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2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Links › Link---economic security

Problematizing "economic security" is crucial to uncover gendered social structures that contribute to conflict and structural violence

Tickner, PhD Brandeis, 97

(J. Ann, You just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists , International Studies Quarterly 41)

Whereas feminist analysis of military security has focused on the gendered structures of state institutions, issues of economic security and insecurity have emphasized the interrelationship between activities in markets and households. Feminists claim that women’s particular economic insecurities can only be understood in the context of patriarchal structures, mediated through race, class, and ethnicity, which have the effect of consigning women to households or low-paying jobs. Public/private boundaries have the effect of naturalizing women’s unremunerated work in the home to the detriment of women’s autonomy and economic security. Women’s disproportionate numbers at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale cannot be explained by market conditions alone; they also require an understanding that certain types of work such as teaching, nursing, and other forms of care-giving are often considered “natural” for women to perform (Peterson and Runyan, 1993:37; Pettman, 1996:165-8). Moreover, the clustering of women in low-paying or non-waged work in subsistence or households cannot be understood by using rational choice models, because women may have internalized the ideas behind traditional systems of discrimination, and thus may themselves view their roles as natural (Nussbaum and Glover, 1995:91). In other words, social expectations having to do with gender roles can reinforce economic inequalities between women and men and exacerbate women’s insecurities. Such issues can only be explained by using gender as a category of analysis; since they take them as given, rational actor models miss the extent to which opportunities and choices are constrained by the social relations in which they are embedded. Many of these issues seem far removed from the concerns of international relations. But, employing bottom-up rather than top-down explanations, feminists claim that the operation of the global economy and states’ attempts to secure benefits from it are built on these unequal social relations between women and men which work to the detriment of women’s (and certain men’s) security. For example, states that successfully compete in attracting multinational corporations often do so by promising them a pool of docile cheap labor consisting of young unmarried women who are not seen as “breadwinners” and who are unlikely to organize to protest working conditions and low wages (Enloe, 1990:151-76). When states are forced to cut back on government spending in order to comply with structural adjustment programs, it is often the expectation that women, by virtue of their traditional role as care-givers, will perform the welfare tasks previously assumed by the state without remuneration. According to Caroline Moser (1991:105), structural adjustment programs dedicated to economic “efficiency” are built on the assumption of the elasticity of women’s unpaid labor. In presenting some feminist perspectives on security and some explanations for insecurity, I have demonstrated how feminists are challenging levels of analysis and boundaries between inside and outside which they see, not as discrete constructs delineating boundaries between anarchy and order, but as contested and mutually constitutive of one another. Through a reexamination of the state, feminists demonstrate how the unequal social relations on which most states are founded both influence their external security-seeking behavior and are influenced by it. Investigating states as gendered constructs is not irrelevant to understanding their securityseeking behaviors as well as whose interests are most served by these behaviors. Bringing to light social structures that support war and “naturalize” the gender inequalities manifested in markets and households is not irrelevant for understanding their causes. Feminists claim that the gendered foundations of states and markets must be exposed and challenged before adequate understandings of, and prescriptions for, women’s (and certain men’s) security broadly defined can be formulated. (627-8)

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Links › Link---economic policy

Economics and policy making are profoundly gendered -fixation with objective facts and accurate predictions prevent acquisition of useful knowledge by creating analytical blindspots

Harding, PhD, 95

(Sandra, Can Feminist Thought Make Economics More Objective, Feminist Economics 1:1)

When the values and interests to be identified by researchers are those that differ between individual researchers or even recognized research communities, the neutrality ideal can be useful. Here feminists have stressed that it has not been vigorously enough pursued. (It has its limits here, too. My point is only that it also has its uses.) But when culture-wide values and interests shape research projects, the neutrality ideal is notjust useless; even worse, it becomes part of the problem. It defends and legitimates the institutions and practices through which the distortions and their often exploitative consequences are generated. It certifies as normal, natural, and therefore not political at all, the policies and practices through which powerful groups can gain the information and explanations that they need to advance their priorities. As two feminist postcolonial critics put the point, modern science's claimed neutrality is "a politics of disvaluing local concerns and knowledge and legitimating 'outside experts"' (Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya and Vandana Shiva 1988: 60). Such information and explanations may well "work" in the sense of enabling prediction and control. However, this obvious fact does not end the matter. One form of explanation that "works" may at the same time obscure or draw attention away from other regularities and their causes that would suggest other possibilities for organizing nature and social relations. One can get information about the natural and social order that makes possible the accumulation of wealth by the few and misery by the many, or other information that makes possible the equitable distribution of means to satisfy basic human needs for food, shelter, health, work and just social relations. Moreover, the regularities of nature and social relations that make possible healing a body, charting the stars, or mining ores may be explained in ways permitting extensive, though not identical, prediction and control within radically different and even conflicting, culturally local, explanatory models. The kinds of explanations favored by modern science are not necessarily the most effective ones for all projects - for example, for achieving environmental balance, preventing chronic bodily malfunctions or distributing access to scarce resources fairly. The fact that societies with massive investments of public resources in natural and social science research have not been interested to prioritize such fundamental human problems is itself illuminating. "It works" is no guarantee that "it" works for explaining all of nature's regularities and their underlying causal tendencies, that "it" is the only reasonable explanation of a given phenomenon, or that "it" does not also generate systematic ignorance. "It works" is no guarantee of cultural neutrality (cf. Harding 1994, forthcoming b). This kind of argument is widespread in U.S. anti-racist analyses and in the postcolonial science studies and development literature, including much work now generated under U.N. auspices as that institution tries to grasp why forty years of conceptualizing "development" primarily as a matter of science and technology transfer from North to South has largely resulted in the dedevelopment (and worse) for the vast majority of the South's peoples. (Cf. Vernon Dixon 1976; Susan Feiner 1994; Goonatilake 1984; Harding 1993, 1994, forthcoming b; Nandy 1990; Petitjean etal. 1992; UNCSTD forthcoming.) The neutrality ideal functions more through what its normalizing procedures and concepts implicitly prioritize than through explicit directives. This kind of politics requires no informed consent by those who exercise it, but only that scientists be "company men" (and women), following the prevailing rules of scientific institutions and their intellectual traditions. This normalizing politics frequently defines the objections of its victims and any criticisms of its institutions, practices or conceptual world as agitation by special interests that threatens to damage the neutrality of science and its "civilizing mission," as an earlier generation saw the matter. Thus, when sciences are already in the service of the mighty, scientific neutrality ensures that "might makes right." Feminists in every discipline have argued that androcentric "might" has all too often appealed to neutrality-maximizing standards in order to justify as "right" distorted descriptions and explanations of natural and social regularities and their underlying causal tendencies. We need a concept of objectivity, and methods for maximizing it, that enable scientific projects to escape containment by the interests and values of the powerful. This only weak concept of objectivity, that remains contained by the neutrality ideal, can't do it. What is the mechanism in scientific processes through which neutrality, and thus objectivity, is supposed to be maximized? Method is supposed to "operationalize" neutrality and, thus, achieve objectivist standards. However, method is conceptualized too narrowly to permit achievement of this goal. For one thing, method - in the sense in which students take methods courses or a research report describes its methods - is conceptualized as functioning only in the context of justification when hypotheses are being tested. It comes into play only after a problem is identified as a scientific one and after central concepts, a hypothesis and research design have already been selected. It is only after a research project is already constituted that methods of research, in this conventional narrow sense of the term, start up. However, as critic after critic has pointed out, it is in the context of discovery that culture-wide assumptions shape the very statement and design of the research project, and therefore select the methods. Moreover, it is well known that the availability of a research technology that was itself selected in earlier contexts of discovery and found productive frequently helps select which scientific problems will be interesting to scientists and to funders (cf., e.g., Strassmann 1993a). And cultural interests, values and relevances always select which problems will get to count as important ones for research. Of course in the "mangle of practice" (Andrew Pickering 1991) during the research process, hypotheses, representations of the object of knowledge and research technologies are adjusted to each other such that an important element of objectivity is produced without the promise of total neutrality. The world constrains our beliefs without uniquely confirming them. The "positive" neutrality ideal has blinded us to the costs of limiting our understanding of "method" only to techniques that standardize or otherwise obscure the values and interests represented in the results of research. Even the U.S. National Academy of Sciences - certainly not a den of wild-eyed radicals now argues that the notion of research method should be enlarged beyond its familiar meaning of techniques to include the judgments scientists make about interpretation or reliability of data, ... the decisions scientists make about which problems to pursue or when to conclude an investigation, ... the ways scientists work with each other and exchange information. (National Academy of Sciences 1989: 5-6) All three of these expansions of the notion of method make dear that methods can themselves be selected because they advance local social values and interests. Thus methods aimed only at eliminating all values and interests from the results of research have no way of detecting the ones that first constitute scientific problems, and then select central concepts, hypotheses to be tested and research designs. The issue I am raising is that some normative influences on research evidently advance the growth of knowledge and others retard it, but the "positivist" understanding of method lacks any way to identify which are which; moreover it is incapable of detecting the most widespread cultural assumptions, such as androcentric, economically elite or Eurocentric ones, that invariably lead to only partial and distorted representations of nature and social relations. (15-18)

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Links › Link---economic policy

Feminist insight crucial to building a better world- 1AC reliance on atomized economic methodology makes systemic change impossible

Dhruvarajan, PhD, 00

(Vanaja, Globalization: Discourse of Inevitability, and a Quest for a Just and Caring World, Society-Societe, 24:2)

Feminism provides an alternate world-view where the life sustaining activities women are assigned the position of prominence they deserve. Critical analysis of the current state of affairs by feminists has led to envisioning a better future. Many feminists have articulated these visions. There is a remarkable convergence o f broad principles underling these visions. They include a way of life where there is harmony with nature, cooperation and mutual respect among people and a pervasive concern for justice and care for all people. Such visions promote a holistic, interdependent world-view and social relations that emphasize cooperation (Mies and Shiva 1993; Gross 1996; Cooey 1991; Goldenberg 1990). A holistic approach to life includes several interrelated, interconnected and irreducible goals. Within this perspective, reproduction of life and the maintenance of health and well-being of all people are placed at the front and center of societal and individual objectives. This means that success in life is not measured by the amount of money one has or the number of goods collected, nor by the degree of control held over other lives. It means that we become conscious of the impact of our own lifestyles on others, and learn to live our lives so as to promote, not only our own health and well-being, but everyone else’s. We learn to resolve conflicts through peaceful means resisting the waste of resources for military build-up and armed conflict. The consequence is that resources can be spent on the reproduction of life and peaceful coexistence. We learn to think that difference does not mean inequality and that one style oflife is not necessarily better, as long as it is lived in a nonexploitative manner. A holistic approach also means that we do not consider nature/environment as something that is ‘out there', but consider it to be intimately connected to our lives. If we ruin the environment, we ruin our own health and well-being. The tendency to think in dualistic terms is avoided. This is important because one of the problems with the current life style is compartmentalization of activities in life. As producers/paid workers we do not care whether a given product has use value and whether it promotes human welfare. The only concern is whether it can sell and make maximum profit. Therefore slick advertising and sophisticated public relations strategies are adopted to sell the products. The products can be toxic chemicals, biological weapons of human destruction, or genetically modified food, the impact of which is not yet established. In addition, no attention is paid to environmental depletion, degradation or pollution. We, as consumers, must demand clean air and water, a safe environment and healthy food. As investors and shareholders of various financial institutions, the overwhelming concern is the return on our investment. Often no attention is paid as to how these returns are obtained. They may easily have been obtained by depriving people of their livelihood. We demand lower price on quality products but do not generally stop to think how it is obtained. As citizens we show concern about child labour in developing countries and make pronouncements of condemnation without stopping to think that, in most cases, child labour is required to make ends meet as the people are exploited by capitalistic greed. Relational analysis is required to shed light on these inconsistencies. Such practices are in vogue not only because pursuit of self-interest is promoted, but also because we are given to believe that some people are more deserving than others. This is particularly evident in contexts where people are different on the basis of gender, race/ethnicity, class or sexual orientation to name a few indices of social status. Difference often means hierarchy. PhilomenaEssed(1991), for example, has argued that EuroAmericans believe in racial and ethnic hierarchy because the belief systems made popular during colonialism and imperialism have become part of common sense knowledge. In general people do not see any inconsistency between believing in democracy and individual rights and considering non-white people as inferior. Such a belief in the coexistence of democracy and racism is labeled as democratic racism by Francis Henry (1995). Audre Lorde argues that much of western history has conditioned people to see themselves “in simplistic opposition to each other dominant/ subordinate, good/bad, superior/inferior” (1984:114). Such a belief system, she argues, is functional because, in a society, where good is defined in terms of profit rather than in terms of human need, there must always be some group of people who, through systematized oppression, can be made to feel surplus to occupy the place of the dehumanized inferior. (1984:114) She continues, somewhere, on the edge of consciousness, there is ... a mythical norm. In North America it is usually defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and fi nancially secure. {116) Under these circumstances acknowledging and respecting differences is threatening. Vandana Shiva (1994), arguing in a similar vein, writes that there is a link between the West’s long thought-war against cultural diversity and its legal and economic war against biodiversity, which currently threatens the global environment. She shows how knowledge monopolies work by enclosing, controlling and privatizing both biodiversity (diverse species) and cultural diversity (marginalized and third world knowledges). Her account of the links between western knowledge systems and the world-wide environmental crisis illustrates that neoimperialism is a world-system that privileges western countries and transnational corporations and those institutions they control, such as the World bank and the IMF. Coalition building is a difficult task under these circumstances. It requires patience and perseverance. Difficulties are mainly due to differences in power among groups due to the historical legacy of exploitation and domination. Patricia Collins (1986) proposes a model which she labels ‘matrix of differences’ to make a relational analysis among groups and individuals. She argues that various dimensions of social status such as gender, race, ethnicity and class are all simultaneous systems of action and meaning that intersect with one another and are interlocked to produce particular types of experiences for all people. These experiences become crystallized in institutional structures. Unequal relationships among people are routinely reproduced. To build coalitions across such differences, Kate Young (1988) argues that everyone, those who are in positions of domination and those who are in positions of subordination, must agree that it is in everyone’s strategic interest to stem the tide of environmental destruction, global poverty, consumerism and deterioration of quality of life. (7-9)

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Links › Link---climate change/environment

the aff’s epistemology is flawed, militarized representations of environmental ‘security’ issues reinforces gender hierarchies & prevents solutions to climate change [link to sequester, geo-engineering, modeling, etc.]

Nagel 15 [Joane Nagel, University Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Kansas University, PhD Stanford, Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 15 Apr 2015, DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1037629]

A preponderance of largely male governments and male-dominated economic interests protecting the unequal status quo can be understood mainly as hindrances to successful climate negotiations. But they are not the only important gendered features of the international system responsible for influencing climate change policy. As we saw above, the military is another gendered institution intimately related to national governments and economies. National militaries are less responsible for stalling organized responses to climate change; they are critical articulators of climate change hazards and advocates for defining climate change as a problem not of controlling carbon emissions, but of protecting national security. Despite the end of the Cold War (characterized by a large-scale U.S.-USSR arms race) in 1990, in 2010 world military expenditures were higher than in any year since the end of the Second World War in 1945. The United States far outpaces other countries in military expenditures. The U.S. accounted for thirty-nine percent of global military expenditures in 2012, when military expenditures consumed more than four percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. The United States is among a handful of the most militarized countries in the world, as measured by military expenditures per capita, including Israel, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Russia, Jordan, Algeria, and Azerbaijan. Even the world’s poorest countries sport national armies whose weapons and training are subsidized by or purchased from the world’s major arms dealers, most notably the U.S., Russia, France, United Kingdom, and China. The world’s militaries are historically hyper-masculine institutions with cultures embracing honor, bravery, loyalty, strength, and violence. Men dominate the ranks and leadership of military institutions just as they dominate national politics and economics around the world. In the United States, the military plays a critical role in scientific research, including climate change research. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has a basic scientific research and development budget that is two and a half times greater than the National Science Foundation (NSF) — the agency tasked with funding basic research across the sciences, mathematics, and engineering. The NSF has a broad mission of supporting transformative research on all topics and issues across disciplines. The DOD’s much narrower mission is to protect national security. This focus on security — food security, energy security, water security, and environmental security — determines the research projects it supports. As a result, the DOD has been a powerful voice in emphasizing national security dangers from and defenses against climate change and in shaping the work of the many researchers it supports in universities, industry, and national labs and research facilities. The DOD’s agenda reflects classical military/masculine tactics for attacking climate change: large-scale geo-engineering approaches to manage solar radiation or sequester carbon, energy research focused on military missions, conflict scenario planning, climate forecasting and modeling, and global resource assessments. The DOD has very limited interest in funding “softer” (feminine) research topics on the health, social, racial, gender, or age disparities in climate change impacts, factors that promote community resilience in the face of disasters, or strategies for reducing the carbon emissions causing climate change. Another important gendered feature of the climate change policy landscape is the funding and organization of climate change denialism. Major disinformation campaigns have been orchestrated by mainly male climate change skeptics in the U.S. Their message has been embraced by powerful partisan climate denialists in congress who have obstructed federal governmental efforts to regulate or aggressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite scientific agreement about the causes of climate change and the necessary actions to slow the rise of global temperatures and sea levels, climate skeptics have managed to create political gridlock around climate change mitigation and adaptation. The U.S. military’s emphasis on security threats tends to set it above the fray, and the political vacuum created by denialists and their industry supporters has opened the door for research and planning on the conflict potential for climate change and the need to prioritize defending our borders, resources, and way of life. Women’s relatively greater vulnerability to the effects of climate change is not on their agenda.

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Links › Link---climate change/environment

climate change “threat” reps obscures gendered militarization & causes of climate change,

Nagel 15 [Joane Nagel, University Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Kansas University, PhD Stanford, Gender, Conflict, and the Militarization of Climate Change Policy, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 15 Apr 2015, DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1037629]

In their 2007 report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, a group of prominent retired U.S. military advisors described climate change as a “threat multiplier” facing many countries in the world, especially the United States. They catalogued dangers to national security from climate change-related flooding, drought, extreme weather, disease, famine, and environmentally-forced migration. The report’s focus on dangers and conflicts reflected the institutional perspective and interests of its all-male military advisory board. They recommended strategic planning to defend against the threat of climate change. They did not call for action on the causes of climate change such as the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The militarization of climate change, by defining it primarily as a security threat, represents one of several ways in which climate change policy is gendered. The international failure to respond effectively to climate change also can be understood by analyzing the gender dimensions of the institutions that dominate international climate change research, planning, and negotiations. In her 2010 Nature article, “Call in the Women,” feminist geographer Susan Buckingham argued that gender imbalance is a major reason for the ongoing stalemate in international efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Starting in 1995, international environmental leaders have gathered each year at United Nations Conference of Parties (COP) meetings around the world to settle on a response to escalating changes in the global climate. In the past twenty years of annual COP meetings, these mainly male negotiators have not managed to produce any significant binding agreements to reduce the rate and scale of climate change. Negotiators’ inability to craft an international climate change agreement has persisted in the face of mounting scientific evidence and wide consensus about the dangerous consequences of climate change to the planet’s biosphere and human societies. Critics of negotiators’ ineffectiveness typically fault the economic interests of carbon emitting countries in maintaining a global energy and economic system that benefits them. They seldom attribute COP meeting failures to the enduring power of gender privilege. Buckingham, however, sees a more gendered COP landscape marked by the gendered culture and approach of male negotiators. To bolster this critique, she reports consistent research findings supporting improved decision-making in economic and political settings where women are included in adequate numbers. Not surprisingly, this research is ignored by predominately male representatives who dominate the ranks of COP representatives (women comprise less than thirty percent of COP delegates). This is despite the fact that in 1995 the United Nations called for including women in all levels of environmental decision-making. Buckingham’s conclusion: “there is enough evidence now to justify increasing women’s involvement in decision-making on climate change. We should do so without delay.”

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Fem IR K---1NC

Thus, the alternative is to decenter the “masculine subject” at the center of the affirmatives depiction of policymaking– only the alternatives feminist revisionism can interrupt the 1ACs masculine project.

Youngs 4 (Gillian, Dr Gillian Youngs, the newly appointed University of Wales Alliance Research Chair, Prof. of Digital Economy and Academic Director of the Institute of Advanced Broadcasting (IAB), University of Wales, Newport, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in*, International Affairs 80.1, CMR) *italics = original article

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a predominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policymaking in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challenging for those in the mainstream camp. The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist International Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

2023 Michigan Kritik
K – Fem IR – BFGHR › Fem IR K---1NC

Linear predictions of state behavior falsely presume unitary coherence and rationality of state actors – view from nowhere ensures self-fulfilling wars and gendered violence – vote for feminist IR to complicate securitized scenario planning.

Laura Sjoberg 13 (Laura Sjoberg, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War, Columbia University Press, Accessed: 7-16-2019)

“Some dyadic accounts of war are interested in how states’ interactions lead to (or help prevent) conflict between them in the sense of signaling, rather than in the sense of relating. “Steps-to-war” models lay out “a set of closely related paths to war that involve a series of steps between states that are roughly equal in power.”50 As Levy and Thompson explain, “they show each ‘step’ increases the probability of war, and that the process is cumulative.”51 Relatedly, rivalry theories of war see specific interstate relationships as more likely to lead to war than others. They suggest that because states “focus selectively on the states that appear to represent the greatest threat,” the act of singling out antagonists is key in predicting interstate wars, suggesting that “repetitive war behavior” points to conflict probability.52 In this view, states’ interactions are cumulative in causing conflict and war(s), and some states’ rivalries account for the majority of wars.” “Another theoretical approach to war that takes account of interaction focuses on bargaining. bargaining theories of war are interested in why war(s) happen(s) despite the(ir) cost, and therefore focus on why war-fighting parties were unable (or unwilling) to reach a (cheaper) negotiated settlement to their dispute(s),53 with emphasis on possible pathologies in negotiations, including commitment problems,54 private information (and/or incentives to misrepresent),55 the lack of a “bargaining” space of outcomes that are mutually preferred to war,56 and/or indivisible issues.57 This work implies that it is difficult to reach a negotiated settlement even when such a deal would be optimal for all parties involved.58” “All three of these models assume that states interact with some linear action and reaction, in which “the primary factors in determining war and peace are the foreign policy strategies adopted by states to deal with their disputes.”59 All three models also assume an internal coherence, or unitary nature, of the actors interacting, whereby each is making decisions for an internally united whole. The bargaining models add the assumption that the unitary actors interacting progressively do so rationally and calculate cost–benefit analysis in conflict decision-making. Feminist research has questioned each of these assumptions, arguing that states interact more relationally than reactively; suggesting that states are, rather than unitary, diverse and full of internal conflict that should not be neglected when defining (or critiquing the idea of) “interest”; and that states are not the rational actors that bargaining theorists assume them to be.60” “Action and Reaction As I mentioned above, a number of dyadic-level theories of the causes of war either do not theorize how states interact explicitly,61 or, in the case of bargaining, rivalry, and steps-to-war models, assume states’ interactions are individuated and progressive. by individuated and progressive, I mean that one state acts, the other (or others) respond, and then the first actor acts again in a sequence of interaction that can be understood chronologically62 and told as a coherent story. Feminist theorists’ understandings of the incomplete independence of decision makers and their decisions 63 frequently suggest that this picture needs to be complicated significantly. For our purposes now, the idea of state interaction in these theoretical approaches takes account of (as discussed in chapter 3) Allen’s ideas of power-over (as domination) and power-to (as resistance of domination)64 but takes inadequate account of power-with, both directly (as states can act together) and in its implications for interpreting state interactions (as neither necessarily individuated or progressive).” “Power-with, or the ability to act in concert, pooling (symbolic or material) power, resources, and/or knowledge, suggests that a model of state behavior in which we understand actions and responses to actions dichotomously does not tell the whole story. Discussing methods such as participatory planning,65 multisited feminist social criticism,66 and empowerment,67 feminist theorists have suggested both that actors are interdependent and that they can act together, simultaneously, and in role-similar and role-differentiated ways.68 In this view, instead of seeing policy as (always) assertion and/or response, it can be seen as responsiveness, more complicated constitutively (in terms of who the actor is) and directionally (in terms of where policies are going).69 For process-based dyadic war theorizing, this suggests that there may be different, more empirically nuanced, ways of looking at the nature of relationships between states to understand how it is that they end up in conflict, particularly in terms of their (gendered) war narratives and (gendered) cycles of violence. before sketching out what that might look like, this section continues to think about the problems with assumptions of state unity, state rationality, and the gender neutrality of the “gender neutrality of the process to war in process-based theories. Unitary Units Feminist scholars have also interrogated the unitary nature of the state, pointing out that efforts to maximize the state’s security interests often threaten the security of people inside the state. Specifically, as I discussed in the previous section, the state’s most marginalized citizens are often made insecure by state security-seeking, making it clear that a state does not have a single interest in interstate interaction but many that conflict. J. Ann Tickner contends that “an explanation of the historical development of state sovereignty and state identities as they have evolved over time does indeed suggest deeply gendered constructions that have not included women on the same terms as men.”70 This is because, according to Tickner:” “From the time of their foundation, states have sought to control the right to define political identity. Since their legitimacy has constantly been threatened by the undermining power of subnational and transnational loyalties, states’ survival and success have depended on the creation and maintenance of legitimating national identities; often these identities have depended on the manipulation of gendered representation.… Drawing on metaphors that evoke matrimonial and familial relations, the nation has been portrayed as both male and female.… The sense of community implicit in these family metaphors is deeply gendered in ways that not only legitimate foreign policy practices but also reinforce inequalities between men and women.71” “Using these gendered metaphors, the state can, while shoring up its “national interest,” both threaten the interest of marginalized citizens inside it and reinforce power inequalities among its groups. Catherine MacKinnon has explained that the “state’s structures and actions are driven by and institutionalize strategy based on an epistemic angle of vision” that can “distinguish public from private, naturalize dominance as difference, hide coercion beyond consent, and conceal politics beyond morality.”72 These structures require a certain standard of behavior from some members of the state,73 while suppressing the voices of others altogether.74” “With these tools, the state can appear unitary by suppressing its diversity and presenting one concept of national interest, autonomous of and not necessarily representative of its citizens. In this understanding, the sovereign state can be “an extension of the separation-minded realist man, also autonomous to various degrees from the diverse ‘domestic’ interests he-it allegedly exists to protect.”75 Additionally, states are complicit with gender subordination when they fail to intervene in domestic violence, perpetuate a heterosexist bias in education, exercise discrimination in welfare policies, and operate on patriarchal laws.76” “In this conception, the unitary state is a misleading and malignant construction. Two implications for the process of state interaction follow: states that interact often promote unrepresentative interests, and those unrepresentative interests exclude gender, racial, and cultural minorities. In this sense, states’ elites often make wars (or fail to) “representing” a limited group or groups among their populations, while claiming full representativeness, effectively rendering a significant portion of their supposed “constituency” invisible in the process of interacting with other states. Empirically, this means that there are a number of levels of interstate interaction, many of which are omitted from process-based notions of dyadic war theorizing. Normatively, it suggests that our conceptions of how states interact (and the content of those interactions) are problematically skewed.” “Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality.77 The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost–benefit analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when… constructed only by those in positions of privilege… [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out significant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79” “In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and masculinism.80 As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions81 assume: 1. Available… conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82” “Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject—in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency—is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexual).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing fields. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness “and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conflict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.91 Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92” “Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conflictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---AT: PDCP

Services are distinct from income cash payments

Ian Gough, 1-19-2021, Ian Gough is Visiting Professor in CASE (Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion) and an Associate of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change. (“Move the debate from Universal Basic Income to Universal Basic Services,” UNESCO, 1-19-2021 , 7-20-2023)//AAlmand

Many arguments have been made for Universal Basic Income (UBI). This article summarizes an alternative case: for Universal Basic Services (UBS). The issue of their relationship is not directly considered here, but the argument is made that UBS is more egalitarian and sustainable than UBI, as befits the rethinking of eco-social policy in the face of dangerous climate change. Furthermore, it is argued that UBS is also politically more incremental and reformist than the case for a true UBI. UBS advocates a wider range of free public services enabling every citizen to meet their basic needs and achieve certain levels of security, opportunity, and participation. The core principles are: Universal: guaranteed entitlement according to need and not one’s ability to pay. Basic: sufficient rather than minimal, enabling people to meet their basic needs, participate in society, and flourish. Services: collectively generated activities that serve the public interest. In many countries, public health services and school to higher education are founded on these goals, despite cuts, attacks, and ongoing disputes over principles. UBS poses the question: can we extend these principles to other basic necessities, such as housing, care, transport, information, and nutrition ()?

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---AT: PDB

Perm fails—too expensive to do both

Anna Coote, 10-26-2020, Anna Coote is Principal Fellow at the New Economics Foundation. She has written widely on social justice, sustainable development, working time, public health policy, public involvement and democratic dialogue, gender and equality. Earlier posts include Director of Health Policy at the King’s Fund and Deputy Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research. (Universal basic services and sustainable consumption, No Publication, 10-26-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/15487733.2020.1843854?needAccess=true&role=button, 7-21-2023)//AAlmand

It has been proposed that UBS be combined with a generous, non-stigmatizing system of social security (Stirling and Arnold2020), which both recognizes interdependence and supports individual autonomy. The third critique takes issue with how UBS is costed. It has been estimated that total expenditure on extending the UBS program, if implemented all at once, would be around 4–5% of GDP in a typical OECD country (Coote and Percy2020, 114–127). While costings are based approximately on average expenditures on similar services in a range of countries, they remain open to question, because so much depends on what services are already in place in any country, what is regarded as sufficient in terms of quality and scope, and the level of users ‘contributions (if any). It is fair to say at this stage that more work is required to arrive at viable costings for UBS. However, as noted below, the costs of a sufficient UBI would outstrip the costs of UBS by a wide margin.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---AT: Critics

Critics of UBS are wrong—transforms the state and is liberating, not paternalistic

Anna Coote, 10-26-2020, Anna Coote is Principal Fellow at the New Economics Foundation. She has written widely on social justice, sustainable development, working time, public health policy, public involvement and democratic dialogue, gender and equality. Earlier posts include Director of Health Policy at the King’s Fund and Deputy Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research. (Universal basic services and sustainable consumption, No Publication, 10-26-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/15487733.2020.1843854?needAccess=true&role=button, 7-21-2023)//AAlmand

To conclude, it may be useful to reflect briefly on the proposal for universal basic income (UBI),which seeks to make regular, unconditional cash payments to all individuals, and on emerging criticisms of UBS, which have come mainly from supporters of basic income (Standing2020, 108–114;Duffy2018). As noted, proposals for UBS were developed partly in response to UBI, offering an approach with different ideological and practical implications. Here I touch briefly on some of the critics’ main concerns about the two ideas. One concern of critics of UBS is that it augments the size and power of the central state. However, this contention overlooks the fact that decentralization, local control, and citizen/user engagement are fundamental to the UBS framework, and that it includes the goal of transforming the state and its relationship with local politics and action. A second critique is that UBS is paternalistic rather than liberating, on the ground that it involves delivering services rather than just giving everyone money to spend as they choose. Against this point, it may be argued, following T. H. Marshall, Amartya Sen, and others, that personal freedom is contingent on the social, economic, and political systems and structures that shape everyday personal lives. UBS embodies a commitment to collective action to create a sustainable social infrastructure that can enable all citizens and residents to participate and flourish. Unless resources (financial and political) are pooled to ensure that risks are shared and everyone has access to life’s essentials regardless of ability to pay, it is likely that genuine freedom will remain the privilege of a small minority.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---Turns Case---Ineq/Efficiency

Cash payments guarantee inequality skyrockets—stratified and inefficient system

Jenny Formby, 9-2019, Jenny Formby is the general secretary of the Labour Party in London. (UNIVERSAL BASIC SERVICES: The Right to a Good Life, Labour UK, 9-2019, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/12730_19-Universal-Basic-Services_v5.pdf, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

For certain goods direct provision by the state has advantages that cash payments do not. It is true that an entitlement to a “national minimum” for a particular good or service could, in principle, be guaranteed through a cash benefit (or voucher or insurance system) rather than through direct state provision. Students of neoclassical economics will have been taught the so-called Second Welfare Theorem which says, broadly speaking, that any desired allocation can be achieved by giving people a transfer and then allowing the market to take its course. Assuming that the cost of universal access was covered by the state through general taxation, why would it matter if everyone received the national minimum as a cash payment rather than in kind? One reason is that a national minimum may not be enough to cover need. How much health or social care someone needs varies widely over the course of one’s life and from person to person in ways that are unpredictable. Given this, if everyone were given an equal cash payment the outcome would be unequal as those with high needs would be unable to cover the cost of their care. Another reason is efficiency. One has only to look at the US health system to see the dangers of for-profit private provision. When healthcare is provided for profit there is a huge incentive to overtreat or to prioritise the most lucrative treatments. This creates inefficiencies and channels resources towards where the money is rather than towards need. The final reason is that inequality is more likely to emerge whenever cash is the medium. This is because the wealthy are likely to top up their guaranteed national minimum to purchase better quality services. This risks creating a stratified system of provision and undermining the solidarity and principle of equal access for all citizens that a national minimums are supposed to create. It is also important that the public sector is the provider of those services and not private companies. For the last forty years, the dominant view was that introducing private companies and market competition to public services would have a disciplining effect that would drive efficiency improvements. However, the internal market for the NHS, academisation of schools and widespread outsourcing are creating a growing body of evidence that creeping privatisation of public services has been counter-productive. Quality has been eroded due to cost cutting and fragmentation. “Efficiency” gains have mostly not materialised and, where they have, they have come at the expense of workers. Perhaps most worrying, however, is that the involvement of private providers has brought with it a cultural shift as profits and margins increasingly take precedence over social purpose.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---A/O Climate

Only UBS can solve climate change, demographic ageing, stagnant living standards, and automation

Jenny Formby, 9-2019, Jenny Formby is the general secretary of the Labour Party in London. (UNIVERSAL BASIC SERVICES: The Right to a Good Life, Labour UK, 9-2019, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/12730_19-Universal-Basic-Services_v5.pdf, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

I have reservations about UBI. But these are not the result of believing work is inherently virtuous. I believe that technological change should lead to more leisure time rather than, as at present, to higher profits. So permit me to critique UBI not from the right, but the left. The planned pilot schemes attracting such ire will take place in Jarrow in north-east England and East Finchley, north London. Between those two locations, 30 people will receive monthly payments of £1,600 for two years – which will supplement their existing earnings. I support the programme because it will test Voltaire’s hypothesis about the necessity of work for happiness. Will those taking part become bored and lazy, or will they become more productive and virtuous? But given the demands for a national – and truly universal – UBI, consider for a moment the cost of expanding the scheme. This would mean 38 million working-age people receiving monthly payments totalling £19,200 a year – meaning a total cost of £730bn. It’s important to point out that nobody is suggesting replicating the exact figures in the pilot scheme nationally, so let’s look at alternative projections by the pressure group Compass. In 2016, it modelled a scheme that would pay £244 a month to every working-age adult in and smaller payments to other groups. This would complement rather than replace existing social programmes, adding more than £170bn a year to public spending, around the same as the day-to-day health budget this year. Yet Compass found that even with this extraordinary intervention, child poverty would only fall from 16 per cent to 10 per cent, while pensioner poverty would stay broadly the same. Even if we assume this is too pessimistic, it is worth comparing such a proposal with a different approach: (UBS). For £170bn a year we could not only fund primary and secondary education (already themselves forms of UBS) but higher education too. Alongside this we could create a national care service, for young and old alike, a critical resource for any society facing the challenge of demographic ageing. We could also provide free (and eventually entirely electric) public transport – – as well as a . Finally we could return to a world of abundant social housing: where publicly owned homes meet demand and help limit house prices for those looking to buy. With extra funding we could reimagine energy as a universal basic service with the customer, rather than private energy firms, benefitting from of renewable energy. The return on such an investment seems superior to UBI, not least because it permits society to engage with the principal challenges of the 21st century – the climate crisis, demographic ageing, stagnant living standards and automation. After all, we are told UBI would mean we work and commute less, thus reducing consumption of fossil fuels. I support a four-day week for precisely this reason but the truth is that to decarbonise by 2040 we need the one thing market fundamentalists hate: planning. Public transport as a UBS would help us engineer a zero-carbon economy in a highly coordinated way. The same is true for housing, with new social homes built to of energy efficiency and solar panels adorning every roof. Then there is care work and the challenge of an ageing population – often gestured to by proponents of UBI. Women do most care work so we should have UBI. This is certainly true. But then why should men, who are less likely to be care-givers, also receive it? And why remunerate care in such a chaotic way if it is analogous to a job? Surely a preferable alternative is , free at the point of use and paid for through progressive taxation? Finally, there are the politics of UBI vs UBS. Universal basic services are readily comprehensible to the electorate, not least because they build on something everyone is already familiar with: postwar public services. It may be fashionable to say we can’t go back, but even a majority of Conservative voters favour public ownership of energy, water and the . Why wouldn’t the left use that as a launchpad to argue for UBS? Offering to instead spend the money on a political programme that few have tried and which has uncertain benefits seems a mistake.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---Solvency---Socialism

Key to decommodification—reduces the role of the market and strength of capitalism

Jenny Formby, 9-2019, Jenny Formby is the general secretary of the Labour Party in London. (UNIVERSAL BASIC SERVICES: The Right to a Good Life, Labour UK, 9-2019, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/12730_19-Universal-Basic-Services_v5.pdf, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

There are other benefits to collective provision. State provision can be more efficient than having lots of fragmented private providers. And when we take providing services out of the hands of the market that means not using tax money to subsidise shareholders. For all these reasons, universal public services, free at the point of use, will be one of three central pillars of the economic programme of the next Labour Government. Alongside the other two – structural reform to create good jobs, reduce the cost of living and broaden ownership and democracy, and social security to provide a cash safety net for those who need it – universal public services are how we will create an economy that serves us instead of making us its servants. An economy that not only reduces the poverty and hardship burgeoning under the Conservatives, but that also gives everyone the opportunity to lead a rich life. Our 2017 policy document ‘Alternative Models of Ownership’ made the socialist case for expanding alternatives to capitalist production: co-operatives, municipalism and democratic public ownership. We argue that not everything in our lives should be treated as a commodity. For example we believe that education is a gift from one generation to another, not a commodity to be bought and sold in the market place. Here we develop the argument for decommodification further, laying out the case for reducing or eliminating the role of the market in allocating what we use and consume as well as how it is produced. That case is not a new one, though it has not been made enough recently. For decades, public universalism fell out of favour as the political pendulum swung towards means-testing and privatisation. More recently, austerity has shredded our public sector and is posing an existential threat to some public services. Against this backdrop, it is high time the case for universal public services is revisited. But we want to do more that defend what we have. There is no inherent limit to where the principle of “free at the point of use” should extend, other than where we as a society set it, and the next Labour Government will extend the scope of our ambition in unprecedented ways. We have been helped in this by a recent groundbreaking report1 by academics at University College London, who make the case for an enhanced role for what they call ‘Universal Basic Services’ in the economy of the future. We owe a debt of gratitude to the report’s authors for sparking an important debate on what services we provide free at the point of use.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---Solvency---Laundry List

UBS solves laundry list of impacts

IGP Network, 2017, The University College London is London’s leading disciplinary university and utilizes a progressive approach to teaching and research, our world leading academics, curious students and outstanding staff continually pursue excellence, break boundaries and make an impact on real world problems.. (“Social prosperity for the future: A proposal for Universal Basic Services”, UCL, 2017, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/igp/sites/bartlett/files/universal_basic_services_-_the_institute_for_global_prosperity_.pdf, 7-20-2023)//AAlmand

Exploring UBS Modelling Basic Services Shelter For Shelter we use the widely accepted remedy of adding significantly to the existing stock of social housing. We model doubling the existing social housing stock by funding the building of 1.5 million new social housing units using 30 year Treasuries at current market rates. The new units would be offered on a needs basis at zero rent. All social housing would be exempted from Council Tax, and include a utilities allowance. With a 7 year building schedule the costs start at £6.1bn and finalise at £13bn from the 7th year onwards. Food To alleviate food insecurity in the UK we use the FSA survey results from 2016 as the basis for a Food service that would provide one third of the meals for the 2.2 million households (8%) deemed to experience food insecurity each year. This would add to existing programs such as free school meals and meals on wheels, providing 1.8 billion meals at a cost of £4bn/year. Transport For Transport we examine extending the existing Freedom Pass (currently for citizens over the age of 60) to everyone for bus services. The objective being to provide access to free local public transport services that enable citizens and residents access to jobs, education, health care and participate fully in their community – all of which are currently under threat. Assuming an increase in use of 260% the cost would be £5bn/year. Information To promote digital inclusion the Information service covers the cost of basic phone, Internet and the BBC TV license fee. The objective being to enable access to work opportunities and other services, as well as participation in our democracy as informed citizens. This is the most expensive service we considered with an annual budget of £20bn, however it also delivers universal value across all income groups and keeps all citizens connected in our increasingly digital world.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

2NC---Solvency---General

UBS solves inequality—can reduce by 1/3 and automatically targets lower income households, unlike a UBI

Ian Gough, 1-19-2021, Ian Gough is Visiting Professor in CASE (Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion) and an Associate of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change. (“Move the debate from Universal Basic Income to Universal Basic Services,” UNESCO, 1-19-2021 , 7-20-2023)//AAlmand

Clearly, these necessities are all very different things, so there can be no uniform formula to implement UBS. But entitlements to certain levels of provision can be guaranteed and these can be backed up by a menu of public interventions including regulation, standard setting and monitoring, taxation, and subsidies. This does not necessarily entail direct government provision – a plurality of collective and communal providers will be involved with appropriate support from government. But the unifying principle is to extend collective solutions, as opposed to providing income support and leaving provisioning to market forces. The case for collective provision to meet such needs can be made on two main grounds: equity and sustainability (though there are also covered elsewhere but not here). Equity. Free public provision of necessities is always remarkably redistributive – even if the total tax system of a country is broadly proportional to income. On average, in OECD countries, existing public services are worth the equivalent of a huge 76 percent of the post-tax income of the poorest quintile compared with just 14 percent of the richest (Table 1). Public services also contribute to reducing income inequality by between one-fifth and one-third depending on the inequality measure. Free provision of necessities automatically targets lower income households without the disincentive effects that often result from money transfers. [Graph omitted]

2023 Michigan Counterplan

1NC---Off

Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by adopting a Universal Basic Services Program funded by [plan’s mechanism].

UBI fails to challenge neoliberal structure—only increases poverty, unemployment, and inequality

Anna Coote, 2-2018, Anna Coote is Principal Fellow at the New Economics Foundation. She has written widely on social justice, sustainable development, working time, public health policy, public involvement and democratic dialogue, gender and equality. Earlier posts include Director of Health Policy at the King’s Fund and Deputy Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research. (There are fairer ways to spread prosperity than universal basic income, New Economics Foundation, 2-2018, https://neweconomics.org/2018/02/better-fairer-ways-spreading-prosperity-ubi, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

2023 Michigan Counterplan

1NC---AT: But It’s Never Been Done Before

Yes it has—Israel, India, UK, and China— and it failed

Lee Edwards, 10-20-2019, Dr. Lee Edwards is the Founding Chairman of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and recipient of the Foundation’s  in 2022. (WKD: These 3 Countries Tried Socialism. Here's What Happened, National Interest, 10-20-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/wkd-these-3-countries-tried-socialism-heres-what-happened-89046?page=0%2C2, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

Socialists are fond of saying that socialism has never failed because it has never been tried. But in truth, socialism has failed in every country in which it has been tried, from the Soviet Union beginning a century ago to three modern countries that tried but ultimately rejected socialism—Israel, India, and the United Kingdom. While there were major political differences between the totalitarian rule of the Soviets and the democratic politics of Israel, India, and the U.K., all three of the latter countries adhered to socialist principles, nationalizing their major industries and placing economic decision-making in the hands of the government. The Soviet failure has been well documented by historians. In 1985, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev took command of a bankrupt disintegrating empire. After 70 years of Marxism, Soviet farms were unable to feed the people, factories failed to meet their quotas, people lined up for blocks in Moscow and other cities to buy bread and other necessities, and a war in Afghanistan dragged on with no end in sight of the body bags of young Soviet soldiers. The economies of the Communist nations behind the Iron Curtain were similarly enfeebled because they functioned in large measure as colonies of the Soviet Union. With no incentives to compete or modernize, the industrial sector of Eastern and Central Europe became a monument to bureaucratic inefficiency and waste, a “museum of the early industrial age.” As the New York Times pointed out at the time, Singapore, an Asian city-state of only 2 million people, exported 20 percent more machinery to the West in 1987 than all of Eastern Europe. And yet, socialism still beguiled leading intellectuals and politicians of the West. They could not resist its siren song, of a world without strife because it was a world without private property. They were convinced that a bureaucracy could make more-informed decisions about the welfare of a people than the people themselves could. They believed, with John Maynard Keynes, that “the state is wise and the market is stupid.” Israel, India, and the United Kingdom all adopted socialism as an economic model following World War II. The preamble to India’s constitution, for example, begins, “We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic . . .” The original settlers of Israel were East European Jews of the Left who sought and built a socialist society. As soon as the guns of World War II fell silent, Britain’s Labour Party nationalized every major industry and acceded to every socialist demand of the unions. At first, socialism seemed to work in these vastly dissimilar countries. For the first two decades of its existence, Israel’s economy grew at an annual rate of more than 10 percent, leading many to term Israel an “economic miracle.” The average GDP growth rate of India from its founding in 1947 into the 1970s was 3.5 percent, placing India among the more prosperous developing nations. GDP growth in Great Britain averaged 3 percent from 1950 to 1965, along with a 40 percent rise in average real wages, enabling Britain to become one of the world’s more affluent countries. But the government planners were unable to keep pace with increasing population and overseas competition. After decades of ever declining economic growth and ever rising unemployment, all three countries abandoned socialism and turned toward capitalism and the free market. The resulting prosperity in Israel, India, and the U.K. vindicated free-marketers who had predicted that socialism would inevitably fail to deliver the goods. As British prime minister Margaret Thatcher observed, “the problem with socialism is that you eventually run out of other people’s money.” Israel Israel is unique, the only nation where socialism was successful—for a while. The original settlers, according to Israeli professor Avi Kay, “sought to create an economy in which market forces were controlled for the benefit of the whole society.” Driven by a desire to leave behind their history as victims of penury and prejudice, they sought an egalitarian, labor-oriented socialist society. The initial, homogeneous population of less than 1 million drew up centralized plans to convert the desert into green pastures and build efficient state-run companies. Most early settlers, American Enterprise Institute scholar Joseph Light pointed out, worked either on collective farms called kibbutzim or in state-guaranteed jobs. The kibbutzim were small farming communities in which people did chores in exchange for food and money to live on and pay their bills. There was no private property, people ate in common, and children under 18 lived together and not with their parents. Any money earned on the outside was given to the kibbutz. A key player in the socialization of Israel was the Histadrut, the General Federation of Labor, subscribers to the socialist dogma that capital exploits labor and that the only way to prevent such “robbery” is to grant control of the means of production to the state. As it proceeded to unionize almost all workers, the Histadrut gained control of nearly every economic and social sector, including the kibbutzim, housing, transportation, banks, social welfare, health care, and education. The federation’s political instrument was the Labor party, which effectively ruled Israel from the founding of Israel in 1948 until 1973 and the Yom Kippur War. In the early years, few asked whether any limits should be placed on the role of government. Israel’s economic performance seemed to confirm Keynes’s judgment. Real GDP growth from 1955 to 1975 was an astounding 12.6 percent, putting Israel among the fastest-growing economies in the world, with one of the lowest income differentials. However, this rapid growth was accompanied by rising levels of private consumption and, over time, increasing income inequality. There was an increasing demand for economic reform to free the economy from the government’s centralized decision-making. In 1961, supporters of economic liberalization formed the Liberal party—the first political movement committed to a market economy. The Israeli “economic miracle” evaporated in 1965 when the country suffered its first major recession. Economic growth halted and unemployment rose threefold from 1965 to 1967. Before the government could attempt corrective action, the Six-Day War erupted, altering Israel’s economic and political map. Paradoxically, the war brought short-lived prosperity to Israel, owing to increased military spending and a major influx of workers from new territories. But government-led economic growth was accompanied by accelerating inflation, reaching an annual rate of 17 percent from 1971 to 1973. For the first time, there was a public debate between supporters of free-enterprise economics and supporters of traditional socialist arrangements. Leading the way for the free market was the future Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman, who urged Israeli policymakers to “set your people free” and liberalize the economy. The 1973 war and its economic impacts reinforced the feelings of many Israelis that the Labor party’s socialist model could not handle the country’s growing economic challenges. The 1977 elections resulted in the victory of the Likud party, with its staunch pro-free-market philosophy. The Likud took as one of its coalition partners the Liberal party. Because socialism’s roots in Israel were so deep, real reform proceeded slowly. Friedman was asked to draw up a program that would move Israel from socialism toward a free-market economy. His major reforms included fewer government programs and reduced government spending; less government intervention in fiscal, trade, and labor policies; income-tax cuts; and privatization. A great debate ensued between government officials seeking reform and special interests that preferred the status quo. Meanwhile, the government kept borrowing and spending and driving up inflation, which averaged 77 percent for 1978–79 and reached a peak of 450 percent in 1984–85. The government’s share of the economy grew to 76 percent, while fiscal deficits and national debt skyrocketed. The government printed money through loans from the Bank of Israel, which contributed to the inflation by churning out money. Finally, in January 1983, the bubble burst, and thousands of private citizens and businesses as well as government-run enterprises faced bankruptcy. Israel was close to collapse. At this critical moment, a sympathetic U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, and his secretary of state, George Shultz, came to the rescue. They offered a grant of $1.5 billion if the Israeli government agreed to abandon its socialist rulebook and adopt some form of U.S.-style capitalism, using American-trained professionals. The Histadrut strongly resisted, unwilling to give up their decades-old power and to concede that socialism was responsible for Israel’s economic troubles. However, the people had had enough of soaring inflation and non-existent growth and rejected the Histadrut’s policy of resistance. Still, the Israeli government hesitated, unwilling to spend political capital on economic reform. An exasperated Secretary Schulz informed Israel that if it did not begin freeing up the economy, the U.S. would freeze “all monetary transfers” to the country. The threat worked. The Israeli government officially adopted most of the free-market “recommendations.” The impact of a basic shift in Israeli economic policy was immediate and pervasive. Within a year, inflation tumbled from 450 percent to just 20 percent, a budget deficit of 15 percent of GDP shrank to zero, the Histadrut’s economic and business empire disappeared along with its political domination, and the Israeli economy was opened to imports. Of particular importance was the Israeli high-tech revolution, which led to a 600 percent increase in investment in Israel, transforming the country into a major player in the high-tech world. There were troubling side effects such as social gaps, poverty, and concerns about social justice, but the socialist rhetoric and ideology, according to Glenn Frankel, the Washington Post’s correspondent in Israel, “has been permanently retired.” The socialist Labor party endorsed privatization and the divestment of many publicly held companies that had become corrupted by featherbedding, rigid work rules, phony bookkeeping, favoritism, and incompetent managers. After modest expansion in the 1990s, Israel’s economic growth topped the charts in the developing world in the 2000s, propelled by low inflation and a reduction in the size of government. Unemployment was still too high and taxes took up 40 percent of GDP, much of it caused by the need for a large military. However, political parties are agreed that there is no turning back to the economic policies of the early years—the debate is about the rate of further market reform. “The world’s most successful experiment in socialism,” Light wrote, “appears to have resolutely embraced capitalism.” India Acceptance of socialism was strong in India long before independence, spurred by widespread resentment against British colonialism and the land-owning princely class (the zamindars) and by the efforts of the Communist Party of India, established in 1921. Jawaharlal Nehru adopted socialism as the ruling ideology when he became India’s first prime minister after independence in 1947. For nearly 30 years, the Indian government adhered to a socialist line, restricting imports, prohibiting foreign direct investment, protecting small companies from competition from large corporations, and maintaining price controls on a wide variety of industries including steel, cement, fertilizers, petroleum, and pharmaceuticals. Any producer who exceeded their licensed capacity faced possible imprisonment. As the Indian economist Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar wrote, “India was perhaps the only country in the world where improving productivity . . . was a crime.” It was a strict application of the socialist principle that the market cannot be trusted to produce good economic or social outcomes. Economic inequality was regulated through taxes—the top personal income tax rate hit a stifling 97.75 percent. Some 14 public banks were nationalized in 1969; six more banks were taken over by the government in 1980. Driven by the principle of “self-reliance,” almost anything that could be produced domestically could not be imported regardless of the cost. It was the “zenith” of Indian socialism, which still failed to satisfy the basic needs of an ever expanding population. In 1977–78, more than half of India was living below the poverty line. At the same time, notes Indian-American economist Arvind Panagariya, a series of external shocks shook the country, including a war with Pakistan in 1965, which came on the heels of a war with China in 1962; another war with Pakistan in 1971; consecutive droughts in 1971–72 and 1972–73, and the oil price crisis of October 1973, which contributed to a 40 percent deterioration in India’s foreign trade. Economic performance from 1965 to 1981 was worse than than at any other time of the post-independence period. As in Israel, economic reform became an imperative. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had pushed her policy agenda as far to the left as possible. In 1980, the Congress party won a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, and Gandhi adopted, at last, a more pragmatic, non-ideological course. But as with everything else in India, economic reform proceeded slowly. An industrial-policy statement continued the piecemeal retreat from socialism that had begun in 1975, allowing companies to expand their capacity, encouraging investment in a wide variety of industries, and introducing private-sector participation in telecommunications. Further liberalization received a major boost under Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother in 1984 following her assassination. As a result, GDP growth reached an encouraging 5.5 percent. Economics continued to trump ideology under Rajiv Gandhi, who was free of the socialist baggage carried by an earlier generation. His successor, P. V. Narasimha Rao, put an end to licensing except in selected sectors and opened the door to much wider foreign investment. Finance minister Manmohan Singh cut the tariff rates from an astronomical 355 percent to 65 percent. According to Arvind Panagariya, “the government had introduced enough liberalizing measures to set the economy on the course to sustaining approximately 6 percent growth on a long-term basis.” In fact, India’s GDP growth reached a peak of over 9 percent in 2005–8, followed by a dip to just under 7 percent in 2017–18. A major development of the economic reforms was the remarkable expansion of India’s middle class. The Economist estimates there are 78 million Indians in the middle-middle and upper middle-class category. By including the lower middle class, Indian economists Krishnan and Hatekar figure that India’s new middle class grew from 304.2 million in 2004–5 to an amazing 606.3 million in 2011–12, almost one-half of the entire Indian population. The daily income of the three middle classes are lower middle, $2–$4; middle middle, $4–$6; upper middle, $6–$10. While this is extremely low by U.S. standards, a dollar goes a long way in India, where the annual per capita income is approximately $6,500. If only half of the lower middle class makes the transition to upper-class or middle income, that would mean an Indian middle class of about 350 million Indians—a mid-point between The Economist and Krishnan and Hatekar estimates. Such an enormous middle class confirms the judgment of the Heritage Foundation, in its Index of Economic Freedom, that India is developing into an “open-market economy.” In 2017, India overtook Germany to become the fourth-largest auto market in the world, and it is expected to displace Japan in 2020. That same year, India overtook the U.S. in smartphone sales to become the second-largest smartphone market in the world. Usually described as an agricultural country, India is today 31 percent urbanized. With an annual GDP of $8.7 trillion, India ranks fifth in the world, behind the United States, China, Japan, and Great Britain. Never before in recorded history, Indian economist Gurcharan Das has noted, have so many people risen so quickly. All this has been accomplished because the political leaders of India sought and adopted a better economic system—free enterprise—after some four decades of fitful progress and unequal prosperity under socialism. United Kingdom Widely described as “the sick man of Europe” after three decades of socialism, the United Kingdom underwent an economic revolution in the 1970s and 1980s because of one remarkable person—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Some skeptics doubted that she could pull it off—the U.K. was then a mere shadow of its once prosperous free-market self. The government owned the largest manufacturing firms in such industries as autos and steel. The top individual tax rates were 83 percent on “earned income” and a crushing 98 percent on income from capital. Much of the housing was government-owned. For decades, the U.K. had grown more slowly than economies on the continent. Great Britain was no longer “great” and seemed headed for the economic dust bin. The major hindrance to economic reform was the powerful trade unions, which since 1913 had been allowed to spend union funds on political objectives, such as controlling the Labour party. Unions inhibited productivity and discouraged investment. From 1950 to 1975, the U.K.’s investment and productivity record was the worst of any major industrial country. Trade-union demands increased the size of the public sector and public expenditures to 59 percent of GDP. Wage and benefits demands by organized labor led to continual strikes that paralyzed transportation and production. In 1978, Labour prime minister James Callaghan decided that, rather than hold an election, he would “soldier on” to the following spring. It was a fatal mistake. His government encountered the legendary “winter of discontent” in the first months of 1979. Public-sector workers went on strike for weeks. Mountains of uncollected rubbish piled high in cities. Bodies remained unburied and rats ran in the streets. Newly elected Conservative prime minister Margaret Thatcher, the United Kingdom’s first female PM, took on what she considered her main opponent—the unions. Flying pickets, the ground troops of industrial conflict who would travel to support workers on strike at another site, were banned and could no longer blockade factories or ports. Strike ballots were made compulsory. The closed shop, which forced workers to join a union to get a job, was outlawed. Union membership plummeted from a peak of 12 million in the late 1970s to half that by the late 1980s. “It’s now or never for [our] economic policies,” Thatcher declared, “let’s stick to our guns.” The top rate of personal income tax was cut in half, to 45 percent, and exchange controls were abolished. Privatization was a core Thatcher reform. Not only was it fundamental to the improvement of the economy. It was “one of the central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism,” she wrote in her memoirs. Through privatization that leads to the widest possible ownership by members of the public, “the state’s power is reduced and the power of the people enhanced.” Privatization “is at the center of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom.” She was as good as her word, selling off government-owned airlines, airports, utilities, and phone, steel, and oil companies. In the 1980s, Britain’s economy grew faster than that of any other European economy except Spain. U.K. business investment grew faster than in any other country except Japan. Productivity grew faster than in any other industrial economy. Some 3.3 million new jobs were created between March 1983 and March 1990. Inflation fell from a high of 27 percent in 1975 to 2.5 percent in 1986. From 1981 to 1989, under a Conservative government, real GDP growth averaged 3.2 percent. By the time Thatcher left government, the state-owned sector of industry had been reduced by some 60 percent. As she recounted in her memoirs, about one in four Britons owned shares in the market. Over 600,000 jobs had passed from the public to the private sector. The U.K. had “set a worldwide trend in privatization in countries as different as Czechoslovakia and New Zealand.” Turning decisively away from Keynesian management, the once sick man of Europe now bloomed with robust economic health. No succeeding British government, Labour or Conservative, has tried to renationalize what Margaret Thatcher denationalized. China How then to explain the impressive economic success of a fourth major economy, China, with annual GDP growth of 8 to 10 percent from the 1980s almost to the present? From 1949 to 1976, under Mao Zedong, China was an economic basket case, owing to Mao’s personal mismanagement of the economy. In his avid pursuit of Soviet-style socialism, Mao brought about the Great Leap Forward of 1958–60, which resulted in the deaths of at least 30 million and perhaps as many as 50 million Chinese, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, in which an additional 3 million to 5 million died. Mao left China backward and deeply divided. Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, turned China in a different direction, seeking to create a mixed economy in which capitalism and socialism would coexist with the Communist Party monitoring and constantly adjusting the proper mix. For the past four decades, China has been the economic marvel of the world for the following reasons: It began its economic ascent almost from ground zero because of Mao’s ideological stubbornness. It has engaged in the calculated theft of intellectual property, especially from the U.S., for decades. It has taken full advantage of globalism and its membership in the World Trade Organization, while ignoring the prescribed rules against such practices as intellectual-property theft. It has used tariffs and other protectionist measures to gain trade advantages with the U.S. and other competitors. It created a middle class of some 300 million people, who enjoy a decent living and at the same time constitute a sizable domestic market for goods and services. It continues to use the forced labor of the laogai to make cheap consumer goods that are sold in Walmart and other Western stores. It allows an enormous black market to exist because Party members profit from its sales. It permits foreign investors to buy into Chinese companies, but the government—i.e., the Communist Party—always retains a majority interest. It operates an estimated 150,000 state-owned enterprises that guarantee jobs for tens of millions of Chinese. It depends on the energy and experience of the most entrepreneurial people in the world, second only to Americans. In short, the People’s Republic of China was an economic failure for its first three decades under Mao and Soviet socialism. It began its climb to become the second-largest economy in the world when it abandoned socialism in the late Seventies and initiated its experiment, which so far has been successful, in capitalism with Chinese characteristics. There are clear signs that such success is no longer automatic. China is experiencing a slowing economy, is ruled by a dictatorial but divided Communist Party clinging to power, faces widespread public demands for the guarantee of fundamental human rights, and suffers from a seriously degraded environment. History suggests that these problems can best be solved by a democratic government ruled by the people, not a one-party authoritarian state that resorts to violence in a crisis, as Beijing did at Tiananmen Square and is doing in Hong Kong. Conclusion As we have seen from our examination of Israel, India, and the United Kingdom, the economic system that works best for the greatest number is not socialism with its central controls, utopian promises, and OPM (other people’s money), but the free-market system with its emphasis on competition and entrepreneurship. All three countries tried socialism for decades, and all three finally rejected it for the simplest of reasons—it doesn’t work. Socialism is guilty of a fatal conceit: It believes its system can make better decisions for the people than they can for themselves. It is the end product of a 19th-century prophet whose prophecies (such as the inevitable disappearance of the middle class) have been proven wrong time and again. According to the World Bank, more than one billion people have lifted themselves out of poverty in the past 25 years, “one of the greatest human achievements of our time.” Of those billion, approximately 731 million are Chinese, and 168 million Indians. The main driver of this uplift from poverty has been the globalization of the international trading system. China owes most of its success to the trade freedom offered by the U.S. and the rest of the world. The latest edition of Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation confirms the global trend toward economic freedom: Economies rated “free” or “mostly free” enjoy incomes that are more than five times higher than the incomes of “repressed economies” such as those of North Korea, Venezuela, and Cuba. Israel’s socialist miracle turned out to be a mirage, India discarded socialist ideology and chose a more market-oriented path, and the United Kingdom set an example for the rest of the world with its emphasis on privatization and deregulation. Whether we are talking about the actions of an agricultural country of 1.3 billion, or the nation that sparked the industrial revolution, or a small Middle Eastern country populated by some of the smartest people in the world, capitalism tops socialism every time.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

1NC---AT: Scandinavian/Successful Countries

Scandinavian countries are not socialist at their core—only successful because they’re rooted in capitalism and true socialism fails

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 9-21-2020, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a Somali-born Dutch-American activist and former politician. She is a critic of Islam and advocate for the rights and self-determination of Muslim women, opposing forced marriage, honour killing, and child marriage. (The False Appeal Of Socialism, Hoover Institution, 9-21-2020, https://www.hoover.org/research/false-appeal-socialism, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

Social democracy as it exists in the Scandinavian countries accepts the core premises of capitalism (the existence of corporations, private property, the free price mechanism, and a stable currency) alongside a relatively high level of taxation to finance redistributive social welfare programs. Crucially, social democrats accept freedom of expression, free and fair elections, the existence of political opposition, freedom of the press, and the rule of law. Scandinavian social democracy is not, however, what today’s American neosocialists desire to impose, some claims to the contrary notwithstanding. They condemn “the system” and say that it must go. But speaking broadly, the debate on socialism has already happened, and one would think it had been long since resolved. Authoritarian socialism, in its quest for utopia, has been a human catastrophe with an immense death toll. Millions died for the cause, and millions more were killed, tortured, imprisoned, and impoverished. The names Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, and Stalin evoke in those who survived their prison camps and killing fields the same revulsion as a figure such as Hitler. All of this has been well documented, particularly after the Soviet Union fell and researchers got a glimpse of Communist Party archives. Authoritarian socialism is lethal because it brooks no dissent. In every implementation of authoritarian socialism, individual freedom has been irrevocably compromised for a utopian and unattainable collective idea. The sheer number of failed socialist experiments raises unavoidable questions about politics, economics, justice, and human nature. Socialist grievance narratives, their claims to be helping the downtrodden, only made people’s lives more miserable. Why was this doomed enterprise so often attempted? The neosocialism of 2020 has shifted gears from the more economically focused socialism of the twentieth century. Now it is enmeshed with the ideas of postmodernism and identity politics. This type of socialism rejects capitalism as immoral, along with notions of national borders and national sovereignty. It condemns American history, emphasizing only the darkest pages of the US experience, not the ideals to which the founding fathers aspired or which drew so many immigrants of all backgrounds over the years. “Woke” socialism is thus distinct from the socialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which was heavily focused on economics and the workers’ struggle. Neosocialism carries an ostensible moral appeal for young people who may know little about history or the nature of socialism, or who are disenchanted with the current state of the world. Nevertheless, although the new socialism differs from the Marxism of old, there are similarities. Once again, individual humans matter less than structural considerations in the effort to achieve a utopia—which, being unattainable, is never achieved. The Marxism of old divided all people into two categories: the oppressors (the bourgeoisie who controlled the means of production) and the oppressed (the workers or proletariat). It did not matter how nice, kind, or charitable a person was individually; if he belonged to the bourgeoisie, he was condemned on the basis of his class identity. In a communist revolution, he was the enemy, against whom all means were justified. A similar division appears in the woke politics of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. People are viewed not as individuals to be judged on their own merits but as members of either oppressive or oppressed tribes. Nothing matters but some intrinsic identity of the person, frequently an immutable characteristic such as race. These concepts have flowed outward from academic institutions and law schools to become embraced by celebrities, political figures, and protesters. I fear it will not be possible to defend capitalism, either intellectually or morally, in this climate of increasing orthodoxy that marginalizes or silences dissenting voices. As woke intolerance spreads ever further into universities, newsrooms, and even large corporations that are fearful of diverging from the new orthodoxy, capitalism as a set of ideas will be increasingly on the defensive, in spite of its moral and economic accomplishments. The adherents of neosocialism have now racialized their worldview to such an extent that all white Americans have become morally suspect, while nonwhites are presented as victims of their exploitation. I posit, to the contrary, that the new socialists are the true racists and exploiters. They misrepresent American and Western history. They exploit immigrants, ethnic minorities, women, members of the LGBTQ community, and children and poison young, impressionable minds through indoctrination, distortions of reality, and empty promises. What have they achieved? More often than not, they hurt the very people they claim to be helping. Democratic capitalism, in the framework of the rule of law and respect for individual rights, has benefited billions of human beings. It allows for gradual, incremental progress to remedy legitimate grievances as they arise. Until a better alternative can credibly be proposed, these are the institutions that we should celebrate—and defend.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

1NC---Cap Better

Cap is the best model—socialism devalues and oppresses the lives of individuals

Ayaan Hirsi Ali, 9-21-2020, Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a Somali-born Dutch-American activist and former politician. She is a critic of Islam and advocate for the rights and self-determination of Muslim women, opposing forced marriage, honour killing, and child marriage. (The False Appeal Of Socialism, Hoover Institution, 9-21-2020, https://www.hoover.org/research/false-appeal-socialism, 7-18-2023)//AAlmand

Many Americans—particularly but not exclusively the young—remain intrigued by socialism. Indeed, a 2019 survey found that socialism is as popular as capitalism among young American adults. Well-known political figures such as Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez describe themselves as “democratic socialists” and advocate tens of trillions of dollars in new spending programs along with a massive expansion of state power over citizens’ lives. In academic circles, too, the debate surrounding the merits of socialism continues. A little less than thirty years after the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, capitalism is nearly everywhere on the defensive, both in academia and in the realm of public discourse. Yet no system offers better opportunities for the downtrodden to rise and improve their living standards than democratic capitalism. The socialism of the twentieth century was primarily economic in orientation: it rejected capitalism and favored state control over the economy. Individuals had to submit to central economic planning. Conceptually, this socialism did not see individual human beings as having inherent dignity. Instead, it divided society into two clashing, competing classes: the group that was economically oppressive (the capitalists) and the group that were economically oppressed (the workers). In this worldview, individualism as a concept became not merely meaningless but suspect. The neosocialism that I see taking root today also rejects capitalism as a system, and, just as in the socialism of old, the individual and his own moral contributions are devalued. What matters, once again, is the group (the collective tribe) to which an individual belongs. Again, these collective groups are either oppressive or oppressed, and an individual’s moral worth is determined by looking at the group or groups to which he belongs. Capitalism, with its emphasis on individualism, meritocracy, and colorblindness, is not compatible with this worldview. Much of today’s debate is therefore being waged on grounds not of the efficiency or inefficiency of capitalism but of capitalism’s alleged immorality. One of today’s most influential public voices, Robin DiAngelo, author of White Fragility, rejects capitalism as follows: “Capitalism is so bound up with racism . . . capitalism is dependent on inequality, on an underclass. If the model is profit over everything else, you’re not going to look at your policies to see what is most racially equitable.” I aim to defend the superiority of democratic capitalism over both the old socialism and neosocialism—not only for its economic efficiency, but also for its moral superiority and the possibilities it provides for humans to flourish. I caution young Americans that before they embrace neosocialism, they consider carefully not only its superficial attractions but also its fundamental drawbacks. Those who value individualism, meritocracy, and equality of opportunity will find these things in a capitalist system, as long as it provides educational opportunities to all. Memories of a Socialist Illusion To me, socialism is more than just an academic concept. When I was around six or seven years old, I lived in Mogadishu, Somalia, with my mother. Much of her daily life consisted of standing in line for hours on end to receive the daily ration of food allotted by the government. At the time, the Somalian state, if one can call it that, had implemented Marxist economics, to the extent that this was possible. To every family the state apportioned a certain quantity of food: sugar, flour, oil, and so on. In the government rations, there was hardly any meat or eggs, as these were deemed to be luxury goods. A person received what the authorities decided was strictly necessary, not what the person wanted. My first experience of socialism was, therefore, one of enduring long lines in the hot sun, without shelters or panels to cover us. My mother and grandmother felt a sense of bafflement, indignity, and powerlessness as a result of this daily grind. In terms of power relationships, the lines served an important function: they emphasized the powerlessness of the individual and the power of the collective over even the smallest food rations. The recipient had no control over what she would be handed. You had to obey political authorities to receive anything at all, however modest. This was the Marxist form of order—even if, because of Somalia’s pastoral traditions and low degree of industrialization, rationing was dictated as much by the imperative to limit food consumption as it was by “scientific socialism.” Scientific socialism as implemented by Somalia’s government did not result in equality and justice. On the contrary, it was the people with the strongest political connections to the government and to influential clans who were most empowered. A system that claimed to empower the marginalized and dispossessed showed an astonishing lack of compassion for precisely the least-connected people. Somalia’s communist regime brutally repressed dissidents, as did other authoritarian socialist regimes of the twentieth century. Yet in school, my fellow students and I sang songs of praise for the system, surrounded by large pictures of Marx, Lenin, and Siad Barre. Today this type of orthodox socialism still appears to have its defenders, despite the fact that it failed in Somalia just as it has failed more recently in Venezuela, a once-rich country now engulfed in hunger and chaos because of similar pathologies of corruption and inefficiency that arose inevitably from state control of economic life. Why Socialism Fails Broadly speaking, socialism typically refers to the ownership of things in common, rather than private ownership; it has been defined as “a form of social organization that prioritizes the common ownership of property and the collective control of economic production.” Quite optimistically, Michael Newman argues in Socialism: A Very Short Introduction that “the most fundamental characteristic of socialism is its commitment to the creation of an egalitarian society.” Some early socialists were more anarchist or individualist than others, but all these thinkers favored a reorganization of society along what they believed would be more equitable lines. Generally, socialists of all persuasions share a critical view of industrial capitalism and its emphasis on private property, but socialists have differed (both in the nineteenth century and today) on the proposed remedy. Therefore, as Roger Scruton reminds us, the work of socialists is more frequently distinguished by its critique of capitalism than by its detailed description of what socialism should look like and how it should work. Among revolutionary socialists, socialism as it existed in the Soviet Union is frequently theorized as a transitional state, ultimately culminating in a communist utopia. For decades, theory aside, economic socialism inflicted extraordinary misery on hundreds of millions of people in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. The puzzle confronting us in 2020 is why, with so much empirical evidence on the rise and fall of authoritarian socialism, there is even a conversation on this topic, other than classroom discussions meant to inform students about some of the darkest pages of human history. Socialists lost the broad economic argument in the twentieth century because socialist systems (command economies) did not work. Why? In a capitalist economy, market prices, in a framework of private property, coordinate economic activity. Companies use prices to see which goods, products, and services are needed and where, at what time, and in what quantities. Firms compete, on the basis of market prices, to deliver these goods as efficiently as possible. Firms that miscalculate run the risk of bankruptcy. The most efficient and competitive firms—those that best meet the needs of the public—survive and thrive. In a socialist system, however, there are no market pricing signals. This creates chaos throughout the economy. Economists in the West who participated in the “socialist calculation debate” of the 1920s and 1930s, including Friedrich Hayek, predicted this crucial flaw in socialism theoretically before it became painfully clear empirically. In a socialist system, unlike in a market system, orders to produce come from the top, frequently in the form of quotas. Yet in the absence of a market pricing mechanism to determine profit and loss, poorly performing organizations tend to persist under socialism: there is no bankruptcy to cull them. The public good suffers as a result. Crucially, in the absence of genuine private property, there may be little incentive to work hard if one cannot keep the fruits of one’s labor. Why cultivate a field carefully if you cannot benefit from the harvest? Although socialism is capable of centrally driven technological innovation, in the absence of market pricing signals a socialist system cannot distribute technological or scientific blessings to the mass of the people in a way that increases their living standards in a sustained way. Socialist systems are command economies that tell people to obey central economic plans, even if they have other ideas. Under socialism, you may wish to start a business, or you may have an idea for a new technology—too bad. You must do as you are told. Authoritarian socialism does not adapt to your wishes. Socialist economic planning depends on authoritarian measures to compel people to obey central directives. As a result, a “black economy” of smuggled goods frequently arises to meet the real needs that the central plan fails to fulfill. Human Activity in Motion Unlike socialist societies, societies with political freedom, alongside a capitalist or free enterprise system in the economic realm, have a prodigious capacity to adapt. A capitalist system is constantly in motion to satisfy the wants and needs of millions of diverse individuals. Every day a capitalist system balances trial and error to evaluate new technologies, new ways of doing things, new ways of improving technologies, and new ways of running businesses. Because of competition, a business under capitalism survives only to the extent it offers consumers a product they enjoy or need at a reasonable price, whether cars, food, lumber, or clothing. And this is true even for hospital systems and medical providers, which vie for the business of patients for, say, safe and successful surgeries. Under a system of crony capitalism, businesses may rely on improper political connections to create cumbersome regulations that block competition. However, in a country with a functioning rule of law, a free press, and an informed public, and where corrupt officials are prosecuted, intense scrutiny of such practices can mitigate this systemic risk. Pure laissez-faire capitalism is a thing of the past. In centuries past during the early phases of industrialization there were indeed inhumane working conditions, ones that should not be forgotten. People worked in unsafe spaces. Over time, however, capitalist societies adapted and introduced safety measures, sickness benefits, pensions, and other forms of social insurance. New technologies reduced risks for workers. Social reformers pressed political leaders to abolish child labor, and universal education was introduced. The wealth created by the capitalist system made these reforms easier to implement. Working conditions in socialist countries were frequently more brutal, with fewer worker protections and environmental safeguards. Admittedly, nothing is perfect. In the capitalist economy today, there are, for example, recurring questions surrounding working conditions in sweatshop factories and warehouses as well as in the gig economy. That is precisely where the agility and nimbleness of societies built on a system of free enterprise come in: such societies are able to adapt, and they do so.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

1NC---No Solvency

UBI re-entrenches capitalism—accepts that we have already lost the battle

Esteban Mercatante, 8-7-2018, Esteban is an economist from Buenos Aires and a member of the PTS. (Universal Basic Income: A Capitalist Fix to the Evils of Capitalism?, Left Voice, 8-7-2018, https://www.leftvoice.org/universal-basic-income-a-capitalist-solution-to-the-evils-of-capitalism/, 7-20-2023)//AAlmand

Universal basic income, a guaranteed, no-strings-attached income for the entire population, is presented as a progressive solution to the “end of work.” But those who promote a UBI are doing one of two things. They either entertain illusions in a top-down palliative measure for the miseries of the capitalist system, or they are searching for an impossible shortcut to the challenges of organizing the working class, the only social force that can overcome capitalism. In either case, they lack any sense of realism. The “end of work” narrative A widely held belief suggests that most jobs today are threatened by the so-called “fourth industrial revolution” which promises to extend robotics throughout production. Unlike previous waves of innovation, according to this line of thought, the fourth revolution will result in fewer replacement jobs. Yet in reality the number of workers exploited by capital around the world has grown as never before. According to the International Labour Organization, over 3.2 billion individuals are employed today. While this supposed “end of work” has escaped serious analysis, the idea that a UBI could secure an income for those who can no longer expect to find gainful employment has become more popular. It is not a new idea. But what gives it a new sense of urgency and more adherents is that, as Paul Mason suggests, it could solve the problem of “the disappearance of work itself.” 1 Talk of the “end of work” is permeated with a fetishism of robotics. But in the conditions of the “secular stagnation“ of modern capitalism, the use of robotics does not produce sufficiently high rates of capital accumulation to present a real threat to most people’s jobs. More generally, the idea that capitalism can impose generalized robotization clashes with capital’s need for ever increasing exploitation of the only source of its profits – labor power. Advocates of UBI also assume that growing job insecurity and precarity, faced by a large proportion of the world’s labor force, are irreversible. It is true that accessing formal employment, participating in the social security system, and so on, are unattainable for a growing sector of the working class. The ILO estimates that 42 per cent of workers suffer from “vulnerable employment”, including self-employment, temporary jobs etc., which has increased among young people and especially women. 2 People are working more and earning less than they did decades ago. The length of today’s workday is as long, or even longer, than it was 80 years ago, and in the United States, Germany and France it is being lengthened further. Contrary to what John Maynard Keynes imagined when he considered the economic possibilities of his grandchildren’s generation, we are not even a fraction closer to 15-hour workweek than we were in the 1930s – even though labor productivity has multiplied threefold. But as Leo Panitch points out 3, such generalized job insecurity, seen as inescapable by those who propose UBI, has much more to do with capital’s advance against the historic gains of the working class than it does with supposedly irreversible changes in capitalism’s material processes. Thirty years ago, the most left-wing proponents of UBI, Robert J. van der Veen and Philippe Van Parijs, considered it “A Capitalist Road to Communism.” 4 But what these proponents see as UBI’s “progressive” side is in fact its fatal flaw: accepting the premise of the “end of work” and sidestepping this problem by fighting not for socialism but rather for a UBI. To accept this idea is to accept that the working class has already lost half the battle. Money for Nothing Money here and now, because there is no time to wait for great social transformations – that is the slogan of UBI proponents. They want to give every person a sufficient income to acquire the essentials, whether or not they have a job, whether or not they want to work, with no strings attached. Such a decoupling of the income of citizens from the obligation to work seems to some to be the only viable alternative in a world where the system of production throws growing numbers of workers to the side of the road.