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2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Hegemony Advantage

Specifically, a strong DIB is key to Taiwan arms support – otherwise China will invade.

Washington Institute for Defense and Security 5/13 [Washington Institute for Defense and Security, WIDS is a policy think tank whose mission is to promote critical thinking on security and defense affairs; 13 May 2024; “Improving America’s Defense-Industrial Base: Key to Protecting Taiwan’s Security”; Washington Institute for Defence & Security; ]//InTr‌

In the age of increasing conflicts between Ukraine and the Middle East and different attempts made by US and European countries to solve these crises show a worrying reality. China might see a chance to take Taiwan by force closing quickly. The winning party of Taiwan’s recent presidential election was the Democratic People’s Party. They won by 2 candidates that China might have preferred to win, despite China’s efforts to meddle in the election. This is the indicator to the nation China that peaceful reunification with Taiwan is becoming less likely. Furthermore, China is a nation that is in great trouble with economic and population-related complications. Due to all of these, China is not in the condition to use force against Taiwan. Furthermore, this nation soon faces strong opposition from the US. The United States is the nation that emphasizes competing with China, and European countries, which are becoming more cautious about their business relationships with China. The government of China has a big advantage due to the current situation of the world. As the US along with its allies are busy dealing with other parts of the world. Europe is focused on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, the US is also caught up in the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. At the same time, troublemakers in the Middle East like Yemen’s Houthi rebels and various Shia militias are challenging America’s ability to keep things under control. So China might think that it’s a good time to take action against Taiwan. The United States is totally in favor of Taiwan and they want to keep them safe for many reasons. Taiwan is a key player in the region because it’s a democracy and shows what a free China could be like. It has also stayed true to democratic values since it held its first elections in 1996, even though China has tried to undermine them. Taiwan is also crucial for technology. Its big tech company, TSMC, makes 90% of the world’s advanced semiconductors. These tiny chips are important for all sorts of things, from AI to military technology. If China took control of Taiwan and blocked the U.S. from accessing these semiconductors, it would be a big problem for national security. If the United States doesn’t make it clear that it will stand up to Chinese aggression against Taiwan, or doesn’t take strong action if China does become aggressive, it could make other allies in the Indo-Pacific region, like Japan and South Korea, doubt whether America would help them in similar situations. They might start wondering if the U.S. would back them up if China started causing trouble in their countries. This is why defending Taiwan is so important for the U.S. Experts have been thinking about the best way to do this, like giving Taiwan a lot of weapons to make it hard for China to invade, or even creating a formal military partnership between the U.S. and Taiwan. However, one thing that needs to happen first is that the U.S. must strengthen its own defense industry. It needs to be able to produce and deliver more military equipment to support Taiwan and others. This means that the United State should increase its factories and infrastructure to make more military gear. It is also less complicated to sell the weapons to Taiwan. Right now, about $19 billion worth of military deliveries to Taiwan are stuck in delays, which could make China think it has the upper hand. Lastly, the U.S. should focus on what works best, not just what costs the most. For example, drones that are less expensive can sometimes be more useful on the battlefield than larger, pricier weapons. This should be kept in mind when planning how to defend Taiwan. Congress knows very well that it is not easy getting weapons to Taiwan from the United States. In the last few years, they’ve tried to fix it with new laws, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 and the Taiwan International Solidarity Act of 2023. However, these attempts have hit a roadblock because of political disagreements in Congress. At the same time there are other laws, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal years 2023 and 2024. It talks about how to assist Taiwan with military training and cybersecurity. This makes Taiwan a big issue for the upcoming elections. Both President Biden and his Republican rival, Donald Trump, agree that it’s important to compete with China, but neither has said much about boosting the U.S. defense industry to support Taiwan. They should focus on it because no matter who wins the election, Taiwan will still be a crucial point in China’s plans for expansion. Good morning, and thank you very much for that kind introduction.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Hegemony Advantage

Deterrence solves multiple existential risks. Collapse causes disease, terrorism, and EMP attacks---extinction.

Helprin ’15 [Mark; January 15; Senior Fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy; National Review, “Indefensible Defense,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/indefensible-defense/]

Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Hegemony Advantage

US military superiority is an impact filter – it deters conflicts from escalating before they even start.

Dowd 15, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose (Alan, “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”, https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/)

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the only thing that keeps the peace, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Hegemony Advantage

Strong DIB innovation is key to deterrence through capability - adversaries perceive lapses in tech development

Kathryn Levantovscaia 24’ deputy director in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Prior to joining the Council, Levantovscaia served the US Chamber of Commerce as director for defense, aerospace, and acquisition policy. Reading between the lines of the new US National Defense Industrial Strategy; Atlantic Council;

Sustaining a strong and resilient defense industrial base is paramount to US national security and stewardship of the current world order. The inability to produce new and innovative defense capabilities at speed and scale sends the wrong message to sophisticated adversaries looking to test the waters, which prompted the Pentagon to release its first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) on January 11. A modern defense industrial ecosystem is “key to integrated deterrence and building enduring advantages,” the NDIS explains in its foreword. “Should deterrence fail,” it adds, “the NDIS postures our industrial ecosystem to provide our warfighters the necessary capabilities—at speed and scale—to defeat any nation that attempts to harm the security of the United States, our allies, and our partners.” The strategy acknowledges the dreadful plight nontraditional defense companies endure when attempting to partner with the Department of Defense, including prolonged periods required to adopt new capabilities. It also serves as a long-needed clarion call to modernize the US defense ecosystem. While the report has generated buzz across circles of stakeholders, exceeding the usual reach of such documents, this very popularity exposes a key paradox. The report’s strength as a rallying cry for a robust industrial base is hampered by an absence of specifics on implementation. Like a captivating manifesto light on concrete recommendations, the report risks igniting enthusiasm without a clear path forward. This feature may shield the strategy from naysayers poised to disagree with specific steps, but it also does little for acquisition managers and industry executives responsible for shaping defense industrial capabilities.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Hegemony Advantage

Status quo requirements undermine defense industry innovation – the DOD requires contracts to surrender intellectual property, limiting competition and deterring investment

SHYAM SANKAR et al in 24, CAITLIN DOHRMAN, AND MADELINE ZIMMERMAN in 2024

Shyam Sankar is the Chief Technology Officer of Palantir Technologies. Caitlin Dohrman is the Chief Executive Officer of Tangram Flex. Madeline Zimmerman is a Department of Defense Deployment Strategist at Palantir Technologies. THE MILITARY’S INSISTENCE ON OWNING COMMERCIAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS LIMITING INNOVATION; War On The Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/the-militarys-insistence-on-owning-commercial-intellectual-property-is-limiting-innovation/

At first glance, the issue of commercial intellectual property rights may seem unrelated to how the U.S. government seeks to meet the needs of America’s warfighters, but Department of Defense leaders are beginning to recognize that intellectual property policy has become a serious obstacle to defense innovation. In the age of advanced software and AI, the U.S. government is coming to rely more on the procurement of dual-use commercial technology to give the armed forces a strategic, operational, and tactical edge. In fact, in the first-ever National Defense Industrial Strategy released last week, the Department of Defense explicitly highlighted the importance of intellectual property and data rights policies as a pathway to flexible acquisition and sustainment. Unfortunately, today, the U.S. government and the commercial software industry are frequently at odds in their vision for how much government intellectual property ownership is required for critical national security programs to succeed. There is a requirement for the secretary of defense to “define the legitimate interest of the U.S. government” when asking companies to give up their intellectual property. While this requirement is meant to protect commercial intellectual property, in practice many commercial vendors are subject to solicitation requirements for either “unlimited rights” or “government purpose rights.” Unlimited rights enable the government to use, modify, reproduce, release, or disclose technical data or computer software in whole or in part, in any manner, and for any purpose whatsoever, including to a company’s competitors. Government purpose rights are slightly more restrictive, but still allow the government to use the software within government without restriction and outside government if there is a government purpose. The result is that software providers eager to support the Department of Defense risk losing the very assets that sustain their business: company intellectual property. This not only dissuades commercial technology providers from seeking government contracts, it places a particularly onerous burden on younger non-traditional tech firms that are hoping to break into the defense industrial ecosystem — both of which limit the public-private partnerships necessary to ensure that the United States stays ahead of technologically advanced competitors.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

The plan’s IP protection saves the defense industry and small contractors.

Stewart ‘24 (Jennifer Stewart; Former Staff Director of the House Armed Services Committee and former Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Vice President for Strategy and Policy at the National Defense Industrial Association; “NDIA Vital Signs 2024,” April 2024, https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/ndia/policy/vital-signs/2024/2024_vital_signs_final.pdf)-KuGa

IP and data rights are crucial to the companies that design, manufacture, apply, and maintain the cutting-edge technologies, systems, and platforms our armed forces rely upon to deter aggression and defend our nation and its interests. Protection of these rights is also essential to the Department’s ability to incentivize investment in innovation, to gain access to new suppliers at the prime and subcontractor levels, and to maintain access to the information and technical data necessary to support military equipment throughout its lifecycle. Simply put, respecting the private sector’s IP rights protects the long-term interests of the Department. Over the last eight years, the legal and regulatory landscape related to the allocation of IP rights and to the Department’s approach toward managing IP has been carefully reformed52 in the pursuit of balancing the legitimate needs of both DoD and industry. The importance of this balance is reflected in the core principles of DoD’s IP policy, which directs the Department to “negotiate specialized provisions…whenever doing so will more effectively balance DoD and industry interests” and “respect and protect IP resulting from technology development investments.”53 Recently, the Department has been working to implement the statutory changes to IP rights contained in the FY2017 and FY2018 NDAAs.54 However, more work is needed, including promulgating these statutes in regulation,55 staffing and resourcing the Department’s IP cadres to support the acquisition workforce, and training and educating the workforce on new approaches and best practices for IP. This work will continue to be supported by a growing body of study examining IP issues and exploring new models and techniques for managing IP. This includes the Section 813 Panel,56 various studies by the Acquisition Innovation Research Center (AIRC),57 and several congressionally directed pilot programs.58 The Department has also outlined goals to increase access to IP and data rights within the flexible acquisition59 pillar of the 2023 NDIS.60 The Department seeks to implement its goals by fully integrating IP planning into acquisition strategies that will protect core DoD interests over the entire lifecycle of the acquisition.61 The means by which the Department seeks to implement these actions is through the use of modular open systems approaches (MOSA)62 and mitigating IP restrictions on proprietary components by negotiating specialized license agreements.63 The Department is also focusing on modernizing IP acquisition regulations and related guidance, updating and approving the delivery of IP training for the acquisition workforce, and expanding the IP knowledge base of the acquisition workforce.64 The Department also intends to augment the recent creation of the IP Cadre offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Military Services.65Furthermore, Congress remains actively engaged on IP rights and deliverables for a range of issues, including maintaining equipment in conflict zones and austere operating environments,66 ensuring the proper return on investments in federal R&D, retaining the ability to re-compete sustainment of programs to control costs or improve quality, exercising better control over program sustainment costs, and helping DoD better leverage industry’s faster pace of innovation.67 As the discussions around IP and data rights continue and the Department moves towards implementation of the 2023 NDIS, it is essential to maintain the balance of serving the needs of the DoD without unduly harming and driving away industry. NDIA is diligently working through public rulemaking68 and legislative engagement69 to ensure the delicate balance that serves the needs of both government and industry is maintained while adapting to changes in technology and industry best practices. Failure to fairly protect and secure the IP of small and large organizations will almost certainly limit the Department’s access to game-changing innovation. For example, many small businesses develop and provide cutting-edge technology through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), or other programs, which in turn feed into larger procurements and operations and maintenance (O&M) efforts. The SBIR program has specific rights that protect IP, and small businesses can usually commercialize and/ or adapt these solutions for large government programs of record, creating real value for the Department and small businesses. However, without acceptable protections, small businesses—whose participation in the DIB has declined by over 40% in the last decade70—will be disincentivized to develop new ideas and/or will simply decline to do business with the federal government altogether, depriving DoD from accessing innovative capabilities and technologies. Inadequate IP and data rights protections can also have unintended consequences for the Department’s ability to utilize innovative commercial products. Companies that supply products with both military and commercial applications often develop and rely upon the same detailed manufacturing and process data to manufacture both military and commercial products. Policies that compel commercial companies to disclose sensitive IP data increase the risk of IP leaking to competitors and disincentivize participation in the federal market. Commercial companies and nontraditional contractors at all tiers of the supply chain prioritize protecting their sensitive trade secrets against disclosure. Faced with the choice of disclosing IP and putting future revenue streams at risk or walking away from certain government contracts, many of these companies will choose to protect their IP and commercial business. For example, at a recent government-industry forum, one small business succinctly explained the challenge. First, the company representative made it clear small businesses take pride in and do want to meet the unique requirements of U.S. warfighters. At the same time, the company representative explained it is difficult for small commercial businesses to offer cutting-edge technology when its IP, developed with private funds, could end up in the hands of competitors due to government regulation. In addition, if the small business accepted private investment, the small business would expect its investors to reduce the value of the product or technology in which they are investing because they would assess the value of the company’s IP had been diluted. For companies with this business context, the company may decide to develop two different versions of a product: one for the government and one for the commercial sectors. This could result in a better product going into a commercial offering or to another commercial entity that may or may not be willing to sell to the government, depending on outside investor decisions. Under these circumstances, the company strongly encouraged other participating companies and the government to focus on developing IP policies and regulations comparable to those in the U.S. commercial sector. The most effective way for DoD to maximize its access to IP is to ensure the Department is a fair, collaborative partner with industry in the shared mission to provide our servicemembers the most advanced, best-maintained equipment possible. The more companies seek to work with the DoD, the more access the Department will have to capabilities that are innovative, cutting-edge, and driven by IP. Without consistent policies that proportionally protect the IP and data rights of industry, companies are driven away from their ability to partner with the DoD, further shrinking the U.S. DIB and the Department’s capabilities. Given the profound importance of this issue, NDIA tracked industry views on IP in the Vital Signs 2024 Survey. Even considering the changes in statute and DoD policy intended to balance the interests of DoD and industry over the last eight years, the results of the Vital Signs 2024 Survey demonstrate companies within the DIB still fear significant risks to their IP when contracting with the DoD. Nearly a quarter (21%) of private sector respondents chose not to bid on certain DoD contracts out of fear DoD requirements for IP would put a company’s rights at risk (see Q55 and Q56 Charts). In addition, in the follow-up question asking if there were instances in which companies did not include certain technologies in bids due to concerns over IP protection, 28% of private sector respondents said their company decided not to include certain technologies in bids because of IP concerns. Most alarming, 61% of the private sector respondents in the Vital Signs 2024 Survey who choose not to bid on certain DoD contracts out of fear that DoD requirements for IP will put their company’s rights at risk identified as small businesses.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

Slow growth emboldens hostile powers – fast growth deters them.

Eric Edelman and Hal Brands 17, Hal Brands is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Eric Edelman is counselor at CSBA and the Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at SAIS., 6-21-2017, "America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/america-and-geopolitics-upheaval

"The essence of a revolution is that it appears to contemporaries as a series of more or less unrelated upheavals,” Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969. “But the crises which form the headlines of the day are symptoms of deep-seated structural problems.” Kissinger wrote this passage as the postwar international system was coming under unprecedented strain, with profound shifts in the global distribution of power driving incessant disruptions in U.S. foreign policy. His admonition applies just as well today, at the onset of a new era of upheaval. During Donald Trump’s presidency and after, U.S. foreign policy is likely to be wracked by crises. The instability and violence along a resurgent Russia’s periphery, the growing frictions with an increasingly assertive China, the provocations of a rapidly nuclearizing North Korea and the profound chaos at work throughout the Middle East: these and other challenges have recently tested U.S. officials and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future. The world now seems less stable and more dangerous than at any time since the Cold War; the number and severity of global crises are increasing. Yet crises do not occur in a vacuum; they are symptomatic of deeper changes in the international order. Accordingly, America’s responses will be ill-informed and astrategic unless Washington first forms a deeper conception of the current moment. The geopolitical changes underway are often framed in terms of “polarity”—the debate on whether America’s “unipolar moment” is over and a multipolar world has emerged. But this debate is misleading. On the one hand, discussions of polarity frequently exaggerate American decline, obscuring the fact that even though Washington’s international superiority has diminished, its global lead over any single challenger remains quite impressive. On the other hand, the polarity debate actually obscures both the degree and breadth of the ongoing changes in the international system, and of the challenges facing American officials. The fundamental fact of international politics today is that the post–Cold War era has ended. The defining features of that period were uncontested U.S. and Western primacy, marked declines in ideological struggle and great-power conflict, and remarkable global cooperation in addressing key international-security challenges. Now, however, the world has returned to a more normal—which is to say, more dangerous and unsettled—state. The core characteristics of the emerging era are the gradual erosion of U.S. and Western primacy, revived great-power competition across all three key regions of Eurasia, renewed global ideological struggle, and empowerment of the agents of international strife and disorder. What makes the present period so tumultuous is that these forces often compound one another’s destabilizing effects; moreover, their collective impact is magnified by a growing uncertainty about whether America and other traditional defenders of the international system will continue playing that role in the future. American primacy is not dead, in other words, and true multipolarity is still a long ways off. But U.S. primacy is far more contested than at any time in a quarter-century, and the friendly contours of the post–Cold War system have given way to a darker and more challenging environment. The best way to understand the present era is to compare it to the previous one. The post–Cold War era was defined by four phenomena that made it historically favorable to American interests. The first was uncontested U.S. primacy. America emerged from the Cold War with clear economic dominance, possessing nearly 25 percent of global GDP in 1994. It controlled nearly 40 percent of world defense outlays, along with utterly unrivaled advantages in global power-projection capabilities. Crucially, these capabilities not only gave Washington an enormous lead over any geopolitical competitor; they also provided the ability—as Saddam Hussein discovered in 1991—to marshal decisive military might in virtually all the key strategic regions around the world. In the nineteenth century, the British ship of the line symbolized London’s global primacy; in the late twentieth century, the American carrier strike group symbolized an even more imposing preeminence. Nor was American dominance purely unilateral, because it was powerfully accentuated by the strengths of the broader Western coalition. In 1994, America’s treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific accounted for 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending, giving Washington and its closest friends upward of 70 percent of global economic power and military spending. Throughout the post–Cold War era, allied involvement thus lent added force to U.S. diplomacy on key issues of international order; from the Gulf War to the war in Afghanistan, allied contributions reinforced America’s ability to project military power overseas. This was no balance of power; it was one of the most pronounced imbalances the world had ever seen. U.S. dominance was also evident in a second phenomenon—the decline of international ideological competition. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has been much derided, but it captured three indisputable facts about the post–Cold War era: that democracy and markets were spreading more widely than ever before; that there was no credible global competitor to the liberal-capitalist model; and that even former U.S. enemies, such as Russia, and authoritarian states, such as China, were making unprecedented efforts to integrate into the liberal order either economically, politically or both. To be clear, Western concepts of human rights and political democracy were far from fully accepted in these countries, and Russian and Chinese leaders—among others—sooner or later came to see liberal proselytism as a grave threat. But the intense ideological struggles of the twentieth century were clearly over, and the liberal model seemed incontestably ascendant. These first two phenomena related to a third—the remarkable great-power comity of the post–Cold War era. The end of the Cold War did not, as was widely expected, see a fragmenting of America’s alliances, or a resurgence of Japanese and German revisionism. Rather, the major Western powers remained tied to America, largely because Washington continued to provide crucial global public goods such as security and leadership of an open global economy. Moreover, the sheer geopolitical dominance of the Western coalition meant that it was dangerous if not impossible for countries like Russia and China to mount serious great-power challenges of their own. Admittedly, there remained sometimes-serious disagreements between the United States and these countries, over issues from NATO enlargement to Taiwan, and those disagreements would grow more pronounced with time. But the danger of great-power war was nonetheless historically low during the 1990s, and great-power rivalries were more muted than at any time since the Concert of Europe. All of these characteristics fed into a final post–Cold War phenomenon: remarkable multilateral cooperation in addressing the relatively mild international disorder of the day. With great-power conflict dormant, U.S. foreign policy and the international community focused largely on combating lesser geopolitical “spoilers,” from ethnic cleansing to mass-casualty terrorism to the actions of aggressive regional powers such as Iraq or North Korea. These efforts, in turn, were greatly aided by the relatively tranquil state of international politics. The absence of great-power conflict made it far easier to organize broad coalitions to confront malevolent actors, whether Saddam Hussein in 1990–91 or Al Qaeda after 9/11. In the same vein, great-power peace allowed America and its allies to devote increasing attention to other forms of post–Cold War disorder. The fact that NATO could focus on “out of area” interventions for roughly two decades after the Soviet collapse, for instance, was directly related to the paucity of more traditional geopolitical threats. It would be a mistake, of course, to exaggerate how benign or pliable the post–Cold War environment really was. The “global disorder” of the period hardly seemed mild for the victims of catastrophic terrorism or ethnic cleansing; U.S. primacy was not omnipotence, as Washington’s travails in places from Mogadishu to Srebrenica to Helmand amply demonstrated. But by any meaningful historical comparison, the structure of international politics was uniquely conducive to the promotion of U.S. interests and ideals—a fact that is now the source of some nostalgia as the global system changes in five significant ways. The first key structural shift underway is the erosion of U.S. and Western primacy. It is incorrect to see this change as a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, for true multipolarity will not arrive anytime soon. The United States still possesses substantial economic advantages over its closest competitor, China, namely an $18 trillion GDP that (as of 2015) was more than $7 trillion larger than China’s, and a per-capita GDP roughly four times that of China. U.S. defense spending also remains around three times that of China, and Washington maintains enormous advantages in the power-projection capabilities—aircraft carriers, advanced tactical aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines and others—that allow it to command the global commons and exert disproportionate influence around the world. What has happened over the past fifteen years, however, is that the extent of U.S. and Western primacy has diminished. The U.S. shares of global wealth and military spending have declined from 25 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in 2004, to around 22 and 34 percent in 2015. The drop-off among America’s allies has been more severe. U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific commanded 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending in 1994; those shares had fallen to 39 and 25 percent, respectively, by 2015. Moreover, many of America’s most powerful allies—particularly in Europe—have undergone severe military decline. The British Royal Navy once ruled the waves, but now struggles to rule even the waters around the home islands; the German army faces equipment shortfalls so severe that its troops have had to exercise with broomsticks in place of machine guns. Western overmatch remains impressive by historical standards, but the global playing field is slanted much less dramatically than before. Meanwhile, the relative positions of America’s principal competitors have improved significantly. Russian economic power remains unimpressive, but an aggressive military modernization program has roughly doubled defense spending over a decade while also developing the capabilities needed to compete with the West—airborne assault units, special-operations forces, ballistic and other missile systems, and anti-access/area-denial capabilities, among others. China, meanwhile, has expanded its share of global wealth more than threefold, from 3.3 to 11.8 percent, between 1994 and 2015, and its share of world military spending more than fivefold, from 2.2 to 12.2 percent. As in Russia’s case, China’s military buildup has featured the tools—ballistic and cruise missiles, diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, advanced air defenses, and fourth-generation fighters—needed to offset longstanding U.S. advantages in the Asia-Pacific, as well as capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, needed to project Chinese power even further afield. The uncontested U.S. primacy of the 1990s has become the highly contested primacy of today. This is no academic distinction; the pernicious effects of this shift are already being seen. The decline of allied military power has made it harder for those allies to defend themselves against growing security threats, and to make more than token military contributions to addressing global challenges such as the rise of the Islamic State. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously warned in 2011 that NATO faced a “dim if not dismal future” if European capabilities continued to erode; American frustration has only become more pronounced since then. More fundamentally still, the changing power balance means that U.S. rivals and adversaries now have greater ability to shift the international order to suit their own preferences, a factor driving a second key shift in global politics today. If great-power comity was the post–Cold War norm, great-power competition is the standard today. Authoritarian rivals that were never fully reconciled to the post–Cold War order, and accepted it only to the degree compelled by U.S. and Western primacy, are now using their greater relative power to push back against that order in key geopolitical regions from East Asia to the Middle East to eastern Europe. Because Washington’s principal adversaries can concentrate their resources regionally, rather than having to distribute them globally, the power shifts that have occurred in recent years are having outsized effects at the regional level. And because the regional orders now being challenged have been the foundation of the broader post–Cold War system, these countries are effectively subverting the system “from the bottom up.” Consider Chinese behavior in East Asia. Chinese leaders always saw America’s post–Cold War dominance as a transitory condition to be suffered for a time, not something to be welcomed forever. And so as China’s geopolitical potential has soared, Beijing has taken bolder steps to erect a Sino-centric regional order. It has asserted expansive maritime claims and used techniques such as island building to shift facts on the ground without risking a premature military clash with America. It has challenged longstanding norms such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and steadily increased efforts to coerce its neighbors. It has probed and worked to weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships, by simultaneously wooing and intimidating America’s regional friends. Finally, Beijing has conducted a major military buildup focused precisely on capabilities that will give it dominance over its neighbors and prevent the United States from intervening in their defense. These efforts are now having an accumulating effect. Chinese coercion has dramatically altered perceptions of momentum and power in the region, while the Chinese buildup has made the outcome of a Sino-American war over Taiwan or other regional hotspots far more doubtful. Chinese economic diplomacy has drawn many countries in the region closer into Beijing’s economic orbit. “America has lost” the struggle for regional supremacy, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines announced in 2016—an exaggeration, surely, but a marker of how contested the region has become. Great-power competition is even more unvarnished in Europe, where a militarily resurgent Russia is reasserting lost influence and undoing key aspects of the post–Cold War settlement. Moscow has waged wars of conquest against Georgia and Ukraine; it has worked to undermine NATO and the European Union through efforts ranging from paramilitary subversion, to military intimidation, to financial support for anti-EU and anti-NATO politicians and other intervention in Western political processes. In doing all of this, Russia has fundamentally contested the notion of a post–Cold War Europe whole, free and at peace; it has challenged—with some success—the institutions that have long maintained security and prosperity in the region. And as with China, these actions have been underwritten by a military buildup that has restored Russian overmatch along NATO’s exposed eastern flank and enhanced Moscow’s ability to project power as far afield as the Middle East. Russia has become an ambitious great power again: it is asserting its prerogatives in ways that only seem anomalous in contrast to the remarkable cooperation of the post–Cold War era. Finally, geopolitical revisionism is alive and well in the Middle East. Iran is not in the same power-political class as Russia or China, but it is a regional power seeking to assert regional mastery. It is doing so via the use of proxies and its own forces in conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, via the weaponization of sectarianism in countries across the region, and via investments in asymmetric capabilities such as ballistic missiles and special-operations forces. This agenda has led Tehran into conflict with U.S. security partners such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; it has contributed significantly to the instability that plagues the region. Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, of course. But taken collectively, they represent a geopolitical sea change from the post–Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails sharper international tensions than have been known for decades, and the return of Cold War phenomena such as arms races and security dilemmas. It entails intensifying conflicts over the global rules of the road, on issues from freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force. It entails starker struggles over states that reside at the intersection of rival great powers’ spheres of influence, such as the Philippines, Ukraine and Iraq. Finally, it raises the prospect that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war—a phenomenon that seemed to have followed the Soviet Union onto the ash heap of history with the end of the Cold War. The world has not yet returned to the titanic geopolitical struggles of the twentieth century, but it is returning to the historical norm of great-power strife—with all the dangers that entails.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

Independently, small defense contractors key to innovation and growth.

Todd Lopez, 2-16-2022, Writer and Editor at the U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Report: Consolidation of Defense Industrial Base Poses Risks to National Security," U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2937898/dod-report-consolidation-of-defense-industrial-base-poses-risks-to-national-sec/tw

A report just released by the Defense Department reveals consolidation in the defense industrial base, which poses risks to national security. The report lays out a series of proposed efforts by the department — including finding ways to help more small businesses get involved — to help mitigate that risk. The "defense industrial base" refers to the collection of businesses, large and small, that DOD relies upon to provide the materials, equipment and weapons systems needed to defend the nation. In recent years, the report shows, the number of companies within the defense industrial base has shrunk dramatically. The decrease in participation decreases the diversity of suppliers and at the same time decreases the kind of competition that spurs innovation and lowers prices paid for defense materials by the taxpayer, the report says. "Since the 1990s, the defense sector has consolidated substantially, transitioning from 51 to 5 aerospace and defense prime contractors," the report states. "As a result, DOD is increasingly reliant on a small number of contractors for critical defense capabilities." Over the last 30 years, the report continues, the number of suppliers for things such as tactical missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, and satellites have all declined dramatically. For instance, 90% of missiles now come from just three sources, the report says. During a background briefing in advance of the report's release, senior administration officials discussed measures the department will take to increase competition within a shrinking defense industrial base and why those efforts are important. "Competition within the [defense industrial base] is vital to the department because it improves cost and performance and fosters greater innovation for the products and services needed to support national defense," one official said. "Competition is also an indicator of the necessary industrial capability and capacity to deliver the systems, key technologies, materials, services and products DOD requires to support its mission." Within the DOD report are five recommendations for how to increase participation in the existing defense industrial base and spur increased completion there, as well. "The department's specific actions will address the systematic challenges to expanding competition and ensuring a sufficient domestic capacity and capability in the priority industrial base sectors while promoting greater competition," the official said. First, the department plans to strengthen oversight of mergers between companies within the defense industrial base. The report says when new mergers between existing defense contractors are proposed and the department identifies such mergers as posing a risk to DOD interests, the department will support the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice in antitrust investigations and recommendations. The report highlights the challenges to planning for and securing the intellectual property rights and data needed to promote competition over the long term. "We'll ... address the challenges to acquiring intellectual property and associated technical data rights to support greater competition throughout a system's lifecycle," the official said. The number of players now in the defense industrial base is insufficient, the report says, and the department would like to see more companies involved competing to support defense priorities. One way to do that is through the use of acquisition authorities such as "other transaction authority," as well as commercial solutions openings that will allow the department more flexibility to better operate in the commercial space and make it easier for contractors who haven’t worked with DOD to become involved. Small businesses also play a big part in DOD's plans. "Specifically for the small businesses, I would say that we've seen a decline in our small business prime contractors, and we believe that increasing that, reversing that downward trend will help us and help the mission and the warfighter," the official said. Finally, the department hopes to increase supply chain resiliency in five areas designated as priorities. These areas include casting and forgings, missiles and munitions, energy storage and batteries, strategic and critical materials, and microelectronics.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

US economic decline causes war—economic fragmentation and populism

Sundaram and Popov 19 (Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought. Vladimir Popov is a Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin. “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War” 2/12/2019. Accessed 6/18/2024. ) wtk

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

Defense industry is key to the economy – it affects manufacturing, jobs, and supply chains.

O’Neil et al 16 [Brendan O’Neil, Managing Director, Shane Norton, Director Leslie Levesque, Senior Consultant, Charlie Dougherty, Consultant, Vardan Genanyan, Consultant, “Aerospace and Defense Economic Impact Analysis: A report for the Aerospace Industries Association”, IHS Economics, April 2016, ]

The U.S. Aerospace & Defense industry is a global leader in innovation and significant component of the nation’s advanced manufacturing base of industries. IHS was commissioned to quantify the economic contributions of the U.S. Aerospace and Defense (A&D) industry to the U.S. economy and provide enhanced understanding of the industry’s extensive supply chain, by economic sector at the national and state level. The key findings of this study measure the economic contribution the A&D industry makes in terms of employment, value added (contribution to GDP), sales (output), labor income and taxes within the broader economy. In 2015, the U.S. economy posted $30.7 trillion in total sales activity; of that total, IHS estimates that $786 billion was supported by the A&D industry’s economic activity. This occurred through approximately $349 billion in direct sales activity, which initiated additional activity as dollars flowed through the A&D supply chain. This “multiplier effect” drove an additional $256 billion in indirect sales. Further, companies and their suppliers hired and paid employees, who, in turn, consumed goods and services in the economy. These induced effects amounted to $181 billion in 2015. The graphic below depicts this flow of economic impacts. The sales activity generated by the A&D industry triggers additional economic benefits – workers must be hired and retained in order to deliver goods and services; companies reap additional profits and make larger contributions to GDP; and both companies and their employees must pay taxes. In this realm, IHS estimates that in 2015 the A&D industry fueled the following contributions to the U.S. economy: The U.S. A&D industry directly and indirectly employed 1.7 million workers engaged in the design and production of end-user goods and services and within the industry’s supply chain. About two-thirds of those workers were split about evenly between the civilian aviation and the defense/national security sector.  More specifically, within the A&D industry about 531,030 workers were employed in the design, manufacture and supply chain of civil and general aviation aircraft, helicopters and space systems. Since 2013, employment in the sector has decreased by a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of -0.38%, or by a net of 6,100 jobs.  Another 510,570 jobs were focused on the design, manufacture and supply chain of end-use military aircraft, ground and sea systems, armaments and space systems. Since 2013, the segment’s employment base experienced overall stability, decreasing by a CAGR of -0.03%, or a net loss of less than 1,000 jobs.  Jobs supported by the A&D industry represent approximately two percent of the nation’s total employment base. Direct A&D industry jobs combined with those supported in the industry’s supply chain represented 13 percent of the nation’s manufacturing employment base.  For every million dollars in direct sales activity, eight employees are supported throughout the supply chain and across economic sectors.  The A&D industry generated $300 billion in economic value, which represented 1.8 percent of total nominal GDP in the U.S. The output supported by the A&D industry directly and through the supply chain represented about 10 percent of manufacturing output in the U.S.  Labor income supported by the A&D industry represented about 2.3 percent of the nation’s total labor income. The average labor income per job within the A&D industry (both producers of end-use goods and services as well as the supply chain) amounted to just over $93,000 – or approximately 44 percent above the national average – reflecting the highly skilled nature of the workforce. The contribution to tax receipts from the A&D industry was $63 billion, or about 1.7 percent of the total tax revenues received by the federal and state and local governments. The U.S. A&D industry is a broad complex of firms performing a variety of functions including service delivery in support of operations and the manufacturing of goods and of materials, components, systems and platforms for civil aviation, space, and national security applications. For the purposes of this analysis, the A&D industry is defined by a set of associated sectors categorized under the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) that include firms that produce goods and services for end use by A&D industry customers, while other sub-sectors are predominately comprised of suppliers that support production. These two primary groupings are described as having a ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ impact on the economy; firms that engage in producing goods and services for end use are considered to have a ‘direct’ impact on the economy (for a list of these sectors, see Table 1 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report), while firms in the supply chain are considered to have an ‘indirect’ impact on the economy (for a list of these sectors, see Table 2 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report). Further, firms supplying to ‘direct’ manufacturers are classified as ‘tier I’ and firms supplying to the ‘tier I’ suppliers are classified as ‘tier II’. In addition to this tiered classification, there is a portion of the supplier base that does not fall within the A&D industry. As a point of reference, firms that supply management consulting, transportation services or office equipment to the tier I and II A&D-supplier community do not constitute the A&D supplier base, but are included as part of the industry’s indirect and induced impact (for a list of these sectors, see Table 3 in the Approach and Methodology section of this report). The A&D industry is a vital component of the US economy, not solely for the role the industry plays in national security, transportation and technological innovation, but also because its influence spans many sectors and every state throughout the country. From commercial airliners to military vehicle manufacturing, the A&D industry calls upon businesses across the nation to supply goods and services for end-use production. From these transactions, the A&D industry supported an average of nearly 2.8 million jobs between 2013 and 2015, representing approximately two percent of total U.S. employment and produced an average of $301 billion in total economic value, or 1.8 percent of nominal U.S. GDP. For much of the previous five decades, the U.S. manufacturing base has experienced a continuous and sometimes precipitous decline as global market forces drove firms to close, downsize, or relocate abroad. The manufacturing segments associated with A&D have certainly not been immune to this trend; however, over the past several years, strong growth in international markets has driven resurgence in the sector, which has helped accelerate the country’s recent economic recovery. Over the past five years, the U.S. manufacturing industry has enjoyed an average annual growth rate in payrolls of 1.5 percent. Meanwhile, the transportation manufacturing sector, which includes the manufacture of ships, aircraft, and locomotives, posted an average annual growth rate in payrolls of 3.6 percent – outpacing the 1.7 percent growth rate of total non-farm payrolls over that same period. The economic impact of the A&D industry goes well beyond the companies directly involved in the production of finished goods. The lengthy process of bringing these products to market supports a variety of services that are critical to the success of the industry. The A&D value chain extends throughout the US – from engineering and research and development efforts to the highly capital intensive sectors that provide raw and intermediate materials and components. The result is an extended network of companies that forge and fabricate metal, design and build complex systems, and assemble the finished goods that are ultimately required by the industry. Furthermore, the economic activity associated with end use and supply chain ripple out to a broader set of economic sectors as wages earned are spent across the economy, benefitting sectors ranging from retail trade to the leisure and hospitality sector. The A&D industry drives economic growth at the local level as well, as many states across the United States depend heavily on the jobs and incomes created by the aerospace and defense industry. From the aerospace manufacturers and suppliers in Washington and Southern California to the defense contractors in Texas and Washington DC/Northern Virginia area, the A&D industry serves as an economic keystone that not only creates jobs and boosts wages, but also provides a reliable stream of tax revenue for state and local governments.

2024 CNDI Affirmative
Defense Industry Affirmative › 1AC › 1ac – Economy Advantage

The defense industry is in decline – there’s a lack of investment and rampant consolidation.

NDIA 23, 02-10-2023, “Vital Signs 2023: Posturing the U.S. Defense Industrial Base for Great Power Competition," Pg. 5, National Defense Industrial Association, https://www.ndia.org/-/media/sites/ndia/policy/vital-signs/2023/ndia_vitalsigns2023_final_v3.pdf, accessed 6/26/2024 // QUEERAMID

The capacity of the U.S. defense industrial base to grow its output, fulfill a surge in military demands, and reconstitute in a major conflict stands as a key test of its health and readiness. There is a mismatch between what our national strategies aim to achieve and how our defense industrial base is postured. Key industrial readiness indicators for great power competition are going in the wrong direction: Fewer People. In 1985, the U.S. had 3 million workers in the defense industry.2 By 2021, the U.S. had 1.1 million workers in the sector. Fewer Companies. In the last five years, the defense ecosystem has lost a net 17,045 companies3 and the Department of Defense estimates the number of small businesses participating in the defense industrial base has declined by over 40% in the last decade.4 A Shrinking Financial Commitment. From 1985 to 2021, national defense spending dropped from 5.8% to 3.2% of U.S. GDP5, and the Congressional Budget Office projects a further decline to 2.7% by 2032.6 Less Predictability. In 13 of the last 14 years, the federal government has operated under a continuing resolution (CR) for part of the year, preventing new starts essential for modernization and delaying increased production rates, multi-year procurement authorities, and advanced procurement funding essential for building capacity. Limited Surge Capacity. A lack of investment in infrastructure, equipment, idle capacity, and tooling, as well as an over-reliance on sole source suppliers, challenges both the readiness and the reconstitution of industry. The federal government must prioritize removing policies, regulations and authorities that are strangling the defense industrial base and make significant, sustained and predictable financial investments to rebuild the DIB’s strategic endurance and resilience. In the Vital Signs 2023 survey, NDIA member companies are emphasizing that the federal acquisition process is growing more – not less – cumbersome; the lack of budget stability is breaking companies and causing significant workforce uncertainty; and the challenges of finding and retaining talent are impacting even our most strategic defense programs. The current inflation level was also highlighted as a cross-cutting issue impacting both the acquisition process and workforce management. Strong defense industrial readiness – ensuring our warfighters have everything they need so they never engage in a fair fight – is a key element of national deterrence. And if conflict ever erupted, national leaders will only have credible response options if they inherit the right investments to the DIB from this current generation of leaders. The government and the private sector must adapt, together, to address these challenges.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Cap › L – Idealism

The aff’s radical open-endedness and indiscriminate anti-instrumentality is weaponized by capitalism – their praxis feeds logics of climate denialism, neoliberal atomization, and infinitely stalls collective action

Levine 23 (Caroline Levine is a professor of humanities at Cornell University. 10/27/23, “In the Humanities, Open-Endedness Should Not Be An End in Itself”, https://www.chronicle.com/article/in-the-humanities-open-endedness-should-not-be-an-end-in-itself?utm_source=Iterable&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=campaign_8160433_nl_Academe-Today_date_20231031&cid=at&sra=true)//SHP

Scholars of the arts and culture return, again and again, to the value of open-endedness. We celebrate pauses: suspension, undecidability, illegibility, opacity, complexity. We valorize ruptures: revolution, resistance, fragmentation, shock, break, unsettling, dismantling, disorder. And we privilege dissolution: fluidity, process, liminality, hybridity, boundary-crossing, flow. These moves often overlap. Sometimes they are indistinguishable. Hybridity can rupture a system dependent on binaries. Dismantling the status quo can open a new space for reflection. Taken together, these moves bespeak a common purpose: to crack the world open to alternative ways of thinking and being — to get in the way of business as usual. My research shows that one key value guides thinkers as different as Lionel Trilling and Fred Moten, Theodor Adorno and Gloria Anzaldúa, Stephen Greenblatt and Bill Brown. It is so pervasive across our fields that it seems to speak for itself. And so, like all norms, it carries its own limitations, repetitions, and exclusions. The name I will use for this value here is anti-instrumentality. Max Weber and, later, the thinkers of the Frankfurt School made a powerful case against what they called instrumental rationality — Zweckrationalität. They argued that capitalism and totalitarianism rest on a kind of means-ends thinking that calculates value according to the efficient, rationalized achievement of economic and technical progress. Instrumental rationality emerged out of modern Europe, feeding the “hungry furnaces” of capitalist accumulation by turning the world into objects for its own use and profit. For centuries, Europeans and their white inheritors have used instrumental rationality to justify themselves as the only real subjects of history and to treat non-European people and homelands as objects to be exploited for their ends. And so, across politically minded scholarship in the humanities — including Marxist, deconstructive, critical race, postcolonial, queer, environmental, and feminist criticism — scholars have sought to unsettle and resist Western assumptions about the human subject: implicitly white, straight, adult, able-bodied, European “Man,” who invokes his exclusive capacity for rationality to exploit all others. This critique has been persuasive and significant. But the argument against instrumentality has gone further. The most influential theorists in the aesthetic humanities have warned against all instrumentality — not just Western-style instrumental rationality but all means-ends thinking. All plans and programs are dangerous. Even the most utopian visions of a revolutionary future, we are told, only re-entrench existing dominations. As Michel Foucault puts it: “To imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system.” Theodor Adorno, though deeply unlike Foucault in many ways, shares this position: “One may not cast a picture of utopia in a positive manner,” he writes. What is productive instead is to draw attention to what’s “missing”: “the determined negation of that which merely is” which “always points at the same time to what should be.” According to this logic, we do our best political work when we dwell in restless negativity, using imperfections to point beyond themselves to something other, the undefined to-come. This argument still holds force. For , it is crucial: To bring home, in local and determinate ways and with a fullness of concrete detail, our constitutional inability to imagine Utopia itself: and this, not owing to any individual failure of imagination but as the result of the systemic, cultural and ideological closure of which we are all one way or another prisoners. Jared Sexton against praxis, prescription, and prognosis in favor of reaching for “an indiscernible something beyond” Being: “imagining it in and as the ruins of Being, after the end of the world, in an entirely other relation to the nothing from whence it comes.” Or as Jack Halberstam puts it, Revolution will come in a form we cannot yet imagine … We cannot say what new structures will replace the ones we live with yet, because once we have torn shit down, we will inevitably see more and see differently and feel a new sense of wanting and being and becoming. For these thinkers, the resistance to instrumentality is political. But anti-instrumentality also underpins major theories of aesthetics. Since Kant, up through Adorno and into our own time, theorists have defined the aesthetic precisely by its disturbance of means-ends thinking. Art cannot be reduced to exchange and profit or to the communication of moral values or information. It halts the reflexive rush to calculability, efficiency, and utility. This is the definition of art that leads the aesthetic humanities — different from history and philosophy, in this respect — to return, again and again, to anti-instrumentality. Jonathan Kramnick, to give a recent example, argues that a disciplinary training in the arts means “spelling out the open-ended or the unresolved.” From Marxist critique to Black and queer studies, and from deep ecology to aesthetic autonomy, the logic of anti-instrumentality connects otherwise conflicting schools of thought. And so, if you look at almost any essay or book in the aesthetic humanities, it will conclude with a kind of deliberate open-endedness — a soaring refusal to spell out the future. Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt write: “We sincerely hope that you will not be able to say what it all adds up to; if you could, we would have failed.” Sara Ahmed’s The Cultural Politics of Emotion closes this way: “Justice involves feelings … Where we go, with these feelings, remains an open question.” For Derek Attridge, “the opening up of possibilities that had remained closed, is — however risky — a good in itself, particularly when the process is a continuous one, allowing no permanent settling of norms and habits.” Dora Zhang reclaims the political potential of description on the grounds that it challenges “teleology and instrumentality.” Peter Boxall invites us to “think our way into the unpictured world to come” by way of literature’s “unthought conjunctions.” At the end of Black Aliveness, Kevin Quashie issues “a call that exists and vibrates beyond the scope of the rule of the world as we know it — an imaginary that inflects how we can behold ourselves and each other.” And for Timothy Bewes, the novel as a form is uniquely important because it gives us “access to a thought that, in its essence, refuses the ideological formulations of our world.” In other words, critics of all stripes refuse the entrenched dominations of the status quo by beckoning to the indefinite, unmappable possibilities beyond. Anti-instrumentality has proved an unusually tough and resilient underpinning for the study of art and culture, its basic presumptions uniting critics who fiercely disagree with each other about everything else. But there is trouble lurking in these arguments. Anti-instrumentality may seem to do the heroic work of uniting political revolutionaries and defenders of the aesthetic, but in fact it falls short on both sides. First, because autonomous art serves political ends. And second, because anti-instrumentality does not in fact yield the revolutionary justice critics have so often hoped and claimed for it. Champions of anti-instrumentality return, again and again, to the freedom that art brings. In The Poet’s Freedom, Susan Stewart argues that because art resists use, commodification, and mastery, the artist can embark on a “process of possibility without resolution.” For Attridge, it is the reader who is freed by the encounter with art: To read a poem and feel one is entering a new world of thought and feeling, to find oneself laughing at a surprising passage in a novel, to have one’s breath taken away by a speech performed on stage — these are experiences of alterity, of the impossible made suddenly possible, of the mind, and, sometimes, the body being changed by new configurations, new connections, new possibilities. For these scholars, art yields pleasures and thoughts and possibilities that push beyond dominant routines and assumptions. And as art breaks free from dogma and determination, it frees us from the torpid conventionality of the status quo. But this also means that we are already fully in the domain of the political. After all, freedom is nothing if not a political value. And that is why political and aesthetic arguments can so easily be yoked together. The politics of aesthetic anti-instrumentality is not merely academic. It was put to powerful use in the Cold War. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviets charged that the United States was a shallow and materialist nation, obsessed only with wealth and military might. The U.S. State Department responded in part by showcasing artistic freedom. One effort, a traveling exhibition called “Advancing American Art,” featured a range of innovative modern American painters including Georgia O’Keeffe and Jacob Lawrence. Reports suggested that these bold and unexpected paintings had success in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The State Department planned to take the show to Guatemala, Iran, and Cambodia. But when the U.S. Congress and the press found out about the exhibit, there was a huge public stink. Public pressure forced the State Department to cancel the show. In response, the strategists of the newly formed CIA launched a covert arts program. funneled resources to the literary magazine Encounter and to the Chekhov Publishing House, which printed the works of Nabokov and other Russian émigrés. It supported the Nigerian magazine Black Orpheus, which published some of the most influential Négritude writers, including Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor. Mundo Nuevo, the Paris quarterly of Latin American writing, which published Gabriel García Márquez, Octavio Paz, and Mario Vargas Llosa, was exposed as a CIA venture early on. The Cold War Program for Cultural Freedom was a major source of support not only for artists and writers but also for the academic humanities. The CIA provided funding for programs in Asian and Latin American studies, foreign languages, and American literature. in creative writing drew support as weapons in the anti-Communist struggle. Richard Nixon poured vast sums into the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Cuts to the NEA and NEH began in 1990 — shortly after the Berlin Wall fell. In other words, the CIA instrumentalized — we might even say, weaponized — the anti-instrumentality of the aesthetic. They saw that difficult, experimental art could stand for freedom from political ends and then they put that freedom to political ends. And this was not a misuse or misunderstanding of artistic anti-instrumentality. Freedom is the value that underpins arguments for aesthetic autonomy. And yet, how could the same politics possibly unite thinkers as radically different as Jack Halberstam and Richard Nixon, Susan Stewart and Aimé Césaire? The answer is that aesthetic autonomy goes hand in hand with a specifically indiscriminate version of political negation. Peter J. Kalliney that African writers in the middle of the 20th century embraced aesthetic autonomy for a wide variety of conflicting ends, including “emancipation from colonialism; independence from the postcolonial nation-state; avoidance of politics in order to foster collaboration among multiple constituencies; freedom from politics altogether as a professional disposition; and ideological neutrality in the Cold War.” Motivating anti-imperialists, nationalists, Cold War spies, and those keen to avoid politics altogether, anti-instrumentality can — and does — set itself against all constraints, all rules, all plans. This politics is too indiscriminate. Anti-instrumentality lends itself to dreams of freedom from any and all norms. It does not necessarily serve collective well-being. In recent years, it has become especially clear that a freedom from norms and constraints does not always align with the radical left or even with progressives. Authoritarian populist leaders have been celebrating resistance to rules in the interests — they say — of freeing people from state power. The Trump administration, for example, rolled back over one hundred environmental regulations, including fracking on Native lands, drilling in wildlife preserves, and dumping toxins in waterways. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro has gutted the environmental agencies that limit and penalize deforestation. And Narendra Modi in India has deregulated the sale of crude oil. From this perspective, the drive to resist norms has hastened the worst effects of climate catastrophe. Climate denialism is itself oddly consonant with the humanistic values of opacity and open-endedness. Called “merchants of doubt” by the historians Erik M. Conway and Naomi Oreskes, a small group of anti-communist strategists turned lobbyists set about undermining the policy prescriptions of scientists who had in fact come to a consensus about urgent dangers, their causes, and the need for government solutions: first tobacco, then acid rain and chlorofluorocarbons, and then, most destructively of all, climate change. Tech companies, too, embrace open-endedness and disruption, claiming to free work from traditional office cubicles, regulations, bureaucracy, schedules, and hierarchies in favor of sharing, convenience, and “personal empowerment.” This emancipation from traditional constraints has brought with it a terrible precarity for much of the labor force, as workers struggle to make ends meet by stringing together multiple unpredictable “gigs.” “Neoliberal subjects,” as Wendy Brown , “are controlled through their freedom.” The humanistic value of open-endedness has become perilously congruent with neoliberal precarity and onrushing climate catastrophe. And it is troubling, in this context, that scholars across the environmental humanities have been especially insistent on celebrating breaks and openings. Stacy Alaimo invites us to “dwell in the dissolve.” Donna Haraway urges us to recognize our complex mutual entanglements with a range of beings — from pigeons to estrogen — in order to refuse the usual “dictates of teleology, settled categories, and function” and shift us instead to “the realm of play.” Jenny Odell’s How to Do Nothing argues strenuously for open-endedness, deliberately refraining from identifying any particular plans or programs in favor of “an aimless aim, or a project with no goal.” And in A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None, Kathryn Yusoff urges a “destabilization of the mode of encounter” and “an insurgent geology for the end of the world.” All of this has been — and will continue to be — deeply important work. There is no question that as long as dominant structures of violence, dispossession, and oppression try to pass themselves off as common sense we will urgently need both critique and resistance. In this context, aesthetic objects that startle and surprise and baffle will help us recognize the limits of dominant ideologies, and to imagine ways of being and thinking and feeling otherwise. What has come to concern me, however, is that these have become their own common sense across the aesthetic humanities. I myself wrote three books that revolved around unsettling dominant structures before realizing how strange it was that I had never even imagined a different set of purposes. And as soon as I began to think directly about them, they seemed limiting and partial. And disturbing. What if open-endedness justifies an avoidance of planning and building, and reinforces the notion that it is not our job to find practical strategies to work against anthropogenic climate change and its calamitous and uneven consequences? What if it disempowers all of us who are working across the aesthetic humanities? I am now, like other humanists, struggling to find alternatives to systems that re-entrench injustice. But it is my hypothesis that the practice of concluding with calls to ever more complexity and possibility instead of sketching out plans of action feeds the logic of climate denialism and neoliberal atomization. It supports collective inaction. As long as the aesthetic humanities stress humility, wild imaginings, the unmaking of prevailing values, and dense entanglements, we push off the work of organized collective action to another moment. Barbara Leckie argues that while this “preparatory work” can be rightly “slow and laborious,” there comes a moment when “both individuals and collectives need to transition to ... action.” But how? So far, the daily work of teaching and writing in the aesthetic humanities remains overwhelmingly caught in the pause before action, rarely focusing on how to gather forces, how to plan and strategize for a different set of conditions, how to face the tough, imperfect struggle of making collective decisions and reclaiming public goods. The first step is to reframe the problem of instrumentality. Anna Tsing distinguishes between two models of use — one that is necessary to ordinary survival, “eating and being eaten,” and the other, a specifically capitalist instrumentality, that turns all kinds of lives into “resources for investment.” Ordinary survival cannot dispense with use. In fact, anti-instrumentality may be itself a product of the Western mind-body split. The Indigenous peoples of the Columbia River Valley both recognize water as a value in itself and understand it as useful for the preservation of human life and health. For “the people of the river,” writes Elizabeth Woody, “there is positively no concept of water as nonutilitarian.” What I propose, then, is an affirmative instrumentality for the aesthetic humanities. I turn here to the Potawatomi philosopher Kyle Powys Whyte’s concept of “collective continuance,” a framework for justice that does not dispense with use. Whyte defines collective continuance as “a society’s overall adaptive capacity to maintain its members’ cultural integrity, health, economic vitality, and political order into the future and avoid having its members experience preventable harms.” This definition allows Whyte to specify the injustices of settler colonialism. Colonizing forces destroy “the capacities that the societies that were already there — Indigenous societies — rely on for the sake of exercising their own collective self-determination over their cultures, economies, health, and political order.” “Collective continuance” points to a kind of means-ends thinking that does not immediately fall back into the trap of instrumental rationality. Collective continuance is a just end that is also an ongoing means. That is, collective continuance is the establishment of political, cultural, environmental, and economic conditions that allow collective life-worlds to flourish over time: It is a set of enabling conditions — an infrastructure. To reject all ends as constraining and oppressive is to miss the ways that some fundamental material conditions — clean water, fertile soil, breathable air — are the preconditions for all other activity. Or to put this another way: Collective continuance is a capacitating end, a crucial means of affording a range of other ends. Another term for collective continuance might be “sustainability.” This term has long drawn fire. As often embraced by businesses as by environmental activists, sustainability implies the continuation of life as we know it, which for many in business and politics includes expectations of ongoing economic growth, competition, and accumulation. Yet in fact, these dominant systems are dramatically unsustainable. I think we should recast sustainability as a neutral term: It refers to the capacity to keep any state of affairs going over time, just or unjust. And what climate change has made suddenly clear is that sustaining must be a goal for social and racial justice. Collective continuance describes a genuine sustainability — the vast and urgent project of sustaining collective life over generations. And for that work, we are going to need to start planning and building.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Cap › L – Horizontalism

The 1AC’s horizontal heuristic is powerless in the face of state repression. Relying on ad hoc structures of trust, shared identity, and affinity to cohere [mutual aid/direct action/whatever] allows the state to inject repressive forces along those same lines. Only effective organization built around democratic centralist procedures and clear structures of accountability can fight state disruption.

Miale, 22 (Marisa Miale, communist organizer and intellectual, former member of the Marxist Center and co-author of For an Internationalist DSA. Writing through study, revision, and comradeship with others involved in the communist project, “Dissolving the People and Electing Another: On Base-Building and Revolutionary Culture” Cosmonaut, Jan. 27th, 2022)

The failure of the communist movement has not occurred in a vacuum, with the blame falling only on ourselves. We operate under conditions of scrutiny and repression, with the state going so far as to infiltrate and surveil study groups and mutual aid collectives. To fight back, radicals use security culture, the cumulative practices and technologies for rooting out and inhibiting the work of state agents, informants and provocateurs, and the process of turning these practices into cultural norms and training new radicals in them. In many movement spaces, veterans zero in on the newly activated and begin passing down elements of security culture, like workers telling new hires about job hazards that management refuses to fix. Most radical security practices were developed for underground work, from pipeline blockades to anti-fascist streetfights, and reflect the needs of this work: encrypted apps, masks, need-to-know information sharing, unadvertised actions, and organizing within private groups of trusted comrades. None of these methods are foolproof. Informants and undercover police wiggle their way into Signal chats, catch wind of surprise actions, and identify masked militants. The game of cat-and-mouse between the ruling class and the Left is always developing, with no tactic offering absolute safety from state agents who are capable of learning and adapting to our forms of struggle. But for activists engaged in militant direct action, security culture often means the difference between imprisonment and walking free. Attempts to translate security culture into aboveground base-building and mass politics, however, often create friction between commitment to privacy and discretion and the needs of public, outward-facing work. Organizers radicalized in ambiguously legal protest movements naturally bring the tools they learn to other forms of work, such as economic organizing and study groups, as if encrypted texting is a spell to keep the police at bay rather than a contingent tactic for a specific terrain of struggle. This can look like union organizers convincing uninitiated workers to plan campaigns exclusively on Signal or radicals showing up to quiet vigils with their faces concealed. Rather than being applied unilaterally, these security practices need to be weighed against any trade-offs in effectiveness. For example, if an elderly tenant interested in getting their sink repaired has trouble learning to use Signal, it may be best to just err on the side of efficiency over precaution and send them an email. Similarly, if a new protester is intimidated by your balaclava, the benefit of earning their trust may outweigh the cost of being photographed at an action. Security practices cannot be applied mechanically, but need to be tailored to the needs of the moment. Dogma, whether political or tactical, hands infiltrators an easy-to-memorize means of blending in, while adaptability and critical thought makes their ingenuousness stand out. Methods developed for underground activity translate unevenly into party-building and mass work, sometimes fitting neatly, sometimes derailing good organizing, and sometimes turning into a useless ritual. Like our enemies in blue, we need to learn and adapt to stay ahead. While the world of cloak-and-dagger direct action may be alien to those of us immersed in mass work, state repression remains a constant threat. Agents have crashed mergers between parties, severed ties between dear comrades, and created entire collectives as fronts for their activity. A repressive apparatus capable of handling complexity and change requires an equally adaptive response. While most handbooks on security are meant for the underground, there is a small body of thought on security in public movements, mostly passed down directly from organizer to organizer. The closest thing to a bible of movement security is J Sakai’s Basic Politics of Movement Security, which takes security not as a specialized practice, but as something embedded in how we debate, organize and relate to each other. In his words: Security is not about being macho vigilantes or being super suspicious or having techniques of this or that. It’s not some spy game. Security is about good politics, that’s why it’s so difficult. And it requires good politics from the movement as a whole. Not from some special body or leadership or commission—from the movement as a whole. This is demanded of us. It’s part of the requirement to be a revolutionary, that you try to work on this.11 When Sakai uses the term good politics, he’s not referring to a certain Marxist doctrine, but to an ability to understand our circumstances and make the correct decisions, whether in mundane practice or grand strategy. In almost every instance of infiltration on public record, the state has taken advantage of the movement’s political failures, leveraging them to gather information or disrupt organizing. This is intimately tied to the cultural interventions discussed in the section above. The primary solution is not to design some special tool for identifying police, but to create resilient organizations that can’t go up in flames because of the ill intent of a minority of members. In the previous section, we identified two forms of uncomradely behavior—treating comrades like enemies to be torn down and objects to be used. The state is well-aware that we suffer from both of these problems, and have historically used them against us. Treating comrades like enemies hands the state a tool to sabotage revolutionary movements. Organizations only function when their components work harmoniously toward a common goal. When we engage in political conflict, we need to recognize that our comrades are trying to use different means to achieve the same ends, not to stop us from achieving those ends. Agent provocateurs, who do intend to stop us, almost always stoke bad faith in these disagreements to generate an organizational breakdown. Racism, sexism and other forms of oppression compound this problem. When these dynamics go unaddressed in the movement, leaders are able to form cliques that exclude the oppressed, denying them status as comrades and equals. Sakai calls this men’s solidarity, where the sense of brotherhood between men allows them to insulate each other from criticism. Sakai’s term is shorthand here: The problem is not specific to men or masculinity. White women and petty-bourgeois intellectuals, for instance, are both capable of creating similar reactionary in-groups that privilege their cultural norms and allow them to defend each other from criticism and change. If you look closely, you will also find similar patterns outside of oppressor-oppressed dynamics, though that’s where you’ll find them most chronically. Sakai explains the concept using the story of a radical named Tom, who he describes as an aggressive and macho movement leader in Chicago. His politics amount mostly to poor whites building “White Power” in alliance with the Black Power movement. Those who held this vision formed a wing of the Rainbow Coalition built by the Chicago Black Panthers, with whites representing themselves as a distinct national community. While Sakai leaves his last name and organization unspoken, he is implied to be Tom Mosher, a federal informant active in a number of radical organizations during the 1960s and 70s—the group Sakai describes seems to be either Rising Up Angry or the Young Patriots Organization, both based among working-class, white Appalachian migrants in Chicago. This is not a full treatment of the Rainbow Coalition or the Young Patriot Organization’s politics, which were as complex as any mass movement, but the point stands that their most conservative elements became a source of power for the state. Tom was insulated by a leadership clique of childhood friends, who recognized the issues with his politics and behavior but defended him because of their relationship. A group of white and indigenous women, disturbed by his behavior and believing him to be an informant, called for Tom’s expulsion and mobilized enough support to kick him out. This wasn’t, however, the end of his career in the movement. Tom ingratiated himself with middle-class leaders in Students for a Democratic Society, relying on the same bond of solidarity between men to worm his way back into activist spaces. He moved to California, freely participated in armed revolutionary organizing, and eventually either instigated or carried out the murder of a Black Panther before coming out publicly as an informant and testifying against the Panthers in court. A similar case forms the basis of Courtney Desiree Morris’s Why Misogynists Make Great Informants. In 2008, the anarchist organizer Brandon Darby revealed himself to be an informant for the FBI, reporting on protesters at the 2008 Republican National Convention. As Morris points out, however, Darby’s career as a provocateur began before he was officially recruited by the FBI. When he began informing, Darby already had a wealth of experience destabilizing movements for his handlers to draw on.12 As a leader in the Common Ground Collective, a disaster relief project in post-Katrina New Orleans, Darby dismissed, insulted and assaulted female volunteers, alienating women from the organization and its work. Common Ground blamed Black men in the surrounding community rather than the white men in its leadership, failing to hold Darby accountable for his actions. As Morris demonstrates, Darby’s comrades would not have had to catch him in the act of calling his handler to prevent him from informing. If they had held him accountable for his destructive behavior, he would not have reached the point where the FBI identified him as a possible asset and brought him into their fold. Instead, his male comrades’ desire to placate him shielded a future informant. In both of these case studies, agents were able to take advantage of insular, self-reinforcing cliques of male leaders and use them to drive out women and people of color. Cadre were scattered, recruits were alienated, and movements were driven into the ground. On the other hand, when we treat comrades like objects to be used, we create a different kind of harm. This commonly takes the form of tokenism—creating the illusion of concern for the oppressed by promoting a small number of them into leadership, without addressing their needs dynamically or building a mass base among them. Nonprofits are notorious for doing this by hiring individual women, low-wage workers and people of color as spokespeople while glossing over the complexity and division within those communities. This creates public goodwill by implying that the nonprofit’s positions reflect those of the community, whether that’s accurate or not. The culpability of liberal professionals in tokenism, however, does not mean revolutionaries are immune to it by virtue of our politics. Like the 80/20 rule described earlier, a run-of-the-mill organizing maxim can help us navigate the weeds of exclusion and tokenism: Leaders should always work to replace themselves with new leaders. Rather than creating a permanent clique that steers a collective for its lifespan, cadres should invest time and energy into bringing those on the periphery into the center, giving them mentoring and encouragement. This concept is deceptively simple, hiding a host of choices organizers must constantly make around who and where to direct their time and attention to. When you have time for a single organizing conversation, who do you choose to have it with? When you need to assign a task, which of your comrades do you ask first? When elections for new leaders are coming up, who do you encourage to run? Who do you treat with suspicion, and who do you choose to trust? All of these questions intersect with class and identity, slowly changing or maintaining the revolutionary Left’s composition. This makes every organizing act fundamentally political, because everything we do impacts who gains the expertise and confidence to step up and take leadership and who does not. This work does not stop when you’ve filled a quota of women or people of color in elected roles; it requires a permanent commitment to building mass leadership among the oppressed. Infiltrators thrive on both insularity and favoritism. These are two sides of the same coin, allowing them to take advantage of organizations that pivot too far in either direction. The self-replacement of leaders is not holy water that casts them out, but dispersing cliques and planning for cadres to regularly turn over leadership turns the state’s work surveilling and sabotaging the Left into a long war of attrition. Security is woven into every part of how we organize. Whether we know it or not, we’re constantly engaging with state agents trying to disrupt our work. Copjacketing, when one accuses a comrade of being an agent without hard evidence, only gives them another weapon to breed distrust and dysfunction. The most powerful defense against disruption is to build organizations that can’t be derailed by bad actors, tearing up the parts of our culture that the state most easily uses to its advantage and replacing them with tight relationships, clear politics, and democratic practice.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › AT Reformism Bad

Reforms are empirically successful – policy-driven solutions drove down incarceration rates in politically, geographically, and racially diverse states.

Schrantz et al. ‘18 [Dennis; director of the Center for Justice Innovation in Michigan; Stephen Debor; senior policy executive in charge of research, planning and automated data systems for the Michigan Department of Corrections; Marc Mauer; Executive Director of The Sentencing Project; 9-5-2018; "Decarceration Strategies: How 5 States Achieved Substantial Prison Population Reductions"; The Sentencing Project; https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/decarceration-strategies-5-states-achieved-substantial-prison-population-reductions/; accessed 7-14-2020; SM] *graphs have been omitted to preserve reading clarity

I. Executive Summary From 1980 until its peak in 2009, the total federal and state prison population of the United States climbed from about 330,000 to more than 1.6 million – a nearly 400% increase – while the total general population of the country grew by only 36%, and the crime rate fell by 42%.1) The catalyst of this prison expansion was policy changes that prioritized “getting tough” on crime. The national prison population began a gradual descent after 2009, lessening by nearly 113,000 (6%) from 2009 through 2016. Several factors contributed to this decline: ongoing decreases in crime rates leading to fewer felony convictions; scaling back “war on drugs” policies; increased interest in evidence-based approaches to sentencing and reentry; and growing concerns about the fiscal cost of corrections and its impact on other state priorities. The state of California alone was responsible for 36% of the overall population decline, a function of a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court ruling declaring its overcrowded prison system to be unconstitutional and subsequent legislative responses to reduce the use of state incarceration. Despite the decline, the overall pace of change is quite modest. A recent analysis documents that at the rate of change from 2009 to 2016 it will take 75 years to reduce the prison population by half. And while 42 states have experienced declines from their peak prison populations, 20 of these declines are less than 5%, while 8 states are still experiencing rising populations.2) To aid policymakers and criminal justice officials in achieving substantial prison population reductions, this report examines the experience of five states – Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South Carolina – that have achieved prison population reductions of 14-25%. This produced a cumulative total of 23,646 fewer people in prison with no adverse effects on public safety. (While a handful of other states have also experienced significant population reductions – including California, New York, and New Jersey – these have been examined in other publications, and so are not addressed here.3) The five states highlighted in this report are geographically and politically diverse and have all enacted a range of shifts in policy and practice to produce these outcomes. All five were engaged in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative process, spearheaded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the Council on State Governments, which was designed to work with stakeholders to respond to the driving forces of prison expansion in each state and to develop strategies for change in policy and practice. This report seeks to inform stakeholders in other states of the range of policy options available to them for significantly reducing their prison population. While we provide some assessment of the political environment which contributed to these changes, we do not go into great detail in this area since stakeholders will need to make their own determinations of strategy based on the particularities of their state. We note, though, that the leaders of reform varied among states, and emerged among governors, legislators, criminal justice officials, and advocacy organizations, often benefiting from media coverage and editorial support. The prison population reductions in these five states were achieved through data-driven policy reforms that pursued bipartisan consensus. Changes were advanced in the areas of risk and needs assessment, community supervision, alternatives to incarceration, sentencing and sanctions, prison release mechanisms, prisoner reentry and community reintegration.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › AT Epistemology First

The notion that affirmation is itself a political act does nothing to alter political structures.

Dorothy Figueira 7, Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Georgia, Ph.D. in Comparative Studies in Literature from the University of Chicago, “‘The Global South’: Yet Another Attempt to Engage the Other,” The Global South, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 2007, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40339239

Pedagogies of alterity seek to manage the other within the American continuum without analyzing non-Western reality. The Third World is studied in many American universities under the umbrella of multiculturalism and I will take this pedagogy as my point of reference, with the understanding that its deficiencies are also applicable to postcolonial studies and what I perceive to be envisioned by theorists of the global South. The practical reason for such packagings of alterity is obvious: it is easy. It does not involve learning about another culture or demand learning another language. It feeds American isolationism. In the Internet age, when the globalization of English has contributed to diminishing the need to learn other languages, the other can be consumed "on the cheap." Such celebrations of diversity in no way compromise American tendencies toward cultural provincialism, triumphalism, or indifference to the world. The resounding global education that a literature student is offered can consist of nothing more than snippets from Arundhati Roy, Toni Morrison, or Maxine Hong Kingston (Talbot). Such pedagogies of alterity presume that one can grasp the world by reading selections from representative women of color writing in the English language. Moreover, such pedagogies provide a real incentive not to respect the intellectual history or genealogy of an underrepresented area of study. There is a tendency to act as if "anybody can play at anything" (Rapaport 2). Alterity scholars, without much homework, can create works of purported sophistication masking a selectively ignorant exploration and ensuring a general failure of engagement. By pretending to honor the other, they actually demean it. Such scholars are often unaware that this other (the black, Native American, Asian) possesses a history and body of scholarship of its own. To "study" them is not an "anybody-can-play-pickup" game performed on a wide-open, untrammeled field (Rapaport 2). Often the object of the game seems to be to reinvent the intellectual wheel; to boldly go where in fact others have gone before, to find the field with supposedly new "new scholarship" that evinces little or no sense of the discipline's genealogy. (Abel, Christian, Moglin 32) Ann Du Cille's complaint regarding African-American studies (Du Cille) speaks to the general problem of pedagogies of alterity: their appropriation of the other reveals not only ignorance but the hubris of those who wish to speak for and hence co-opt the Other. The political advantages of alterity scholarship are significant. While students learn little regarding the languages, literatures, histories or philosophies of other cultures, administrators and faculty can pretend that they all have somehow confronted the other. If you add texts to the curriculum marked by "otherness," then you have provided a non-threatening element of diversity, without having to engage real diversity. As practiced in universities and colleges in the U.S. today, alterity studies feeds institutional and individual desire for engagement and fosters the pretense that academic criticism can function as a political act. It supports the myth, common to poststructuralist theory, that textual culture can replace activist culture. A discourse of freedom, individuality and tolerance sustains cultural ignorance (Srivastava 16), while the alterity critic aspires to appear relevant on a global level. In this process, the real world and the variety of its literatures are eclipsed by this larger professional hegemonic project. Some Americans of color have learned to deconstruct such strategies of personal and professional development. There are those who recognize that fragmentary and acontextual representations of ethnic and subaltern identity are often promoted by an intellectual and administrative mainstream out of a deep cynicism regarding the other as a fossilized object of clinical experimentation. Multiculturalism, in particular, has been condemned as a patently deceptive and self-serving upper-class democratization (Fox-Genovese 142), providing a situation governed by a seemingly inclusionary logic of pluralism that only preserves the status quo (Okada 198). It has been recognized as fostering a discredited form of scholarship and canon formation. By packaging the world and its literature in order to satisfy a university's mandate for diversity, multiculturalism has been seen to represent an ethos of "free trade" theorizing for privileged academics (San Juan 226). As the Georgia episode highlights, theories and pedagogies of alterity often seek to include representatives of traditionally neglected groups and offer an alibi for liberal reform that may not, in fact, exist. In this effort, the educational system has manifestly entered the important promotional work of encouraging tolerance, pluralism, and diversity as well as rearguard damage control (Cruz 32). Under this format, theories and pedagogies of alterity (whether they be multiculturalism, postcolonialism, or the global South) can serve as an institution's strategic response to a perceived deterioration of the progressive policies, civil rights gains, and change in demographics. They address a national imperative to include courses on cultural diversity (i.e., non- Western material) in tertiary general education curricula. As a University of Wisconsin faculty committee expressed it, there is general belief that an ethnocentric view pervades mainstream curriculum and it "is restricted to the Euro-American experience. Excluded and left invisible are the people of color whose labor and sacrifices have been and continue to be neglected" (San Juan 224). Due to this situation, the committee claimed, American students have been made insensitive to and intolerant of cultural and ethnic difference. Another objective of the cultural diversity requirement at the University of Wisconsin was "to facilitate understanding of what it means to live in a society which may display hostility to the individual on the basis of stereotypes of fundamental, frequently unalterable characteristics of race, religion, sex, or national origin (Wald 5, cited in San Juan 224). In response to such concerns, policy conferences, workshops in teachers' conventions, publisher's marketing sessions, and curricula in schools throughout America now all target cultural diversity and multicultural literacy as prime directives. Multiculturalism thus served as a concession to earlier modes of exclusion. It cashed in on long-held promissory notes and provided payback (Cruz 31). Ideally, its mission should have been to question old definitions of knowledge and disciplines as defined by a Western canon of texts. But it never quite reached this level of sophistication. Other critics have been equally dismissive in their assessments. Wahneema Lubiano condemned multiculturalism as an empty abstraction used by administrators to take the political heat off their institutions for their failure to diversify (Lubiano 68). Noam Chomsky dismissed it as a form of fetishized knowledge. Multiculturalism flourished as a program while it weakened as a reality (Jacoby 124), since students were still held to Euro-American values for educational and life success (Guerrero 61). Studying the other in multiculturalism's thoroughly appropriated and diluted fashion ensured that the continued domination of Eurocentric knowledge remained unchallenged. Slavoj Zizek characterized it as an experience of the other deprived of its otherness. The idealized Other of multiculturalism dances fascinating dances and has an ecologically sound holistic approach to reality, while practices such as wife-beating remain out of sight (Zizek 11). Thus, multiculturalism has been judged to be nothing more than a subterfuge for business as usual. Can the global South promise anything different? Will it not fall prey to these same deficiencies, as postcolonialism has? The problem behind so many theories and pedagogies of alterity lies in the false consciousness of the critic who claims spokespersonship for the Other. One can offer a selection of ethnic or racially specific courses without addressing the ways in which the focus of what we understand as Western culture is itself incomplete and distorted (Lubiano 68). Just as Native American studies was brought onto campuses as a "polite pseudo-intellectual vehicle to provide the appearance of ethnic diversity" (Guerrero 56), so now Amerindian cultures can be included in curricula. In both instances, the subaltern cultural production provides validation for the supposed insights and conclusions of Euro-American academia. The indigenous tradition of scholarship is not studied in sufficient depth to offer an alternative to Eurocentrism and its institutions. The key concern with alterity pedagogies here is that identity is not simple a matter of positionality, nor is an ideology of alterity a way to recuperate sensibilities disintegrated by society and the labor market (San Juan 4). Such problems cannot be solved by university canon reform. The real problem is not just the texts that transmit the heritage of the humanities in order to preserve standards and promote excellence. Rather, the problem once again is one of who consumes the tasty salad. In more concrete and less flavorful terms, we can formulate the situation as follows: Who defines the standards of excellence and whose interests are at stake? Who should articulate the purpose and meaning of a humanities education and how? The multicultural battles at Stanford University over the revision of the canon met with considerable resistance from factions decrying the replacement of the classics from the Western tradition with lesser valued works from minority literatures. However, part of the resistance also stemmed from what was seen as the cooptative strategy behind such canon revision. Did not the process of liberalizing the canon by simple addition of non-Western texts betoken tokenization and exhibit a patronizing tolerance (Pratt 59, cited in San Juan 231)? If non-white materials are perceived as "add-ons" to white structures, they never address the centrality and dominance of the latter (Newfield and Gordon 87). Ultimately, difference should make a difference (Davis 48). The simple fact is that not only conservative think-tanks and champions of the Western canon criticized the institutionalization of alterity studies. Minority critics and students have also made their voices heard. At the University of Texas, Chicano students expressed their uneasiness regarding multiculturalism. They viewed it as a bland, catch-all phrase connected with diversified reading lists or required courses on non-Western cultures. They perceived it as a means of thwarting a head-on confrontation that should take place over institutional racism (San Juan 224). Their perception had a good deal of validity.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › Reforms Good

Legal reforms solve—Brazil proves—gaps in law require legal solutions

Karvat 23 [Jaciel Santos Karvat, Master's candidate in the Master's Program Regional Development at Universidade do Contestado - Campus Canoinhas/SC. Professor in the Law graduation course at Universidade do Contestado -UNC - Campus Rio Negrinho/SC; Febuary 2023; “Biopolitics and the Issue of Biopiracy: The Right of Traditional Peoples to Benefit Sharing”; Home Publishing Brazil; https://homepublishing.com.br/index.php/cadernodeanais/article/view/57 ] LJS

Precisely because of the gaps in Brazilian law, biopiracy continued to occur, making it necessary to create stricter rules to combat these criminal acts, as the only way to truly and effectively protect natural resources, the environment, biodiversity and the discoveries coming from the intellect of traditional peoples and communities38 . As defined by the CBD, when the bioprospecting activity (when the research and exploration of biodiversity is done legally) involves knowledge, innovations and/or practices of traditional peoples and communities, it is necessary that its application occurs with the approval, participation and benefit sharing with the community(ies) involved. Thus, the CBD involved both consultation with the country(ies) of origin of the genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, recognizing the expression of their sovereignty, and consultation with the traditional peoples and communities that hold the knowledge, which is done through the same country(ies)39 . In cases where, upon being granted a patent, its holder fails to comply with this commitment, he will be subject to the sanctions described in Brazilian law, which is currently the New Biodiversity Law, Law No. 13,123/2015, also known as the New Legal Framework of Brazilian Biodiversity. When analyzing the innovations brought by it in relation to the previous one (MP No. 2,186-16/2001), it is observed that it came with the intention of facilitating the legal exploitation of biodiversity, stimulating agreements and, consequently, benefit sharing. In its art. 8, paragraph 2, it determines that: "The traditional knowledge associated with the genetic heritage dealt with in this Law integrates the Brazilian cultural heritage40 . This was an important change, because when traditional knowledge was conceived as intellectual property it became patentable, and the company or entrepreneur that approached the holders and acquired their knowledge ended up patenting it, becoming its owner, which was commonplace. Now this traditional knowledge goes beyond something only intellectual, representing national culture, representing the identification of a people, being protected as such. It also brings the Chapter V with ten articles that deal exclusively with the rules for benefit sharing. Among them, articles 20 and 21 regulate the percentages when the chosen modality is the monetary benefit sharing, which will be due a portion of 1% of the net annual revenue obtained with the economic exploitation of the product, except for the hypothesis of reduction to 0.1%, with the purpose of guaranteeing the competitiveness of the contemplated sector41 . Thus, this chapter came to make the rules clearer and pre-established. However, the new law, although it has brought important innovations, is still unable to reconcile the economic and scientific interests of researchers with the interests of traditional communities. This is because it continues to allow the distribution of royalties through means other than monetary means, which studies have shown is not beneficial or advantageous for these populations. On the other hand, this law is deficient in relation to inspection and punishment for those who do not comply with it, representing a step backwards, since it favors large corporations and industries, to the detriment of the rights of traditional peoples and communities, allowing biopiracy to continue to occur42 .

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › Politics Good

The best way to resolve bare life is with a political-ontological approach

Abbot 12 (Mathew Abbot PhD - lecturer in philosophy at the University of Ballarat, “NO LIFE IS BARE, THE ORDINARY IS EXCEPTIONAL: GIORGIO AGAMBEN AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY”, Parrhesia Journal, 2012, http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia14/parrhesia14_abbott.pdf, MG)

In a critique of Agamben that would be devastating if it didn’t make the category mistake I am trying to identify, Andrew Norris writes the following: If the Bush-Cheney administration is simply providing the sovereign decisions that are metaphysically necessary to maintain public order in the United States, one cannot fault it for acting tyrannically. Conversely, if it is indeed acting tyrannically, this is something that requires not metaphysical analysis and political theology, but practical, political resistance and institutional change.60 A political ontological approach, which undermines the very idea of ‘metaphysical necessity,’ will dissolve the terms of this dilemma. For if bare life and the exception are not metaphysically necessary, then we should respond to it with a both/and rather than an either/or. In other words: Guantanamo Bay is metaphysically contingent, and that is part of why it is tyrannical (it is not only a political, juridical, and ethical monstrosity; it is also based on a violent metaphysical logic). As such we can agree with Schmitt when he writes that “metaphysics is the most intensive and clearest expression of an epoch”; that monarchy was “self-evident” as a form of political organisation in the 17th Century because it was “in accord with the structure of metaphysical concepts” in play at the time.61 The mistake, however, would lie in underestimating the complexity of the relationship at work here, refusing to recognise the real intertwining of politics and ontology that it represents. Political ontology does not mistake theory for practice, falling into a kind of magical thinking where the former is somehow taken to have the capacity to change the world; rather it insists on the mutually determining relation between ontology and politics, on the claim that truly radical change in one area means change in the other (there is no vulgar claim of one-way causality at work here). The practise of thought and the critique of metaphysics have political stakes, just as properly revolutionary political action is not only concerned with ontic political change, but also with challenging the very figure of the world as we know it. “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”62 Political ontology does not hold up another world as an ideal to which the present one should be made to conform; instead it demands the abolition of the present metaphysical scheme of things, in which the natural sweetness of life, the sharing of the gratuity of the world, are voided. A political movement cognisant of this would be on that insists on—indeed one that demonstrates in practise—the truth of the claims that no life is bare and the ordinary is exceptional. These are ontological laws, but they are also ethical laws; they are real ontological claims, but they also make a normative demand on us. Gershom Scholem writes that “[m]etaphysics is a legitimate theory in the subjunctive form. This is the best definition I have found so far; it says everything.”63 Though Scholem uses the term ‘metaphysics’ here, exchanging it for ‘political ontology’ will see his point sit perfectly with this project. Political ontology is a mode of thought in which the distinction between fact and value collapses, such that what is shown to be valuable is the fact of existence itself. As such, a politics in-keeping with political ontology would be a subjunctive politics,64 a politics informed by an exigency.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › Law Good

Knowledge of legal intricacies and skills to advocate for particular policies are critical tools for activists

Roa & Klugman 18 – Mónica Roa, a human rights lawyer, the Director of Programs in Women's Link Worldwide; Barbara Klugman, a South African strategy and external practitioner, and co-coordinator of the South African Constitutionalism Fund; “Seeking Social Change in the Courts – Tools For Strategic Advocacy”; Women’s Link Worldwide, an international human rights non-profit organization working on gender equality issues;

CHANGING NORMS, VALUES, AND BEHAVIORS Achieving the remedies of recognition, redistribution, representation, and participation often requires shifting public norms, values, and actions away from the stigmatization of particular groups. This requires influencing people’s political priorities and hence what issues they feel motivated to take action on, to campaign for, and who and what they vote for. However, shifting people’s values, beliefs, and behaviors is not easy: providing information is seldom sufficient. Advocates must create opportunities for people to engage with an issue emotionally, to build their motivation for action, and practically, to build their skills to take action.15 It further requires building people’s sense of self so that they have the capacity to act.16 This may require not only influencing individuals directly, but also targeting their influencers, a concept borrowed from marketing that refers to those whose perspectives the decision-makers value.17 There are many different theories and models of how to shift behavior,18 in part because perspectives and behaviors can be influenced by a diverse set of strategies and tactics. These include utilizing mass media such as a television series, local public events such as community theatre, public pro - tests, social media campaigns, or speeches and actions by public opinion leaders or popular figures. Public service providers can also be motivated to take action to change public perspectives on an issue as they, in focusing on meeting their constituencies’ needs, “are often stymied by the larger systems that seem to work against the people they are trying to serve.”19 In particular, non-governmental organizations providing services frequently serve those who are closest to the problem. Both these organizations and the people they serve may be mobilized to participate in campaigns or movements to shift public values or pressure policy-makers and implementers into action. 16 17 CHANGING AND IMPLEMENTING LAWS AND POLICIES Changes in the law can also influence public support for an issue,20 either because the national debate about a legal or policy change engages the public’s imagination, or because laws themselves carry a symbolic value that influences public perspectives.21 If a particular law is targeted, as an activist you can attempt to build one-on-one relationships with politicians. You can also appeal to political parties and public opinion leaders;22 indeed as a long-term strategy you or your allies can join political parties and build your leadership voice within these. If there are formal mechanisms for civil society participation, such as a legal requirement that parliament or city councils have public hearings before finalizing laws or policies, you can prepare organizations and individuals from different constituencies and with different skills to speak at these hearings. These strategies usually require that you utilize “insider” strategies in “invited spaces” aimed at influencing political decision-makers, including mobilizing evidence such as personal testimony of individuals experiencing the problem or research about the nature of the problem and options for addressing it.23 On the other hand, sometimes you can use public campaigns and protests in an effort to put external pressure on decision-makers to change the law. Frequently this involves mobilizing public outrage and media coverage, which in turn exerts pressure on decision-makers who want support from their constituencies. These can be considered “outsider” strategies.24 When you manage to raise the resonance of an issue, you can “invent” spaces for example establishing platforms for dialogue or negotiation that decision-makers then feel obliged to attend.25 As an advocate for social change, you may use diverse strategies to influence the development and implementation of policies and regulations. You may offer research and technical expertise to support policy development, make submissions, organize policy dialogues, offer mentorship and training to implementers, or monitor budgets and service provision. You can also use the information gathered to hold the government accountable. In addition, you can use this information to inform outsider strategies, such as public protests, or for insider strategies such as meetings with decision-makers to share problems and identify solutions. Furthermore, you can mobilize to secure formal mechanisms for representation of diverse communities in policy dialogues on the boards of service institutions, such as hospitals or schools, or strengthen the capacity of people representing those constituencies. Thus, advocates can effectively build support for their understanding of the problem and the possible solutions they have identified. We now turn to the importance of keeping judges on your radar, as social justice activists, in order to identify threats and opportunities as you design your strategies to achieve social justice.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Off Case › Framework › Fiat Good

Fiat embodies a prefigurative politics---acting as though specific reforms are being enacted, even though we know they’re not, enables counter-hegemonic redefinition of prevailing norms and actively rewrites the social conditions that perpetuate flawed institutions---the temporal space and mental distance from actual enactment is key to every benefit of our model

Davina Cooper 20, Professor in Law and Political Theory at Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, 4/6/20, “Towards an adventurous institutional politics: The prefigurative ‘as if’ and the reposing of what’s real,” The Sociological Review, 68(5), pp. 893-916 /jpb (Thank you Buntin)

Earlier, I discussed the controversy over reforming state law to treat gender as an elective identity. In this final example, I want to approach prefigurative law reform from a different angle and ask: what value is there in a research project acting as if more radical proposals around gender were on the law reform table?47 In their 2017/18 consultation on reforming the Gender Recognition Act, policy-makers in both Scotland and England and Wales solicited public views on how and whether to make gender transitioning easier and less pathologising. Questions posed included: how many transitions can someone have; to what genders; at what age; and through what means?48 Yet, a more fundamental question remained unasked, even as it became tacitly invoked by the move towards self-determination and the growing gender-neutrality of statutory law: Are there good reasons for people to continue to be legally gendered, issuing from the sex registered at birth? This ‘decertification’ question (Cooper & Renz, 2016) is at the heart of a three-year collaborative research project on the Future of Legal Gender (FLaG).49 In Britain, different social relations structure people’s lives, as they also structure the law, but many – including ethnicity, sexuality and religion – do not give rise to a legally assigned personal status, for instance as gay or Jewish. In contrast, the formal legal status accorded sex/gender places people within defined categories and obliges them to undergo official procedures for their status to change. Legal gender status doesn’t just affect those who need to transition or who object to the category they are placed within. The symbolic importance which the law attaches to a binary structure, in requiring birth-sex to be registered, suggests that sex – lived socially as gender – marks a distinction that is human-shaped and that matters. This is not just a critical mattering; it is also a normative claim about who and what we are (see Cooper & Emerton, 2020). But what alternative arrangements are possible? And can a prefigurative law reform project help to anticipate and establish pathways for reform? We might think of prefiguration here as having two dimensions. The first centres on process, and the challenge of undertaking a mock law reform project in collaborative, critically reflexive ways (see also Macdonald & Kong, 2006, p. 27). The second, which I want to consider, involves taking a radical proposal, not currently on the law reform table, and acting as if it was already under review, and so accelerating its detailed consideration (if not its enactment). De Smet’s (2015) discussion of Vygotsky and ‘proleptic learning’ is useful here. Proleptic learning involves ‘anticipat[ing] or imagin[ing] competence through the representation of a future act or development as already existing’ (de Smet, 2015, p. 91). A prefigurative law reform project comes to understand the implications of legal change by acting as if the questions and choices at stake were reasonable to attend to in the present. But does this assume that what we learn today about future possible changes to legal gender status will retain their value? In the case of law reform, the life expectancy of imagined consequences can be brief as conditions change, lessening the benefits of earlier rehearsal. I therefore want to consider the value of prefigurative law reform as an intervention in the present (rather than an effective managing of the future), and to address the significance of the ‘as if’ in this process. The Future of Legal Gender (FLaG) did not represent itself as an advocacy project. Its aim was not to argue for a new legal agenda; that ‘decertification’ – understood as the withdrawal of state-assigned gender status – should be introduced. But does acting as if this proposal was already on the law reform table, in effect, put it there? FLaG certainly lacked the authorising conditions to render its proposal officially performative (cf. Law & Urry, 2004). It could not work in illocutionary ways by requiring or ensuring decertification was given consideration by state bodies, even as it might contribute to the emergence of a more official proposal in the future (although a backlash could cause it to have the reverse effect). Yet, regardless of whether decertification emerges as a ‘real’ legal proposal, as an imagined measure, that also constituted an emergent methodology for doing socio-legal research, decertification was saturated with belief that it could act. For our part, we hoped its exploration through interviews, seminars and other forms of public engagement would offer, in the current fraught scene, a more exploratory, less judgemental space for gender’s consideration, one that could incorporate some marginalised perspectives, cleavages and questions. With politically lower stakes, looser attachments, and the inevitable temporal space between now and any future-present of the law reforms proposed, more flexible and plural conceptualisations of gender might also be possible, away from the rigid monolithic definitions – that this is what sex or gender really means, for example. The value of a prefigurative law reform project, then, is not just, or even principally, about preparing (for) the future but about alternative discursive lines in the now. Yet, this may suggest prefigurative law reform projects can insulate themselves and so provide participants with a politically constructive, ‘safe’ refuge away from the ‘real world’ fray. Law reform projects, however – including this one – are not that insulated; and this is a source of both difficulty and challenge. If proposals are seen – or can be depicted – as ‘real’ law-making, or if they get presented as the scary place that moderate-sounding legal measures will inevitably lead to, this can intensify divisions and anxieties, undermining the capacity of a prefigurative law reform project to enact an exploratory deliberative space. While it is the credible appearance of prefigurative law reform proposals which incites serious attention, for such attention to remain focused on the merits (or otherwise) of the reform rather than on (challenging) its realisation, the ‘as if’ simulated character of the proposal needs to be explicitly sustained. Conclusion Prefiguration is sometimes dismissed as a minor form of politics – too small-scale and marginal, too invested in its own purity, voluntary action, and dream-world to be a politics that matters or that adds much given the tremendous contemporary crises that we face. But without romanticising prefigurative politics or suggesting it is the only politics worth pursuing, this discussion works from the assumption that prefiguration remains important, including – and, perhaps, especially – at times of political despair when much needed “transfers of power” seem out of reach. This article has sought to contribute to prefigurative thinking by focusing on institutions in conjunction with a specific form of prefiguration, attuned to the ‘as if’. Drawing on research I have carried out, including collaboratively, over two decades, it draws together four very different kinds of prefigurative activity: (1) where local government acts as if it has authority to engage in international policy-making and global solidarity despite countervailing national government policies, authority and alliances; (2) where state law acts as if it has the authority to establish gender’s terms and categories, including by changing understandings of gender’s meaning in the process; (3) where grass-roots communities act as if they have the power and right to remake institutions of money and state; and (4) where researchers act as if a different, more radical proposal was already on the law reform table, and so deserving of serious consideration. At the heart of this discussion lies the question: what do such initiatives create; and what does reading them as prefigurative make visible? Typically, work on prefigurative politics and counter-institutions foregrounds three features: learning, practising and showcasing. This article has considered how prefiguring institutions innovates, energises, stimulates, anticipates, hurries and normalises. However, in understanding what prefiguring does, this article has also foregrounded a different, less attended-to aspect, namely how prefiguring institutions mediates, reconstitutes and troubles the interrelationship of the real to the imaginary (recognising the imaginary is also, in its own sense, real; cf. Bottici, 2014). This relationship comes to the fore in the authorising conditions that prefiguration relies upon, and the work recognition does (and doesn’t) do, within diffuse and unequal circuits of power. A central paradox of prefiguration is that it takes the meanings, conditions and legitimacy it seeks as if they already existed. In a sense, we might describe it as a form of retro-figuring, reliant on imagined antecedents that authorise, for instance, councils’ engagement in foreign policy and street squatters’ state secession. For while prefiguration takes up future-oriented aspirations as enactable present-day practices and norms, it also relies on this future as already in place to authorise the actions it undertakes. This can be read as an imagined form of backfilling undertaken playfully or seriously. But this backfilling can also prove performative – retrospectively creating the authorising conditions relied upon. Local government’s legitimate capacity to engage in international policymaking, for instance, is not predetermined. However, while municipalities may act as if they have authority – putting permissions or entitlements in place by treating them as if they were already there – whether this proves successful depends on what councils and the network of actors, who support, thwart or otherwise affect council actions, also do. Acting as if the necessary conditions are already in place, particularly when undertaken seriously, can be challenged. But the challenging (and other) effects of intervening bodies also structures forward-oriented conditions of accomplishment, and one important process here is how recognition happens. The prefigurative acts discussed are not siloes. Their existence, effects and force are mediated by mainstream institutions along with other bodies, and this mediation also shapes how and whether institutional prefiguration is recognised as ‘real’ (and so not read in the terms of the ‘as if’). For while prefiguration can involve deliberately reaching beyond what can be accomplished, it can also be a way of reading initiatives and reforms that receive insufficient recognition to be realised, and which lack the force to bring such recognition into effect. At the same time, recognition as real is far from uncomplicatedly positive. Initiatives may be framed as ‘wrongly real’, and so subject to criticism and attack as municipal boycotts and legislative consultation on recognising a third gender experienced. Recognition as real-like may also carry costs as local currencies encountered, shoe-horned into a restrictive and penal wider welfare culture. In such conditions, it may seem as if explicit recognition as ‘not-real’ is preferable – where simulations are authorised and validated as imaginative ventures not intended to pass. Approaching initiatives in this way might prefigure a more explicitly experimental and playful politics. While Frestonia shows how recognition as play can trivialise and dismiss, it can also protect initiatives by diminishing their threat. Instead of being denounced as grievous or seditious, initiatives become forms of invention, art, or recreation, occupying a separate, bounded play-world in which their claims can stand. But what happens when the tacit contract is broken, and prefigurative play seeps out? It is tempting to suggest that prefiguring institutions needs to come out either on the side of fictive play or on the side of an ambition to be recognised as real. However, at its heart, prefiguration – whether as a political orientation, specific form of practice, or register of understanding – involves the complex relationship between the imaginary, the fictive and the real. At one level, acting as if things were otherwise invokes a conscious distinction between the real and the fictive – where the imaginary is juxtaposed against what is realised as true. At another level, acting ‘as if’ undoes the distinction as actions based on counterhegemonic understandings and norms change what is (and what is becoming). But prefiguration also embodies something else, and that is the coexisting, overlapping, multiplicity of institutional worlds. Prefiguration undercuts the notion of institutional life as a clear, zero-sum, singular plane (or world). This is not simply because partially-recognised and minor counter-institutions exist alongside dominant ones, communicating, effecting and interacting with them (although this indeed occurs). It is also because what institutions are depends on the facts, legitimacy, roles, authority and functions underpinning and expressed by them, and these different dimensions are frequently in dispute. Acts that are anchored in different normative and epistemic beliefs produce different definitions and accounts of the acts. LETS, for instance, both was and wasn’t money; municipal engagement in BDS both was and wasn’t authoritative state action. This multiplicity is more than simply disagreement or different views about what is happening. Since imaginaries of authority, role, function and legitimacy (among others) help make institutions up, it is also, importantly, about different happenings (see also Law & Urry, 2004, p. 397). Prefiguration unsettles political certainty when it comes to what institutions are and what they do. While this creates risks, it also creates hope.

2024 CNDI Kritik
Method › Turns › Cede Political

The aff’s essentializing thesis dooms it to irrelevancy and causes deep aporia

Boukalas 14 (Christon Boukalas PhD - researcher in Cardiff Law School, “No exceptions: authoritarian statism. Agamben, Poulantzas and homeland security”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 26 February 2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2013.877667, MG)

Eighth, the analytical relevance of Agamben’s account of power for contemporary politics is doubtful. Agamben’s thesis does not allow us, but forces us, to examine the Roman Republic, Nazi Germany and homeland security (and, literally, everything in between) with the same analytical tools – because, strictly speaking, they are the same thing, differentiated only by the degree in which the true nature of power is revealed in each case (see Scheuerman 2006, 69). Its disengagement from socio-historical specificity deprives it of the capacity to discuss the reasons for, and the processes through which, the state of exception is triggered; bios is reduced to bare life, and the sovereign conducts its power/violence. This results in deep aporia when the exception thesis confronts actuality – including that of homeland security. For instance, while the decision is taken by the sovereign, we do not know who the sovereign is. Even when specified by law, there is no guarantee that the specified entity does indeed determine action. What if the sovereign’s mobilisation in the exception results in a coup by the army against its political overlord? Is that an exception within the exception, or a displacement of the seat of sovereign power, and if so, when does this displacement end and how do we know it has ended? More importantly, is the President of the United States of America “sovereign”? Is the executive branch (or its armed forces) over which he presides a singular, unitary entity or has he to overcome, repress and reconcile internal divisions and antagonisms? Does this affect the capacity and quality of sovereign action in an emergency? What is the range of the sovereign decision? Is everyone equally affected by it? Moreover, is the sovereign a subject with its own will and interests, or does it pertain to interests and antagonisms in the broader society? If the former, then what motivates the sovereign? Is this motivation the same for all sovereigns at all times? If the latter, is it possible that the sovereign acts on behalf of “powerful men” operating in his institutional shadow? Would the character of their interests influence the modalities, intensity, expanse, duration and purpose of the exception – or whether the exception is triggered at all? Would an exception declared by a sovereign “captured” by big petroleum companies be “the same” with that of a sovereign “captured” by school teachers? (And why does the former scenario seem more plausible than the latter?). Furthermore, even if conceivable, is reduction to bare life (the stripping of the individual from legal mediation and political capacity) the moment where sovereign power is constituted or the moment it collapses? (Boukalas 2012a, 292–293). And, finally, why does normality exist at all? Why does the bearer of awesome power use it only occasionally? (see Colatrella 2011). It is not clear as to where this leaves the exception thesis. It seems that, by abstracting his concepts from social and historical content, Agamben does not provide structures that can be populated by any/every specific socio-historical reality. On the contrary, socio-historical content crashes these empty structures: the price for essentialism is irrelevance to any/every existing social reality