPS Agreement was to incorporate these treaties, except if they become rules of international law.

Whereas previous Chinese administrations espoused “stability maintenance,” the focus under Xi is on threat prevention. Chinese documents compare popular outbursts to cancerous tumors that need to be cut out quickly before they spread to vital organs of the state. Ideologies that could rival communism, including liberalism and Islamism, are seen as infectious diseases against which China’s population must be immunized. As Sheena Chestnut Greitens has shown, these medical metaphors justify targeting and “treating” people long before they display threatening symptoms. The clearest illustration is in Xinjiang, where China has extrajudicially locked up more than a million Uyghurs. But China is applying this preventive logic beyond its borders too. Beijing spends billions of dollars annually on an “antidemocratic toolkit” of nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, diplomats, advisors, hackers, and bribes all designed to prop up autocrats and sow discord in democracies. The CCP provides fellow autocracies with guns, money, and protection from UN censure while slapping foreign human-rights advocates with sanctions. Chinese officials offer their authoritarian brethren riot-control gear and advice on building a surveillance state; PRC trade, investment, and loans allow those dictators to avoid Western conditionality regarding anticorruption or good governance. Beijing uses its globe-spanning media organs to tout the accomplishments of illiberal rule while highlighting democratic governments’ flaws and hypocrisies. China works with fellow authoritarian regimes, such as Vladimir Putin’s in Russia, to push autocrat-friendly norms of internet management in international institutions and standards-setting bodies. Beijing also helps other illiberal regimes near or in Central Asia to hound and repress exiles and dissidents. Not least, China is waging a campaign of political and military coercion to destabilize Taiwan, a flourishing nation whose very existence disproves the CCP’s claims that Chinese culture is incompatible with democracy. The fundamental problem that Taiwan poses for China, write Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “comes from Taiwan’s simply being what it is—a modern Chinese society that is economically prosperous and politically democratic.” It might be tempting to dismiss China’s democracy-prevention efforts as “world politics as usual.” After all, autocrats have been colluding to hold liberalism at bay ever since the monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia banded together to fight Revolutionary France more than two centuries ago. But China’s ideological assault is especially threatening, for three reasons. First, China’s global reach is more pervasive than that of any prior illiberal power. Its massive economy and 1.4 billion consumers arm it with powerful carrots and sticks to silence free speech far beyond its borders. Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, Lithuania, Norway, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States—plus dozens of private companies and individuals from democratic nations—have recently experienced China’s economic wrath. In many cases, the punishment has been vastly disproportionate to the supposed crime. For example, China slapped steep tariffs on nearly all of Australia’s major exports after Canberra requested an international investigation into the origins of covid-19. In addition to economic weapons, China holds leadership posts in the UN and other major international institutions that give Beijing chances to bend global governance in an illiberal direction. For example, when Belarus violated international norms by forcing down an airliner that was carrying a wanted dissident in 2021, China exercised its authority as head of the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization to shield the brutal Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime from censure. And if diplomacy and economic inducements fail, Beijing can use its navy, now the world’s largest, and conventional missile force to coerce countries into compliance or even to wipe democracies off the map, as China is threatening to do to Taiwan. Second, China’s illiberal campaign capitalizes on a disturbing global trend: As Freedom House reports, authoritarianism has spread during every year since 2006, while democracy has retreated. This “democratic recession” has given China a window of ideological opportunity to promote a vision of a hierarchical and harmonious society and a critique of a disorderly and decadent West. Around the world, public faith in democratic institutions has sunk to lows not seen since the 1930s. The political soil has grown ripe for authoritarianism to take root, and China, Russia, and other authoritarian states are fertilizing this antidemocratic plant with digital disinformation that their propagandists pump into the social-media feeds of billions worldwide. The third and most important factor supercharging China’s efforts is the ongoing digital revolution. The CCP possesses data-collection and messaging power to rival that of Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Twitter. By combining artificial intelligence (AI) and “big data” with cyber, biometric, and speech- and facial-recognition technologies, Beijing is pioneering a system that will allow dictators to know everything about their subjects—what people are saying and viewing, whom they hang out with, what they like and dislike, and where they are located at any given time—and to discipline citizens instantly by restricting their access to credit, education, employment, medical care, telecommunications, and travel if not to hunt them down for more medieval forms of punishment. This technological revolution threatens to upend the global balance between democracy and authoritarianism by making repression more affordable and effective than ever. Instead of relying on expensive and potentially rebellious armies to brutalize a resentful population, an autocrat will now have more insidious means of control. Millions of spies can be replaced with hundreds of millions of unblinking cameras. Facial-recognition technologies can rapidly sort through video feeds and identify troublemakers. Bots can deliver propaganda tailored to specific groups. Malware can be installed on computers through seemingly innocuous apps or links, and then government hackers can crash the computer networks of dissidents or gather information on their operations. That information, in turn, can be used to coopt resistance movements by bribing their leaders or meeting their more innocuous demands. Alternatively, authorities can print out an AI-assembled list of alleged activists and kill everyone on it. The evil genius of this “digital authoritarianism” is that most people will be seemingly free to go about their daily lives. In truth, however, the state will be constantly censoring everything they see and tracking everything they do. With old-school authoritarianism, one at least knew where the oppression was coming from. But now people can be nudged and cajoled by invisible algorithms delivering personalized content to their phones. In past eras, autocrats had to make tough choices between funding death squads or economic development. Today, however, repression is not only affordable, but also profitable, because “smart-city” technologies that enable tight social control can also be used to fight crime, diagnose diseases, and make the trains run on time. These technologies are a tyrant’s dream. Recognizing this demand, Chinese companies were already selling and operating surveillance systems in more than eighty countries as of 2020. As the CCP feels increasingly threatened at home and abroad, there is every reason to expect Beijing to export digital authoritarianism farther and wider. Many countries already want it, and China has powerful tools to compel those that do not. Want access to the vast PRC market? Let Huawei install the core components of your 5G network. Want a Chinese loan? Accept PRC surveillance technology in your capital city. As more governments partner with Beijing, the reach of China’s surveillance state will grow. Existing autocracies will become more totalitarian, and some democracies will drift into the authoritarian camp. International conflicts will likely proliferate—not merely those of ideas but those of arms, for as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates, dictatorship often turns to blood-and-soil nationalism and violent revanchism. The liberal belief that democracy and peace are destined to spread around the world will be upended. So will the comforting myth that humanity has evolved past the point of mass atrocities, because digital authoritarianism does not displace gulags and genocide; it enables them. When dictatorships ramp up digital repression, they also engage in more torture and murder. Computers and cameras handling everyday surveillance free the regime’s foot soldiers for tasks such as ethnic cleansing and beating dissidents into submission. Xinjiang, with its smart cities and concentration camps, offers a glimpse of this dire future. Democracy Protection China’s ideological offensive is thus at the heart of its effort to reshape the global order. A crucial part of the democratic world’s China strategy, therefore, must involve securing democratic institutions against authoritarian assault. If democracy promotion has a bad name, democracy protection is becoming indispensable. This ideological campaign does not entail seeking regime change in China. Democracy may eventually take hold in that country, but there is little prospect of it anytime soon, and active efforts to destabilize the CCP could be counterproductive and dangerous. During the Cold War, the United States never really tried to overthrow the Soviet government. This was out of concern that doing so might trigger the hot war that Washington hoped to avoid. The same cautionary principle ought to apply today. Democracy protection is an essentially defensive strategy, although in some cases it will require tactics that are more assertive than those which the United States and its allies have been willing to employ to date. At its core, democracy protection requires what military planners call “defending forward”—safeguarding democratic systems by actively weakening an opponent’s ability to damage them. The United States should do whatever it can to shore up democracy at home and abroad, but the immediate priority must be to blast holes in the digital iron curtain that Beijing is drawing around large swaths of the globe. If the world is indeed at an “inflection point” in the struggle between democracy and autocracy, as Biden and Xi seem to think it is, an America that remains on the defensive will not tip the balance. Getting “America’s democratic house in order” is a wonderful idea, but it will take years, if not decades, and would lend only indirect help in halting the spread of autocracy overseas. Forming a giant alliance of democracies is a worthy objective, but might deliver endless debate instead of decisive action. In 2000, the Bill Clinton administration created the “Community of Democracies,” which ultimately included 106 countries. After years of meetings, its sole accomplishment was a bland statement criticizing the 2021 military coup in Burma.

During the past two decades, the Chinese economy has grown dramatically, taking advantage of access to international markets and foreign investment that has given China the resources to expand its military and advance its political influence through financial programs like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).1 “By the end of March 2019, the Chinese government had signed 173 cooperation agreements with 125 countries and 29 international organizations. The Belt and Road has expanded from Asia and Europe to include more new participants in Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific.” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Contributions and Prospects,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/zywjyjh/t1675564.htm (accessed September 4, 2022). Western nations hoped that China’s integration into the international system would “normalize” China and lead it to appreciate existing international rules and norms and gradually become freer economically and politically. This did not occur. In retrospect, it is clear that Beijing wishes to continue its domestic repression, dominate its neighbors, and replace the United States as the preeminent global power. As part of this process, China has sought to reorder the international system to its benefit and influence the United Nations and its affiliated organizations from within and without to advance its interests. These efforts have borne fruit to the detriment of the stated principles of the U.N. and the interests and values of the U.S. and like-minded countries. Many diplomatic, economic, and security matters are discussed, negotiated, implemented, and acted upon through international organizations. There is a growing bipartisan recognition that failing to act effectively to advance U.S. interests in these fora will undermine U.S. interests on multiple fronts. Because Chinese influence is unlikely to decline anytime soon, the U.S. must take proactive steps to counter that influence by: Conducting a detailed assessment of Chinese interests and tactics, Encouraging U.S. and like-minded leadership in key international organizations, Promoting U.S. employment in international organizations, and Applying U.S. pressure purposefully and judiciously. China’s Multifaceted Influence China has long exerted significant diplomatic influence in the U.N. through its historical relationships with developing countries and influence over ideological and regional U.N. voting blocs. As its economy has grown, however, this diplomatic influence has been supplemented by China’s willingness to provide economic investment through the BRI and other mechanisms. Inside the U.N. system, China’s economic growth has resulted in higher contributions and financial leverage. This has lent credibility to campaigns by Chinese nationals to lead U.N. organizations and has contributed to the increased employment of Chinese nationals in the U.N. system. All of these advantages have enabled China to influence the U.N. to its political and economic benefit. Examples include inserting references and phrases like “win-win cooperation” into U.N. resolutions that echo Beijing’s rhetoric and statements, securing U.N. cooperative agreements with and endorsement of Chinese initiatives like the BRI, impeding Taiwan’s participation in the U.N. system, delaying U.N. reports that it opposes such as the U.N. report on human rights violations in Xinxiang, and blunting criticism of its lack of transparency and international cooperation during the Covid-19 pandemic.2 “A Long-Awaited UN Report Condemns China’s Actions in Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 1, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/2022/09​/01/a-long-awaited-un-report-condemns-chinas-actions-in-xinjiang (accessed September 7, 2022), and Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “What the World Health Organization Must Do to Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5098, August 7, 2020, https://www.heritage​.org/global-politics/report/what-the-world-health-organization-must-do-earn-back-us-support. For the text of the U.N. report on China’s violations of human rights in Xinjiang, see United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China, August 31, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents​/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf (accessed September 7, 2022). Beijing has exerted its influence in the U.N. system through its financial contributions and by placing Chinese nationals in leadership positions and increasing Chinese employment in international organizations. Financial Contributions. China has dramatically increased its financial contributions to the U.N. system. According to the U.N. Chief Executives Board, China ranked fifth among all nations with contributions of $1.98 billion to the U.N. system in 2020, including $1.79 billion in assessed contributions and $190 million in voluntary contributions.3 was the most recent year for which revenues from government donors were reported. Table, “Revenue by Government Donor and by Financing Instrument,” UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor (accessed September 4, 2022). This is 10 times the amount China contributed in 2010 when it ranked 21st among all government donors with $190 million in total contributions. Looking just at the core U.N., China now is second only to the United States in its assessments for the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets—roughly double Japan’s assessments.4 Specifically, in 2022, China is assessed 15.254 percent for the U.N. regular budget and 18.6857 percent for the U.N. peacekeeping budget, while the U.S. is assessed 22 percent and 26.9493 percent, respectively, for those budgets. Annex, “Effective Rates of Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations, 1 January 2022 to 31 December 2024, Based on the Scale of Assessments Adopted by the General Assembly in Its Resolution 76/238 and the Composition of Levels Endorsed by the Assembly in Its Resolution 76/239,” in Report of the Secretary-General, “Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Addendum,” A/76/296/Rev.1/Add.1, December 28, 2021, p. 2, https://undocs.org/en/A/76/296/Rev.1/Add.1 (accessed September 4, 2022). BG3726 Table 1 This increase in financial contributions translates into greater influence. Beijing can now use its financial leverage as a counterweight to the U.S.—but with very different intent. The U.S. historically has used its financial clout to press for reforms to improve the U.N.’s transparency, accountability, and effectiveness and focus the organization on its founding principles, such as promoting human rights. China has used its influence to undermine those principles by, for instance, seeking to reduce or eliminate human rights officials’ participation in peacekeeping missions5 Richard Gowan, “China’s Pragmatic Approach to UN Peacekeeping,” Brookings Institution, Global China Project, September 14, 2020, https://www​.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ (accessed September 5, 2022). and to advance its political priorities by, for example, securing U.N. endorsement of its Belt and Road Initiative.6 Colum Lynch, “China Enlists U.N. to Promote Its Belt and Road Project,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/10/china​-enlists-u-n-to-promote-its-belt-and-road-project/ (accessed September 5, 2022). Nevertheless, while China’s contributions have increased rapidly, the U.S. far outstrips China in terms of total contributions to the U.N. system. The gap is particularly high in voluntary contributions—funding that the U.S. is not obligated to pay and that could be leveraged to greater effect in influencing recipient organizations to support U.S. priorities, advance the core missions of those organizations, and counter harmful Chinese influence. Leadership in International Organizations. The U.N. system encompasses far more than the U.N. headquarters in New York. All told, the U.N. is comprised of dozens of organizations, commissions, funds, and other entities. These entities, while all falling under the U.N. umbrella, have different relationships with the U.N. and levels of autonomy. Least autonomous are the committees and bodies with narrow mandates that have been established by the U.N. Security Council and U.N. General Assembly and report to them. More independent are the U.N. funds and programs like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)7 Known originally as the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund. that are created by General Assembly resolutions but have their own governing bodies and are funded mainly through separate voluntary contributions. The U.N. Secretary-General usually appoints the heads of U.N. funds and programs in consultation with the Member States. The most prestigious organizations in the U.N. system are the 15 specialized agencies, which are autonomous international organizations affiliated with the U.N. Until 2006, a Chinese national had never led a U.N. specialized agency. In recent years, however, China has led more U.N. specialized agencies than any other nation. Specifically, a Chinese national led four U.N. specialized agencies in six of the seven years from 2015–2021.8 Margaret Chan was Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) from 2006 to 2017. Li Yong was Director-General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) from 2013 to 2021. Houlin Zhao was first elected Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2015; his second term ends on December 31, 2022. Fang Liu was Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) from 2015 to 2021. Qu Dongyu was elected to be Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2019 and will likely run for a second term in 2023. This leadership has given China enormous influence over the agendas and work of those organizations. For instance: Director-General Li Yong of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) repeatedly praised China’s Belt and Road Initiative and partnered UNIDO with China in related initiatives.9 News release, “UNIDO Further Engages with the Belt and Road Initiative,” United Nations Industrial Development Organization, April 25, 2019, https://​www.unido.org/news/unido-further-engages-belt-and-road-initiative (accessed September 5, 2022). Secretary-General Houlin Zhao of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) deepened the organization’s ties to China, endorsed the BRI, favorably hosted Chinese proposals for changes in Internet governance, and dismissed U.S. warnings about the security threat posed by the involvement of Chinese technology company Huawei in 5G networks.10 Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “Countering China’s Growing Influence at the International Telecommunication Union,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3689, March 7, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/countering-chinas-growing-influence-the-international​-telecommunication. Secretary-General Fang Liu of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) advanced policies dictated by Beijing, including new air routes instituted in violation of ICAO procedures and concealed security breaches linked to China that threatened the security of ICAO, its member states, and the aviation industry.11 Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “International Civil Aviation Organization: United States Should Repair Chinese Damage and Focus the Organization on Its Core Mission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3632, June 22, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report​/international-civil-aviation-organization-united-states-should-repair. Director-General Qu Dongyu of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) regularly praises Chinese programs, congratulating China on its “complete victory” in the battle against poverty, and has deepened FAO’s cooperation with China12 CGTN [China Global Television Network], “FAO Chief Praises China’s Success in Poverty Reduction,” updated February 26, 2021, https://news.cgtn.com​/news/2021-02-26/FAO-chief-praises-China-s-success-in-poverty-reduction-YbByCctasU/index.html (accessed September 5, 2022). by expanding its partnership with China on the South–South Cooperation Program with $50 million in Chinese funding.13 News release, “South–South Cooperation: FAO Signs Key Agreement with Chinese Government,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, January 12, 2022, https://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/1468951/ (accessed September 5, 2022). Term limits have resulted in Chinese nationals cycling out of their leadership positions in several of these organizations. Chinese nationals currently lead two U.N. specialized agencies: the ITU and the FAO. This will fall to one in the beginning of 2023 as Houlin Zhao ends his second term as Secretary-General of the ITU, but Beijing will continue to seek leadership positions for its nationals in U.N. organizations or support candidates that it believes will support China’s goals. Most immediately, the election for the next Secretary-General of the ITU will take place at the upcoming 2022 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Bucharest, Romania, from September 26 to October 14. The two candidates are American Doreen Bogdan-Martin and Russian Rashid Ismailov. While the ITU is not well known, it is a critical organization where standards for communications and digital technologies are negotiated and approved. It also plays a crucial role in the allocation of orbital slots for satellites and spectrum for various purposes from communications to navigation. Russia and China have shared interests and objectives within the ITU mandate, and the election of Ismailov—a former Huawei executive—would likely solidify and expand Houlin Zhao’s efforts to advance Chinese priorities in the ITU. The U.S. has mounted a strong campaign for Bogdan-Martin, but victory is by no means assured. In 2023, there will be elections for leadership of several other major U.N. organizations. In some, including the FAO, the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP), current leaders are likely to seek and secure reelection. Leadership changes worth tracking in 2023 include the following: World Food Programme (WFP). The term of Executive Director David Beasley was extended for a year but will expire in 2023. Since the early 1990s, this position has been filled by a U.S. national as America is by far the largest donor to the WFP, contributing nearly 40 percent of total contributions in 2021.14 United Nations, World Food Programme, “Contributions to WFP in 2021,” as of June 21, 2022, https://www.wfp.org/funding/2021 (accessed September 5, 2022). However, in the past, the WFP has been led by nationals from other nations, and the position is not a U.S. sinecure. The Executive Director of WFP is jointly appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General and the FAO Director-General, who is a Chinese national, and it would not be surprising if rising tensions between China and the U.S. played a role in this process. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR is a massive organization that assists tens of millions of refugees, internally displaced persons, and asylum seekers in 137 countries around the world. In 2021, it had a budget of more than $9 billion and a staff of 18,879.15 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Figures at a Glance,” June 16, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (accessed September 5, 2022). The original term of UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi was extended by the U.N. General Assembly for two and a half years (until June 30, 2023) upon recommendation by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The president of ITLOS “directs the work and supervises the administration of the Tribunal and represents the Tribunal in its relations with States and other entities.”16 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, “The Tribunal: The President,” https://www.itlos.org/en/main/the-tribunal/the-president/ (accessed September 5, 2022). The current president’s term expires in 2023. Reelection is permitted, but that would run counter to precedent. Both China and Russia have judges on ITLOS and, considering their respective territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Black Sea, both countries might seek to have their nationals assume the presidency. In addition, jockeying for advantage often starts a year before the elections are held. Organizations for which competitive elections are expected in 2024—i.e., those where the incumbent is not eligible for reelection—include the International Maritime Organization (IMO), INTERPOL, and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). BG3726 Table 2a BG3726 Table 2b BG3726 Table 2c Chinese Nationals Employed by the U.N. The number of Chinese nationals working in the U.N. system has grown substantially. In 2011, the U.N. system employed 888 Chinese nationals.17 Table 12, “Number of Staff by Nationality, Organization, Category, and Source of Funds as at 31 December 2011,” in United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination, Personnel Statistics: Data as at 31 December 2011,” CEB/2012/HLCM/HR/16, June 11, 2012, pp. 50–51, https://unsceb.org/sites​/default/files/imported_files/2011_0.pdf (accessed September 5, 2022). Ten years later in 2021, it employed 1,471 Chinese nationals18 United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “Personnel by Nationality: Number of Personnel in 2021: Country,” https://unsceb.org/hr​-nationality (accessed September 5, 2022). —an increase of 66 percent. In addition to the U.N., where China’s increased assessments would logically lead to increased employment under U.N. practices, the increases tended to be higher in organizations that had been led by Chinese nationals during the past 10 years like the FAO, ITU, and WHO; organizations that had a substantial presence in developing countries like the U.N. Development Program and UNICEF; or organizations that had the potential to provide economic or technological advantage such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).19 Brett Schaefer, “Chinese Leadership of WIPO: A Threat to Intellectual Property,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5038, February 13, 2020, https://​www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/chinese-leadership-wipo-threat-intellectual-property. In the abstract, an increasing number of nationals working at the U.N. from a particular nation is not objectionable. U.N. employees are expected to be impartial and independent in fulfilling their responsibilities, and this includes not seeking or receiving instructions from governments. The problem is that Beijing demands that its nationals place China’s interests above the principle of neutrality enshrined in the United Nations Charter. There are numerous reports of Chinese staff at international organizations using their positions to advance Chinese priorities and harassing nongovernmental organizations that are critical of Chinese policies.20 Agence France-Presse, “UN Diplomats and Activists Describe Chinese Pressure and ‘Threats’ over Uygur Event at UN Rights Council,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3004214/un-diplomats-and-activists-describe-chinese-pressure​-and (accessed September 5, 2022), and Human Rights Watch, The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, September 2017, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/chinaun0917_web.pdf (accessed September 5, 2022). Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Wu Hongbo, for example, admitted that Beijing required him to act in the interests of China as a U.N. civil servant and cited how he had instructed U.N. security to remove a “Xinjiang separatist” from a U.N. seminar. “I think being a Chinese diplomat means one can’t be careless, when it is about protecting China’s national interest and safety,” he said, “We have to strongly defend the motherland’s interests.”21 World Uyghur Congress, “CCTV Interview with Wu Hongbo,” Facebook, April 25, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/uyghurcongress/videos​/649658305496919/ (accessed September 5, 2022). Individuals who do not heed Beijing can face severe consequences. Even high-level international officials are not immune, as former INTERPOL President Meng Hongwei found out when he was arrested on a trip home to China and charged with abuse of power and refusing to “follow party decisions.”22 Reuters, “Wife of China’s Meng, Former Interpol Chief, Sues Agency,” July 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france-interpol/wife-of​-chinas-meng-former-interpol-chief-sues-agency-idUSKCN1U20L6 (accessed September 5, 2022). What the Administration Should Do There is bipartisan concern over Chinese influence in international organizations and the need for the U.S. to take steps to counter that influence. In 2020, former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien warned: The Chinese Communist Party seeks total control over the people’s lives. This means economic control, it means political control, it means physical control, and, perhaps most importantly, it means thought control…. International organizations are also part of China’s plan. China has sought leadership positions within many global bodies…. The PRC uses these leaders to force the international bodies to parrot Beijing’s talking points and to install Chinese telecommunications equipment in their facilities.23 National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions,” remarks delivered in Phoenix, Arizona, June 24, 2020, https://china.usc.edu/robert-o%E2%80%99brien-chinese-communist-party%E2%80%99s-ideology-and-global-ambitions-june-24​-2020 (accessed September 5, 2022). In a speech outlining the Biden Administration’s China policy, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken explained why Chinese influence in international organizations is cause for serious concern: China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.24 Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” speech delivered at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ (accessed September 5, 2022). The Biden Administration has responded by focusing its efforts on engagement, including providing funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), seeking unconditional payment of arrears to the U.N., and rejoining the Human Rights Council, the World Health Organization, and the Paris Climate Agreement.25 President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “A Proclamation on United Nations Day, 2021,” The White House, October 22, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov​/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/10/22/a-proclamation-on-united-nations-day-2021/ (accessed September 5, 2022). But countering Chinese influence requires a broader, multifaceted strategy beyond offering the carrots of engagement and funding. Sticks, including financial leverage and confrontation, must be part of the strategy. Specifically, the U.S. should: Analyze Chinese influence in international organizations. As it did during the Cold War in dealing with Soviet influence in the U.N., Congress should require the U.S. intelligence community to conduct a detailed assessment of Chinese objectives, tactics, and progress in influencing international organizations and use that report to adjust U.S. policy and resources appropriately. Support well-qualified, independent candidates for leadership of international organizations that will rebuff pressure from China and other authoritarian governments. The U.S. should create a regularized process of tracking openings and soliciting good candidates for them. If a qualified American is interested, the U.S. should nominate and support his or her candidacy vigorously as it is currently doing with Doreen Bogdan-Green in her campaign for Secretary-General of the ITU. However, it would be unrealistic to expect an American to lead more than a few international organizations at any one time. Where a U.S. candidate is not available or is unlikely to win, the U.S. should support individuals from other nations who are well qualified, support the organization’s core purposes and mission, are not beholden to governments whose priorities are antithetical to U.S. interests, and are committed to ensuring that the organization operates efficiently, accountably, and transparently. Use U.S. financial leverage to counter Chinese influence. Chinese contributions to international organizations, though rising, remain far less than U.S. contributions, particularly voluntary contributions. If U.S. funding is seen as an entitlement, pressure to respond to U.S. criticism will be less effective. Moreover, past unwillingness to modify its funding patterns has limited America’s ability to influence the organizations in a positive direction and blunt Chinese influence. This needs to change. In addition, Beijing has skillfully used China’s historical relationship with developing countries and economic incentives to advance its efforts to influence international organizations. Major recipients of U.S. assistance are among the countries that support America the least at the United Nations.26 U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations for 2020, Section 46 of Public Law 101-246 (22 U.S.C. §2414a), pp. 33–38, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Report-Voting-Practices-in-the-United-Nations-2020.pdf (accessed September 5, 2022). While U.N. voting should not be the sole driver of aid allocation, it should be a factor given the evidence that China has been using investment and assistance to elicit support from recipient nations in international organizations.27 Brett D. Schaefer and Anthony B. Kim, “The U.S. Should Employ Foreign Aid in Support of U.S. Policy at the U.N.,” Heritage foundation Backgrounder No. 3356, October 5, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-us-should-employ-foreign-aid-support-us-policy-the-un. Focus U.S. engagement on the most important organizations. Having a “seat at the table” is not a strategy, nor is it sufficient to achieve positive results. Not all international organizations are equally important, and the U.S. should not squander finite time, effort, and resources on international organizations of dubious merit like the U.N. World Tourism Organization, from which the U.S. withdrew in 1995, or those where U.S. engagement would undermine other U.S. foreign policy interests like the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which granted the Palestinians full membership in 2011.28 Brett D. Schaefer and James Jay Carafano, “U.S. Shouldn’t Rejoin U.N. ‘Tourism’ Agency, Despite Trump’s Budget Request,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 11, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/us-shouldnt-rejoin-un-tourism-agency-despite-trumps​-budget-request, and Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.S. Should Withdraw from UNESCO,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3760, October 19, 2012, https://​www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-us-should-withdraw-unesco. The U.S. should focus its effort and resources on organizations whose responsibilities affect key U.S. interests. Seek a maximum assessment of 25 percent for U.N. peacekeeping. As China’s contributions increase, so will its ability to advance priorities that are antithetical to the aims of the United States and counter to the principles of the U.N. Charter. While there is a maximum assessment of 22 percent for the U.N. regular budget, there is no maximum assessment for U.N. peacekeeping. If its economy continues to grow, China’s assessment may exceed the U.S. assessment in the not-too-distant future, giving it even more financial influence. Past U.S. motivations for seeking a maximum peacekeeping assessment were to save taxpayer dollars and encourage other Member States to have more financial incentives to ensure that U.N. activities were suited to the organization’s purpose. Limiting China’s future financial leverage is now a third motivation.29 Brett D. Schaefer, “Time for a New Helms–Biden Agreement to Reform the U.N.,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3690, March 7, 2022, https://​www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/time-new-helms-biden-agreement-reform-the-un. Payment of U.S. peacekeeping arrears should be tied to adoption of a maximum peacekeeping assessment of 25 percent. Support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Across the U.N. system, China has succeeded in ostracizing Taiwan. For instance, Taiwan has not been able to participate as an observer in meetings of the U.N., the WHO, the ICAO, and other international organizations despite the many equities Taiwan has in matters considered by those organizations. In June, Tuvalu pulled out of a U.N. Ocean Conference after China blocked the participation of three Taiwanese citizens on its delegation.30 Lucy Craymer, “Tuvalu Minister Pulls out of U.N. Ocean Conference After China Blocks Its Taiwanese Delegates,” Reuters, June 27, 2022, https://www​.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tuvalu-minister-pulls-out-un-ocean-conference-after-china-blocks-its-taiwanese-2022-06-27/ (accessed September 5, 2022). The extent of this effort goes to ridiculous lengths, including successfully pressuring the U.N. to deny private citizens access to U.N. offices and conferences because they have Taiwanese passports.31 Press statement by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, “Supporting Taiwan’s Participation in the UN System,” U.S. Department of State, October 26, 2021, https://www.state.gov/supporting-taiwans-participation-in-the-un-system/ (accessed September 5, 2022). The U.S. should continue to demand that Taiwan be allowed to participate as an observer in international organizations and insist that its citizens, media, and civil society organizations be allowed the same access to facilities and opportunity to participate that is available to citizens and private organizations from other nations and territories. Hold authoritarian states accountable for their actions. China has routinely pressured the U.N. system to its advantage. In the early days of the Covid pandemic, China was not transparent and violated its obligations to notify the international community about the disease. Yet Beijing successfully undermined efforts to get the WHO to conduct a truly independent investigation into the origins of Covid.32 Associated Press, “China Has Rejected a WHO Plan for Further Investigation into the Origins Of COVID-19,” NPR, July 22, 2021, https://www.npr.org​/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/07/22/1019244601/china-who-coronavirus-lab-leak-theory (accessed September 5, 2022). As noted, China also pressured the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to delay the public release of a report on human rights abuses against more than a million Uyghur and other Muslims in the Chinese province of Xinxiang.33 See note 2, supra. Yet China has faced no consequences for these actions. As shown by the U.N. General Assembly resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council, the U.S. and its allies can take steps to hold authoritarian governments accountable and should not ignore China. Demand that Chinese citizens employed by the U.N. observe their obligation “not [to] seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization.”34 United Nations Charter, Article 100, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter (accessed September 5, 2022). When there are complaints or evidence of bias and inappropriate acts by Chinese staff in international organizations, the U.S. and like-minded states should demand that these allegations be properly investigated and that, if they are substantiated, the individuals involved are disciplined, suspended, or dismissed. Increase the employment of U.S. nationals in international organizations. U.S. nationals historically have been underrepresented in U.N. organizations.35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Employment in the United Nations: State Department Needs to Enhance Reporting Requirements and Evaluate Its Efforts to Increase U.S. Representation, GAO-10-1028, September 2010, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d101028.pdf (accessed September 5, 2022). This is unfortunate because U.S. citizens, unlike nationals from authoritarian states like China, are free to act independently and neutrally in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter. With the support of Congress, the State Department has created a portal to facilitate applications by U.S. nationals for international organization jobs, junior professional officer positions, and federal employee details and transfers.36 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, “Federal Opportunities: How to Work for an International Organization as a Federal Employee,” https://iocareers.state.gov/Main/Home (accessed September 5, 2022). The Government Accountability Office should be tasked with assessing the effort and reporting on whether U.S. employment has increased. Conclusion China’s increasing influence in the U.N. and other international organizations threatens U.S. interests. Although Chinese influence cannot be eliminated, it can be countered through a multifaceted strategy that is informed by a detailed analysis of Chinese interests and tactics and includes coordinated action by the U.S. and like-minded governments in key international organizations, the purposeful and judicious application of U.S. pressure, and a willingness to act aggressively to hold authoritarian governments accountable for their actions.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) will elect a new Director General this spring. By allowing investors to register and protect their inventions and discoveries in most of the world’s countries simultaneously, WIPO serves a vital function. That role requires extraordinary trust by those registering their intellectual property, who must have faith that WIPO will protect proprietary information. This trust is threated by the candidacy of Wang Binying of China to be Director General. China is the world’s pre-eminent intellectual property thief. China has successfully exerted its policy priorities through Chinese nationals in positions of authority in international organizations. The Director General of WIPO has extraordinary discretion and authority, and a Chinese national in charge of WIPO could facilitate Chinese access to proprietary information. The U.S. should raise this serious concern with businesses and other governments and seek election of an alternative Director General who will respect WIPO’s mission and responsibilities. KEY TAKEAWAYSThe World Intellectual Property Organization plays a vital role by allowing inventors around the world to simultaneously register and protect their innovations.In order for WIPO to function effectively, these patent applicants must have faith that the organization will protect their proprietary information.China is the world’s foremost intellectual property thief. The U.S. must oppose Chinese candidates for WIPO positions if they could compromise the patent system. Copied Select a Section 1/0 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which promotes protection of intellectual property worldwide, will soon elect a new Director General. By allowing investors to register and protect their inventions and discoveries in most of the world’s countries simultaneously, WIPO serves a vital function. That role, however, requires extraordinary trust by those registering their intellectual property, who must have faith that WIPO will protect proprietary information under the terms set forth in the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the procedures of the agency. This trust is threated by the candidacy of Wang Binying of China to be Director General. China is the world’s pre-eminent intellectual property thief. The Chinese regime has shown little compunction about exerting its policy priorities through Chinese nationals in positions of authority in international organizations and punishing Chinese nationals if they fail to comply. The Director General of WIPO has extraordinary discretion and authority. If elected, Wang Binying could compromise the confidentiality of intellectual property to the benefit of the Chinese government. As a major contributor to United Nations organizations, China deserves to have its nationals employed in international organizations where they can serve independently, but China’s record on intellectual property should lead other governments to recognize that Director General of WIPO is not such a position. The U.S. and other nations concerned about protecting intellectual property should work together to highlight the concerns about Chinese leadership of WIPO, coordinate support for an alternative candidate, counter Chinese efforts to secure support through offers of investment and jobs to WIPO member states, and demand enhanced security at WIPO to protect proprietary information. Failure to secure these recommendations should lead the U.S. to withdraw from the PCT, encourage U.S. businesses and inventors to withdraw their patent applications from WIPO, and work with other nations to establish an alternative forum to handle these responsibilities. What Is WIPO? The history of WIPO actually predates the establishment of the organization by nearly a century with the adoption of three international agreements: (1) the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; (2) the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; and (3) the 1891 Madrid Agreement for the International registration of Marks. The organization originally set up to administer the Paris and Berne conventions (the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property) became WIPO when the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization entered into force in 1970.1 The convention was finalized and open for ratification in 1967 and entered into force in 1970. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,” https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/ (accessed February 11, 2020). WIPO joined the United Nations system in 1974 as a Specialized Agency. Under the convention, WIPO is charged with promoting intellectual property protection worldwide as a forum to shape rules on intellectual property, helping to resolve disputes over intellectual property across borders, administering the technical infrastructure to connect national intellectual property systems and authorities, sharing knowledge to promote economic and social development, and serving as a depository of intellectual property information. A practical and critical function of WIPO is to harmonize patent systems among countries and serve as a central registrar to file patent applications so that inventors do not have to file individual applications in every country with commensurate costs and processes. WIPO also administers the treaties entrusted to it: The Patent Cooperation Treaty. The PCT allows individuals and businesses to apply for a patent and seek protection for an invention across all 153 contracting states, assists national patent offices in decisions to grant patents, and provides public access to technical information on inventions once the patent application is published. The Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol (the Madrid System). The Madrid System allows filing of a single application to register, manage, and protect trademarks among the 122 countries covered by the Madrid System. The Hague System for the International Registration of Industrial Designs. The Hague System allows registration of up to 100 designs in 90 countries through the filing of a single application. The Lisbon System for the International Registration of Appellations of Origin. For a fee, the Lisbon System offers protection of an “appellation of origin” among the 30 contracting parties to identify products of a specific geographical origin. The Budapest Treaty. The Budapest Treaty allows registration of patents involving biological material among the 80 contracting parties so that submission to national patent authorities is no longer required. Currently, there are 192 WIPO member states, but not every member state is a party to the above agreements. The U.S. is a party to all of these agreements except the Lisbon Treaty. Most U.N. organizations are funded primarily through assessed or voluntary contributions from the member states, but WIPO is different in that over 90 percent of revenues come from fees and charges to businesses, research institutions, or individuals for WIPO services. In the two-year budget for 2020 and 2021, for instance, WIPO projects income of $903 million, of which $860 million were derived from fees, $36 million from member state contributions, and the remainder from sale of publications and other miscellaneous sources.2 World Intellectual Property Organization, “Program and Budget for the 2020/21 Biennium,” p. 8, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-wipo/en/budget/pdf/budget_2020_21.pdf (accessed February 11, 2020). Thus, the 2020–2021 biennial budget forecasts that more than 95 percent of WIPO revenues will be fee-derived. The Next WIPO Director General The term of the current WIPO Director General, Francis Gurry, expires on September 30, 2020. Originally, there were 10 candidates to replace Gurry, but two have since withdrawn.3 The candidates are Saule Tlevlessova of Kazakhstan, Daren Tang of Singapore, Kenichiro Natsume of Japan, Wand Binying of China, Edward Kwakwa of Ghana, Marco Matías Alemán of Colombia, Adebambo Adewopo of Nigeria, and Ivo Gagliuffi Piercechi of Peru. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Election of the Director General in 2020,” https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/elections2020/ (accessed February 11, 2020). One of these candidates is Wang Binying of China. On paper, she is well qualified. She has extensive experience after working at WIPO in various capacities since 1992. She is currently the Deputy Director General in charge of the Brands and Designs Sector.4 World intellectual Property Organization, “Brands and Design Sector,” https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/activities_by_unit/index.jsp?contact_id=5 (accessed February 12, 2020). She knows WIPO and its functions well. The problem with her candidacy is not her personal qualifications, but the record and prospective influence of China over her if she is elected Director General. There are three main reasons for concern: The Director General of WIPO has extraordinary authority and the member states too often fail to fulfill their oversight role. For instance, Gurry has been embroiled in a series of controversies during his tenure, including shipment of U.S.-made computer equipment to North Korea and Iran in defiance of U.S. sanctions and, arguably, United Nations sanctions.5 George Russell, “U.N. Shipment of High-Tech to North Korea, Iran Unjustified and Unfathomable, Say Investigators,” Fox News, September 13, 2012, https://www.foxnews.com/world/u-n-shipment-of-high-tech-to-north-korea-iran-unjustified-and-unfathomable-say-investigators.amp (accessed February 11, 2020), and Paul McGeough, “The Anonymous Letters that Started a Decade-Long Stoush,” Sidney Morning Herald, August 5, 2017, https://www.smh.com.au/world/the-anonymous-letters-that-started-a-decadelong-stoush-20170804-gxp47i.html (accessed February 11, 2020). Allegedly, Gurry approved these transfers in exchange for Iran and North Korea supporting his election as Director General.6 Emma Farge, “Exclusive–U.N. Patents Body Roiled by Misconduct Feud,” Reuters, August 30, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-un-feud/exclusive-u-n-patents-body-roiled-by-misconduct-feud-idUKBRE87T0UX20120830 (accessed February 12, 2020). He also was accused of retaliation against staff he considered disloyal.7 McGeough, “The Anonymous Letters that Started a Decade-Long Stoush.” In each of these controversies, the member states found out after the incident, and few states seemed moved to hold Gurry accountable. Moreover, because of WIPO’s negligible reliance on member state funding, even those governments angered by Gurry’s actions were unable to pressure the organization directly to censure Gurry. The opportunity for a future Director General to abuse his or her authority is magnified by the fact that, in 2014, WIPO changed the “terms of office of the Deputy Directors General (DDGs) and the Assistant Directors General (ADGs) so as to coincide with the mandate of the Director General. In other words, the new Director General will be appointing the senior leadership in WIPO, each of whom will be incentivized to maintain the Director General in office. China is the world’s pre-eminent threat to intellectual property, engaging in economic espionage, forced transfer of technology, and patent infringement. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “In 2016 trade in counterfeit and pirated products amounted to as much as USD 509 billion. This represents up to 3.3% of world trade.” Rewarding China with the leadership of WIPO sends entirely the wrong signal given that one of WIPO’s core missions is to promote protection of intellectual property. Chinese nationals in powerful positions in international organizations have used their authority to advance the interests of China to the detriment of the mission of those organizations.11 Under the leadership of a Chinese national, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) refused permission to Taiwan to attend ICAO meetings, covered up a cyber hack of ICAO servers originating from China, and punished the whistleblower who exposed the cover-up. Since a Chinese national became Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), cooperation and support for Chinese priorities, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei technology, have increased. Failure of Chinese nationals in international organizations to advance Chinese interests carries significant consequences as Meng Hongwei, then the head of Interpol, found out after being imprisoned, charged with corruption and refusing to “follow party decisions,” and sentenced to 13.5 years in prison. Taken together, these three concerns should worry other governments and patent holders. Not everything that WIPO does is of critical importance. Its administration of trademarks and copyrights, for instance, does not generally involve proprietary or sensitive information. In her current position as Deputy Director General of the Brands and Designs Sector, for instance, Wang Binying simply does not pose the same risk as she would as Director General of WIPO or as Deputy Director General of other WIPO sectors. For instance, one of the most sensitive activities overseen by WIPO is maintaining the confidentiality of patent applications under the Patents and Technology Sector. Under the PCT international patent system, inventors apply for a patent with WIPO for a fee that allows them to file a single “international” patent application that applies across all 153 contracting states. This application includes technical and confidential information relating to the invention. The applicant can maintain the registration and confidentiality for up to 18 months before WIPO discloses the application publicly. This confidential phase allows the applicant to raise financial backing or establish production plans with secure knowledge that his or her invention will remain proprietary. The value of this service is clear. Most major corporations, research institutions, universities, and inventors use the PCT system, and PCT fees comprise over 75 percent of WIPO’s projected income for 2020/2021 (accessed February 11, 2020). The remainder of the top 10 were European nations and South Korea, but every nation has a stake in protecting the intellectual property of its citizens. As Director General, Wang Binying would have authority over all WIPO activities including the PCT system. Gaining access to proprietary information on all WIPO patent applications 18 months before they become public would be an incredible coup for the world’s most prolific violator of intellectual property, and China would without doubt exert extraordinary pressure to secretly access this trove of information. As Chinese companies increasingly apply for patents, China may begin to appreciate the value of honoring and enforcing intellectual property rights, but its record as documented by the OECD indicates that it still has far to go. Although the U.S. reportedly favors Daren Tang of Singapore, the most pressing concern for the U.S. should not specifically be the election of Tang, but to ensure that the next Director General is qualified and not susceptible to pressure that could threaten the confidentiality and security of patent applications. Election Process The two primary decision-making bodies of WIPO are the General Assembly and the Coordination Committee, and both play a role in selecting the Director General. Under the WIPO convention, the Coordination Committee shall: nominate a candidate for appointment to such position by the General Assembly; if the General Assembly does not appoint its nominee, the Coordination Committee shall nominate another candidate; this procedure shall be repeated until the latest nominee is appointed by the General Assembly.18 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Article 8(3)(v). The Coordination Committee, comprised of 83 member states, meets on March 5 and 6 to nominate a candidate for Director General. The committee nominates a candidate from the pool of nominees through successive secret ballots. In each round, fewer candidates proceed. Based on a field of 10 candidates, for instance, in the first round, only the seven candidates with the most votes are eligible for the second round, then the top five, then the top three, then the top two, until a candidate is nominated though majority vote of the committee. Once the Coordination Committee nominates candidate for Director General, the WIPO General Assembly (192 member states), the Assembly of the Paris Union (175 member states), and the Assembly of the Berne Union (175 member states) must approve the candidate by majority vote. These votes are scheduled for May 7 and 8. Although, in the past, these votes have been largely a formality, they present a final opportunity for the U.S. should the Coordination Committee nominate Wang Binying. What the U.S. Should Do There has been increasing consensus in Washington that rising Chinese influence in international organizations can be detrimental to the missions and purposes of those organizations. Although not every international organization is equally vulnerable in this regard, WIPO is a uniquely tempting target for Chinese exploitation. A Chinese Director General would present China unprecedented opportunities to access proprietary patent information with the goal of giving Chinese businesses illicit access to information to which competitors would not have access for months. China has a long record of infringing on intellectual property rights and it is hard to believe that China would not seize an opportunity for illicit competitive advantage if the opportunity arose.