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Judicial decisions are not self-fulfilling directives. Because of institutional limitations, courts cannot implement their own decisions. Thus, the Court must rely on other individuals and institutions to carry out its directives. Because of these potential problems, many argue that the Court should not be active in policymaking. Ultimately, it is an empirical question, like broader notions of capacity. If the justices make decisions that lower courts do not apply or implementers ignore, there is a loss of institutional legitimacy for the Court.

ONE of the major impediments to the judicial protection of collective rights1 is the group of doctrines falling under the rubric *606 of “justiciability” — standing, ripeness, and mootness.2 These are the gatekeeper doctrines; each regulates a different dimension of entrance to the federal courts. The law of standing considers whether the plaintiff is the proper person to assert the claim, the law of ripeness ensures that the plaintiff has not asserted the claim too early,3 and the law of mootness seeks to prevent the plaintiff from asserting the claim too late.4 By keeping certain public-minded plaintiffs and public-law claims out of federal court, these doctrines have shifted much of the battle for collective rights to the more steeply pitched fields of state courts or the political process.5 In particular, defendants in public law litigation have had considerable success keeping such cases out of the federal courts by invoking the “case or controversy” requirement *607 of Article III.6 Under current Supreme Court precedent, if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she possesses an ongoing “personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation, a federal court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on the merits.7 No amount of judicial discretion can overcome this jurisdictional defect, because Article III demarcates the outer limit of federal court power.8 As a result, many attempts to establish entitlements to important collective rights fail before courts can give them full consideration.

Of the three doctrines, standing has received the most scholarly attention,9 perhaps because the case law on standing is so internally inconsistent.10 But the mootness doctrine also constitutes a substantial barrier to the adjudication of collective rights claims. Consider the following examples:

 Endowed with a relatively unique capacity to extend beyond its national borders, American law serves to persuasively guide sister jurisdictions, who look to this emerging jurisprudence for inspiration in treading uncharted legal territory. Thus, for instance, Canadian courts 5 - and certainly the Israeli Supreme Court - have been known to routinely cite U.S. jurisprudence when tackling novel juridical issues. 6 In fact - for better or for worse - it is not uncommon to see a significant portion of leading Supreme Court judgments in both these countries dedicated to a survey of the American approach to previously unaddressed challenging issues of law.

It is also worth asking why the Court fares so well in Congress. As noted above, few of the Court's most controversial interventions in the past half century have been directly reversed. Nor has Congress enacted any of the numerous bills to remove the Court's jurisdiction over areas in which the Court has aroused congressional anger. A large part of the explanation lies in the difficulty of enacting legislation in a process with so many veto points. That difficulty is especially great in an era like the current one, which lacks a strong or stable law-making majority. In such an era, interventions are likely to have significant support in government regardless of their ideological direction, and even decisions that strike down federal laws may enjoy majority support. The line of decisions since 1995 that has limited the regulatory power of the federal government (e.g., Alden v. Maine 1999, United States v. Morrison 2000) constitutes the most significant judicial attack on federal policy since the 1930s. But since 1995, Congress has had Republican majorities except for the bare Democratic Senate majority in 2001–2002. In that situation, any significant action to counter the Court's policies has been exceedingly unlikely.

Another important factor is the institutional role of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ’s primary function is to represent the interests of the United States in federal court.30 In order to perform this function effectively—that is, to win cases in court—the DOJ must maintain a certain level of credibility with the federal judiciary. The DOJ would have difficulty maintaining that credibility if its “client” (the federal government) threatened to violate adverse federal court orders. Accordingly, the DOJ has a strong institutional incentive to push the rest of the federal executive branch to abide by federal court judgments. 31 These institutional incentives are bolstered by the culture among the attorneys at the DOJ. These attorneys were trained in a legal community that has long promoted compliance with federal court orders.32 Indeed, it likely does not occur to many lawyers at the DOJ that defiance is a viable, much less legal, option.

In addition, activists noted that education stemming from litigation can influence government decision makers. This potentially includes state and federal legislators as well. Attorney Lauren Smedley suggested that judicial decisions can "serve as a springboard for further legislation." Likewise, another attorney-activist described litigation activity as having three parts: litigation, education, and legislation. Although she does not play a direct role in the third, this attorney asserted that, in conjunction with litigation, "ideally, there should be a piece of legislation ready to go so that an angry public that has just read all about it ... can say 'now Mr. or Ms. Assemblyperson, vote for this."'

From this we see litigation defined beyond the realm of implementation and regulatory enforcement. Litigation is viewed and used as a catalyst for legislation. In addition, the evidence and information revealed during trials may provide the impetus for other activity. As Kaplan noted, even if a case does not result in a direct judicial victory, the "emergence of evidence ... may help us to crystallize the grievance that we have and help us to formulate another strategy either in the courts or not in the courts." In Kaplan's view, litigation has meaning-making power for animal rights advocates. It may contribute to the formulation of complaints and strategies and may foster new ways of thinking about and approaching an issue. More generally, litigation by one group can catalyze litigative activity by others. As was suggested in Animals' Agenda, a court decision that overturned a hunter harassment law in New Hampshire "provides potent ammunition for those who wish to challenge the constitutionality of similar legislation in other states" (Animals' Agenda, December 1986, 28).

But a good job of fact-finding should not always be presumed. Legislators often act in their self-interest and pursue fact-finding to support a desired legislative outcome.208 If lawmakers do not care about collecting the necessary facts and just want to “deliver[ ] the goods” to interest groups, then judicial deference based on institutional capacity is flawed.209 Therefore, deference based on institutional capacity to collect facts to serve the public must be tempered by the realization that the legislative institution may not have adequate incentives to actually do a good job fact-finding.210 Just because the legislature has superior institutional capacity, it does not follow that the legislature actually uses this capacity wisely. Congressional performance in collecting facts to serve the public preferences is related directly to political salience of the issue.211 Significant public scrutiny or opposition will likely increase the attention or care that legislators take.212 For example, Congress has made “short thrift to fact finding” in certain legislation taken pursuant to the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power. Congress lacked incentives to engage in comprehensive fact-finding because of the lack of interest group or federalism-based opposition to this legislation.213 Thus, perhaps the Supreme Court’s intervention to curtail some congressional activity on behalf of federalism is due to the absence of congressional attention to federalism when enacting legislation.214 In the previous Part, I explained that incentives and structure make it more likely that the strength of opposition ensures a more properly functioning political process in takings than in copyright extensions. If the political process is well-functioning, we should expect the legislature to take fact-finding seriously. By examining the fact-finding behind the governmental action in Kelo and Eldred, it appears that the tools of superior institutional capacity more likely will be exercised in takings than in copyright extensions. Consequently, copyright extension warrants less judicial deference to Congress’s fact-finding than takings.

5-1-2009. https://academic.oup.com/chicago-scholarship-online/book/17136/chapter/174495140

Even if industry-specific patent legislation is legal, we are not persuaded that it is a good idea, for several reasons. First, while economics can make useful policy suggestions as to how patents work in different industries, we are skeptical of the ability of a statute to translate those suggestions into detailed patent rules for each industry. Many of the predictions of economic theory are fact-specific—they suggest different factors that should bear on the outcome of particular cases, but that require case-by-case application that cannot easily be captured in a statute. Economic theory is more useful in making general suggestions about how the patent system can be adapted to particular factual contexts than it is dictating hard and fast statutory rules.

A. Proposed Reforms of Existing Law While Copyfraud anticipates that the legislative system will deal with copyright abuse, I suggest that the judicial system may prove a more effective venue for some reforms that Mazzone recommends. Copyfraud proposes, for instance, that Congress revise U.S. copyright statutory damage rules so that legitimate fair users will feel freer to engage in lawful (if edgy) uses of copyrighted works (pp. 201–03).82 Under current law, a successful copyright claimant can opt for an award of statutory damages instead of actual damages.83 The normal range for statutory damage awards is between $750 and $150,000 per infringed work.84 Mazzone believes that the risk of substantial statutory damage liability has undue chilling effects on users (pp. 202–03). Imagine, for instance, a town historical society that owned a set of 100 historically significant photographs by an unknown photographer from the 1960s, which it wanted to post on its website. Even if the society firmly believed doing so would be fair use, it might well refrain from posting the photographs online because of its potential exposure to a statutory damage award that could send it into bankruptcy.85 Mazzone would have Congress limit statutory damages for noncommercial infringements (p. 203). Reform of copyright’s statutory damages provision would be a very good idea.86 However, Congress seems unlikely to reform it as Mazzone recommends, given that copyright industry groups favor statuto-ry damages awards precisely because of their deterrent (that is, in terrorem) effects.87 A more feasible way to reform statutory damages would be to persuade judges to adopt guidelines to ensure that statutory damages awards are “just,” as the statute says they should be.88 In many cases, this approach would mean awarding an amount that approximates actual damages, and in some cases, courts have done just that.89 Another reform recommended in Copyfraud concerns contractual and technical measures aimed at overriding lawful uses of public domain or copyrighted works.90 The book recommends that Congress enact legislation to forbid contractual overrides to fair use (for example, anti–reverse engineering clauses in software licenses) so that such restrictions would be null and void (pp. 114–15). Mazzone would similarly have Congress amend laws outlawing circumvention of technical protection measures (TPMs), which are used to protect copyrighted works, so that circumvention for fair use purposes or for purposes of accessing public domain materials would be lawful (p. 93). Given the failure of previous legislative efforts to limit contractual overrides to fair use and to enable circumvention for fair use purposes,91 Copyfraud’s proposals are admirably idealistic, yet unrealistic. As with statutory damages reform, a more viable way to accomplish these objectives would be to persuade courts to treat contractual restrictions on fair use and other privileged uses as unenforceable on public policy grounds.92 Mazzone might also find comfort in plausible interpretations of the anticircumvention rules under which circumvention for fair use and other public interest purposes is already lawful.93 A complete ban on contractual or technical overrides to privileged uses may be overbroad.94 Copyfraud also recommends that Congress amend fair use to make it lawful to take samples from existing sound recordings to make new recordings (p. 65),95 but if Congress truly cared about creative sampling of sound recordings as fair use, it would probably have already taken action, given how well known the problem is. The book further recommends that initial purchasers of digital copies of or access rights to copyrighted works should have the right to transfer that copy or access right (p. 135), which would allow purchasers to resell these copies, give them away to friends, or donate them to nonprofit libraries. Congress has, however, had a chance to be receptive to a similar recommendation but declined the opportunity.96 Courts are a more likely venue than is Congress for achieving these two reforms. Courts could become more receptive to sampling as fair use and could draw upon common law exhaustion of rights principles to allow resales of digital copies.97 Nor is Congress likely to amend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act98 (DMCA) so that users would have considerably more due process rights with respect to materials they have stored on ISP sites that copyright owners claim are infringing, as Copyfraud recommends (pp. 92–93).99 Under Mazzone’s regime, a user would first have the chance to oppose a takedown notice, whereupon the ISP would do nothing unless and until the owner filed an infringement lawsuit (p. 93). Perhaps Mazzone is right that more should be done to encourage ISPs to take fair use and free speech principles into account when they process takedown notices, but it seems inefficient to require copyright owners to file a lawsuit when sending a letter identifying infringing works and asking the ISP to take them down would resolve most disputes. Courts are more likely than is Congress to interpret the noticeand-takedown rules in a way that takes into account public interest concerns.100

The European Union and the United States will announce a wide-ranging partnership around technology and trade next week in an attempt to push back against China and promote democratic values, according to two EU officials and draft conclusions for the upcoming EU-U.S. summit seen by POLITICO.

While negotiations on the new body are still ongoing, U.S. President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen plan to announce details of the project when they meet in Brussels on June 15. The EU proposed the initiative in December, and U.S. officials have been eager to show that Washington is willing to work with its allies after a rocky period in the transatlantic relationship during Donald Trump's presidency.

On a broad level, the U.S. and Europe agree on the need for new regulations to limit dangers from the authoritarian digital model. They want to reign in tech monopolies. They want to protect privacy. They want to combat disinformation that threatens democracy.

On a practical level, both favors strengthened export controls of dangerous technology. A good example of cooperation concerns semiconductors. While the US is leading in most stages of the semiconductor supply chain, the Dutch company ASML dominates lithography equipment production. Even under President Trump, the Dutch government agreed to stop ASML from selling its most advanced machines to China.

According to US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, the United States and European Union (EU) don’t have a moment to wait in setting standards for the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI). “If the US and EU don’t show up,” she warned, “China will, [and] autocracies will.”

Raimondo spoke at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on Tuesday alongside European Commission Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager, who cautioned that the field of standardization in technologies is already being “dominated by nonmarket players or Chinese players.” But “we need to be much more present in standardization for us,” she said. “We need to have a presence.”

The Internet has created an extraordinary new democratic forum for people around the world to express their opinions. It is revolutionizing global access to information: Today, more than 1 billion people worldwide have access to the Internet, and at current growth rates, 5 billion people — about 70 percent of the world’s population — will be connected in five years.

But this growth trajectory is not inevitable, and threats are mounting to the global spread of an open and truly "worldwide" web. The expansion of the open Internet must be allowed to continue: The mobile and social media revolutions are critical not only for democratic institutions’ ability to solve the collective problems of a shrinking world, but also to a dynamic and innovative global economy that depends on financial transparency and the free flow of information.

Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia. It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it. The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power, gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit), France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda, because it erodes federalism—the idea that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This makes it easier for Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia. This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy. Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly, Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy. The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is always one of degree and intensity. So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated by nuclear weapons.

Economists are debating how AI might reshape the U.S. job market and boost productivity growth in the decades ahead. But a new paper finds that such benefits will be harder to match across the Atlantic.

Why it matters: The result might be a widening divide in innovation and economic outcomes between the U.S. and continental Europe.

In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism.

Strategic autonomy’ and ‘complementarity with NATO’ usually appear in the same sentence in the European debate – the latest doctrinal iteration to be found in the EU Global Strategy of June 2016. The ensemble reflects Europe’s need to rely on its transatlantic relationship for security and territorial defence, empowering it to carry out foreign policy too. The EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement of enlarging to Central Europe after the Cold War, pursued in tandem with NATO expansion, is testimony to this pairing.

Third, business wants to expand deeper into traditional human activities. It has already done so by systematizing activities that laypeople once engaged in naturally—for example, friendship, matchmaking, advising, loving, and caring. Business turned these activities into fields of study, then employed credentialed providers to perform these activities as a paid “service.” Business also systematized and rationalized these services directly through computers—for example, Internet dating sites. AI robots are the next step. Not only do they eliminate the cost of the human service providers, but also the variations inherent in those providers, thereby saving money. Yet such robots must appear human enough for customers to feel comfortable engaging. By giving robots rights, along with arms, legs, faces, and speech, business makes the fiction more compelling.

People will gradually start to look upon these advanced AI robot service providers, which will be ubiquitous, as perfect beings existing on the same moral plane as humans. That robots are lumps of passive metal incapable of causation will be long forgotten. The robots will be said to “work” with humans, “advise” them, and “befriend” them. At the same time they will be programmed to exist beyond ambition, aspiration, and selfish hopes and desires. They will be perfect “humans.”

At the outbreak of the pandemic, no one could have predicted that Americans would have access to three highly effective vaccines within a year.

No one, that is, except our nation's scientists. Researchers at Pfizer, Moderna and Johnson & Johnson were uniquely prepared to fast-track the development of these breakthroughs, thanks largely to the legal infrastructure that encourages companies to make risky bets on cutting-edge technologies.

The study of imagery and creativity is of special importance. Many of the problems faced by mankind [humankind] involve the use of creative thinking. In this section I review one representative study indicating the strong links that exist between imagery vividness and creativity. Kobnithikulwong (2007) at the University of Florida, presented her masters thesis on “Creativity and Imagery in Interior Design…” Kobnithikulwong’s conceptual framework consisted of a Person, a Process and a Product. The Person needs to have a creative personality and vivid visual imagery. The Process needs to have an Internal Visualization and an External Representation of that visualization which is the Product. Kobnithikulwong designed a drawing and writing task and also measured students’ VVIQ and creativity scales.

The students were allowed 30 minutes to do a drawing of a “transitional space within a building” and 10 minutes to write a description of being in the space. Significant differences were found between the high and low creative performance students. Low creative performance produced narratives averaging 73 words. High creative performance produced narratives averaging at 133 words, nearly double the length. The low creatives contained linear and rectangular forms that gave the designs a static look. High creatives produced stronger dynamic movement in their designs by using curves and free-form elements. Solutions in the high group employed movement from curves to create perspective “Pulling a viewer into their spaces”, while low creatives did not make this kind of connection with the viewer. High creatives showed better quality perspective building techniques and designed spaces which were open on one side or end. Low creatives were mostly enclosed with a more limited perspective. High creatives showed high contrast and line weight while lows produced drawings that were less legible with low line weight and low contrast.

The European Patent Office recently turned down an application for a patent that described a food container. This was not because the invention was not novel or useful, but because it was created by artificial intelligence (AI). By law, inventors need to be actual people. This isn’t the first invention by AI – machines have produced innovations ranging from scientific papers and books to new materials and music.

That said, being creative is clearly one of the most remarkable human traits. Without it, there would be no poetry, no internet and no space travel. But could AI ever match or even surpass us? Let’s have a look at the research.