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Against this backdrop, GATT contracting parties’ multilateral trade meeting, known as the Uruguay Round negotiations in Uruguay, TRIPS was put on the table. Finally, “the TRIPS agreement was adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco in April, 1994.”3 Articles 7 and 8 of the agreement were adopted with minimal modifications from proposals submitted by developing and less developed countries.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a comprehensive international agreement dating from 1995 that establishes minimum intellectual property (IP) protections. Signed by the vast majority of WTO member countries, TRIPS provides a basic global floor for IP standards. TRIPS seeks to ensure that IP is protected and enforced across borders and that bad actors do not get a free ride on innovators’ investments. Least-developed countries are exempt from meeting most substantive TRIPS obligations, while countries seeking to promote and lead innovation, such as the United States, provide IP protections beyond the minimum requirements of TRIPS.

The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 seeks to implement a uniform set of intellectual property protection across member nations to provide greater stability in international economic relations. Critics argue that the TRIPS agreement provides unnecessarily strong protection of intellectual property rights which serves to prevent the ill in developing nations from having access to affordable essential medications.

II.A-B. The government agrees the Lanham Act does not apply extraterritorially. It suggests that applying the Act to a foreign sale represents a “domestic” application if the “effect” of that sale might be U.S. consumer confusion. That argument is waived and without merit. The Lanham Act requires “use in commerce.” Because the Act’s definition of “commerce” does not extend to foreign conduct, the “use in commerce” must be in the United States.

Likewise, the Act’s text and structure make clear that its “focus” is trademarks’ “use in commerce.” It is that “use” that must be domestic. The government suggests that the statute’s “focus” is consumer confusion, such that the Act is applied “domestically” to foreign conduct if that conduct has the potential “effect” of confusing U.S. consumers. But extraterritoriality is primarily concerned with conduct, not effects. The government’s standard is a test for determining when an extraterritorial law should cover foreign conduct—not distinguishing extraterritorial from domestic application. The government’s test gives the statutory term “use in commerce” inconsistent meanings. It is unpredictable, threatens international friction, and serves little practical purpose.

Despite the seemingly territorial nature of trademarks, the sale of trademarked goods on e-commerce and social media have exponentially increased the amount of cross-border transactions, and therefore also the amount of infringing goods sold online across multiple jurisdictions. Because infringers can reach potential consumers of goods and services anywhere in the world, a tension now exists between the territorial nature of a trademark and the global nature of the potential consumer. The basis for extraterritorial reach is mainly “to either prevent spillovers from extraterritorial activities into the local market (inbound regulation) or to protect and enforce the interests of the rightsholders also in other territories by implementing the local IP regime (outbound regulation).”19

Today, e-commerce and the sale of products occurs on a global scale. Whereas commerce and the trade of goods used to be done almost entirely within a territory or through goods moving across borders, the global supply chain now has many different forms and can cross many borders, jurisdictions, and the online space. While reaching consumers has become easier for sellers, protecting intellectual property has become increasingly complex. Globalization is prompting a reevaluation of this field as the Internet reduces the importance of national borders. Trademarks are particularly susceptible to the effects of globalization because, unlike copyrights and patents, trademark law is perceived, at least in the United States, to “extend across national borders.”1 In this paper, we focus on the enforcement of trademark rights, particularly those used against counterfeiters. We examine the concept of extraterritorial enforcement of trademark rights—the extending of enforcement across national borders—and review how different countries and jurisdictions approach this practice. In order to examine extraterritoriality in this context, we need to review the history and basis of jurisdiction. In the global enforcement of intellectual property rights, a general principle of territoriality exists.2 This principle exists beyond the scope of intellectual property and goes to the root of international law, noting that countries, or nation-states, can only enact and enforce laws within their own territory.3 This concept originates in public international law and can be found in international intellectual property conventions and treaties, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,4 the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,5 and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement.6 However, while spelling out details of enforcement in intellectual property, these international agreements contain only minimum standards,7 and each individual country must have domestic implementing legislation to enforce that law and fulfill their treaty obligations.8 Once a country creates and implements domestic legislation, the executive, judiciary, or other appropriate government body interprets the laws, which is often where we see the doctrine of extraterritoriality arise.9

According to plaintiffs, "the [Internal Revenue] Code need not expressly provide for a foreign tax credit if the foreign levy in question falls within the treaty definition of a creditable tax" because "what constitutes a United States income tax for purposes of the application of a treaty derives from the treaty's definition and not from domestic law."32 (emphasis in original; alteration added). Plaintiffs argue that "[d]omestic law therefore does not constitute an absolute limitation on the rights and entitlements that may be granted to treaty beneficiaries under the terms of a U.S. tax treaty." (alteration added). Plaintiffs state that "[t]he parties agree that the NIIT constitutes a United States income tax as defined in Article 2(1) and 2(2) of the French Treaty," and, therefore, "that when a treaty provides a definition of a covered tax, it is that definition, and not the more limited definition under United States or foreign law, that is applied." (alteration added).

In understanding what Domestic IP Law means, we have to understand the context in which the word “domestic” is used. The English electronic dictionary defines domestic to mean “of or relating to home” and “internal to a specific country”. Adopting this definition, “domestic” qualifies activities peculiar to a locality which is home to some persons. Thus, an opposite of “domestic” will be “foreign” or “international”.

Therefore, Domestic IP Law will refer to the IP Laws of a region, state, or nation that applies to the people of such region, state, or nation. This is opposed to the International IP Laws. Here when we refer to the Domestic IP Law in this sense, we refer to the Domestic IP Law of States like Nigeria, Ghana, England, South Africa, Britain, USA, Cameroon, to mention but a few. For every State, reference must be made to its specific legislation, although the provisions of the law may be similar. There are, however, subsidiary legislations that may be made in a state to regulate IP practices, this class of legislations shall not be treated in this discourse. For the purpose of this discourse I shall identify the Domestic IP Laws of Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana and reference shall only be made to legislations. I encourage detailed discussions on them on later sessions.

Intellectual property (IP) law is a complex and ever-evolving field, with different rules and regulations governing different countries. It is essential to comprehend the distinction between domestic and international IP law to guarantee that your IP rights are secured. Domestic IP law is the set of laws that control intellectual property inside a particular nation. These laws are typically set up by the legislature of that nation and are intended to secure the privileges of people and organizations to their intellectual property.

This incorporates patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and other forms of IP. Domestic IP law is usually enforced by the courts of that country, although some countries may have international agreements in place that allow for enforcement of IP rights in other countries as well. International IP law, then again, is a set of laws that control intellectual property across multiple countries. These laws are typically established through international treaties or agreements between countries.

This AFF strengthens domestic IP protections by making patent waivers (the government’s ability to seize the intellectual property rights to an invention or a set of inventions) in biotechnology (encompasses vaccines, gene-editing, biofuels, medicines and therapeutics for healthcare, and far more) illegal. In 2022, the World Trade Organization (WTO) passed a patent waiver for COVID-19 vaccines, which the U.S. supported. This waiver exempted all of the consigning countries from certain protections under TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which compels WTO members to implement a set of IP protections.)

This is a trademark affirmative that tries to increase trademark enforcement against online platforms (like Amazon, eBay, etsy or Facebook marketplace) that don’t take action against counterfeiting. Counterfeiting is a specific form of trademark infringement regulated under the Lanham Act, where a bad actor tries to sell a product under a counterfeit trademark. The problem with counterfeiting enforcement is that most counterfeit products sold in the United States are made in other countries, and it’s impossible to prosecute someone in China for selling a counterfeit good online in the United States. The affirmative claims that instead, the platforms that list and sell those counterfeit products should be held liable for trademark infringement and damages if they do not take proactive measures to enforce anti-counterfeiting measures.

Because economic power is central to military power, realist theory rejects the idea that states can be unconcerned with relative gains. Many influential scholars of power politics recognize, however, that factors other than relative power can inform states about whether another state is a threat. Arguably, the behavior of a state says more about whether it is a threat than do its economic and military capabilities. Even John Mearsheimer, considered to be the first theorist to postulate “offensive” realism, has asserted that “the prospects for cooperation among market democracies are ‘excellent.’

This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory, I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies. Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the prin ciple of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.

In the pages of Foreign Affairs, the indefatigable Robert Kagan recently weighed in with yet another fervent appeal on behalf of empire. Ever the true-blue American, Kagan avoids using the offensive E-word, of course. He favors the term hegemony, which, he explains, is benign, involving neither domination nor exploitation but willing submission—“more a condition than a purpose.” Scratch the surface, however, and “The Price of Hegemony” offers a variation on Kagan’s standard theme: the imperative of militarized U.S. global primacy, whatever the price and with little regard for who pays.

Few would charge Kagan with being a deep or original thinker. As a writer, he is less philosophe than pamphleteer, albeit one possessing a genuine gift for packaging. Recall, for example, his famous assertion that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Once deemed to express a truth of Lippmannesque profundity, this warriors vs. wimps formulation has since lost much of its persuasive appeal, not least because the warriors, a.k.a. “the troops,” have not fared especially well when dispatched to liberate, pacify, or depose.

Kagan's fundamental flawed misconception analysis begins about with a fundamental misconception about the international system and the relations of states within it. His worldview perceives two types of countries: those that are con- genitally incapable of dealing with urgent security challenges on their borders or in their respective regions; and a crafty, rapacious few who are forever scheming to intimidate, disrupt or simply devour the hapless and the helpless. Within this dichotomy, however, is a third sort of country, the only one of its kind. The United States enjoys a privileged place in the world order, explains Kagan. Its power is unthreatening because it is relatively distant from others. And, according to Kagan, the costs of this power are easily borne by the wealthiest country in the world. Kagans world order "is as fragile as it is unique," and "preserving [it] requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment." The message today is consistent with that from sixteen years ago when he and William Kristol first made the case for what they called "benevolent global hegemony." In other respects, however, the story that emerges from The World America Made is subtly different. Anticipating a rising tide of pessimism and gloominess within the American electorate, Kagan at times resorts to the tone of a pep talk. Whereas he once highlighted the "present dangers" confronting the United States (in a volume coedited with Kristol, published in 2000), he now says the world today isn't as dangerous as it once was - during the Cold War, for example, or at other periods in American history. Looking ahead, he says, China has its own set of problems, is unlikely to make a bid for regional hegemony and is unlikely to succeed if it tries. Likewise, we shouldn't be overly frightened by Chinas growing economic power, Kagan explains, which will lag well behind that of the United States for years. Other global challenges are more modest still. The object of these relatively optimistic assessments is to convince Americans that they can manage to hold on to their position of global dominance for many years without bankrupting themselves financially or exhausting themselves emotionally. This line of argument cuts against Kagans other claims, however, both in this volume and elsewhere, that the United States should spend even more on its military and that Washington should use this military more often, and in more places, than it has in the recent past.

The People's Republic of China has used force when measures short of war have proven inadequate to secure its borders or strategic interests (as in Korea, India, and Vietnam), but, by marked contrast with India in Goa or Indonesia in Timor-Leste, it gave diplomacy the decades needed to resolve the Hong Kong and Macau issues without bloodshed. Beijing has shown a similar preference for negotiations rather than the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue. Cross-strait tensions are lessening. It should be encouraging that China has insisted on United Nations authorization for its military activities abroad, which are directed at peacekeeping and against piracy. Still, China is modernizing its military at a peculiar moment of history. The United States inherited worldwide military superiority from the collapse of its Soviet rival. Without much discussion, it has embraced the neo-conservative agenda of sustaining this superiority at all costs. But rising Chinese defense capabilities erode American supremacy. China's new anti-carrier weapons endanger U.S. force projection capabilities in the Western Pacific; its anti-satellite programs imperil U.S. global surveillance and communication capabilities; its growing operations in cyberspace menace U.S. government operations and the economy of the American homeland alike. These are serious challenges not just to American hegemony but to core U.S. interests. They have begun to draw a response. The result is a deeply troubled Sino-American military relationship despite the diminishing prospects for war in the Taiwan Strait. China will persevere in its efforts to build a credible counter to American coercion. The United States will not soon abandon its obsession with the retention of absolute military superiority everywhere. A less hegemonic objective would allow the U.S. to accommodate a more powerful China while retaining the ability to prevail in any conflict with it. As things are, increasingly overt military confrontation between China and the United States is likely. These inherent tensions — along with those arising from the huge bilateral trade imbalance in favor of China — are why the idea of a US-China duopoly like the so-called G-2 is infeasible even if it were desirable, which it is not. Still, the world economy is about to see the displacement of the United States from its 20th Century preeminence. China will join the U.S., the EU, and Japan at the top. India, Brazil, Russia, and others in the G-20 will follow. What is in prospect is not the hegemony of one or two countries but its opposite — a multipolar balance of economic power. China, like Japan, is, of course, a country with a population vastly larger than it can prosperously support on its own resource base, large as that is. And China is late in the search for access to raw materials for its burgeoning industries. (So is India.) China has a vital interest in the perpetuation of a global economic order open to trade and investment. China is now enmeshed in multilateral organizations in which it must daily demonstrate its dedication to the sovereign equality of nations, great and small. All this enforces the respect for comity that is the essence of a "responsible stakeholder." It informed People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan's cautious suggestion last spring that it would be better to manage the dollar down to a sustainable international role than to have it collapse. But America is out of practice at dealing with independent power centers. For the past two decades the United States has been the undisputed global hegemon. For 40 years before that, it was the indispensable arbiter of the bloc of nations known as the "free world." American politicians are unaccustomed to formulating policy through multilateral consultations with other nations. Beijing isn't very good at this either, but seems more open to it than Washington. The United States will, as always, do what must be done, after it has exhausted all of the alternatives. But this will take time and cost the United States further prestige and influence. Meanwhile, China's global role will grow, especially if Beijing sustains the modesty and competence for which its diplomats have become known, rather than the arrogance that some of its domestic officials increasingly exemplify. The Chinese Communist Party has delivered prosperity to ordinary Chinese, which is why it enjoys their support. Eighty-six percent of Chinese think their country is on the right track. Chinese see proof of the superiority of their political-economy in the apparent effectiveness of its response to the financial crash and its aftermath. Their government's policies have so far succeeded in sustaining high rates of economic growth through programs that enhance long-term economic and intellectual competitiveness. The contrast with the muddled self-indulgence of Washington's response to the crisis, in particular, is striking. Americans have so far shrunk from the hard decisions necessary to restore fiscal integrity to their government or to reverse serious decay in their nation's human and physical infrastructure. The recession has joined foreign wars and continuing deterioration in relations with the Islamic world as a factor accelerating American decline. China seems certain to emerge from the crisis with a much larger and more competitive economy. The generation born under the single-child policy is coming of age. It is far more inclined to consumption than its frugal predecessors. A faster transition to growth driven by domestic consumption than many have thought possible seems in prospect. China's imports are now rising much more rapidly than its exports. Its balance of payments surplus, huge as it still is, fell by half in 2009. Continuing economic growth, deepened ties with Asian neighbors, the progressive internationalization of a yuan that is rising in value, all promise domestic stability and greater international stature for China in coming years. The current self-congratulatory mood in China is therefore entirely understandable. Yet it masks the underlying weakness of the Chinese political system. Government in contemporary China derives its legitimacy almost entirely from its ability to deliver continued rapid economic growth. It stands for no credible values, neither trusts nor is trusted by those it rules, suffers from a high level of corruption, and has no clear vision for self-improvement. If America's politics are widely viewed as so venal as to be dysfunctional, the Chinese system is seen as cynically manipulative and of questionable legitimacy. Without political reform, China will remain vulnerable to unrest should the economy falter. If there is no rule of law in China, Beijing's word will be doubted abroad. Despite its economic successes and growing defense capabilities, China's international influence will remain limited as long as it fails to evolve an attractive political system. It is not impossible that it may do so but there is no evidence at present to suggest that it will. A Chinese perception that the United States is attempting to leverage its military superiority to keep China down could goad Beijing into efforts to dislodge America from its position of global dominance. Given the continuing disparities in national power, the ensuing struggle would be a long one. The trigger would probably be some incident derived from U.S. military operations offshore China or from the Taiwan issue, to which Sino-American relations remain hostage. This is unlikely, but, unfortunately, it is not impossible to imagine. As I speak, for example, China is actively considering how to put effective pressure on the United States to halt arms sales to Taiwan. China wants Washington to live up to Ronald Reagan's commitment to restrain and reduce such sales in return for credible pursuit by Beijing of a peaceful settlement of its differences with Taipei. Sanctions on selected American companies — modeled on those the U.S. Congress has imposed on Chinese companies selling objectionable items to others — are apparently among the options before China's leaders. In the current economic climate, any such move by China could trigger a nasty confrontation and unleash an orgy of American protectionist retaliation that would likely set off a trade war. I do not consider such a development likely. If nothing else, however, the possible consequences of miscalculation by Beijing or Washington illustrate the global stake in continuing prudent management of the Sino-American relationship by both sides.

Greater German and Japanese assertiveness is likely to go hand in hand with U.S. retrenchment (and a shrinking of Washington’s relative economic and military might) over the long haul, a trend that is unlikely to change with the war in Ukraine. The United States will be forced to concentrate its limited resources on the challenges posed by China. Analysts such as Robert Kagan have argued that Pax Americana could give way to global chaos. That is definitely possible. But it is not what has happened in much of the Middle East, where the United States was most engaged for the last two decades and where it is now pulling back most dramatically. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations have described how there was an initial surge in regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and in military conflicts that drew in outside powers, such as Russia and Turkey. But then many of these conflicts slowed down, and more locally driven reordering processes began, exemplified by the August 2021 Baghdad conference that brought key regional actors into dialogue with one another.

In Europe, U.S. retrenchment could yield greater sovereignty once Europeans finally realize that the war in Ukraine will not stop Washington’s long-term pivot to Asia. One reason that Europeans have failed to develop a common foreign policy is their lack of trust in one another. But Moscow’s aggression has brought Europeans together, convincing countries that previously favored engagement with Russia, such as Germany and Italy, to embrace a policy of containment. If this convergence holds, one could see a real European strategic alignment, backed eventually by a European armaments industry and even conceivably by a more common European nuclear deterrent (or at least a willingness by France to share its deterrent). In the long term, Europe could forge a common framework to manage relations with other powers, such as Russia and Turkey, including through deterrence, selective decoupling to minimize tensions, and some form of dialogue to prevent escalation. Instead of continuing to expand the EU and NATO, Europe might opt for smaller, more flexible multilateral arrangements involving some of the most important players, much like the Quad in Asia. In short, the European order might become more Asian.

One of the contemporary issues in international relations is that the current hegemon, the United States, has undergone a relative decline. It is argued that American hegemony that emerged aftermath the Second World War is undergoing a decline and with the rise of a potential challenger in China looming, one major issue concerning IR scholars is whether or not the relative decline of US hegemony will result in a hegemonic war. Hegemonic wars occur when a rising challenger – revisionist power – isn’t content with the current international order and wants to change it so as to become a preponderant force and dictate terms of a new world order. This article assumes that although the US is in a relative decline it is still a dominant power and the rising power is content with the current status quo so no war occurs between the dominant and the rising power. In order to support the argument that a hegemonic war does not occur, this article provides explanation using several theoretical perspectives. Structural Realism and Balance of Power To begin with, prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz contends that the end of the Cold War has changed the structure of international politics from bipolar to unipolar with the US being the dominant power. According to Waltz, days of US being unipolar force in world politics is numbered and slowly the world is moving towards bipolarity or multipolarity because changes in the structure of international system brings about changes in state behavior. It does not matter how much self-restraint and self-control a preponderant power is in its conduct of international relations; states are always wary and fear the dominant power and thus he maintains that balancing is universal. [1] In order to explain why, he has resorted to the Balance of Power (theory). In most basic sense, international politics is a state of anarchy where there is no central government and states rely on themselves to protect their autonomy and perpetuate their survival. Balance of Power contends that states involve in a balancing act to check the powers of preponderant force so that no any single state has enough power to become a global hegemon. [2] With the relative decline of US, China and America can enter into bipolar relationship much like the US and the USSR during the Cold War. Since Waltz himself posits bipolarity as the most stable of international configurations, it can be argued that act of balancing between the US and China brings the international distribution of power into an equilibrium and averts the risk of war. Socialization of Hegemonic Power Most scholars posit that hegemons use threats and rewards to get compliance from secondary states. Contrary to popular wisdom, scholars Ikenberry and Kupchan have contended that in addition to material power, hegemons also have the power of socialization to achieve compliance from secondary states. They call this the socialization process which involves ‘altering of the belief systems’ of elites. Basically, hegemons project their vision of international order through normative principles (norms and values) and not by material incentives; elites in secondary states internalize them, and devise policies that are compatible to the hegemon’s ideal of the international order. The authors contend that the world order thus created can sustain even when hegemon undergoes a decline because the world order created is relatively inexpensive to maintain in the sense that altering of states preferences are by virtue of ideals rather than use of coercion. Thus, by virtue of socialization of hegemonic power, relative changes in hegemon’s distribution of material power (military and economy) does not put strain on the international system. So, on viewing the world from the lens of socialization, it can be argued that the expansion of US normative principles on liberal economic norm to its former allies and enemies aftermath the second world war that led to the formation of the current liberal economic world order provides an explanation as to why in spite of US’ relative decline there is continuity for America’s liberal economic order. [3] The rising challenger China can be considered to have been socialized – it has accepted US led international norms, and participates in various International Organizations. Thus, it makes less sense for China to wage war against the hegemon whose ideals it has internalized. Hegemonic Stability Theory According to this theory, a hegemon creates a stable international economic order characterized by market openness but its decline results in global instability. This hegemonic effect of open trade benefits all participants, especially, weaker states that do not have any burden of public goods. In this sense, global economic stability is born out of hegemony and provides provision of collective public goods and in doing so facilitates a stable international system. The motivation to create an economic openness lie in the interest of the hegemon – it has the largest economy and so benefits most from open markets. In addition, only hegemons have the material capability (political and military) to provide public goods and induce other states to embrace open trade. [4] By virtue of the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is an important element in creation and maintenance of the international system. As stated earlier, open trade benefits all participants, even the rising challengers that are accommodated in the system. In contemporary world politics, China is the fastest rising power and it is also reaping the benefits of the open economic order created by the US. By participating in the globalized economy, China has earned a comparative advantage in labor-market and its economy has been growing. On top of that China is an export-based economy and thus, it has very little incentive to jeopardize this benefit by engaging with the hegemon and thereby disrupting the order. In his article, Artur Stein has argued that decline in hegemony does not bring about a complete collapse of the trade regime as long as hegemonic power is committed to economic openness. Taking these two points in consideration, it can be argued that it is not in the interest of China to challenge US hegemony. On account, likelihood of war is averted. [5] Robert Keohane and Institutionalist Approach In After Hegemony, Robert Keohane uses an institutional approach to explain inter-state cooperation. He posits that states have common interest and in order to realize it requires achieving mutually beneficial agreements which is where international regimes come in. These regimes foster cooperation by making it easier to reach mutually beneficial inter-state agreements. They help overcome the problem of lack of qualitative and asymmetrical information, through institutional embeddedness reduces transaction costs, legal costs reduce incentive to cheat thereby reducing uncertainty and building confidence among states. Since hegemonic leadership is required to create regimes in the first place, even after the erosion of hegemony, they have high stakes and play important role in fostering cooperation (US role in the IMF and WTO). Because cooperation fosters absolute gain, all participants are benefitted. [6] By this approach, states see cooperation more beneficial than conflict. Thus, it can be argued from institutionalist approach that international regimes foster cooperation thereby reducing likelihood of conflict in the event of hegemonic decline. Conclusion The article provided four distinct perspectives with regards to declining US hegemony and potential of a hegemonic war. Using these approaches the article concludes that in spite of decline in American hegemony there will not be a significant change in the current structure of the international system mainly due to power differentials between the US and its nearest challenger China. The US is undergoing a relative decline but still, it is the largest economy boasts strongest military and has highest political leverage. In sum, prospect of a hegemonic war in contemporary world politics is only a far-fetched dream.

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.¶ Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.¶ Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.¶ The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.¶ Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46¶ Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.¶ Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

Investing in R&D is not new, and it will be an important element in new economy competitiveness. But supporting federal and university laboratories is not enough. The United States needs to look at the path from the laboratory to production for domestic and global markets. In addition to funding research at universities, national laboratories, and research centers, the United States must also support the education of scientists, engineers, and skilled workers. During the early 1980s, the U.S. often led the world in scientific break throughs, but often lagged in terms of turning ideas into competitive products. Students of innovation point to two hurdles that face every innovator. The challenge of moving from idea to product is often referred to as the Valley of Death. Taking the next step and taking production to a competitive scale is referred to as surmounting the Darwinian Sea. A combination of federal, state, and private support will help labs and single inventors to overcome both hurdles. The U.S. has taken some creative steps to foster innovation. Started by the Obama administration, the Manufacturing USA program now has some 16 public private partnerships focused on aspects of advanced manufacturing that range from 3-D printing to regenerative medicine. The Departments of Defense and Energy provide much of the public funding and choose topics that fit their mission. The Department of Commerce also supports manufacturing institutes but chooses candidates from an open competition. In a recent competition focused on pharmaceuticals, the Department of Commerce identified five qualified candidates but could only fund one (ISA, 2020). By way of contrast, when China saw the U.S. developing the manufacturing institutes, it quickly created its own version. China now has 40 or more similar institutes. The Chinese example suggests the U.S. should pay close attention to the innovation initiatives around the world. In the Department of Commerce, the Foreign Commercial Services promotes exports and economic opportunity for American companies and workers overseas. U.S. could match that effort with a Foreign Technology Service that identifies innovations in products, processes, and institutions around the world. After rejoining the Paris Accord, President Biden is expected to set goals for reducing harmful emissions. Meeting any ambitious goals will require research and development coupled with the ability to put green innovations to work. Facing an ever more competitive world, many students of innovation suggest that the U.S. must pick priority areas for research. Basic research can lead to unexpected but promising directions. At the same time, targeted research focusing on what next steps are needed in artificial intelligence or new materials for electronics will yield near-term dividends that help the U.S. maintain a competitive edge. In an era of global companies and competing nations, the United States is likely to create incentives to translate innovations into domestic production and jobs. Like foreign policy, competitiveness policy starts at home. The Biden team can be expected to build on the reality and the sense that gains in productivity are widely shared.