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2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › Uniqueness › 2nc Uniqueness / Link / AT: New Efforts Resolve the Link ***

Clean energy increases reliance on China’s rare earth supplies at a time when the West is accelerating efforts to reduce dependence – supply diversification is a process that takes time

Springfield ‘4/17/23 [Cary Springfield, 4-17-2023, “Global Competition over China-Dominated Market for Rare-Earth Elements Heats Up,” International Banker, https://internationalbanker.com/finance/global-competition-over-china-dominated-market-for-rare-earth-elements-heats-up/, St. Mark's School of Texas, Ashrit Manduva '24]

Such fears are prompting Western governments led by the US, the EU, Australia and Japan to look at investing more in their respective domestic rare-earth production facilities. “The adoption of EVs alone will require an additional 200,000 tonnes of rare earths in the next ten years,” Luisa Moreno, president of Canadian rare-earth mining firm Defense Metals, told the mining industry publication Mining Technology in April 2022. “There is need for more mine production, and we need to build rare earths supply chains outside China, starting with refinery capacity. The West also needs the capacity to make rare earths metals, rare earths magnets, and other products and technologies.”

But could times be changing? A series of key events of late could see Western consumers’ reliance on China’s rare-earth supplies gradually diminish. Most recently, for instance, Tesla confirmed in early March that the forthcoming iteration of its permanent magnet EV motor would not contain a single rare-earth element. Colin Campbell, vice president of powertrain engineering at the EV company, noted that “as the world transitions to clean energy, demand for rare earths is really increasing dramatically, and not only is it going to be a little hard to meet that demand but mining that rare earth, it has environmental and health risks”.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › Uniqueness › 2nc Uniqueness / Link / AT: New Efforts Resolve the Link ***

The US is diversifying supply chains but needs time to break overdependence --- the plan pushes us back to China

Lu, 23 (APRIL 14, 2023, Christina Lu is a reporter at Foreign Policy. Prior to joining FP, she worked at Foreign Affairs and the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research in Lusaka, Zambia. She is a graduate of Cornell University, The Critical Minerals Club, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/14/us-china-critical-mineral-security-europe-rare-earth-energy-transition / SRB)

U.S. lawmakers are scrambling to weaken China’s grip on the critical mineral supply chains that are key to the global energy transition, as escalating tensions stoke fears of strategic vulnerabilities and potential geopolitical disruptions.

While decades of investments have allowed Beijing to dominate the processing and refining of key critical minerals, worsening U.S.-China relations have sparked a new push to redraw the map. Desperate to disentangle from China, Washington has been joining forces with allies to secure new supplies, part of a broader realignment as countries increasingly forge new trade ties alongside geopolitical lines, rather than the bottom line.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › 1nc DA REE

Independently, resource accumulation for green energy will spark great power conflict --- transition will be slow and messy

Domestic production, REE alternatives, working with allies are all hopeful at best

Brands, 22 --- Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (November 01, 2022, Hal, “The Green-Energy Revolution Will Make the World More Dangerous,” https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-green-energy-revolution-will-make-the-world-more-dangerous/, recut by JMP))

Think a green transition will free America from high-stakes competition over energy supplies? Think again. Since the Industrial Revolution, changing patterns of energy consumption have propelled international conflict. Today, the world is entering a very messy period, in which rivalry over sources of renewable energy will steadily intensify, even as older clashes over oil and other hydrocarbons continue to play out.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › 1nc DA REE

Taiwan conflict goes nuclear

first strike based on conventional losses or inadvertent escalation make it likely

Goldstein ’23 [Lyle Goldstein, director of Asia Engagement at the Washington DC think tank, Defense Priorities. He is also a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University. Goldstein previously served 20 years as research professor at the US Naval War College, where he received the Superior Civilian Service Medal for his pioneering research on Chinese military development. 3-13-2023, "The trouble with Taiwan," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/the-trouble-with-taiwan/, St. Mark's School of Texas, Ashrit Manduva '24]

The nuclear problem

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › 1nc DA REE

Prioritizing rare earths for defense instead of clean energy wins support for a domestic supply chain to ensure combat readiness --- reducing dependence on China checks military aggression

Foss & Koelsch, 22 --- *Fellow in Energy, Minerals and Materials at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, AND **Research Associate, J.A. Green & Company and Former Research Intern, Center for Energy Studies (December 19, 2022, Michelle Michot Foss, Jacob Koelsch, “Of Chinese Behemoths: What China’s Rare Earths Dominance Means for the US,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/chinese-behemoths-what-chinas-rare-earths-dominance-means-us, SRB+JMP))

The U.S. government, of course, has its own part to play. First, strategic planners must honestly distinguish rare earth demand for defense and other strategic purposes from non-strategic demand. While both strategic and non-strategic demand must be balanced in order to stabilize supply, delivery delays for defense purposes carry significant implications for combat readiness, especially in an era of heightened major-power tension. It is also crucial that the U.S. government ensure its strategic stockpiles of REE are filled to aid in these efforts.

Conclusion

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
DA – Rare Earth Elements – Starter Packet › 1nc DA REE

The plan would force greater dependence on China AND trigger tradeoffs with military weapons development that rely on rare earth elements

Ernst, 22 --- U.S. Senator from Iowa (5-4-2022, Joni, “DEMOCRATS' GREEN AGENDA RISKS NATIONAL SECURITY,” https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/democrats-green-agenda-risks-national-security, SRB)

Democrats have spent the past year pursuing their radical Green New Deal energy agenda. Now the left is using Russia’s war in Ukraine to try to justify a massive transition to electric vehicles and renewable energy. If enacted, this would significantly increase our dependence on China for certain “critical minerals” and other materials needed for these energy sources. If the left successfully implements its flawed agenda without strengthening supply chains, the United States could become significantly dependent on China for its energy needs. China could use its commanding influence over green energy technology to get its way in the future, just as Russia used its energy to influence Europe not to act prior to the invasion of Ukraine.

GROWING DEMAND FOR CRITICAL MINERALS

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

The imposition of “maximizing” certain outputs from debate is synonymous with the drive to fix those that “need to be fixed”. Refuse the notions of endless improvement and completeness that police value producing subjects and instead affirm a system of indebtedness that embraces brokenness as a state of being

Fred Moten & Stephano Harney 21 – Fred, American cultural theorist, poet, and scholar whose work explores critical theory, black studies, and performance studies; Stephano, American activist and scholar; “All Incomplete”, Monoskop, 2021, pgs 43-44 – tishu

The algorithm of work subjects every labor process on the production line to undoing, disassembly, and incompletion, in order to demand it be completed better, assembled better, done better. It leaves behind not an improved organization but a metric to ensure the organization will never be satisfied. The metric measures everything against its last instance, ensuring that the last instance never comes. The metric demands more access, more measurement of access, more movement, more assembly, more measure of the last instance, which is given in and as enclosure. The consultant is still talking but it does not matter now what he says. The algorithm of work has arrived, algorithmic surplus has gone viral. If the settler could not be heard over the screams of primitive accumulation, and the citizen could not be heard over the noise of the machines, the consultant cannot be heard over the click of the metrics. Mikey heard this noise and walked the other way, another way, so the algorithm could not pass through, so we could hold him up and pass him along. Chandler reminds us of a term W. E. B. Du Bois invented and employed; “democratic despotism.”21 When the consultant cannot demonstrate access, and therefore the algorithm cannot demonstrate improvement, the consultant calls for policy as once (and still) the citizen calls for heteropatriarchal nationalism or the settler for racist manifest destiny. Policy is past all that, even though all that’s not past. Policy comes in to diagnose what’s blocking access, and what’s blocking access are ‘those people.’ What’s wrong with those people in Detroit who want water, in British Columbia who want land, in Manila who want some place to stay? Policy says there is something wrong with those people that makes it so that the consultant can’t get access. But it is the other way around. The consultant is denied access – those people deny him access – because they embrace the general access-in-antagonism that he denies. And so policy must be called. Self-defense becomes the disease. Love becomes the problem because love is the problem, the self-defense of the accessible. But, hey, maybe governance can help, which is to say maybe those practicing self-defense may be willing to self-diagnose, self-reflect, self-improve! One way or another policy will proscribe, or policy will get posed – as democracy, as democratic despotism, where everyone is given the chance to say there is something wrong with those people. Democratic despotism is the imposition of policy and its violent possibilities and impossibilities on the wrong(ed). Because the thing is, the consultant’s not wrong, the algorithm of work is not malfunctioning, the policy hustler is not misdiagnosing. We’re wrong, which is why we’re wronged. We are incomplete. Moreover, they got the very idea of incompleteness from us! Another word for incompleteness is study, or more precisely, revision. The consultant gets this revision from us, from study, from our sumptuous revisions of one another out of existence, as existence. Study happens and it don’t stop. In study, we are engaged consciously and unconsciously. We revise, and then again. Tis is not just about distinguishing improvement as capitalist efficiency. Tat is too easy to dismiss. It is about improvement itself, the time-concept, the moral imperative, the aesthetic judgement, which is to say capitalist improvement founded in and on black flesh, its female informality. Revision has no end and no connection to improvement, never mind efciency. So the consultant does and undoes institutions but can’t access instituted life, can’t open black life, can’t uncover queer life, can’t expose feminist planning around the ‘kitchen table’ as Barbara and Beverly Smith called it and Tiziana Terranova calls to it again, all noting certain paradoxes of freedom and sequestration in little general intellects of surreal life.22 He can’t access open secrets, can’t incomplete what is already incomplete, can’t deform what is always informal already, and yet they can’t believe and this leads to the state emergency that goes under such names as resilience and preparedness. When democratic despotism fails, simple despotism in the name of democracy must be imposed. Resilience is the name for the violent destruction of things that won’t give, won’t return to form, won’t bend when access is demanded, won’t be flexible and (com)pliant. Stopping when you are told to stop and moving along when you are told to move along demonstrates resilience and composure; but broken, breaking, dissed assembly demonstrates itself openly, secretly, dissembling in captured but inaccessible glance, for us, to us, as incomplete and much more than complete. Its daimonic performance can’t be individuated and won’t be performed.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

Only an integration of queer calculus creates an ethical framework that refuses notions of endless war – their hegemonic configuration of power produces the notions of legitimacy that create a state of endless “security” and warfare as a means of being.

Kapadia 19 – Ronak, PhD, American Studies, New York University. Director of Interdepartmental Graduate Concentration and Associate Professor of Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. “Insurgent Aesthetics: Security and the Queer Life of the Forever War,” Duke University Press, October 2019, pp. 9–24, – tishu

Insurgent Aesthetics: Cultures of Counterinsurgency, Security, and Struggle Insurgent Aesthetics is about the creativity and fugitive beauty that emanate from the shadows of terrible violence incited by forever war. Of freedom dreams flecked by inscriptions of wartime’s death and dispossession.25 The forever war is an assault on the human sensorium for citizens, subjects, survivors, and refugees of US empire alike.26 A time of ever more state security and imperial violence, the historical present necessitates more sensuous ways of knowing and feeling that challenge the militarized imperatives of the state and exceed the visual register alone. The global circulation of images of violence and social suffering has also intensified in our public culture over the past three decades. As a privileged regime of power, the field of vision is central to the manufacture and global supremacy of US war-making regimes and to the violent regulation of racialized, gendered, and sexualized bodies under the conditions of state security and surveillance.27 Given the US state’s will toward quantified abstraction in counting, without ever being accountable to, those killed, diseased, displaced, traumatized, and/or maimed in its armed conflicts, how might we divine other, more sensuous and affective ways of knowing this forever war and its inhuman violences? This book asserts that we must demand a stranger calculus—what I term a queer calculus—that unsettles prevailing interpretations of the forever war, makes sensuous what has been ghosted by US technologies of abstraction, and endows the designs for seemingly impossible futures amid infinite aggression. A queer calculus of the forever war advances an account of both dominant knowledge apparatuses and data logics of the US security state as well as alternative logics, affects, emotions, and affiliations of diasporic subjects living and laboring in the heart of empire. One such embodied queer calculus can be found in the corpus of aesthetic forms created by contemporary diasporic artists from South Asia and the Greater Middle East. These imaginative works of art reassemble vision with the disqualified knowledges, histories, geographies, and memories preserved by the “lower” senses of empire’s gendered, racialized Others to fashion an insurgency against empire’s built sensorium. In so doing, these insurgent aesthetics craft a queer calculus of US empire that makes intimate what is rendered distant, renders tactile what is made invisible, and unifies what is divided, thereby conjuring forms of embodied critique that can envision a collective world within and beyond the spaces of US empire’s perverse logics of global carcerality, security, and war. This book engages a wide range of critical interdisciplinary paradigms to reveal the radical experiments, aesthetic strategies, and freedom dreams of contemporary Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic artists. I argue that these works comprise a transnational constellation of visual art and aesthetics that together have animated new ways to think, feel, sense, and map the world amid US global state violence and its forever wars across the so-called Muslim world.28 Specifically, the book surveys the broader post–Cold War expansion of US militarism in the Greater Middle East (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine) and the domestic regimes of surveillance and repression in the US and other militarized sites mapped onto a transnational jihadist network. It contends that new and flexible forms of remote killing, torture, confinement, surveillance, and lawfare have built a distinctive post–9/11 infrastructure of gendered, racialized state violence both within and beyond US borders, which in turn marks the ongoing present as a distinct age within the longue durée of US settler colonial society. I explore this complex terrain through a contrapuntal queer feminist analysis of contemporary Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic visual cultures and their critical intersections with the contemporary logics and tactics of global warfare.29 Although many scholars have studied the impact of liberal empires and late modern warfare in the Greater Middle East, including the militarized and racialized vision of US imperialism at its core, insufficient attention has been paid to how the state’s dominant necropolitical calculus of neoliberal security and warfare has been thwarted and reimagined.30 By contrast, this book foregrounds the conceptual works of contemporary artists from South Asian and Middle Eastern diasporas, whose insurgent aesthetic acts refashion ascendant ways of knowing and feeling the forever war. My chief premise in this book is that if we want to apprehend (so as to ultimately arrest) contemporary transnational security politics and carceral practices, especially the prevailing biopolitical regimes of surveillance, imprisonment, and killing perfected at the domestic and international fronts of the forever war, then we need an alternate approach to the maps of strategic thinkers and security analysts who have been telling us how we should look, think, and feel about the world and its violences. By privileging a wide range of diasporic cultural forms—namely, visual and sound installation, performance, painting, photography, new media, and video—as a generative site for critiquing American war and empire, this book illuminates what I term insurgent aesthetics, an alternative articulation of minoritarian knowledge produced by those populations and their diasporic kin most devastated by the effects of the homeland security state and its forever wars.31 This book illustrates how Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic artists in the US and Europe, including Mahwish Chishty, Wafaa Bilal, Naeem Mohaiemen/ Visible Collective, Rajkamal Kahlon, Index of the Disappeared, Mariam Ghani, and Larissa Sansour, have grappled in their work with the neoliberal state of exception and the national security state’s use of gendered racial violence. Insurgent Aesthetics documents the impact of present-day militarized security practices and historical legacies of imperial violence on diasporic, (im)migrant, and refugee communities in the US who have been besieged both by domestic wars on terror, crime, drugs, and immigration as well as military and foreign policies directed at their homelands. These artists, in turn, have produced sensuous affiliations and political imaginaries that critique the simultaneous proliferation of gendered racism, neoliberal capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and Islamophobia in the post–9/11 period. These concepts represent intersectional systems of power and violence that fuel the ideological engines that legitimate the homeland security state’s use of global prisons, confinement technologies, overt killing, and permanent warfare as inevitable features of a political economy that seeks to “solve” our multifarious contemporary crises. In this context, what role can expressive culture and aesthetics play in struggles over hegemony of the contemporary neoliberal carceral, security, and warfare state? This book answers this question by centering the expansive world-making knowledge practices of diasporic visual and multimedia artists who hail from societies besieged by war but live and labor in the heart of empire. In short, the book investigates how South Asian and Middle Eastern diasporic artists challenge violent histories of US militarism, sustain critical opposition to the global war machine through the realms of art and culture, and create alternative systems of knowing, feeling, and living with and beyond forever warfare. The theoretical strategy and interpretive framework that I name “insurgent aesthetics” brings together diverse histories, geographies, and archives organized around several unifying themes. First, the book argues that insurgent aesthetics is a collective and relational praxis. Insurgent Aesthetics represents the first sustained effort to analyze contemporary works of conceptual art across the South Asian and Middle Eastern diasporas as a coherent social, cultural, and political formation challenging the explanatory power of dominant “expert” knowledge about US empire and its forever war. Second, these artists share a collective concern with revealing the gendered racial violence at the heart of the US security state. My close readings of their artworks make visceral and palpable what artist and cultural geographer Trevor Paglen calls “the black world,” the contradictions and disavowals of official archives of US global warfare.32 In this study, I grapple with the contradiction between the US state’s claim to rational security and the material orders of brutality, misery, ruin, detention, confinement, and extermination upon which that claim continuously is made. For instance, the US state has, on the one hand, come to “know” the so-called human terrain33 of global conflict in the war on terror by using abstract vision and limitless data to map racialized “Muslim” populations and innovate surveillance and intelligence-gathering procedures. On the other hand, the US state persistently disavows imperial violence in efforts to disappear the corporeality of its wars through “black sites,” redactions of classified documents, so-called touchless torture of detainees, denials of civilian death counts in drone attacks, and bans on images of the coffins of US soldiers killed in combat. This imperial paradox of transparency and opacity in discourses of state security reveals what political theorist Laleh Khalili calls “the contrasts and connections between that far twilight realm in which sovereign violence occurs without concealment and the domestic liberal order in which the same violence is concealed in broad daylight.”34 This incongruity is manifest in both the gendered racialization of contemporary Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities in the US and in the aesthetic works highlighted throughout this book, which cast light on the manifold unseen and disembodying technologies of secrecy and terror that define the forever war. Third, as theorists and practitioners, these artists exemplify the significance of insurgent aesthetics by utilizing official archives and technologies of war, such as declassified government documents and surveillance cameras, as resource and inspiration for their experimental and conceptual art practices. Many newly released government documents detail widespread US military practices of torture, interrogation, kidnapping, and rendition. The artists’ direct engagement with the “black world” of US statecraft is central to the book’s contention that insurgent aesthetics not only expose the contradictions of the warfare state but also make available more capacious ways of knowing, feeling, and sensing states of security. However, I reject a strict sociological reading of these artists’ contributions in line with approaches that would view them as native informants for the international art world. The US-based minoritarian art practitioner is routinely seen as merely transmitting information rather than pushing aesthetic boundaries. By contrast, a focus on aesthetic aims, innovations, and formal manipulations of these cultural forms is, as queer critics Kadji Amin, Amber Musser, and Roy Pérez contend, “the very substance of many of these artists’ engagement with legacies of social violence. Aesthetic form offers resources of resistance to the violences of interpretation that prematurely fix the meaning of minority artistic production within prefabricated narratives.”35 As such, I opt to center a formal analysis of artistic techniques and forms in keeping with newer queer feminist approaches to visual aesthetics.36 Fourth, these artists embody insurgent aesthetics’ public dimension through site-specific visual, installation, and performance art practices that often extend beyond gallery walls. They use common aesthetic strategies to coimplicate audiences, thus closing the distance between state violence and its afterlives. I am drawn to these artists in particular because they comprise an important part of my own scholar-activist relational orbit. Much of their work has been informed by deep contact with a legacy of urban grassroots activism, legal advocacy, and civil and human rights work. They encompass a group of artists (as activists, scholars, lawyers, curators, journalists, architects, and multimedia cultural producers in their own right) who, in the main, came of age in the cultural and political organizing milieu of New York City and other cities across the US in the 1990s. This pre-9/11 period spawned an efflorescence of urban multiethnic activist and creative cultural production against a range of violences such as urban police brutality; immigrant detention; and feminist, lgbtq, and labor struggles. This invigorating milieu had profoundly politicizing effects on successive generations of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic artists and activists in the US and North America.37 In this sense, the contemporary art of social practice featured in this book draws on activist traditions and social movements, including prison abolition, immigrant justice, antiwar activism, US Third World feminism, and Black liberation, which often predate the global war on terror and stem from earlier encounters with US military, security, and penal regimes. Fifth and finally, in my analysis of contemporary US war and empire, I focus on intimacy, affect, and sensation in ways that exemplify hallmarks of postcolonial, Black, Indigenous, and women of color feminist inquiry in American studies. It is worth recalling that feminist and queer studies have the longest critical engagement with the figure of the body as a gendered, sexualized, and racialized entity.38 Insurgent Aesthetics examines how the body is implicated in the workings of US global warfare and in the diasporic visual art and aesthetics that challenges counterinsurgent knowledge. This focus critiques how security states turn counterinsurgency into an abstraction that has no visceral, physical, or psychic impact on the victims of security. In contrast to the security state’s will to abstract knowledge, these artists illustrate how war is felt on the flesh and how the corporeal is a key site for acquiring political knowledge. The body and the senses thus become vehicles to affectively “know” the circumstances of security, carcerality, and counterinsurgency. It is important to note that I treat the body not as an abstract entity but as a social formation differentiated by race, gender, sexuality, ability, citizenship, and religion. By making the body and its sensory states the primary focus of the formation of security states and the challenges to that formation, my book extends this critical intersectional queer feminist legacy. It does so further by arguing that an analysis of what I term “the sensorial life of empire” is an urgent question of a just and equitable future. I ultimately argue that the insurgent aesthetics of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic cultural producers are crucial not only for their diagnosis of the dominant maps of exclusion and political violence characterizing the US forever war, but also for the open-ended and sensuous models of subjectivity, collectivity, and power that they imagine and inhabit. At once a critical formalist examination of how diasporic cultural producers have innovated new directions in contemporary American art and visual media, Insurgent Aesthetics prioritizes a transnational queer feminist account of the effects of the US forever war on the racialized, gendered, and sexualized bodies that are its targets. Drawing on and advancing frameworks in critical ethnic and postcolonial studies, queer and feminist studies, and visual culture and performance studies, Insurgent Aesthetics outlines alternative maps for exposing violent global histories of US militarism in the Greater Middle East and designing collective futures. It further argues that critical analysis of insurgent art and culture can excavate subjugated forms of knowledge about the US and its forever wars, a vital resource for policy, activism, and social transformation. Theorizing Culture in the Age of Neoliberal Security and Warfare My approach to the study of insurgent aesthetics as a mediation of material conditions builds on works across disciplines that understand visual art and expressive cultures as offering a critical and sensuous intervention in the context of debates on neoliberal security and late modern warfare. To date, global security has been a rich topic of critical analysis in the social sciences, but not yet fully for the humanities. Rather than cede an engagement with these issues to the social sciences, I explore in this book how contemporary social, political, and economic processes of security governance can be understood through the lens of South Asian and Middle Eastern diasporic visual and performance art practices. I contend that the global politics of imperialism, war, terrorism, and militarism cannot be extracted from practices and processes of cultural mediation. In this way, insurgent aesthetics do not literally represent social crises and contradictions, but rather do the work of defamiliarizing or queering the social order. Put differently, they implicate their audiences in the violence of the forever warfare and in turn engage our collective critical analysis of its existing hegemonic formation. As such, insurgent aesthetics poses a critique of the knowing subject at the center of dominant Western aesthetics and the social exclusions at the heart of that project.39 By radically challenging who the subject is that gets to “know” the endless emergency of the forever war and its gendered racialized regimes of institutionalized terror and violence, this book illuminates a method for knowing and sensing otherwise. The dissident works of art under investigation here are not about inclusion or assimilation, or even civil or human rights, but rather about advancing a rebellious aesthetic depiction of the “impossibility of such resolutions”—to paraphrase literary critic Christina Sharpe—by representing the paradoxes of brownness within the legacies of the forever war.40 Although the first chapter of this book develops a historical genealogy of contemporary twenty-first-century US counterinsurgency and global warmaking regimes, my primary goal is to shift attention away from the dominant imbricated structures of US gendered racial and imperial formation to focus instead on the capaciousness and creativity of insurgent aesthetics. That is, I wish to spotlight the affective structures and aesthetic forms of resistance found in Arab, Muslim, and South Asian diasporic cultures. This analytic shift is about foregrounding the alternative so as to identify, interrogate, and animate race radical and decolonial queer feminist experiments with speculation, fabulation, and otherworld imaginings in the midst of and in spite of the forever war. However, the diasporic cultural field of art and performance that I seek to enliven through this book does not have an obvious or indexical relation to the logics and tactics of US global warfare. Furthermore, insurgent aesthetics are not uniformly oppositional or resistant to the violent practices of the counterinsurgent state. Yet, when read through the lens of critical theory, these works of art produce a radical cultural archive that, while illegible within prevailing discourses of foreign relations, make visible the contours of race, gender, sexuality, religion, and citizenship in US forever wars. They further allow us to articulate social visions and political imaginaries that are incompatible with dominant counterinsurgent and counterterrorist solutions to crisis. I thus see these cultural forms as offering epistemological and affective interpretations that expose, without ever succumbing to, the contradictory logics of the US security state. The notion of insurgent aesthetics of the forever war challenges a state-based security framework. In this fundamental paradigm, security is defined as “the quality of being free from threats” (whether those threats come from external invasion or internal rebellion), a status ensured through the state’s historic monopoly over violence. In my queer feminist analysis of the cultural politics of national security and the securitization of everyday life, I draw upon critical security studies and international relations scholarship that embraces poststructuralist insights to interrogate the rhetoric, grammar, and motives of key terms and concepts such as “security,” “terror,” “danger,” “targets,” “bodies,” and “expertise” in the forever war.41 In so doing, I expose how prevailing conceptual framings contribute to US imperial and identity formation across the contemporary period. My analysis of insurgent art and performance practices further challenges the so-called proper objects and conventional reading practices of the social sciences. Rather than taking the notion of “security” as a given, I ask instead, who does this normative framework make “secure”? Who does it target for killing, abandonment, or humiliation? US global counterinsurgencies (gcoin) and militarized regimes often work to obscure evidence of the proliferating and intersectional forms of racialized, gendered, sexualized, xenophobic, Orientalized, and Islamophobic violence they inaugurate. By contrast, the artists I study find complex and creative ways to account for the subjects who are murdered, detained, disappeared, tortured, abstracted, ignored, or otherwise dispossessed by the forever wars waged in the name of security and freedom. Closely reading their art is my way of locating ethical practices and perceptual regimes that access those subjugated knowledges, histories, geographies, and memories absented by the abstractions of war. Analyses of insurgent aesthetics thus provides a “trace,” material and affective evidence of the redacted archives of security wars and their affective afterlives. Insurgent Aesthetics is also informed by scholars of race, war, and empire who have traced how the neoliberal state of exception enables the post–9/11 war on terror and its national security regime.42 These critics argue that the emergence of the US national security state in the mid-1940s43 is closely tethered to the subsequent neoliberal political and economic restructuring starting in the early 1970s that has led to mass criminalization, securitization, and inequality in the US and globally.44 More specifically, this set of interconnected historical, political, and economic shifts over the latter half of the twentieth century has intensified racialized, gendered, and regionalized class disparities and led to the militarized retrenchment of multiple freedoms through the dismantling of the welfare state, the social wage, and the broader “liberal-pluralist distributive order” characterizing the mid-twentieth century.45 In this context, transnational feminists such as Inderpal Grewal have argued that US neoliberal and imperial policies can be understood through the “‘state effect’ of appearing like a security state,” which paradoxically signals “the rationale for militarized cultures of surveillance and protection that lead to insecurities, threats, and fears, which work at material, affective and embodied levels. Security is also a cause and effect not just of the relations of the United States with the world, but also of neoliberal policies that have contributed to the inequalities that create insecurity throughout the world, including in the United States itself.”46 Detailing multiple approaches to “security” as the shape-shifting keyword of contemporary governance across the period that she terms “advanced neoliberalism,” Grewal outlines how the concept has been appropriated in vast domains of welfare, militarism, criminalization, humanitarianism, and beyond in the production of “exceptional citizens” who claim responsibility for national security in the absence of the state’s dismantled social safety net and at the expense of its gendered racialized Others. This book’s approach is informed, moreover, by scholars who take the longer view to articulate the nexus of security, race, and capitalism in the US since its founding. Historian Nikhil Pal Singh pursues an approach to “America’s long war” that highlights the durable entanglements of race and war that gave rise to the US as a capitalist power well before the advanced neoliberal age of globalization. He writes, “The frontier wars, the wars of the early US empire, and the twentieth century’s world wars all illuminated affinities between war-making and race making, activating or reanimating distinctions between friend and enemy along an internal racial border.”47 The gendered racialization of enemies of the state was crucial to the so-called law and order policies of ensuing decades that led to the criminalization of both domestic and foreign populations and the formation of the neoliberal turn as early as the 1940s.48 As Singh adds, “new conceptions of inequality were realized and practiced in trials by violence: the wars on crime, drugs, and now terror. Through the 1990s, the success of neoliberal policies that rolled back welfare-state protections and market regulations in the name of austerity, efficiency, and individual responsibility carried a similarly sharp racial edge as they sought to separate the deserving from the threatening poor.”49 Singh’s critical reformulation of America’s long war echoes other scholarly arguments on how these fundamental social transformations were the state’s response to what sociologist Jordan T. Camp calls “the organic crisis of Jim Crow Capitalism.”50 Camp observes how “moral panics around race, crime, disorder, security, and law and order became the primary legitimating discourse for the expanded use of policing, prisons, and urban securitization in the state’s management of social and economic crises.”51 What he terms “neoliberal racial and security regimes” are the “outgrowth of a long counterinsurgency against the Black freedom, labor, and socialist alliance that took shape in the struggle to abolish Jim Crow racial regimes.”52 The resultant period of neoliberal political and economic restructuring (which has its roots in early Cold War bipartisan consensus) has given rise to uneven capitalist development, mass criminalization, and violent securitization in cities across the US and globally. I would add that worldwide counterinsurgency operations of the European great powers (developed in the wake of revolutionary decolonization movements across the Global South) also emerged at the precise moment in which antiracist and socialist critiques of domestic counterinsurgency (police surveillance and incarceration) “gripped the imaginations of radical social movements in the US.”53 In particular, the late 1970s and early 1980s mark the beginning of the explosive boom in the racialized US prison population and a turn toward mass incarceration, domestic counterinsurgency, and neoliberal restructuring that is part and parcel of the “war on drugs” and the “war on crime.”54 Putting my account of the forever war in conversation with this scholarly literature on racial capitalism and the Black Radical tradition provides more historical context for the domestic and international ends of US counterinsurgency warfare and its gendered racial targets into the twenty-first century. The work of Camp and Singh builds on the groundbreaking contributions of Stuart Hall and his students in edited volumes such as Policing the Crisis and The Empire Strikes Back. 55 These scholar-activist projects provide endlessly compelling blueprints for analyzing our ongoing crises of authority caused by police violence; mass and racialized incarceration; seemingly permanent foreign and domestic wars; and struggles for global economic, environmental, social, sexual, and religious justice. To better understand issues of crime, of terrorism, of immigration, of gender violence, of poverty, of forever wars, and so on, we need to adopt intersectional, interdisciplinary approaches to understand how presumably distinct spheres collude in producing dissident outsiders. By now, scholars take for granted this notion of “articulated categories,” or a framework of intersectionality (in works of Stuart Hall, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and countless others) that formulates an understanding of race, class, gender, sexuality, religion, and other categories of social difference as co-constituted, that is, coming into existence “in and through relation to each other,” to adopt Anne McClintock’s terms.56 But this understanding of articulated categories advanced by Hall and other Black British thinkers of the time went one step further to demonstrate the intersectional nature not only of social difference but of culture, politics, and the economy too. These realms are rendered too often as discrete spheres of inquiry rather than co-constituted social forces. In their classic volume Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, Hall and his colleagues argued that the problems confronting advanced capitalist nations such as Great Britain and the US in the 1970s were not purely economic, but that the crisis of overaccumulation was a political and social crisis too. That is, they claimed that race and other salient categories of difference were at the heart of capitalist violence. Governments repeatedly scapegoat “outsiders”— whether undocumented Central American migrants, trans and gendernonconforming people, sex workers, the homeless, the seroconverted, Muslim refugees, and so on. The point here is that there is often an unseen cultural and ideological dimension to what is conventionally understood as “merely” political or economic.57 So too with the moral panics of security. It follows, then, that state surveillance and racism are deeply imbricated in the history of US capitalism. The saga of national security surveillance in the US, in turn, is inseparable from the history of US colonialism, gendered racism, and empire. As many scholars have argued, racialized surveillance has enabled the consolidation of capital and empire throughout US history, from the settler colonial period through to our advanced neoliberal era of forever war.58 According to Arun Kundnani and Deepa Kumar, What brings together these different systems of racial oppression— mass incarceration, mass surveillance, and mass deportation—is a security logic that holds the imperial state as necessary to keeping ‘American families’ (coded white) safe from threats abroad and at home. The ideological work of the last few decades has cultivated not only racial security fears but also an assumption that the security state is necessary to keep “us” safe. In this sense, security has become the new psychological wage to aid the reallocation of the welfare state’s social wage toward homeland security and to win support for empire in the age of neoliberalism.59 To their account of the neoliberal and racial regimes of security at the heart of empire, we can add the insights of US women of color and Third World feminists who have long argued that racial and imperial capital, in Grace Kyungwon Hong’s terms, “was always organized around gender, reproduction, and sexuality.”60 Indeed, debates on national security surveillance and warfare remain impoverished without an intersectional analysis of gendered racism, capitalism, and empire.61 To review, this book’s critical cultural studies approach to insurgent aesthetics and neoliberal security and warfare is indebted to at least three major intellectual formations. The first inspiration, as described above, is my reading of the work of the late Stuart Hall and his comrades in the 1970s and 1980s at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.62 The second body of scholarship is the US Black Radical tradition, most often associated with the writing of Cedric Robinson.63 The third strand of critical cultural materialist influence on this book is the work of Lisa Lowe and other “post-Marxist” materialist feminists of color and queer of color critics who likewise reject the crude dichotomous thinking on cultural politics that emphasizes stale binaries between social control and resistance or incorporation and subversion of earlier cultural Marxist traditions. These writers also note how “culture” names “the field on which economic and political contradictions are articulated.”64 Under this formulation, diasporic visual art and related cultural forms are the sites where knowledge and meaning about the forever war are at once constituted and unraveled. These works can provide essential reserves for articulating ideological systems of difference across multiple national sites. “Because culture is the contemporary repository of memory, of history,” writes Lisa Lowe, “it is through culture, rather than government, that alternative forms of subjectivity, collectivity, and public life are imagined. This is not to argue that cultural struggle can ever be the exclusive site for practice; [but] it is only through culture that we conceive and enact new subjects and practices in antagonism to the regulatory locus of the citizen-subject.”65 Moreover, for Hong, as for other materialist feminists of color in this rich intellectual tradition, culture is a “material force rather than a transcendental, autonomous, aestheticized separate sphere,” or “the site to express that which is unspeakable.”66 Insurgent Aesthetics thus presents a vital counterhegemonic site for constructing new political subjects and analytics that are materially and aesthetically at odds with the institutions of citizenship and national identity—the grounds from which insurgent alternatives and political coalitions against the forever war might emerge. As such, this book connects the intersectional theorizations of diaspora, migration, and insurgency in critical race, postcolonial, Black, Indigenous, queer, and feminist studies to the long-standing scholarly tradition on the cultures of US imperialism.67 On the Queer Calculus of US Empire In this introduction’s opening account of the “collateral afterworlds”68 of US drone strikes in Af-Pak, I asserted that we require a stranger calculus to grasp the violence of the forever war and challenge the state’s dominant militarized logics—what I term a queer calculus—that unsettles normative analyses of the forever war and outlines blueprints for utopian future imaginings amid limitless violence. In this section I elaborate on queer calculus as an epistemological and affective intervention, and in so doing dwell on the essential, if unexpected, reservoir of political inspiration and theoretical power that the field of queer studies affords this book’s account of the forever war. Queer calculus is a critical hermeneutic strategy through which racialized and dispossessed peoples, including Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians in the diaspora, have created alternative world-making knowledge projects to render visible or sensuous all that has been absented by the abstractions of the forever war.69 The constellation of contemporary art and performance works analyzed here produces an insurgent aesthetics by how it interacts and plays with viewers’ multisensory experiences of and responses to its aesthetic objects. This book questions the abstractions and rationalities of US imperial discourse and the statistical modes through which the forever war’s “collateral damage” is calculated, aggregated, and divided. In the process, I expose another calculus, a queer calculus, of bodies in pain and of bodies that imagine alternatives to that pain. Queer calculus is thus about inhabiting another arithmetic altogether, one that constructs a slantwise relation to how imperial warfare has been measured conventionally, including body counts, combat time, military budgets, and the price of oil. This critical hermeneutics is at odds with the US state’s necropolitical calculations, an investment in numeracy and counting that dates back to the early American slave period and further evokes what geographer Katherine McKittrick suggestively names “the mathematics of unliving.”70 If, as I contend in this book, global counterinsurgencies disorganize and destroy communal modes of belonging for racialized and diasporic populations targeted by US forever wars, then an antiracist, feminist, and decolonial queer calculus not only identifies an alternative frame from which to interpret these violent imperial practices but also signals an entirely new mode of inhabiting and feeling the world collectively and relationally in times of neoliberal security and war. Insurgent Aesthetics is indebted to the major paradigm shift in queer studies over the past two decades that situates the study of sexuality at the intersections of race, nationalism, (settler and franchise) colonialism, capitalism, liberalism, migration, militarism, and empire.71 The mode of critical inquiry (that is, antiracist, feminist, decolonial, and queer critique) prioritized in this project is in explicit conversation with the emergent formation known as critical ethnic studies.72 As Chandan Reddy, Grace Hong, and Roderick Ferguson have all argued, Third World and women of color feminisms and queer of color critique emerge from this intersectional, race radical tradition of scholarship rather than primarily from Eurocentric strands of queer theory.73 I use these broader theorizations of the social world from queer of color, queer diasporic, and queer Indigenous/Native studies to suggest that we can further de-link queer reading practices and analytics from putatively queer bodies. Moreover, the mode of queer studies I draw on in this project understands queerness not simply as an identitarian category (to describe lgbtqia populations), but as a critical set of interpretative practices or a decolonial praxis that makes possible the production of new knowledges, affects, and affiliations.74 Here, a willingness to accept that queer theory can be marshalled beyond studies of non-normative sexualities and genders becomes paramount.75 This is not at all to suggest that the decolonizing erotic project at the heart of queer theory should be abandoned. I likewise remain attentive to scholarly criticism that has called into question the wholesale valorization of sexual deviance and disorder that is endemic to contemporary queer studies and politics, and the genealogies of what theorist Kadji Amin calls “disturbing attachments” that sometimes ensue from the field’s idealization of the queer erotic.76 But I equally want to join other queer critics who hold on to the power of queerness as a complex sign for decolonization and radical pleasure, intimacy, fugitivity, coalition, and utopian futures despite (and perhaps also because of) these conditions of violent subjection.77 By asserting the sign and method of queerness centrally within this study, I bring the intellectual and political tools from queer of color and queer diasporic critique—intersectionality and assemblage theory and an attention to embodiment, sensation, and aesthetics—to address violent transformations in the sensorial life of US empire in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. While the primary goal of this book is not to privilege an examination of non-normative gender and sexual subjects in a criticism of the forever war, this is not at all to imply that heteropatriarchal structures or non-normative sexual or gender subjectivities, expressions, and embodiments do not centrally undergird US neoliberal security state practices of racialization, war, and empire. In fact, US global security and surveillance regimes have long been concerns of at least radical feminist, if not queer and/ or trans*, studies.78 As literary critic Kyla Wazana Tompkins observes, one of the clearest insights of queer of color criticism is that as the “foundational racial violences” undergirding modern nation-states “were being laid down and concretized, categories of normative and non-normative sexuality were constructed alongside and over them . . . . Queer of color critique articulates queer theory from the heart of these and other histories.”79 Moreover, US, Israeli, and other settler colonial and biopolitical regimes have long rendered the sexualities of nonwestern and racialized Others (including Arabs, Muslims, South Asians, and Palestinians) as non-normative—that is, savage, repressed, and deviant—in order to legitimize settler colonial dispossession over people and lands. While attentive to the intersectional systems of social power and violence that structure the imperial and racial formation of the forever war, my primary goal in this book is to apply the conceptual traditions and tools of queer criticism to enhance a scholarly investigation of race, security, and empire. At the same time, this book explores how queer politics and queer studies themselves might be enriched and reimagined in light of violent practices such as aerial bombings and remote warfare, military detention and extrajudicial torture, and the atmospheric and subterranean politics of US/Israeli settler colonialism. Because these sites comprise the major flashpoints of neoliberal security and warfare examined in this book, I ask further, what are the effects of these violent practices on the gendered, racialized, and sexualized bodies that are their targets? What alternative forms of being and belonging do such vulnerable queered and racialized bodies in turn enact and imagine through culture and performance? And finally, how do the insurgent aesthetics of South Asian and Arab diasporic artists “queer” the governing calculus of US empire to propose alternative modes of sensuous affiliation and fugitive coalition in the forever war? As my brief tripartite discussion reveals below, I aim my use of queer criticism in concrete ways throughout this book. “Queer calculus” thus names an alternative lens to analyze (1) logics and evidence, (2) affects and the senses, and (3) sensuous affiliations and coalition in the forever war.

der theories have played a vital role in this project and transformed our understanding of these collateral populations who face death and preciousness on a daily basis (Lamble 2013; Snorton and Haritaworn 2013). Partly in the light of Puar’s work, Jin Haritaworn (Haritaworn et al. 2015) has argued for a distinctive “queer necropolitics” that reveals how forms of life that are deemed worthwhile are sharply divided from those that are consigned to the garbage heap, as disposable and worthless. In an argument that recalls Judith Butler’s theorization of “precarious life” in post-9/11 America, we might consider the contrast between the wealthy, white gay and lesbian couples imagined in neoliberal advertising campaigns aimed at the “pink pound,” and an incarcerated transgender subject seeking urgent surgical interventions (Butler 2006). In a 2015 volume, Haritaworn and others (2015) have shown how working-class and marginal queers have repeatedly been marked by death as a form of social control. Like Puar’s studies of maimed and collateral populations, necropolitics reveals those who are not yet dead, their lives neglected and subject to the chance drone strike, the possible drive-by shooting, or a malfunctioning batch of fake black-market pharmaceuticals; in other words, the living dead. Mikdashi and Puar contend that following the lengthy US war in Afghanistan, the country was left with the world’s highest population of individuals relying on prosthetic body parts, often without adequate aftercare and support. The authors deliberately use the term crippled to distinguish between those who have received medical care and identification as disabled, and those simply left to live without any limb; Puar (2017) has recently advanced her theorization of physical impairment in this context. These are the lives of queer and collateral subjects; their deaths are as yet unrealized, but they are always already sanctioned. Deprived of legal protection, one thinks of villagers subjected to drone strikes, collateral subjects can die at any time. These queer life stories run at odds with core assumptions within Western LGBTQ rights discourses; they are deprived of the self-realization deemed integral to the emergence of a sexual subject. Queer forms of living death marked by permanent war clearly preclude the possibility of middle-class self-discovery. The mobilization of living death, as evinced separately in the work of Mbembe and Haritaworn, is in itself of considerable interest to queer theorists, who have long been concerned with the politics of life, reproduction, and futurity (Edelman 2004). To live without the privilege of a future, or to have children who are not privileged as the bearers of futurity, are conditions that must develop queer theory’s otherwise sophisticated accounts of biopolitics and reproduction. Queer theory from elsewhere challenges a certain stagnation within metropolitan queer theory, or what Mikdashi and Puar (2016: 215) term “queer theory as American studies”; forms of life and death in the South speak far more closely to the interests of earlier queer theorists than contemporary middle-class queer life in the West. Yet this point must remain secondary; queer theory from elsewhere should not be judged on what it offers “to” its Western counterpart. Work at the intersection of queer theory and area studies needs primarily to engage closely with the specificity of non-Western cultures, histories, and languages; there is a continual danger of becoming subsumed into a generalized notion of “world sexualities.” But given these caveats, interventions such as Mikdashi and Puar’s force queer theory out into the world; they anticipate a traveling queer theory able to engage with non-Western places and peoples, whether in Kabul, Beirut, Kinshasa, or Lagos. This deprovincialized queer theory has the potential to generate a type of reverse ethnography through which Western readers can appreciate their own domestic practices of exclusion, particularly in the prison and health care systems, through newly critical eyes.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

In opposition to the call for the social reproduction of policy, only cuts within the cracks and fissures of the system can generate spaces capable of queering the financialization of social relations and taking down the bastion of normalcy

Lepp 19 – Nicholas, PhD candidate in Communication Studies focusing on critical rhetorical theory at the University of Georgia, “Queering Utopia: ACT UP and the Disruption of Heteronormativity,” 05/01/2019, pp. 52-64, – tishu

Using a deconstructive lens to view place, we realize that place was never actually place at all. Rather, place was always already space. Given the pervasive power of heteronormativity (and other such power structures), this understanding is important. Queer utopic cuts flip the meaning inherent in ideologically settled places and turns them into ideologically contested spaces, thereby opening new zones of queer freedom. This space-based approach also has particular significance for the heterotopic nature of queer utopic cuts. By cutting back against heteronormativity, queer utopic spaces seek to portray the contestable state of gender and sex. If it is true that the spatial metaphor invites scholars to understand the multiple conflicting realities experienced by people as contingent rather than static, then a space-based understanding is integral to understanding these spaces and what they attempt to change. Moments of queer utopia must then exist contingently in particular spaces, queering the heteronormative reality created in that location. ACT UP, for example, takes this space-based approach to queerness as well. The point of these demonstrations is to “occupy a space that’s not supposed to be yours” and to “usurp public spaces.”141 In other words, by protesting, ACT UP sought to change spaces that were predominantly heteronormative into spaces of queerness. ACT UP thus further reminds us that a space-based approach to queerness is valuable. For the purpose of thinking about the cut then, a space-based approach has a few implications. This approach reminds us that heteronormativity, while hegemonic in modern-society, does not exist uniformly throughout society. Rather, this power structure manifests itself in particular ways. Because of this, the queer utopic cut must operate differently throughout time and space, rejecting a monolithic approach towards fighting back. If the cut is as fluid and space-based as I have suggested it is, then the ability for this queer utopic cut to create long-lasting change is stymied. In other words, if heteronormativity is constantly changing based on particular spaces, then so must the cut portraying a better future. There cannot, by definition, be one giant cut that stops heteronormativity, but rather multiple smaller space-based cuts that chip away at this power structure. If it is true that queer utopias are confined to particular spaces, I have stumbled across an interesting conundrum. How can they create long-lasting change in a system of power that pervades other spaces? If they do only serve to fight back in particular spaces, rather than targeting the power structure itself, then aren’t they simply cutting off each of the heads of the hydra separately, allowing room for the other heads to grow back while in battle? I believe that the solution to this problem lies in the aftermath of these cuts, through the creation of queer worldmaking and queer counterpublics. But before I turn to a discussion of those concepts, I want to further discuss the moments in which queer utopic cuts occur, and how they change the reality of the spaces they occupy. Queer Relationality When Gust Yep wrote “The Violence of Heteronormativity in Communication Studies,” he wanted to further “make sense of the individual and collective suffering produced by nonnormativity.”142 He recognizes that heteronormativity, even in academia, can create “deep feelings of isolation, worthlessness, and shame to diminished access to opportunities, decreased life chances, and multiple forms of death.”143 In response, he questions how queer individuals can “maintain wholeness” in a world that fundamentally wishes they did not exist.144 This, I believe, is the major effect of the queer utopic cut in the moment—it creates a space that opens room for queer individuals to maintain wholeness in a world that rejects them. In other words, queer utopic moments establish a kind of queer relationality. Queer relationality can be thought of as a kind of affective connection, a communal understanding of relations between and among queer individuals. It creates a sense of intimacy, a kind of interdependence that exists between people who are not wanted by the outside world. Much like Judith Butler’s work on cohabitational vulnerability and mutual dependency,145 queer relationality recognizes a world in which queer people need to care for and about each other. It involves “closeness, deep knowing, mutual attunement, sensuality, and eroticism that could range from fleeting to enduring, and spheres of desire;” it creates an emotional interconnection that oftentimes cannot be explained through discourse.146 In many ways, queer relationality reflects the discursive components of rhetorics of difference as elucidated by Lisa Flores. For Flores, A rhetoric of difference includes repudiating mainstream discourse and espousing self-and group-created discourse. Through the rejection of the external and creation of the internal, marginalized groups establish themselves as different from stereotyped perceptions and different from dominant cultures…. The naming that comes about through a rhetoric of difference allows groups to reflect on the uniqueness of their identity. Pride and solidarity within one’s group are essential.147 Queer relationality rejects the mainstream, discursive construction of queer individuals and instead invites queers to create their own communities of discourse. By arguing for intimate interrelations designed to protect queer folks, queer relationality calls for a unique kind of pride and solidarity within the queer community. The process also establishes a separate space by deconstructing heteronormative conceptions of queerness itself. In doing so, queer relationality invites queer people to “transform their space into a home,” thereby embodying this rhetoric of difference.148 Queer relationality thus pushes towards what Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa call “El Mundo Zurdo,”149 or the left-handed world, “the place where the misfits suddenly fit.”150 Queer relationality, however, cannot only be understood in terms of difference. To do so risks replicating an understanding of queerness as solely abject or difference, as theorists such as Lee Edelman have famously done.151 This is not to suggest that Flores’ work does this—indeed, in her work, Chicana feminists find their agency within this difference—but given the understanding of queer as abject resulting from queer anti-relationality, we risk stumbling into queerness as abject through an analysis of difference. Instead, we must draw from queerness as abject to think of queer bonds in a simultaneously positive and negative way, being defined through a kind of difference but also through a connection between individuals. This is what Joshua Weiner and Damon Young describe as a bond of extimacy, their psychoanalytic reading of intimacy: What do we make of the fact that today we experience so many social spaces in which queer bonds—however precariously and temporarily—manage to appear through something other than just an act of defiance or resistance?.... We suggest that some ‘we,’ however fugitive, has always appeared in the interstices of historically conditioned homophobic interpellation, perhaps in the simplest experience of two or more people realizing their queer desire for each other…. Our queer bonds are not merely a bulwark of resistance, via determinate negation, of the normative socio-symbolic order. It is on the terrain of a social death that a ‘we’ precipitates into a mobile and precarious assemblage perennially in excess of the negations it survives…. If we are ‘intimate’ when we can recognize a symbolically articulated commonality, whence a shared identity, here we should perhaps speak of ‘extimacy.’152 Extimacy takes Edelman’s starting point that the queer is abject and Flores’ rhetoric of difference as a site of social agency to develop new modes of queer bonds. If queer relationality and bonds can be thought of as a form of extimacy, then the creation of these bonds renders agency out of that which cannot have agency—mainly, the abject—and queers the very starting point of interpersonal relations. This process thus imagines a queer future where heteronormativity does not define queerness in such a violent manner. Extimacy then establishes a bond that “occasions a certain discursive, erotic and political transconnectivity, and configures a relationality that persists in fraught ways, whether acknowledged or not.”153 This is a benefit to the queer utopic cut in the moment. By revealing a world in which their relations are not demonized but rather celebrated, queer people are invited to create powerful interconnections. These interconnections create a zone of comfort and love that reminds queer individuals that they do deserve to even be. Some of those interconnections may be long lasting, and some may be temporary. Regardless, in this manner, the queer utopic cut operates as a kind of queer survival strategy. By “continuing to unpack normativities, and exploring queer relationalities,”154 the queer utopic cut inverts the space it exists within to open room for queer life to exist. This may only be momentary and aspirational, but just the invocation of queer utopias can create positive change. A tangible example of queer relationality is the Positive Space Campaign, a social campaign taking place at various universities in Canada designed to help alleviate heteronormativity by inverting the university space to create room for queerness. Through the distribution of posters and buttons and the creation of public rallies and workshops, this campaign contributes “to an imagined space that confronts homophobia and heteronormativity in the hopes of creating a campus that embraces sexual and gender diversity.”155 By fighting heteronormativity, this campaign envisions a university environment in which queer students can freely be themselves. It operates as a kind of “'powerful intervention in the routine lexicon’ of the hallways or other university space,” and “disrupts the dominance of heteronormativity simply by being visible and drawing attention to the fact that LGBTQ people are on campus.”156 These campaigns can and do have a positive impact by opening the space for queer life to exist. I’d like to think that this is enough, but, unfortunately, it is not. Given the pervasive nature of heteronormativity, this power structure adapts to this space of queer life and boxes it in. Heteronormativity may even seep into a queered space, re-claiming it as its own bastion of normalcy. Thus, while creating a tear in the fabric of heteronormative power is valuable, it cannot be all that the queer utopic cut does. Rather, there must be beneficial, long-term after effects of the cut for creating lasting change. Queer Worldmaking One of these important after effects comes in the form of queer worldmaking. This process can be thought of as developing a world outside of heteronormativity for queers to thrive. In Disidentifications, Muñoz says The concept of worldmaking delineates the ways in which performances-- both theatrical and everyday rituals-- have the ability to establish alternative views of the world. These alternative vistas are more than simply views or perspective; they are oppositional ideologies that function as critiques of oppressive regimes of ‘truth’ that subjugate minoritarian people.157 Queer worldmaking is a process of creating an entirely queer world, challenging the heteronormative structure that exists now. Through queer worldmaking, queer utopic cuts utilize their heterotopic nature to create new spaces that explore a world absent heteronormativity. This is “a messy enterprise driven by a vision of another world, another way of living,” that fights for a more equitable future.158 Queer worldmaking thus consists of “practices and relationships that contest the logics of compulsory heteronormativities,” challenging normative understandings of identity and society through new futures.159 This is not an aspirational push, but one that engages in “the contemporary situation with its historical legacies, varying interests, and much more.”160 In other words, queer worldmaking is a kind of world-shattering that draws a new world from the one that currently exists. This establishes a kind of Blochian concrete utopia. Queer worldmaking is thus an important part of the queer utopia that the queer utopic cut sets out to establish. It “engender[s] a now and a future with promise and hope that must not be discarded as always already hetero- and homonormative,” imbuing a vision for a more perfect world. As Muñoz even says, “queer world-making, then, hinges on the possibility to map a world where one is allowed to cast pictures of utopia and to include such pictures in any map of the social.”161 In other worlds, queer worldmaking is the perfectly queer part of queer utopianism, embracing a queerness sans heteronormativity.162 Queer worldmaking, however, cannot be conceptualized in a conventional manner. Gust Yep indicates that queer worldmaking consists of creating spaces where “individual freedom and collective possibilities” are freely explored;163 Thomas Nakayama and Charles Morris think of queer worldmaking as “not a strategic plan, organized by anyone, but a bottom-up engagement with the everyday.”164 In this manner, the road to creating a queer world is rhizomatic, rejecting straight paths in favor of queer ones that turn and bend along the way. In creating a queer world, the world as we know it is reformulated and becomes radically different. A rhetorical approach to queer worldmaking is necessary to understand how it comes to life. If it is true that “queer world-making is a process brought to life, in part, by the vernacular contestation of discourse,” then an approach that starts from that discourse is necessary to theorize this cut.165 In other words, queer worldmaking becomes operationalized through the rhetorical invocation of the queer utopic cut. This happens by inverting the space that the queer utopic cut occupies. By undermining the normative and embracing the non-normative, the queer utopic cut rewrites what a space means. In revealing a world sans heteronormativity, this cut divulges a vision of a queer world. It is a performative rhetoric in the Butlerian sense, simultaneously performing and becoming the world that it seeks to create; it “attempts to remake the world in its image.”166 In this manner, the queer utopic cut exists within a similar position to queer kissing for Morris and John Sloop; it exhibits a “heightened sense of kairos,” insofar as it “effects a powerful affirmation for queer communities… with potentially profound material and symbolic implications for the constitution of sexuality.”167 The cut may also push towards queer worldmaking in a visual manner.168 In fact, this “visual affirmation of queer lives” is oftentimes “the first step in instigating productive modes of world-making.”169 Jeffrey Bennett takes this as a starting point in his analysis of the queer worldmaking of the Born This Way blog, a website designed to portray the queerness of its contributors. If they so wish, people visiting the blog may upload pictures of themselves as children, portraying images of queerness at a young age. These pictures may include photographs of boys wearing dresses and acting in effeminate manners or girls wearing male costumes. For these contributors, then, their queerness was showing at such a young age that they could have uncovered and revealed it much sooner than they did. However, due to internalized and external homophobia and heteronormativity, these contributors did not understand their queerness until they were much older. In these instances, the visual representations of queerness portray an imagined utopia whereby the contributors to this blog could have been openly queer at a younger age.170 When ACT UP sought to redefine what it meant to be somebody living with AIDS, they were actively utilizing queer worldmaking to change societal understandings of what it means to be someone with AIDS. As they protested, AIDS activists articulated a new way of conceptualizing people with AIDS in order to create this queer world. This change was not only rhetorical, changing the literal discourse used to describe people with AIDS, but was also visual, as demonstrators used images of their AIDS-filled bodies to re-write what it was to be someone with AIDS. ACT UP is thus a prime example of queer worldmaking. In addition, queer worldmaking acts as a form of healing. In creating separate worlds through forms of queer relationality, the queer utopic cut reminds queer people that heteronormativity is not an innate phenomenon, but rather one to be deconstructed. For example, Benny LeMaster writes about the Trans Empowerment Group (TEG for short), a campus-based support group for transgender students. Through ethnographic data, LeMaster explores the queer worldmaking process of this group as transgender students engage each other in group meetings. For the students involved in TEG, meeting spaces push towards a queer world. One of the ways this is operationalized is through the laughter of the students. As LeMaster says, “We all laugh. Through our collective laughter, we process our relative intersectional degrees of deviation from the mythical norm.”171 Through this laughter, the students involved in the group simultaneously engage in a learning process whereby they become more familiar with the process of deviation from heteronormativity—and thus push towards making a queer world—and experience a temporary, cathartic release from the norms they are consistently constrained by. Thus, by envisioning and pushing towards a queer world rhetorically, the queer utopic cut can begin to heal the wounds inflicted by heteronormativity. The telos of queer worldmaking is not to suggest an immediate change, even if queer worldmaking does have valuable, immediate effects, like queer healing. Rather, this is a longterm project—the world cannot be revolutionized in a day. Thus, queer worldmaking must be a part of the afterlife of a queer utopic cut. In much the same way that Morris and Sloop argue that “in order to achieve a queer world, a ‘critical visual mass’ of same-sex public kissing must exist,” the call for queer worldmaking must be repeated endlessly to counter heteronormativity.172 Queer worldmaking thus demands an endless repetition of the queer utopic cut.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

This never ending cycle is based on promises of progress that can only create catastrophic history. Each day, our dreams of change and meaning push us towards an impossible future – hoping, somehow, that we may grab the mirage and smooth over the destructions of the past

baedan 12 (baedan. “Journal of Queer Nihilism.” The Anarchist Library, 2012, theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan.)//HANZBANZ

Of Benjamin’s various metaphors for understanding history, that of the angel runs parallel to his reference of the saying that the historian is “a prophet facing backwards.” The two different readings of this saying parallel, in turn, his distinction between his concept of history and the conformist one. He says that one way to read the saying is as a description of the position taken by the historian of empathy who is marked by despair and accedia, doomed to drown in his conformism to the tides of history. A very different reading of the saying could describe well the posture of the historian who, like the Angel of History, turns his back to the future in order to set his sight on the past. He does this in order to take hold of the true picture of the past that appears momentarily and without warning in a moment of danger. For in another parallel metaphor Benjamin describes “an occurrence of ball lightning that runs across the whole horizon of the past,” illuminating moments that had been up until that point left dark and mysterious. From the juxtaposition of these metaphors we can gather that while on the one hand progress may be a storm always blowing the angel away from a broken world that he [they] faces, frustrating [their] his desire to stop and make it whole, nevertheless this same storm produces the very flashes of light in which a moment of history unexpectedly “present[s] itself… as a moment of humanity.” He continues: “In this moment, time must be brought to a standstill.”¶ It is this standstill, jetztzeit, which may also be translated as now-time, that is at the heart of the theses. In the sixteenth he writes that the true historian “cannot do without the notion of a present which is not a transition, but in which time takes a stand and has come to a standstill. For this notion defines the very present in which he himself is writing history.” For Benjamin, the concept of a causal chain of progress is a smoothing-over, or reduction to a common denominator, of what is in truth an eternal catastrophe. He points out that “the basic concept in myth is the world as punishment.” This ancient concept has taken on a more terrible modern form in “the eternity of punishment in hell,” which “substitutes an eternity of torment for the eternity of a cycle.” It is worth noting, however, that Benjamin does not straightforwardly claim that hell is the reality of living in modern times. Rather, he describes hellish punishment as akin to the way in which a student is held after school, not allowed to run outside and play, forced to repeat the Sisyphean task of writing lines by hand repeatedly, e.g. I will not expose the ignorance of the faculty. It is no mistake that Benjamin would depict hell as so reminiscent of the conformist historian’s domain.¶ We might link Benjamin’s denial of progress with our own by pointing out that progress is nothing but a daily catastrophe of life in the world of the commodity. We can see this catastrophe around us everywhere: the architecture of the cities, the physical infrastructure of the multi-form prison, the endless apparatuses which exist to extract our energy to turn it into dead labor, the monotonous agricultural killing-fields, the ever-expanding ecological dead-zones. All processes that have dominated, extracted, and paved over generations of the living. Civilization’s homogenizing process is constantly intensifying and accelerating. Technological advances and other progressive developments are perpetually revolutionizing the armed disaster which confronts us as the future. It is clear that Benjamin’s view is similar when he describes history and culture as the spoils carried by the rulers as they triumphantly proceed, tramping upon the prostrate bodies of the oppressed. “A historical materialist,” writes Benjamin, can only view these spoils “with cautious detachment. For in every case these treasures have a lineage which he cannot contemplate without horror…. The historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from this process of transmission as far as possible.” Like Benjamin and the angel, we would like to pause for a moment so fair, awaken the dead and piece together what has been smashed. But what blows us away from being able to do this is progress itself. It is as if the very passage of time, or more accurately the manner of its passage, has caught us up and distances us from the present moment itself. Indeed, if there is only ever one time, then there is also a manner or concept of time’s movement—progress—capable of blowing us away from being present in it.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

Investments into the resolutional question are an investment into state time that creates cruelly optimistic futures for queer folks that remain visible but always out of reach – their plastic integration of queerness through economic equality problematizes that the starting point for queerness is always located in a radical disjunction, and reform exists as an exhausting mechanism that only infuses state time into queer rhythm

Dillion 13 – Stephen, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Queer Studies at Hampshire College. “It’s here, it’s that time: Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in Born in Flames” – tishu

Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of the Women’s Army declare: “This is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish anti-blackness, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” and state time are two antagonistic temporalities of violence in the film. As James Scott argues, the modern state’s utopian aim is to reduce the disorderly and chaotic social order under its purview into a mirror of the administrative knowledge central to its observations and governance. The state works to produce temporal and spatial intelligibility with the goal of manufacturing the orderly administration and regulation of the nation’s population, resources, and infrastructure. By disrupting and dismantling spaces, populations, and epistemologies that are illegible to its regimes of knowing and governance, the modern state creates a utopia of visibility and legibility that is open to policing and control (Scott 1998, 82). The management of time is central to this process. “Our time” is what the state seeks to capture. In Born in Flames, state time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time” is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people” (Fanon 1963, 107). According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives (51). For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all (74). Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence. In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of queer futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the future. We can turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and the future. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

Legalism acts as a trojan horse that greases the wheels of moralism, all the while plastically integrating the “desirability” of queerness into civil society – however, the signifiers of queerness rupture the means of knowing and planning under White Linguistics. Thus, the starting point for analysis MUST originate from “problem bodies” rather than the nation-state

Gali 23 – Ali Murat JD, Queer, non-binary, organizer, “Crawling Out of Fear and the Ruins of an Empire: Queer, Black, and Native Intimacies, Laws of Creation and Futures of Care”, 2023 Yale J.L. & Feminism – tishu

Queerness is a generative desiring; it is an evoking of the playful, unpredictable, capacious possibilities of being in bodies, expressing selves, and exploring intimacies.1 In a society of definitive meanings, where identities signify specific and predictable positions, queerness insists on the incompleteness of any one structure of organizing individuals and relationships.2 While the social order is diluted by narratives instructing how relationships form, evolve, and get hierarchized, queer relationalities reject the simplicity of common-sense assumptions; in their place creating a playground of love, care, and dependencies. Against the fantasy of the monogamous couples and their biological families, for example, queer peoples have developed hand-made relational configurations. They intermingle friendships, families, lovers, and partners; they render these categories flexible and allow the individuals to give them meanings based on their unique patterns of connection, communication, and communion.3 Queer peoples have metamorphosed sensuality, from a private act of coupled [*178] intimacy, into what can pervade across social relations and positions.4 Intimacies take shape between individuals who may not know each other s names, and in public spaces where privacy is carved out; sensuality becomes a part of body language between those who may not engage in sexual acts it structures one s disposition and gendered presentation. Intimacies turn into enactments of losing and gaining control, which stretch the definitions and functions of bodies.5 As an invitation to creation, queerness places a fundamental contradiction within the law, which seeks to provide[] the context for ending the story successfully. 6 Whereas the legal order is built upon the premise that a truth is necessary for ordering society, and functions through centralizing that truth, queerness refuses to organize [ ] desire[ ] . . . [even] refusing to speak in a single voice. 7 The tension between the fluid and constructive tendencies of queer worldmaking, against the stabilizing and regulatory matrix of the legal order, offers a beginning point for this article.8 From within this incommensurability, I will pull forth a conversation on the meaning and ideal of equality, particularly as it shapes the relational order of the society implicating how individuals perceive themselves and one another. [*179] The law enshrines and entrenches a unified narrative, a singularized network of meanings, as shared principles of the society. This is an ideal of american citizenship,9 a socialized identity based upon overarching value structures and ethical principles, anticipated to override all particularities.10 Specifically in the context of rights and liberties, the law relies upon the centralized narrative of citizenship.11 To make a claim for equality, a minoritarian group must create an image of themselves employing these normalized conditions of the society. In other words, the group seeking equality must bring themselves in a continuous formation with the dominant narrative of american citizenship what cannot be captured in this linguistic simplification is buried under a political silence; it can only be an excess but it will not be operational in the structuring of reality.12 The construction of identity-based claims with a reliance on the shared values of citizenry represent a fantasy of equality as sameness pretending that [differences] [*180] can be translated with no damage to the structure of meaning underlying the disputes. 13 Under this hegemonic approach to equality, there is a singular truth, the truth of the dominant civil society, and all variances are narrative modifications that can expand, but never undo this truth.14 Even as the introductory remarks show, an understanding of equality that relies upon a singularized narrative cannot sustain the possibilities of existence generated among queer collectivities. Instead, in a queer world order, equality would require allowing difference to produce its own meanings. This is not denouncing the impacts of the social and collective; on the contrary, creation always begins from the vocabulary, grammar, networks, and ideas that populate the social imaginary.15 Yet, rather than taking the particular ordering of these facets as immutable or essentially desirable, queerness recognizes their historical specificity and malleability. In turn, individuals shift away from being passive observers or reproducers of the social order, and take the stance of being willful subjects, those who can claim an agency to shift the forms and concurrently the names given to their bodies, relationships, and the purpose of their lives.16 Queer worldmaking is an act of survival embedded in creation.17 Where the dominant order has shunned away, if not actively violated, the existence of queer peoples,18 finding new names for bodies, coming together in dependent [*181] relationships, and visioning other orders through playing with sensualities is an insistence upon remaining alive, declaring one s worth, and retaining hope for futures of freedom.19 With the centrality of survival to queerness in mind, the unified narrative of the law comes across as inherently violent to those whose being and loving stray away from its demands.20 While liberties may be extended to those priorly denied their rights, the existences which lose their essence when translated into the central narrative will remain at the fringes and continue to be dehumanized.21 Approaching this persistence of inequality is not an unavoidable reality of living in a constitutional polity, but a choice we make in how we think about and organize the law, this article seeks to create a critical inquisition into the centralized relational order, including its forms and specifically its guiding values. In subsequent parts, the article will attempt to tear away the layered, historicized, and cultural assumptions that persist the societal narrative through its tensions with queer desires and dreams, and by unearthing its violent implications on Black communities, and its entrenched roots in colonial dispossession of Native communities. Racialized violence persists across the everyday of the american citizenry.22 Racialized inequality is never separate from the constructions of deviance and abnormality, which most directly bring to mind gendered, sexualized, hence relational variations.23 For [*182] a constructive critique, this paper will tie racialized violence to the encounters and values guiding the nations formation and persistence, in which race has functioned as the baseline historical sign of injury and its reparation, which structures the condition of possibility for modern identities and rights.24 In addition to the analytic and political convergences of queer, Black, and Native histories, just as queer peoples, Black and Native peoples insist on their existence against a social that do not wish for them to survive. They have possessed and have continued to grow their own cultures, their own ways of existing together, which as I will come to argue, transgress the unified fiction upheld by the law. To this end, they offer knowledge, wisdom, and hope to reach beyond the stifling constitutional polity.25 Starting these conversations from a point of relationships is nurturing, because they are personal, as much as always political. We rely upon relationships for sustaining ourselves, building our lives, and reaching towards our dreams. How we come together in intimate relationships and passing connections is the backbone of the society. And where the law can be taken as the story the nation tells of itself, organization of relationships in light of these stories implicate where we think we stand and who we think we can become.26 There is thus a deep intimacy between the values guiding the legal order and those guiding our lives, and a central work of this article is to explore these values as means of understanding how their . In my analysis I will touch upon three layers of the relational order as responsive constructs: (i) forms, that is how we name our relationships and hierarchize them in a particular manner, (ii) values, that is the ethical and moral principles that reason the organization of relationships, and (iii) feelings, that [*183] is the emotional underpinnings that stabilize certain value structures as necessary or desirable for the continuity of the society. Seeing these layers will require bringing disjointed archives and scholarship together, and drawing connections that I will not claim to be the truth, but rather a possible reinvestigation of what we have learned to take for granted.27 My overarching aim is to reflect upon how a law that conditions equality upon sameness structures and is in turn sustained by the relational order. Through foregrounding relationships of queer, Black, and Native peoples, this paper will simultaneously explore the possibilities of queering the law. In particular, I would like to invite us to think whether changing feelings, values, and forms of relationships can foster the possibility of laws that encourage branching and multiplying the ordering principles of collective togetherness. With these ambitious and introductory goals, this paper will trail off as follows. Part I will unpack Lawrence and Obergefell to reveal the romanticized narratives that organize connection and intimacy in the broader society. I will focus on the private/public divide, as a fiction that is insistently deployed to establish the idealized relationships of marriage and family. Part II will carry the conversation into the layer of values, specifically thinking about privatization of dependencies as a national value that defines not only the american family, but also creates alienated publics. I will build these claims and explore their effects through centering the families and publics nurtured by Black peoples, which the dominant sociopolitical narratives mark as failures based on their difference from the national norm. To ground these assertions in a historical continuum, Part III will investigate the colonial moment and display how the settlers have deployed the forms of romanticized relationships as well as their accompanying value structures to justify destruction of Native cultures. This Part will further elaborate on the contemporary echoes of this colonial paradigm, ultimately asserting that the centralized relational order persists white supremacy. Collecting the tendrils of these conversations and focusing on how the regulatory force of the law has been justified across time and place, Part IV will elaborate on fear as a [*184] public feeling that urges preservation of the relational order and equality based upon sameness. Thinking together with the teachings of Black queer feminists and Native peoples, this Part will end with reflections to move away from fear and towards alternative configurations of laws, which do not homogenize into a singularized ideal, but instead encourage collective living, and make possible accountability and justice. At the heart of this work lies a desire to produce and promote hope. Particularly within a legal structure that insists upon the repetition of the same, this paper urges a remembering of our own power and creative capacities. To originate laws from our bodies, rather than a nation, is to be guided by these capacities that are already manifested in our loves, dependencies, and intimacies; foreshadowing societies structured not through exploitation, but trust and care

2023 Michigan Affirmative
1AC – Queer Worldmaking

Fiscal redistribution is built around questions of the heternormative nuclear family – divisions of labor and household configurations undergird the basis for wealth through a filtration of all those that love and be in the wrong way – analysis must start with the individual subject rather than institutions to build bottom up solutions that unleash beautiful resistances from the ground up.

Ellie Gore 22 – Lecturer in Global Political Economy at the University of Manchester, “Understanding Queer Oppression and Resistance in the Global Economy: Towards a Theoretical Framework for Political Economy”, New Political Economy, 27:2, 296-311, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2021.1952558 – tishu

The snapshots of contemporary queer struggle that opened this paper demonstrate two ostensibly simple points: firstly, that the state represents a key battleground for queer activists and movements around the world; and secondly, that macrolevel structures, processes, and practices have important implications for queer individuals’ lived experience, within and beyond their erotic/embodied lives. When I say within and beyond here, I mean that queer oppression is shaped by the interactions and interconnections between multiple axes of oppression—i.e. not exclusively sexual orientation or gender identity—and, moreover, that sexual injustices have material bases and drivers—i.e. not just cultural-symbolic ones. These insights are foundational to a political economy approach to queer struggle and, as such, provide the first two dimensions of my framework, which I summarise as: (1) an interest in the role of the state in shaping, regulating, and disciplining queer sexualities; (2) a structural rather than individually subjective orientation Underlying this first dimension is another foundational concept: the queer analytic of heteronormativity.2 Dimension 1 is thus intended to shed light into the role of sexuality—and specifically heterosexist norms—in maintaining and perpetuating particular economic structures and power relations within the historical and contemporary nation-state. It further illuminates—at an ideological level—how heteronormative logics work to legitimate and uphold culturally and historically-contingent divisions of labour and household configurations by grounding these in ideas of ‘universality’ (Sears 2017, p. 173). These questions of historicisation and spatialisation are important, since it is evident that capitalism does not, always and everywhere, depend on the heteronormative family unit. This is the case, for example, in some Global North contexts where significant sections of the population now ‘live through wage labor outside of heterosexual families’ (Fraser 1997, p. 272). Yet it is also evident that capitalist society continues to work through, promote, and perpetuate heteronormative family structures and the gender division of labour (albeit in shifting and transformative ways) across many other contexts, including parts of the Global South. This concern for heteronormativity and the state is informed by the ‘state-centric’ approach to queer sexuality and capitalism (Bergeron and Puri 2012, Lind 2012, Peterson 2017, 2020). In this vein, Suzanne Bergeron and Jyoti Puri (2012) call for scholars to theorise sexuality and (Marxist) political economy beyond reproductive and sexual labour (within the family) and in relation to the institutional, legal, and structural mechanisms through which hegemonic configurations of gender and sexuality are constructed and privileged. Peterson (2020) pushes this line of analysis further by setting out a ‘critical genealogy’ of state-making practices that centralises the regulation of the family. She notes that ‘unruly’ sexual relations represent both a political and economic problem, since they threaten the (literal) ‘reproduction of the state/nation’, as well as ways in which interconnecting hierarchies of race, gender, and class are legitimated and maintained, notably through inheritance and citizenship laws (Peterson 2020:190). This framing is useful in that it very clearly places queer sexuality—and the concept of heteronormativity—within the more conventional boundaries of political economy research. It also underlines why intersections of race, gender, class, and sexuality matter for understanding state formations across space and time. While much of the state-centric literature has focused on the Europe and North America, scholars such as Amy Lind (2009, 2012) have sought to unpack the relationship between state policies and heteronormativity in the Global South and to identify the linkages between North–South geopolitical spheres as produced through neoliberal development reforms and actors such as the World Bank (see also Bedford 2005, 2009). In addition to a state and structural orientation, this suggests another key dimension of a political economy approach to queer struggle: (3) a focus on the relationship between heteronormativity and capitalism across different scales and modes of governance. This dimension offers a means to explore the structural linkages and interplays between global capitalism and dominant sex/gender regimes—and how these unfold in concrete, material (and corporeal) ways—not just in relation to nation-states, but in relation to the ‘layers of institutions that are involved in defining and regulating our intimate lives’ (Lind 2009:35). Put otherwise, dimension 3 facilitates analysis of the materiality of queer sexuality as it is grounded and reproduced across multiple sites and scales, and through different modes of global (and local) governance. This includes inter- and surpa-national organisations, international financial institutions, development agencies, and NGOs. Although Peterson’s (1999, 2017, 2020) work also focuses on heteronormativity and the state, she uses queer theory in a more integrative fashion to push feminist scholars beyond binary ways of thinking about men and women in the global economy (Peterson 2002, 2003). In this articulation, the queer concern for deconstructing binaries and unsettling stable or taken-for-granted concepts is applied to both the gender binary and fixed categorisations of sexual orientation, and to other boundaries and dichotomies, such as ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’, ‘public and ‘private’. Given the synergies between the queer project of unsettling binaries and wider feminist critiques of ‘masculinist/modernist dualisms’ (Peterson 2005, p. 507), I do not consider this to be essential to understanding queer struggle, per se, but more a cross-cutting concern within feminist and queer political. economy. Similarly, while I am not specifically including a dimension on the relationality and multiplicity of oppressions, frequently conceptualised as ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw 1991), I see this as fundamental to a feminist political economy approach. As such, it is threaded throughout this paper’s theoretical discussion, framework, and analysis. Furthermore, I address the importance of understanding intersecting or, more specifically, co-constituting social relations—race, class, gender, sexuality—within the global economy in detail in my discussion of dimension 5. The state-centric literature has moved forward understandings of queer sexuality and capitalism in a number of valuable ways, notably by: incorporating the queer analytic of heteronormativity into political economy analyses; illuminating the key regulatory and coercive powers of the state vis-à-vis intimate and family relations; and interrogating how heteronormativity links to the cultural, legal, and the economic. However, rarely has this literature extended beyond analysis of the (re)production of heterosexist family and gender norms and models—typically construed as heterosexual couples living in male-breadwinner households with children—to connect these structures and dynamics to the actual lived experience of queer individuals in different settings. In other words, it frequently notes who is excluded—queer, transgender, and gender non-conforming individuals and couples, other queer configurations of love, desire, family, corporeality etc—but does not provide empirical insight into the lives of these excluded populations themselves (or into the forms of resistance they take up). As such, there is a way in which existing approaches to the study of queer sexuality in/and the state risk reproducing some of the same occlusions and oversights they seek to disrupt. This suggests a fourth key dimension in my theoretical framework: (4) a concern for the everyday political economies of queer lives and resistance. I am informed here by the turn to the everyday in feminist IPE (Elias and Roberts 2016, Elias and Rethel 2018), as well as longstanding feminist work that documents the gendered character of global economic processes and their implications for women’s everyday productive and reproductive lives. The point here is not simply that the ‘global’ affects the ‘local’, the ‘macro’ affects the ‘micro’, but that non-elite and, importantly, non-Western actors’ engagements with, and articulations of, everyday political economic processes may both reproduce and resist broader patterns of global economic transformation. Given the resonance of concepts of resistance within queer studies (Warner 1991:16), this seems an apt formulation for a political economy approach to queer struggle. Thus, while heteronormativity remains critical as an organising analytic for studying queer sexualities within political economy, this should be conceptualised to include more quotidian microlevel practices, formations, and relations (i.e. in addition to the state and supra-state levels), as well as the acts and modalities of resistance that challenge them (i.e. in addition to mainstream social movements).

Gali 23 – Ali Murat JD, Queer, non-binary, organizer, “Crawling Out of Fear and the Ruins of an Empire: Queer, Black, and Native Intimacies, Laws of Creation and Futures of Care”, 2023 Yale J.L. & Feminism – tishu

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › AT: EU Failed/Defection

Unique EU circumstances don’t apply- multiple solutions to US defection

Saez and Zucman, PhDs, 20

(Emmanuel, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California, Berkeley and Gabriel, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/emmanuel-saez-gabriel-zucman-final-response/ , 4-8)

The main reason why a number of European countries abolished their wealth tax is that they gave up on attempting to address international tax competition. There’s no EU-wide wealth tax, and EU member states don’t tax expatriates. A wealthy Swedish resident could avoid the Swedish wealth tax by relocating to Switzerland—it was child’s play. The international mobility of wealthy individuals would not be a concern for a U.S. wealth tax, because U.S. citizens are taxable in the United States no matter where they live. Karl Smith and Dean Baker worry that wealthy Americans would renounce citizenship should a wealth tax be implemented. But this risk can be avoided. A steep exit tax could be applied at the time of citizenship renunciation; the Warren wealth tax, for example, includes a 40 percent exit tax on net wealth. Other mechanisms could be considered. For instance, the United States could continue taxing billionaires even after they renounce U.S. citizenship. To a large extent, all large fortunes are social creations: U.S. billionaires have benefitted from U.S. markets, U.S. workers, the U.S. legal system, U.S. public infrastructure, and so on. It would be legitimate for the United States to keep taxing billionaires who built their wealth while living in the United States, even after they’ve renounced U.S. citizenship.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 2AC Workability

Critics of wealth tax are bad faith exaggerations-market valuation and in kind payment fixes every problem

Saez and Zucman, PhDs, 20

(Emmanuel, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California, Berkeley and Gabriel, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/gabriel-zucman-taxing-superrich/ , 3-17)

A progressive wealth tax is possible because wealth is well defined at the very top, in contrast to realized income, which can be artificially reduced. Wealth is defined as the market value of one’s assets net of all debts. The taxable income Buffett reports to the Internal Revenue Service is a tiny amount of his true economic income; he is worth more than $50 billion. With a wealth tax at a rate of 3 percent for fortunes above $1 billion, Buffett would pay more than $1.5 billion a year.Not all forms of wealth are as easy to value as Buffett’s shares in Berkshire Hathaway, and this has been a concern for critics of a wealth tax who believe it would be impossible to implement fairly. (A publicly traded company such as Berkshire Hathaway has a well-defined market value; because Buffett’s wealth is fully invested in Berkshire Hathaway shares, it is easy to tax him. But the affluent can also own shares in unlisted (also called private or closely held) businesses. Other forms of wealth—such as art or jewelry—are sometimes hard to value, too. But these concerns—as well as the claim that wealth taxation failed in many European states, so they must fail here—are often exaggerated. The valuation problems can be addressed, if there is political will to address them. Here’s how. Modern capitalist economies such as the United States have well defined property rights and put value on most assets. Around 70 percent of the wealth owned by the top 0.1 percent richest Americans consists of listed equities, bonds, shares in collective investment funds, real estate, and other assets with easily accessible market values. For the remaining 30 percent—mostly shares in private businesses—valuation raises fewer problems than you might think. In the first place, shares in large private businesses—though not publicly listed—are regularly bought and sold. Even before Lyft and Uber went public in 2019, for instance, people could invest in the ride-sharing service companies. Private companies regularly issue new stock to banks, venture capitalists, wealthy individuals, and other “accredited investors” with sufficiently deep pockets. These transactions put a de facto value on private firms. In some cases, however, no transactions take place for years, especially for mature private businesses controlled by a small number of owners. For example, 90 percent of the agribusiness giant Cargill, the largest private company in the United States, is owned by 125 or so members of the Cargill and MacMillan families. Cargill shares were last transacted in 1992, when 17 percent of the company’s shares were sold for $700 million—thus valuing the entire firm at a bit more than $4 billion. Here is a striking case where taxing wealth might seem hopeless. What is the value of Cargill today, almost thirty years after this last share transaction? Isn’t any estimate fraught with countless risks of abuse? But in fact, taxing the Cargills and the MacMillans equitably is not impossible. To start with, the tax administration can take the 1992 Cargill valuation and update it based on any changes in the company’s profits since then. If the company makes three times more profits today, it is not unreasonable to believe it is worth about three times as much as in 1992. Of course, much more information ought to inform a reliable valuation. What sort of information? Data about Cargill’s direct competitors that are listed as public companies, such as Archer Daniels Midland and Bunge, for example. To better assess Cargill, the IRS can consider how much a dollar of earnings made by these firms is valued by the stock market. It can study how the price-to-earnings ratios of Archer Daniels Midland and Bunge have changed since 1992. Every day, hundreds of financial analysts value private firms in this, and more complex, ways. The United States, with its sophisticated financial markets, has no shortage of expertise in this area. Drawing on standard private sector practices, it would not be terribly complicated for the IRS to come up with a reasonable estimate of Cargill’s market value at the end of each year. But suppose that the MacMillans and Cargills feel cheated by the IRS—they complain that the IRS, out of an interest in generating tax revenue, over-estimates the value of their firm. Perhaps Cargill has fundamentally changed since 1992, in ways that state-of-the-art valuation techniques may fail to capture. Perhaps it has weaknesses that its competitors do not share. What is to be done? The heart of the problem is a missing market: while there is an active, liquid market for Archer Daniels Midland and Bunge shares, no such market exists for Cargill’s stock. The solution to this problem, in our view, is for the government to step in and create the market that is missing. The IRS would give the option to Cargill’s shareholders to pay the wealth tax in kind—with Cargill shares—rather than in cash. If they used this option (which they would do only if they believed the IRS valuation was exaggerated), the tax authority would then sell the shares to the highest bidders on a market open to any and all bidders—venture capitalists, private equity funds, foundations, or other rich families interested in acquiring a stake in the agribusiness giant. This solution addresses the challenge head on. Just as a well-functioning income tax should treat all income equally, a good wealth tax should treat all assets in the same way, at their current market value. If some values are missing, the solution is to create them. And there is nothing better to create a market value than, well, to create a market. For a wealth tax imposed at an average rate of 2 percent, Cargill’s shareholders would hand in 2 percent of their shares each year (or the cash equivalent, if they prefer to retain full control of the company). As with Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, there would be no getting away. Transforming Cargill’s shares into cash would be the government’s job. This solution also addresses another frequent objection to wealth taxation—the problem of liquidity. Very rich people may have a lot of wealth and yet not enough income to pay their tax bills. Isn’t it unfair to force them to pay a tax when they don’t have cash in hand? To be frank, liquidity concerns are often put forward in bad faith. The claim that people worth hundreds of millions of dollars may not have enough cash to pay a million dollars in tax does not often withstand scrutiny. If ultrarich individuals say they have little cash, it is usually because they choose to realize little income to avoid the income tax. They organize their own illiquidity. But suppose the liquidity problems are real. The most relevant case might be a highly valued startup that makes no profit. Generating cash each year may turn out to be complicated or costly for anyone whose primary source of wealth is shares in the company, since young firms typically do not pay dividends. In that case, allowing taxpayers to pay in kind—with shares of the companies—addresses the problem. Because the wealth of the rich mostly consists of equity, and equity (in contrast to real estate) can always be divided, it can be used to pay for the tax. If the wealth tax can be paid with assets rather than cash, a progressive wealth tax isn’t harder to implement in practice than a progressive income tax. The middle class already pays taxes on its wealth, in the form of property taxes. The wealthy don’t, since most of their wealth consists of financial assets, which are exempt from the property tax. In the nineteenth century, by contrast, the property taxes of most states fell on all assets, both real and financial. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States pioneered the progressive taxation of property with its federal estate tax—now moribund. Before turning its back on this distinguished tradition, the United States was at the forefront of the democratic regulation of property via the tax system.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 2AC K of Wealth Tax

“Wealth tax” is not a small scale reform-its part of a larger assault on inequality

Saez and Zucman, PhDs, 20

(Emmanuel, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California, Berkeley and Gabriel, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/emmanuel-saez-gabriel-zucman-final-response/ , 4-8)

In the twentieth century, the United States pioneered the sharply progressive, quasi-confiscatory taxation of high incomes. From 1930 to 1980, the top marginal income tax rate averaged 78 percent; it exceeded 90 percent in the 1950s and early 1960s. The goal of this policy was not to generate government revenues. It was to reduce the concentration of pre-tax income. It was to change how markets work: to discourage the various forms of rent extraction that are associated with unfettered markets and to suppress the incentives for corporate executives, for instance, to pay themselves sky-high salaries. Dean Baker worries that a wealth tax would not change the way that markets work—that it would not affect the distribution of market income. In fact, we view the wealth tax as a way to reconnect with and modernize the U.S. tradition of using the tax system to regulate markets and reduce pre-tax inequality. Wealth is power: the power to influence markets, government policies, the political process, the prevailing ideology. Reducing wealth inequality would reduce the concentration of power. It would contribute to equalizing economic and political power, which would contribute to more equal market outcomes. A wealth tax, if progressive enough, would be much more than yet another tax-and-spend policy. From that perspective, we fully agree with the insightful responses by Bryce Covert, Martin O’Neill, Stuart White, and Felicia Wong, who all stress the need to go beyond ex post redistribution and stress how the wealth tax could contribute to that goal. Of course, a wealth tax is not enough. It would not, by itself, address the rise of inequality. Many other policies—such as patent regulation, worker representation on company boards, a more equal access to higher education, and campaign finance reform, among others—have a critical role to play to equalize market outcomes. The wealth tax is not a silver bullet; it is only part of the policy response. But we believe it is an important part, because it targets the stock of wealth directly—and is thus the powerful fiscal tool that governments have at their disposal.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 2AC Democracy

Inequality crushes democracy- progressive wealth tax is key to restore the balance

Saez and Zucman, PhDs, 20

(Emmanuel, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California, Berkeley and Gabriel, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/gabriel-zucman-taxing-superrich/ , 3-17)

Much has been written about the dramatic increase in income and wealth inequality in the United States over the last four decades. This volume of literature not only warns about the injustice of our current system, but also raises alarm that extreme inequality poses a serious risk to our democracy. Concern about inequality is at least as old as the United States itself. Writing in 1792 about the necessity and dangers of political parties, James Madison made the connection between excessive wealth and its political influence: The great object should be to combat the evil: 1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort. Excessive wealth concentration, in Madison’s view, was as poisonous for democracy as war. “In war,” he continued, “the discretionary power of the executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied. . . . The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes.” Wealth is power. An extreme concentration of wealth means an extreme concentration of power: the power to influence government policy, the power to stifle competition, the power to shape ideology. Together, these amount to the power to tilt the distribution of income to one’s advantage. This is the core reason why the extreme wealth of some can reduce what remains for the rest—why part of the income of today’s superrich can be earned at the expense of the rest of society. That’s what earned John Astor, Andrew Carnegie, John Rockefeller, and other Gilded Age industrialists their epithet of “Robber Barons.” An extreme concentration of wealth means an extreme concentration of power: the power to influence government policy, the power to stifle competition, the power to shape ideology. In much of the twentieth century, the U.S. tax system protected against such extreme disparities. But far from curbing this trend, the tax system in the last four decades has instead reinforced it. The three traditional progressive taxes—the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, and the estate tax—have all weakened. The top marginal federal income tax rate has fallen dramatically, from more than 70 percent every year between 1936 and 1980—in fact, often higher, peaking at 94 percent during the final years of World War II—to 37 percent in 2018. (The income threshold at which this rate kicked was several million of today’s dollars.) Corporate taxes—which are progressive in the sense that they tax corporate profits, a highly concentrated source of income—have declined from about 50 percent in the 1950s and 1960s to 16 percent in 2019. And estate taxes on large bequests are now almost negligible due to a high exemption threshold, many deductions, and weak enforcement. A renewed political demand calls for progressive taxation to reverse these trends—to achieve greater tax justice, raise revenue to pay for important public goods, and curb the rise of inequality. Indeed, two major presidential candidates have proposed wealth taxes. In January 2019 Elizabeth Warren proposed a progressive wealth tax on families or individuals with net worth above $50 million with a 2 percent marginal tax rate and 3 percent above $1 billion (she revised that to 6 percent rate for billionaires in the fall). And in September 2019 Bernie Sanders proposed a similar wealth tax starting at $32 million with a 1 percent marginal tax rate, rising to 5 percent for billionaires and 8 percent for deca-billionaires. The key difference between these proposals and earlier proposals, for instance the one made by Edward Wolff in these pages (as well as existing or past wealth taxes in other countries), is the high exemption thresholds: fewer than 0.1 percent of U.S. families would be liable for the Warren or Sanders wealth tax. Both presidential candidates rightly believe that a wealth tax of the sort they have proposed would fill a critical gap in the U.S. tax system: it would ensure greater tax justice by requiring that the ultra-wealthy pay taxes commensurate with their ability to pay. But in the long run, an ambitious wealth tax—with marginal tax rates high enough for billionaires—could also help address the threat that extreme inequality poses for democracy.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 2AC Taxes Top level- GG

Critics of wealth tax rely on outdated economic models -the risk of the disad starts at ZERO and goes down from there

Bivens, PhD, 19

(Josh, ChiefEconomist@EconomicPolicyInstitute, https://www.epi.org/blog/analyses-claiming-that-taxes-on-millionaires-and-billionaires-will-slow-economic-growth-are-fundamentally-flawed/, 11-21)

In recent weeks, a number of policy analyses of progressive economic policies—a surtax on high-incomes, a wealth tax, and Social Security expansion—have claimed these policies would damage economic growth. Policymakers should give these analyses very little weight in debates about these issues, for a number of reasons. First, and most important, is the fact that all of these analyses are grounded in an economic view of the world that sees growth as constrained by the economy’s productive capacity (or the supply side of the economy) and not by the spending of households, businesses and government (the economy’s demand side). These estimates have other problems too—they are not even particularly convincing supply-side estimates and even if the economy’s growth really was constrained by supply, these estimates would still be misleading about the effects of these policies on welfare. But the biggest reason why policymakers should give these analyses zero weight is because they assume that growth is almost never demand-constrained. Before the Great Recession, the assumption that growth was nearly always supply constrained was almost universally held by economists and macroeconomic policymakers. It was recognized that demand (or aggregate spending) could occasionally be too weak to fully employ the economy’s productive capacity and hence cause rising unemployment, but it was generally thought that such periods were rare and would end quickly after the Federal Reserve sensibly cut interest rates. Because shortfalls of demand relative to supply were rare and short and easy to fix, the reasoning went, any real constraint on the economy’s growth over the long-run must be the pace of growth of supply. Growth in supply is generally driven by growth in the quality of the workforce, the productive stock of plants, equipment and research, and growth in technological progress, which together lead to growing productivity—or the amount of income or output generated in an average hour of work. The assumption that supply constraints are much more likely to bind overall growth than demand constraints drove almost all macroeconomic policymaking in the decades before the Great Recession. For example, the Federal Reserve for decades feared lower unemployment far more than lower inflation. Lower unemployment was a signal that demand was rising relative to supply, and if one thinks growth was generally supply-constrained, this meant that demand growth would quickly outstrip supply growth and lead to rising inflation. Lower inflation, conversely, meant that supply growth was outpacing demand growth—but that was always a temporary and easy-to-fix condition. The decades-long bipartisan overreaction to rising federal budget deficits is also a byproduct of assuming the economy’s growth is supply constrained. Deficits boost demand growth. If one assumes that demand is generally marching in lock-step with supply, then larger deficits that boost demand imply that supply constraints will soon bind and cause inflation (or interest rate increases). Smaller deficits, conversely, reduce demand growth. But if the danger of demand growth slowing too much is low and easy-to-fix, then that’s not a problem. The experience of the last decade has done much to shake this belief that demand-constrained growth is nothing to worry about and that supply-constrained growth should be the default presumption for policy analysis. For example, the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates to spur demand growth three times in the past six months with unemployment below 3.8 percent. They certainly seem to be acting (correctly) as if demand-constrained growth is a real problem. Prominent macroeconomists and former policymakers like Olivier Blanchard, Jason Furman, and Lawrence Summers have all written in recent months that efforts to close budget deficits should not be a high policy priority, largely because there is no evidence that supply constraints are binding. These reversals of policy presumption are evidence-based and admirable. Yet the decades-long inertia of policy evaluation done in a framework of supply-constrained growth is hard to stop—and so we have the recent parade of analyses claiming that a number of progressive initiatives will slow the economy by dragging on supply side growth. The Tax Foundation, for example, has estimated that a ten percentage point surcharge on incomes over $2 million—a change that would only affect the highest-income 0.1 percent of households—will slow growth enough to cost 118,000 jobs by the end of the decade. A still-preliminary analysis of presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax—a change that would affect only the wealthiest 0.1 percent of households—was estimated by the Penn-Wharton Budget Model team to slow growth by more than 0.2 percentage points each year over the next decade. The Penn-Wharton Budget Model project’s assessment of a plan by Representative John Larson (D-Conn. ) to expand Social Security benefits was analyzed by my colleague Monique Morrissey previously, so I will largely leave that aside in this post. Each of these results is driven entirely by the assumption that growth is supply-constrained. In the case of both the high-income surcharge and the wealth tax, the taxes are assumed to reduce labor supply and savings (which raises the “user cost of capital” and hence leads to reduced investment). But over the past decade, there is no evidence that labor supply has been a constraint on growth. Unemployment rates fell steadily in the years between 2010 and 2018. Even as the decline in unemployment moderated over the past year, labor force participation rose smartly. Additionally, the share of prime-age adults with jobs remains below its 2000 level—and there’s no particular reason to be sure that 2000 level is a hard upper bound. The clearest sign that availability of labor has become a supply-side constraint would be rapid wage growth— and that has certainly not happened. There is even less evidence that insufficient savings or a high user cost of capital have been constraints on growth of the capital stock or will become constraints anytime soon. Interest rates—the simplest proxy for the scarcity of savings and high user costs of capital – have been severely depressed for years, and interest rate projections have overestimated their growth since the late 1990s. Corporate profitability has been extraordinarily high over the 2000s, even as investment has been weak.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 1AC Radical Wealth Tax Solvency

A wealth tax is crucial to resolving a laundry list of impacts- newest evidence shows critics are wrong

Malleson, PhD, 5-14-23

( Tom, SocialJustice&PeaceStudies@Western,https://theconversation.com/taxing-the-wealthy-to-the-hilt-would-make-us-all-much-better-off-203814 )

Though most people naturally dislike inequality, it’s often argued that raising taxes on the rich will do more harm than good by damaging incentives and investment, thereby slowing economic growth and ultimately hurting us all. “Given five fat sheep and ninety-five thin, how [to] induce the ninety-five to resign to the five the richest pasture and shadiest corners?” the famous British philosopher R.H. Tawney once asked. He continued: “By convincing them, obviously, that, if they do not, they will die of rot, be eaten by wolves, and be deprived in the meantime of such pasture as they have. Nor, indeed, hitherto has it been difficult to convince them, for there is nothing which frightens thin sheep like the fear of being thinner.” But is it really true that high taxes — even very high ones — are detrimental to societal well-being? The last few years have witnessed an explosion of new evidence from economists, sociologists, political scientists and ecologists that suggests they’re not. Exaggerated concerns It’s accurate that high taxes on the wealthy bring real risks. But in general, the downsides are highly overblown. For instance, a common worry is that rich people will respond to high taxes by working less. But there’s essentially zero empirical support for this claim. In fact, there is now close to consensus among researchers that while the rich do frequently try to avoid taxes, they don’t do so by working less. The most serious potential cost of high taxes is the reduction of private investment. This is definitely possible. But the key point to keep in mind is that such a reduction is only half the picture. It’s wrong to think of taxes as simply reducing investment, because states do not simply collect taxes — they also spend them. Therefore it’s more accurate to regard taxes not as reducing investment but as rearranging it — from the private sector to the public. Whether this is a good or bad thing depends entirely on the details. In many cases, levying high taxes on the rich will mean money is no longer invested in foreign stock markets or spent on unproductive things like private jets and multiple mansions, but is rather spent on productivity-enhancing entities like schools, hospitals, roads, public research grants and so on. Indeed, critical research shows that, all things considered, high inequality actually tends to reduce an economy’s overall growth rate. The most sensible and cautious conclusion is that high taxes — very high taxes, in particular — could somewhat reduce economic growth, but these costs are likely to be only mild or moderate. What about the other side of the ledger? What are the social and economic benefits from high taxes and reduced inequality? In my book Against Inequality: The Practical and Ethical Case for Abolishing the Superrich, I note that five stand out: 1. The environment It’s well-known that the rich emit far more carbon than the rest of us. The wealthiest 20 people in the world emit 8,000 times more carbon than the poorest billion people on Earth combined. So imposing high taxes on the rich would be doubly effective from an environmental perspective. It would directly reduce the copious emissions of the rich. And it would provide the necessary resources to build the new low-carbon infrastructure — including public transit, green energy grids, etc. — that we desperately need. That would indirectly help the rest of us reduce our emissions too. 2. Our democracy The evidence is overwhelming that inequality erodes democracy. For instance, American scholars Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page examined 1,779 public policy debates between 1981 and 2002 to see whose voices actually mattered in deciding important issues. They found that: “The majority does not rule — at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose.” Such evidence demonstrates that significant inequality can actually break a democracy, transforming it into oligarchy, as has arguably already transpired in the United States. 3. Opportunity for all Inequality makes a mockery of the cherished aspiration of equal opportunity. To take one particularly egregious example, the poorest residents of Chicago today face a life expectancy 30 years shorter than their richer neighbours down the street. High redistributive taxes could reverse this most brutal of disparities. We also know that countries with more equality tend to have greater social mobility too. Richard Wilkinson, the famous British epidemiologist and inequalities scholar, likes to quip that if Americans want to live the American dream and not just dream it, they should move to high-tax Denmark. 4. Reduced xenophobia and racism Though right-wing populism has many complex causes, research clearly demonstrates that one of its main drivers is economic insecurity. That’s likely because insecurity increases fear that one’s already precarious position will be worsened by competition from “immigrants” and “others.” The evidence shows that right-wing populism can be effectively reduced by enhancing economic security — for instance by taxing the rich to fund free public services — a stronger safety net and perhaps even a guaranteed basic income. As neo-Nazis once again march in the streets, hate crimes rise, far-right political parties receive more public support than any time since the 1930s, the benefits of reducing such terrifying threats are hard to overstate. 5. Reduced social friction Reducing inequality also builds community health and cohesion. It encourages greater levels of agreeableness and tolerance, better mental health and reduces crime. All in all, the costs of high taxes and low inequality are likely to be only moderate. But the benefits are truly enormous — a different order of magnitude entirely.

2023 Michigan Affirmative
Wealth Tax Aff › 1AC Radical Wealth Tax Solvency

A radical wealth tax is crucial to resist oligarchy and sustain democracy-they don’t just fight inequality they deconcentrate wealth

Saez and Zucman, PhDs, 20

(Emmanuel, E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Equitable Growth at the University of California, Berkeley and Gabriel, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley https://www.bostonreview.net/forum/gabriel-zucman-taxing-superrich/ , 3-17)

From 1930 to 1980 the top marginal income tax rate in the United States averaged 78 percent; it exceeded 90 percent from 1951 to 1963. These quasi-confiscatory top rates championed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his successors in office were meant to reduce the income of the superrich: not simply to achieve tax justice, but to compress the income distribution. These tax rates applied to extraordinarily high incomes only, the equivalent of more than several million dollars today; only the ultrarich were subjected to them. In 1960, for example, the top marginal tax rate of 91 percent started kicked in at an income threshold that was nearly 100 times the average national income per adult, the equivalent of $6.7 million in income today. The merely rich—high-earning professionals, medium-size company executives, people with incomes in the hundreds of thousands in today’s dollars—were taxed at marginal rates in a range of 25 percent to 50 percent, in line with what is typical nowadays (for instance, in states such as California and New York, when you count state income taxes).According to the evidence, the policy of quasi-confiscatory tax rates for sky-high incomes achieved its objective. From the late 1930s to the early 1970s, income inequality fell. The share of pre-tax national income earned by the top 1 percent was reduced by a factor of two, from close to 20 percent on the eve of World War II to barely more than 10 percent in the early 1970s. In 1960, for example, only 306 families earned more than $6.7 million in taxable income a year (the threshold above which income was imposed at 91 percent). This tax policy reflected the view that extreme inequality hurts the community; that the economy works better when rent extraction is discouraged (indeed, the economy grew strongly in the mid twentieth century); and that unfettered markets lead to a concentration of wealth that threatens our democratic and meritocratic ideals. Extreme wealth concentration, like carbon emissions, imposes a negative externality on the rest of us. The point of taxing carbon is not to raise revenue but to reduce carbon emissions. And the point of high tax rates on the very highest incomes is not fundamentally to fund government programs. They are aimed at reducing the income of the ultra-wealthy. The reason for reducing those incomes is not, as critics sometimes say, to give vent to envy. It is to disrupt privilege, impede rent extraction, and protect democracy. When 90 cents out of any extra dollar earner will go to the IRS, we will disincentivize negotiating a $20 million salary, earning millions by creating a zero-sum financial product, and spiking the price of patented drugs. Quasi-confiscatory tax rates equalize the distribution of pre-tax income, make the market place more competitive, and limit the concentrations of economic power that pave the way for undemocratic concentrations of political power. To see how wealth taxation might work to reduce such concentrations of wealth and power, let’s contrast a moderate with a radical wealth tax. A moderate wealth tax, say with marginal tax rates of 2 percent above $50 million and 3 percent above $1 billion, would generate a lot of revenue—about 1 percent of GDP each year, according to our estimates. Consider now a more radical wealth tax with a marginal tax rate of 10 percent above $1 billion. A person with $1 billion in wealth would pay the same $19 million as under a moderate wealth tax. A radical wealth tax would not make it harder to become a billionaire; it would make it harder to remain a multi-billionaire. A person with $2 billion would pay almost 5 percent a year, a decabillionaire such as David Geffen 9 percent, and a centibillionaire such as Bezos 10 percent (instead of 3 percent with a moderate wealth tax). Just as Roosevelt’s 90 percent top marginal income tax sharply reduced the number of families earning more than $10 million of today’s dollars, a radical wealth tax would eventually lead to a reduction in the number of multi-billionaires. More than collecting revenue, it would de-concentrate wealth. There would still be multibillionaires, no doubt. If a wealth tax of this higher sort had been in place over the last decades, Zuckerberg would still be worth $21 billion in 2018—instead of the $61 billion recorded by Forbes. Why? Because Zuckerberg’s wealth has grown at a rate of 40 percent a year since 2008 when he first became a billionaire. A 10 percent annual wealth tax would not have stopped his stratospheric ascent. But a more mature billionaire such as Bill Gates would be worth “only” $4 billion—instead of $97 billion in 2018—because he has been a billionaire for over three decades now, giving the radical tax more time to reduce his wealth. If a radical wealth tax had been in place since 1982, most of the 400 richest Americans would still be billionaires in 2018, but they would be only one third as wealthy as they currently are (see graph 1). Their share of U.S. wealth would be similar to what it was back in 1982, before the wealth inequality took off. A radical wealth tax would have raised $250 billion in revenue from the 400 richest Americans alone in 2018. That is more than 1 percent of GDP. But if such a tax had been in place since 1982, it would have only raised $66 billion from the 400 wealthiest families in 2018, while a moderate wealth tax, despite its much lower rate, would have yielded almost as much—about $50 billion. In the long run, a radical wealth tax erodes top fortunes so much that it reduces the taxes paid by the ultrarich. Is a radical wealth tax worth it, then? Would society benefit from curbing huge fortunes, even if it means lower tax collection at the top end? Over the years, our own thinking about this question has evolved as the stagnation of working-class income, the boom in extreme wealth, and the threats to democracy became clearer. Perhaps yours will too.