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Changing rain patterns are expanding vectors’ range and their active periods. Shorter, warmer winters and longer summers are also linked to more vector-borne diseases. For example, diseases caused by ticks (like babesiosis and Lyme disease) are now occurring in the winter too. They’re also being found in regions farther west and north than in the past. “We're seeing cases of tick-borne diseases in January and February,” said first author of the study Matthew Phillips. Phillips is an infectious diseases fellow at Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School. “The tick season is starting earlier and with more active ticks in a wider range. This means that the number of tick bites is going up and with it, the tick-borne diseases.” Another concern is malaria. The mosquitos that transmit the disease are expanding northward, a climate-induced change. Changing rain patterns have led to more mosquitos and a higher disease transmission rate.

To most people, COVID-19 appears to be an anomaly; it isn’t. The 20th century began with devastating waves of Spanish flu that killed from 50 million to 100 million people worldwide. About one new disease is emerging each year.1 Not all have human-to-human transmission, but enough do (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Ebola virus disease) to scare those tasked with monitoring the world’s health. To highlight the danger and to prioritize research, each year the World Health Organization (WHO) commissions an expert committee to update its list of the most threatening infectious diseases that lack effective treatments or vaccines. The current list (Table 1) contains COVID-19.3 That is no surprise, given that the entire world is now focused on that pathogen. What should act as a wake-up call to seriously fund the surveillance of, research into, and treatment of the wide variety of potential pandemic agents is the entity at the end of the short list: Disease X. Since 2015, the WHO has used this designation for a disease that could cause a pandemic due to a pathogen currently unknown to cause human illness. Last year’s Disease X now has a name, COVID-19. The next unknown and unnamed entity may already be lurking. One might ask: Why don’t we devise a plan to identify such pathogens early and mobilize scientists, the healthcare community, politicians, and the populace to fight these scourges? The answer is, we already have. We know what steps to take to limit a pandemic. WHO, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services have produced and disseminated detailed plans.4–7 After the SARS pandemic, for example, WHO itemized the steps needed to control a pandemic (Table 2). These vital steps were ignored during the initial period of the COVID-19 pandemic.1 WHO, chronically underfunded, is saddled with a bloated, slow, and uncoordinated bureaucracy that has to answer to 194 countries. It has been condemned for both overreacting (2009 H1N1 pandemic) and severely underreacting (2014 Ebola epidemic and the COVID-19 pandemic) and for failing to act.8–11 The CDC is chronically underfunded and has no political power. Academics are voices in the wilderness whose advice is usually sought too late in the process for it to have much effect. As the COVID-19 threat lessens, politicians will make grand promises to implement plans to stop, or at least to prepare for, the next pandemic. The recovering economy will be too weak at first to support the effort, although more funding will be promised in the future. Politicians will ultimately make changes that are politically expedient and will fail to authorize the changes necessary to produce faster, more flexible responses. The memories of angst and societal disruption during COVID-19 will recede. Our bulwarks against pandemic diseases will remain underfunded and inadequate to the task. Even so, multiple Disease Xs are clearly in our future; we need to be prepared.

By 2100 – a short 81 years in the future – he sees three potential outcomes: human extinction, the collapse of civilization with limited survival, or a thriving human society. The first two outcomes could be the result of population growth coupled with the increasing destruction of our planet. The growth in global population follows a flat line for most of human history and then, at the turn of the industrial revolution, the – like a hockey stick – as the population explodes. The same shape show growth in technology and innovation –flat for thousands of years and then suddenly germ theory, telephones, airplanes and the internet, all within a few hundred years. Sadly, a graph showing the increasing destruction of our environment would have the same shape and would lead to our demise. “Without a thriving biosphere, there is no human future,” Luby said. Also threatening that future? Our recently acquired abilities to destroy each other with nuclear weapons and lethal synthetic biology. As an example, CRISPR, a gene-editing technology, could be a force for good used to help eradicate disease or it could potentially be used to cause harm, such as by genetically modifying bird flu to become airborne. And, as Luby sees it, “There’s no shortage of sociopaths.”

In the case of biological warfare, the aim of which would be to kill or to incapacitate the largest possible number of enemy soldiers, the aggressor will consider measures to protect his own army and civilian population. In contrast, the aim of bioterrorism is to cause maximum disruption and to seed terror. This may be achieved by actual acts or by simply causing panic. While this does not necessarily imply actually harming more than a few people, many modern terrorist groups on the other hand do not seem to pay much attention to the safety, well being or even survival of their own followers. Terrorists will know that using highly infectious agents such as the smallpox virus for biological attacks might well mean their spread also to their own followers because they do not have smallpox vaccine or other preventative measures available.

How likely is a bioweapon attack and, more tightly focused, how real is the chance of such an attack by a terrorist group? It has to be taken into account that sophisticated microbiological and biochemical techniques are required to cultivate highly pathogenic biological agents and to make them suitable for use as bioweapons. Due to the high infectiousness of many potential bioweapon agents, all handling and manipulation would have to be done under Biosafety Level 3 (BSL 3) or BSL 4 conditions to protect the handlers [].

A bioterrorist attack against the United States is a constant threat with potentially devastating consequences, including mass casualties, economic instability, and damage to critical infrastructure. Established in 2003, the DHS BioWatch Program provides early warning of a bioterrorist attack in more than 30 major metropolitan areas across the country. This early warning helps decision makers plan an effective, coordinated, and rapid response.

BioWatch is managed by the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office.

Technological advances, including AI, biotechnology, and the Internet of Things, may offer opportunities for terrorists to conduct high-profile attacks by developing new, more remote attack methods and to collaborate across borders. Terrorists will also seek weapons of mass destruction and other weapons and approaches that will allow them to conduct spectacular mass casualty attacks. For example, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has already launched mustard gas attacks and uses unmanned aerial vehicles extensively—as do Iranian-supported Shia militants. Autonomous delivery vehicles guided with the help of AI systems could enable a single terrorist to strike dozens of targets in the same incident. Augmented reality environments could also enable virtual terrorist training camps, connecting experienced plotters protected by distant sanctuaries with potential operatives.

The threat from bioterrorism – the malicious use of bacteria, viruses or toxins to threaten or cause harm to humans, animals or agriculture – is growing, with many terrorist groups demonstrating an interest in obtaining or using biological material as weapons. This threat has become more apparent with many countries increasing their preparedness in areas of biosecurity, biosafety, critical infrastructure response and biorisk mitigation.

What INTERPOL is doing

Bacillus anthracis, the cause of anthrax, is a likely agent for such attacks. We don't know if or when another anthrax attack might occur.

However, federal agencies, along with health departments across the country, are actively preparing in the event of a U.S. anthrax emergency. The CDC and other federal agencies will coordinate closely with local and state partners.

Nurses are the largest group of healthcare providers and will be at the forefront during a response to a bioterrorism attack in the U.S. However, nurses' bioterrorism risk perceptions and their participation in bioterrorism preparedness activities, such as bioterrorism-related exercises or drills, have not been evaluated. We mailed a survey to all members of the Missouri Nurses Association in July 2006, consisting of 1,528 registered nurses. The instrument measured risk perception, perceived susceptibility, perceived seriousness, bioterrorism education received, participation in exercises/drills, and personal response plan thoroughness. The response rate was 31% (474/1,528). Most respondents believe that a bioterrorism attack will occur in the U.S. (82.3%; n = 390), but few (21.3%; n = 101) believe that one will occur in their community. The majority of nurses reported that they believe that a bioterrorism attack would have serious consequences (96.1%, n = 448), including having a serious impact on U.S. citizens' safety (90.7%, n = 446) and on their own safety (84.3%, n = 379). Most (60%, n = 284) reported that they had not received any bioterrorism-related education nor participated in any drills/exercises (82.7%, n = 392). Of those who had received education, most had participated in 3 or fewer programs and in only 1 drill. Few nurses (3.6%, n = 15) reported having all aspects of a personal bioterrorism response plan; approximately 20% (19.4%, n = 81) did not have any components of a plan. Most of the registered nurses in Missouri who were surveyed are not receiving bioterrorism education, participating in bioterrorism exercises, or developing thorough personal response plans. Nurses need to be aware of and encouraged to participate in the many education and training opportunities on bioterrorism and infectious disease disasters.

The ghastly bombings in Boston followed by envelopes laced with the lethal poison ricin that were sent to the U.S Capitol and the White House, renew fears about our vulnerability to these kinds of terrorist acts. It invites unwelcome memories of 9-11. Speculation is widespread about the potential origins of these attacks, and whether they could be related (seems unlikely). Investigations are underway and a suspect in the ricin attacks is now in custody. In time, we also must ask how much safer we’ve made ourselves based on the lessons we learned after 9-11. And whether there are still precautions we should heed. When it comes to bioterrorism, it’s a mixed bag. Programs enacted after 9-11 helped shore up our defenses. But in their current form, they're not as well equipped to promote development of the kinds of technologies that we need to thwart modern day threats. These threats may not come from established agents of bioterror, but new strains of bugs engineered for deadly purposes. Programs were started after 9-11 to underwrite the federal development of medical countermeasures. The centerpiece of the effort was Congress passed the Bioshield Act in 2004. Its aim was to fund the purchase of vaccines and treatments aimed at thwarting bioterrorism. A key element of the Act was to allow stockpiling of countermeasures. Some of these agents would be approved for government purchase based on testing in animals alone. It’s not feasible to infect people with deadly bugs like smallpox just to enable human testing. You can Follow Dr. Scott Gottlieb on Twitter Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, the feds have allocated nearly $50 billion to address the threat of biological weapons. A lot of the funding also goes to Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), established in 2006 to help companies through the mid (and high risk) stages of drug development. BARDA is part of the Department of Health and Human Services. It provides funding through contracts to mostly mid and later-stage efforts to develop new types of countermeasures. But the government’s foray into this sort of venture investing has been bumpy. The Bioshield and BARDA funding has proven useful for scaling up the manufacture of vaccines and other countermeasures that were already in advanced stages of development, but needed additional money to make their manufacture economically feasible or possible in the first place. But these programs have been less successful at financing early stage ventures aimed at developing completely novel agents. It hasn't really been their mission. For one thing, taking on the kind of risk inherent in the early stages of drug development is not an exercise well suited to government work, where political pressures often cause an aversion to risk taking. Some government programs, like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have success at financing innovative, early ventures. But they tolerate a lot of failures along the way. Over the past decade, BARDA and Bioshield have not been so lucky. The intense political scrutiny that these efforts have undergone (often stoked by companies that lose out on contracts and complain to Congress) has made the government executives managing the programs understandably skittish. This has rendered the entire process adverse to the kind of risk taking that’s required for successful drug discovery. A better approach to stimulating development of the kinds of countermeasures we need to thwart future threats may be a prize-based system. This isn’t a new idea. It’s been long advocated by left-leaning policy analysts and critics of pharmaceutical patents and the lucrative monopolies that patents confer. The idea is that publicly funded cash awards would be offered for firms that develop products that meet a certain public health purpose. That sort of system isn’t likely to match the success of our market-based model for ordinary drug development. But when it comes to medical countermeasures, there's no natural market for the products (the only purchaser is the government). A prize system could work well alongside than contract-based programs under BARDA. The contracts are effective at scaling up established technology. The prizes could be used to create incentives for early-stage endeavors. For one thing, a prize-based system may be less prone to political intrusion than a grant-making process. Ideally, lucrative prizes for successful countermeasures would still be coupled to smaller grants or contracts that would offset some of the costs of development. But those small grants could be disbursed more easily since they would be for modest amounts - just enough to get a promising program started. The combination of small seed grants, and rich rewards to successful endeavors, could create the mix of incentives that will entice entrepreneurs to chase these endeavors. Right now, few companies are dedicated to working in this space. The ones that do often rely on federal money to fund the work, and the promise of stockpiling if they succeed. In many cases, these are companies re-purposing existing technologies rather than developing brand new agents with the singular aim of thwarting bioterrorist threats. The result is that the companies chasing these high risk, lower reward endeavors are often small firms that are otherwise capital constrained (and need the BARDA funding as a bridge.) Among the firms developing countermeasures to ricin are mostly very small companies like Soligenix. It's worth noting that -- because ricin can't be easily weaponized -- it isn't on the. (This list is referred to as the Material Threats Determination). BARDA and Bioshield have played a highly valuable role in enhancing our preparedness. But we must also re-imagine these programs to confront evolving risks. The ricin laced envelope sounds like a crude attack based on the public reporting. Ricin is a highly toxic substance. A very small amount can kill an adult. And there’s no reliable test for exposure, no approved vaccine, and no antidote once exposed. But ricin generally has to be injected or ingested to kill. Large quantities would need to be inhaled to cause death. For this reason, it isn’t considered a weapon of mass attack, but has been used as a tool for targeted assassination. In the future, the real threat may not be established bioweapons like ricin or anthrax. These agents, while deadly, have limitations. To be weapons of mass attack, these agents must be dispersed on a mass scale. That doesn’t only require knowhow with the bioagents, but with the technical means for weaponizing them and dispersing them over a wide area. In the future, the bigger threat may come from the deliberate misuse of engineered organisms. These are biological agents that can be engineered to spread from person to person, like a deadly form of flu or a re-engineered version of smallpox. As I noted in a, DNA synthesizers for making weaponized bugs are small, cheap and easy to procure. The technical means for harnessing these tools is relatively straightforward. The instruction sets for making these kinds of deadly organisms. Rogue regimes and lone villains could exploit these scientific methods for deadly aims. In the extreme, such an attack could play like the creepy plot of the 1995 film “Twelve Monkeys,” where a wicked scientist engineers a virus that nearly drives mankind to extinction. With the advent of such scenarios are no longer wildly implausible. The most recent attacks only serve to reinforce the existence of evil motives that continue to search for these means of wicked ends. In the future, the bigger threat may come from the deliberate misuse of engineered organisms. These are biological agents that can be engineered to spread from person to person, like a deadly form of flu or a re-engineered version of smallpox. As I noted in a, DNA synthesizers for making weaponized bugs are small, cheap and easy to procure. The technical means for harnessing these tools is relatively straightforward. The instruction sets for making these kinds of deadly organisms. Rogue regimes and lone villains [Terrorists] could exploit these scientific methods for deadly aims. In the extreme, such an attack could play like the creepy plot of the 1995 film “Twelve Monkeys,” where a wicked scientist [Terror Group] engineers a virus that nearly drives mankind to extinction. With the advent of such scenarios are no longer wildly implausible. The most recent attacks only serve to reinforce the existence of evil motives that continue to search for these means of wicked ends.

Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have expressed interested, and have even attempted, to use biological agents in terror plots (Biodefense, 2016). The technical and administrative knowledge of biology and chemistry can be acquired globally in medical schools, research programs, and laboratories, making it difficult to prevent potential practitioners of bioterrorism from acquiring the required scientific knowledge (Chiodo, 2015). While at one time the ability to mutate strands was restricted to advanced research laboratories, rudimentary high school laboratories now have the ability to develop deadly biological agents (Garrett, 2012). With relative easy, terror groups could engineer the flu virus, making it deadlier (Selk, 2017). By combining traits of multiple strains and maximizing the virus’ natural properties, it could become highly transmittable (Farmer, 2107). Genetically engineered viruses have the potential to kill more people than nuclear weapons, governments remain underprepared for that threat (Selk, 2017).

Terrorists could be drawn to the use of biological agents because of the difficulty of detection and the ease at which some biological agents can naturally spread through a population (Bioterrorism, 2006). There are essentially three ways which agents could be acquired by terrorist: they could be stolen, created in laboratory environments, or collected naturally. A gloomy reality is that as the advancement of new technologies reduce the costs of genetic sequencing, it will become easier and less expensive to create novel organisms (Garrett, 2012). Bioterrorist attacks can be planned to induce maximum damage and panic with a minimum risk of early detection. Potential agents of attack are categorized by risk (rated as an, A, B, or a C) depending on the agent’s availability, ease of dissemination and transmission, and potential impact (Bioterrorism, 2006). Category A agents are considered the most dangerous and threatening to National Security. Ebola is categorized as a Category A bioagent because of its ability to cause mass panic and disruption and the special public health actions required for treating those infected.

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Because bioterrorism continues to be a real concern for the United States, NIAID and other agencies have accelerated microbial research and development of diagnostic, preventive, and treatment methods. Microbial genomics has become an important part of this overall approach. Genomics refers to being able to identify and utilize the totality of genetic information found in an organism. This complete collection of an organism's genetic information is known as its genome. Understanding an organism's genetic program may aid in understanding how an organism carries out its biochemical and physical processing and operates as a complex biological system.

According to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), this genetic information is used to develop gene-based diagnostic and sampling tests to quickly detect dangerous germs and assess their susceptibility to different types of treatment. Genomes also provide molecular fingerprints of different strains of a given microbe, thereby enabling investigators to better track future outbreaks to their source.

I’ve lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But a deliberate outbreak caused by an engineered pathogen would be far worse. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that would spread once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We’re scared of disease outbreaks and we’re scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for chaos.

As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could spread faster and kill quicker than anything that would emerge out of nature. It can be designed to evade medical countermeasures, frustrating doctors’ attempts to diagnose cases and treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could be reintroduced into the public again and again. It could, with the right mix of genetic traits, even wipe us off the planet, making engineered viruses a genuine existential threat.

Ideally, the interfaces between the various processes are well resourced and managed to ensure continuous availability of health products. Unfortunately, product research and development (R&D) and access is skewed in favour of ailments that are commercially attractive, while those diseases that disproportionately affect poor populations in developing countries are neglected. Consequently, an estimated 1 billion people, one in six of the world's population, currently suffer from neglected tropical diseases, mostly in developing countries . The afflicted populations are poor and commercial incentives to enable investment in the risky product R&D are weak ,. The few available drugs have problems related to their cost, safety, stability, and increasingly, the threat of resistance that may limit their utility.

Some of the neglected diseases include malaria, trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, schistosomiasis, filariasis, and onchocerciasis. Malaria is a major health problem with over 1 million deaths occurring mainly in children and pregnant women in sub-Saharan Africa ,. New and affordable antimalarial drugs that are effective against resistant parasites and can be safely administered to children and pregnant women are urgently needed ,. Even for malaria, which has probably had significant investment, the drugs expected from the existing R&D portfolio in the next few years are a combination of old drugs that are mostly reliant on artemisinins. Going by the industrial assessment of attrition, the number of projects in the pre-clinical phase of R&D is too small to guarantee success. Recent reports of artemisinin resistance in Asia  means that emphasis has to be placed on the discovery of novel entities to support the medium to long-term needs of malaria control as well as possible elimination and eradication. The ongoing discussion on malaria eradication requires major technical and financial investment today to support the discovery and development of the tools needed for eradication beyond the next 15 years.

Li ’23 [Yon; 2023; lawyer at Henan Shilin law firm; Science of Law Journal, “Analysis of the Status Quo of Intellectual Property Protection in China in the Era of Big Data,” Vol 2, No. 5]

In order to implement the specific work of intellectual property protection, the state and government must put forward the corresponding protection mechanism, which fully reflects the importance attached to intellectual property protection. Therefore, the government and judicial departments should update and improve the relevant laws in light of the actual situation. For example, from the perspective of patent law, works law, etc., the protection of intellectual property rights is clearly defined. Count the related infringements, and formulate corresponding punishment measures for these infringements, and further improve the judicial supervision system, so that the owners and beneficiaries of intellectual property rights can be protected by law [4]. In addition, to improve the relevant professional protection system, we need to mobilize various forces. These forces mainly reflect the state's emphasis on intellectual property protection. As long as the government and the state take corresponding measures, people's awareness of safeguarding rights can be raised. This fundamentally ensures that the owners of intellectual property rights can constantly innovate in the process of practice and actively research and develop technology projects that are beneficial to national development. Thus, the support and protection of the law is the basis for promoting the progress of science and technology, and it is also an authoritative means. As a researcher in the new era, we should not only pay attention to the research and development of technology, but also learn to protect our legitimate rights and interests by legal means. Only in this way can we build a good technology research and development system and play an important role in intellectual property protection. In addition, the state and the government should combine with individuals to fully raise the awareness of individual rights protection, so that people can have no worries in innovation and ensure the smooth progress of all work in China.

Kunkle ’23 [Kellie; August 23; writer for INTIPSA, and intellectual property law blog; INTIPSA, “The Essential Role of Intellectual Property Law: Protecting Creators and Owners,” https://www.intipsa.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-intellectual-property-law]

Intellectual property (IP) law is a complex and ever-evolving field, with different rules and regulations governing different countries. It is essential to comprehend the distinction between domestic and international IP law to guarantee that your IP rights are secured. Domestic IP law is the set of laws that control intellectual property inside a particular nation. These laws are typically set up by the legislature of that nation and are intended to secure the privileges of people and organizations to their intellectual property.

Brent ’10 [Douglas F.; June 2; attorney; “Reply Brief on Threshold Issues of Cricket Communications, Inc.,” online: ] italics and bold in the original

AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of “any given” interconnection agreement for a single three year term. AT&T Brief at 12. Specifically, AT&T asserts that because Cricket adopted the interconnection agreement between Sprint and AT&T, which itself was extended, Cricket is precluded from extending the term of its agreement with AT&T. Id This argument relies upon an inaccurate assumption: that the agreement (contract) between Sprint and AT&T, and the agreement (contract) between Cricket and AT&T, are one and the same. In other words, to accept AT&T’s argument the Commission must conclude that two separate contracts, i.e. the interconnection between Sprint and AT&T in Kentucky (“Sprint Kentucky Agreement”) and the interconnection between Cricket and AT&T in Kentucky (“Cricket Kentucky Agreement”), are one and the same. Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T asserts that “the ICA was already extended”; id. at 14, and “the ICA Cricket seeks to extend was extended by Sprint . . . .”; id. at 15, and, finally, “Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second time . . . .” Id. (emphasis added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T brief (and elsewhere) AT&T uses vague and imprecise language when referring to either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement, or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, in hopes that the Commission will treat the two contracts as one and the same. But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing AT&T’s duties and obligations with Sprint is a legally distinct and separate contract from that which governs AT&T’s duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2008 in Case Number 2008-033 1. AT&T ignores the fact that these are two separate and distinct contracts because it knows that the merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual telecommunications carrier has with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states that “AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a requesting telecommunications carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As written, the commitment allows any carrier to extend “its” agreement. Clearly, the use of the pronoun “its” in this context is possessive, such that the term “its” means - that particular carrier’s agreement with AT&T (and not any other carrier’s agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an individual carrier may have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Cricket’s right to extend its agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and distinct right from another carrier’s right to extend its agreement with AT&T (or whether such agreement has been extended).

Mandel ’18 [Gregory N.; January; Dean & Peter J. Liacouras Professor of Law, Temple University; Minnesota Law Review, “Institutional Fracture in Intellectual Property Law: The Supreme Court Versus Congress,” 102:803]

I constructed a database of every Supreme Court opinion implicating patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret issues from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2016. The database entries are the Supreme Court’s final decision in each matter; certiorari dispositions are not included. I removed from the database any cases that, though referring to intellectual property law, did not actually decide any intellectual property issue. For example, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. concerned whether there should be a presumption of market power under antitrust law where the product in question is subject to patent protection.7 Though this case bears a relation to patent protection, its result did not turn on or affect patent law. The final Supreme Court database includes forty-four intellectual property decisions and is summarized in Appendix A. Using similar methods, I developed a database of every federal statute concerning patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret rights during the same time period. As with the Supreme Court data, I removed statutes that did not actually affect patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret doctrine. For example, the Lanham Act is the primary statute providing for Federal trademark protection in the United States.8 Portions of the Lanham Act regulate nontrademark activities, such as false advertising.9 Legislation that affected only the false advertising portions of the Lanham Act was excluded from the database. The final dataset includes forty-three legislative entries for the pertinent period and is summarized in Appendix B.10 The following sections analyze the contours of intellectual property activity in these Supreme Court and congressional datasets.

Summers ’94 [Edward; November 8; Justice of the Oklahoma Supreme Court; Oklahoma State Courts Network, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” ]

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", 1 -- makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or 2 -- constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” ]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.