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Regarding the language of the delegation, one critical issue in these cases is how a judge interprets the rule subdelegating authority: did the delegator intend to divest themselves of that authority? Indeed, to ensure that an agency abides by its own rules under Accardi, the court has to interpret those rules.93 Sometimes delegators are explicit about this intent. For example, one subdelegation from the Secretary of Commerce to the Director of the Census Bureau regarding population tabulations made clear that “[t]he determination of the Director of the Census shall not be subject to review, reconsideration, or reversal by the Secretary of Commerce.” 94 In other words, the delegator expressly stated that she would not disturb the decision of the delegatee. Another common formulation of this intent to divest authority is when the subdelegation makes clear that the delegatee’s decision will be “final.” Under these circumstances, a court will likely invoke Accardi against a Secretary who seeks to later reverse the Census Director’s decision.

It also should be noted that the different PBM activities serve different groups of audiences and purposes. For example, although the budgetary planning module should be done primarily by the budget office and financial analysts, dialogue about fiscal constraints and the implications of budgetary planning for the departmental (Macro budget planning) (Micro budget planning) Budgetary Planning - Develop annual and multiyear budget forecasts - Assess short-term and long-term liabilities -Develop spending targets for discretionary and nondiscretionary spending - Develop spending targets for departments and cross-departmental programs Policy Planning - Identify policy priorities with the leadership and key stakeholders - Develop cross-departmental and departmental action plans for key policy priorities - Develop annual and multiyear performance goals - Develop key performance goals and outcome indicators for key policy priorities Sound revenue administration, reliable accounting and financial management systems, effective financial control Sound data quality management, reasonable capacity for evaluation and performance measurement, effective stakeholder engagement Departmental Budget Cycle - Identify departmental priorities and develop departmental action plans - Develop the annual budget requests and justifications - Monitor operational, capital, and program spending progress and results of departments Program Budget Cycle - Identify cross-departmental and subdepartmental program priorities and develop program strategic plans - Develop annual budget requests and justifications - Monitor program spending process and results Spending Review and Performance Audit - Review departmental and program performance measurement results - Identify deficiencies, vulnerabilities, and risks - Recommend remedial and improvement actions Figure 2 A System of Performance Budget Management 754 Public Administration Review • September | October 2018 budget cycle should involve the executive leadership, members of the legislative appropriation and authorization committees, and departmental leadership. In addition, policy planning activities should involve both executive and legislative leadership as well as key external stakeholders and constituency groups, members of the legislative authorization committee, and even the auditor’s office. It is particularly important that dialogues about the implications of policy and budgetary planning on the program budget cycle should engage representatives of the public and service users so that a citizen perspective can be integrated into program performance budgets. An example is the City of San Jose, California, which divides up all city spending and programs into six crossdepartmental service areas: community and economic development, environment and utility services, neighborhood services, public safety, transportation and aviation services, and strategic support (City of San Jose 2016). Under each area, the city has strategic priorities, performance goals, program budgets, and budget strategies, and these priorities and strategies are developed through an extensive engagement process with the citizenry, community stakeholders, the mayor and the city council, the city manager’s office, and the budget staff (see figure 4). The city budget also includes specific recommendations from the city auditor’s office that have funding impacts and shows to the public and policy makers how the proposed budget will address the concerns raised and hold departments accountable for improvement and results (City of San Jose 2016, attachment C). Because PBM activities serve the needs of different stakeholders, performance reporting should be user-friendly and customized to their respective needs. For example, budget offices may explore the use of multiple reporting platforms, from print reports, websites, and social media tools to mobile phone apps. Many U.S. cities, such as Boston, Detroit, Denver, and New York, are using government websites and smartphone apps to let citizens submit complaints and track the performance of city services (Ho and McCall 2016). Many also provide citizen-friendly financial and performance reports that are shorter, more readable, and outcome driven (Yusuf et al. 2013). A big, single report that tries to present all performance results to all users and stakeholders is no longer an acceptable reporting strategy given today’s technological and media environments. The coexistence of these mutually supporting PBM activities also implies that performance budgeting is a multifaceted and complex organizational phenomenon (Schick 2014). Even when one activity, such as the legislative use of performance goals and outcome information in budgetary decision making, is disappointing, other activities, such as multiyear strategic planning and the effort to strengthen budget communication and performance-oriented dialogue, may contribute positively to the results of budget execution (Dull 2006; Heinrich 2012; Lee 1997; Melkers and Willoughby 2005; Willoughby 2004).

Support for a universal basic income is one of the key political puzzles of our time. This once utopian idea, mainly advocated by philosophers and writers, is now an increasingly viable alternative with rising salience in political and public debates. Defined as a universal, unconditional, and individual cash payment made to all of the population with no strings attached, the concept stands in stark contrast to the orthodox approach to welfare which mainly relies on means-testing or conditional cash transfers.

The puzzle

When we measured support as favoring increases, decreases, or maintenance of benefits, we found respondents to be quite supportive. Of those responding, 57% wanted Social Security benefits to be increased, 40% wanted benefits maintained, and only 3% wanted to see benefits decreased. Using this three-level question to compose a support score yields a mean of 2.53. Table 2 shows both the mean levels of support and the percentages of each response given for the seven major social welfare programs about which we asked. Mean support for Social Security is comparable to that for the Supplemental Security Income [Paired T (1152) = -0.33, p < .75] but significantly lower than the mean support for Medicare [Paired T (1176) = -6.78, p < .OOl]. It is TABLE 2 Support for an increase, Decrease, or Maintenance of Current Benefit Levels for Seven Social Welfare Programs: Percentages and Mean Support Scores* Percent increase 67.60 57.30 56.70 47.10 31.50 32.60 24.60 Percent maintain 29.90 40.00 40.00 46.30 55.50 51.90 51.00 Percent decrease 2.50 2.70 3.30 6.60 13.00 15.50 24.40 Mean scores 2.65 2.55 2.53 2.40 2.18 2.17 2.00 Notes: *The percentages are based on valid responses only; the few “don’t knows” and refusals have been omitted. The mean scores range from 3 (increase) to 1 (decrease). Standard deviations range from 0.44 to 0.72. 346 JOURNAL OF AGING STUDIES Vol. ~/NO. 4/l 988 significantly higher than support for Medicaid [Paired T (1155) = 5.83, p < .OOl], Unemployment Compensation [Paired T (1137) = 16.08, p < .OO 11, Aid to Families with Dependent Children [Paired T (1150) = 15.94, p < .OOl], and Food Stamps [Paired T (1115) = 22.09, p < .OOl]. It appears that the programs with the highest levels of support are those for which the elderly are the primary beneficiaries: Medicare, Social Security, and SSI. The increase-decrease measure of support is a simplistic, although informative, measure of support. Of perhaps greater importance to researchers and policymakers is to understand the degree to which people are willing to back up their beliefs with actions. As discussed in the methods section, we measured four dimensions of support-stated satisfaction, intensity of satisfaction, a willingness to write a letter or sign a petition, and a willingness to pay more taxes. As we see from Table 3, there is an overwhelming degree of satisfaction. Eighty-two percent of the respondents state thay are satisfied with the payment of Social Security taxes. When questioned further about their degree of satisfaction, 89.9% say that they would be opposed to spending cutbacks in Social Security. Further, those respondents TABLE 3 Probability of Specific Attitudes and Actions Given Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with Paying Social Security Taxes: Overall and Broken Down by Age Satisfied Dissatisfied Percentage in group 81.5 Percentage in group 18.2 18-34 years 81.3 18-34 years 18.7 35-49 19.4 35-49 20.6 50-64 80.8 50-64 19.2 65+ 87.8 65+ 12.2 If sati.$ed probability of. ffdtisatis$ed, probability of. opposing spending cut 89.9 opposing increase 60.1 18-34 years 86.3 18-34 years 59.4 35-49 91.0 35-49 57.7 50-64 90.8 50-64 11.8 65+ 96.9 65+ 44.4 being willing to write a letter or sign a petition 18-34 years 35-49 50-64 65+ 17.2 72.0 71.0 81.6 86.2 being willing to write a letter or a letter or sign a petition 18-34 years 35-49 50-64 65+ 43.3 40.5 46.2 55.6 11.1 being willing to pay more taxes 71.2 being willing to decrease taxes 26.7 18-34 years 13.3 18-34 years 29.7 35-49 75.0 35-49 30.8 50-64 13.7 50-64 33.8 65+ 58.5 65+ 11.1 Public Support for Social Security 347 who are satisfied are quite willing to stand behind their beliefs: 77.2% would write a letter or sign a petition to their representative in Congress and 7 1.2% would pay higher taxes. Although we have no way of knowing for certain whether the respondents would actually perform these acts, considerable evidence suggests two major conditions under which attitudes are closely related to behaviors: (1) when the attitudes are “behavioroid”; and (2) when they are specific in their referent (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Kelman 1974). Two of our support measures are clearly behavioroid, being based on a willingness to pay taxes and to sign petitions or write letters. In addition, respondents were not asked their opinions about global social welfare programs (e.g., “welfare”) as in some attitude surveys (Smith 1987). Instead, they were asked questions about their willingness to act in support of a specific program, Social Security. Such behavioroid and referent-specific measures are better predictors of support than more affect-laden measures of attitudes, although, of course, no behavioroid measure perfectly predicts actual behaviors. Dissatisfied respondents are less likely to feel strongly about their beliefs than respondents who express satisfaction with payment of taxes. Only 43.3% would write letters or sign petitions, and only 26.7% want their taxes decreased. When asked why they are dissatisfied, 37.8% say they fear that Social Security will not be available for them when they retire. The remaining respondents have various grievances against the program, the most common being a belief that individuals could do better investing their own money in private pension plans (18.9%) and that too many people are receiving benefits who do not really need them (15.6%).

In 2023, Social Security benefits will increase by 8.7% to account for inflation, potentially hastening the already-imminent depletion of the program’s trust fund reserves.

Even before this change, the program’s trustees have estimated that all current and future Old-Age and Survivors Insurance beneficiaries will face a 23% benefit cut in 2034 unless Congress acts—a devastating blow for the millions of older Americans who rely heavily on Social Security.

Overview Since it was established in 1935, the Social Security program has been very popular among the American people. For about half of beneficiaries, Social Security provides at least 50 percent of their income, and for about one-fifth of older adults, such benefits make up at least 90 percent of their income. However, for some time the benefits of the program have been in jeopardy. According to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) 2022 Trustees’ Report, if no steps are taken by Congress to reform Social Security, its trust fund will be exhausted in 2034, and after that the program will only be able to deliver benefits based on current receipts—which would result in a 23% benefit cut to retirees. The SSA determines when the Trust Fund will be depleted by calculating Social Security’s funding shortfall: the amount by which benefit payments exceed revenues over a 75-year period. To give lawmakers options for how the shortfall could be reduced, the SSA publishes a list of revenue-increasing and benefit-reducing proposals, along with how much each would reduce the long-term shortfall. They also publish proposals to increase benefits, along with how much they would increase the shortfall. A major reason that these proposals have not been passed by Congress, and thus Social Security’s solvency has not been addressed, is a widespread assumption by many representatives that the American public is not willing or able to face the issue and thus bringing it up is too politically risky. Social Security has been called a “third rail,” implying that it is political suicide to address it. Much of the existing polling data tends to reinforce the belief that the public’s attitudes toward Social Security are too conflicted and anxious to support any kind of constructive action. While majorities believe that Social Security is headed for a crisis, when asked, in stand-alone questions, about raising the retirement age, cutting benefits, or raising taxes, majorities often say they do not find these options appealing. Public consultation surveys take a different approach that goes beyond initial reactions. Rather than a series of separate, stand-alone questions, respondents go through a process called a ‘policymaking simulation’ in which they are asked to go into a problem‐solving mode. The objective is to put respondents in the shoes of a policymaker. Respondents are given a background briefing, presented arguments for and against policy options, and then finally make their recommendations in a context in which they understand the impact of their choices on the viability of current benefit levels. In addition to concerns about the Social Security shortfall, there are proposals in recent legislation for increasing certain benefits (Social Security 2100: A Sacred Trust and Social Security Expansion Act). Naturally these would worsen the shortfall and the SSA has determined by how much. Design of the Social Security Policymaking Simulation Respondents first went through a briefing about the Social Security program which included: ● how the program is structured; and ● the nature and extent of the Social Security shortfall, along with its multiple causes. AMERICANS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 2 PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION Respondents were then presented a series of reform options that have been put forward by the SSA, along with their effect on the long-term shortfall. These included ones that mitigated the shortfall: ● Raising the full retirement age ● Increasing the payroll tax ● Increase the amount of wages subject to the payroll tax ● Reducing benefits for high-income earners In addition, they evaluate options for increasing benefits. These included: ● Increasing the minimum benefit for those who have worked for 30 years ● Increasing benefits for beneficiaries 85 and over ● Reforming the cost-of-living adjustments so that it reflects what older adults tend to buy, which would make the adjustments to benefits higher than the current method In addition to a brief explanation of the option, they were told what impact it would have on the Social Security shortfall. For each option, respondents: ● evaluated 1‐2 arguments for and 1‐2 arguments against the option, in terms of how convincing they found the argument, and then ● evaluated each option in terms of how acceptable it would be on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being completely unacceptable, 10 being completely acceptable and 5 being just tolerable. Finally, respondents were presented all the reform options in a spreadsheet together with the impact of each option on the shortfall, in terms of the percentage of the shortfall. Respondents were asked to make their own comprehensive and integrated set of recommendations. An interactive feature gave respondents immediate feedback on the total impact of their recommendations on the shortfall.

Fielding of Survey The survey was conducted online from April 11 - May 15, 2022, with a national probability-based sample provided by Nielsen Scarborough from its sample of respondents, who were recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of households. The full sample consisted of 2,545 respondents (margin of error 1.9%). Responses were weighted by age, gender, education, race and geographic region. Benchmarks for weights were obtained from the US Census’ Current Populations Survey of Registered Voters. The sample was also weighted by partisan affiliation. Democrats and Republicans identified below include those who lean toward one or the other party. A further analysis was conducted by dividing the sample six ways, depending on the PVI Cook rating of the respondent’s Congressional district. This enabled comparison of respondents who live in very red, somewhat red, leaning red, leaning blue, somewhat blue, and very blue districts. AMERICANS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 3 PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION Key Recommendations Large bipartisan majorities favored a set of proposals that would, together, reduce the shortfall by 95%, by increasing revenues, reducing benefits for high-income earners and raising the full retirement age, as well as increasing the minimum monthly benefits (which increased the shortfall). More modest, but still bipartisan majorities favored two other proposals that would increase benefits for all beneficiaries, by changing the inflation index used to recalculate benefits, and increasing benefits for those 85 and over. These proposals would increase the shortfall by 17%. Taking all of the majority-supported proposals together, the shortfall would be reduced by 78 percent and push back the Trust Fund’s insolvency by decades. Addressing the Social Security Shortfall Making More Wages Subject to the Payroll Tax: Currently, wages subject to the payroll tax are capped at $147,000. An overwhelming majority of eight-in-ten, including eight-in-ten Republicans and nearly nine-in-ten Democrats favored a plan to also make all wages over $400,000 subject to the payroll tax. With inflation, the cap would continue to rise so that decades from now, all wages could become subject to the payroll tax. This proposal would eliminate 61% of the shortfall. Increasing the Payroll Tax: Three-in-four favored increasing the payroll tax from 6.2 to 6.5 percent including seven-in-ten Republicans and nearly eight-in-ten Democrats. This would eliminate 16% of the shortfall. Raising Retirement Age: Three-in-four favored gradually raising the retirement age from 67 to 68 including three-in-four Republicans and Democrats. This would eliminate 14% of the shortfall. Reducing Benefits for High Earners: Eight-in-ten favored reducing benefits to the top 20% of earners including nearly eight-in-ten Republicans and over eight-in-ten Democrats. This would eliminate 11% of the shortfall. Raising Benefits Raising the Minimum Benefit: Nearly two-in-three favored increasing the minimum monthly benefit for someone who has worked 30 years from $951 to $1,341, including six-in-ten Republicans and seven-in-ten Democrats. This would increase the shortfall by 7%. Supplementing Benefits for those 85 and Over: A slight majority favored increasing benefits for those 81 by about five percent, including small majorities of both Republicans and Democrats. This would increase the shortfall by 5%. Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) Changing the COLA to Account for What Older Adults Buy: A modest majority favored changing the way COLAs are calculated by focusing on the goods and services that older adults tend to buy, which would make them higher than the current method. A modest majority of Republicans and six-in-ten Democrats were in support. This would increase the shortfall by 12%.

More than 70 percent of voters in a national poll released Wednesday said they would support a federal jobs program.

Forty-two percent of respondents said they would “somewhat support” such a program while 36 percent said they would “strongly support” it, according to a Harris/HillTV poll. Five percent “somewhat” opposed such an initiative, while 6 percent strongly opposed it. Another 11 percent were unsure.

How Managerial Networking Can Improve City Budgetary Solvency

Managerial networking can help improve city budgetary solvency through a number of mechanisms. First, networking allows the diffusion of innovative policies or approaches to organizational problem solving and service delivery (Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier 2009; Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2017, Vol. 27, No. 3 453 Johansen and LeRoux 2012; Meier and O’Toole 2001; O’Toole and Meier 2004a, 2004b, 2006). Information about strategies that worked in other local governments or nonprofit organizations can help city managers to respond quickly to a budget crisis and avoid costly policy experimentation. For example, managers can learn from officials in neighboring local governments or managers from nonprofit service providers about new methods to increase the efficiency of service delivery, different mechanisms for charging for services, and other means of reducing expenditures that preserve their organizations’ ability to fulfill their service responsibilities. Additionally, contact with private financiers such as banks can facilitate access to information about new debt instruments or opportunities for debt refinancing at lower rates. Second, networking can help managers access the implementation and service capacity of external stakeholders (Meier and O’Toole 2010). Networks enable the pooling together of skills, institutional capacities, and financial resources of numerous organizations (Agranoff 2006; O’Toole 1997). External organizations can be mobilized to co-produce public services, reducing the pressure on city government budget. Service and religious organizations, and neighborhood associations, can supplement city services with programs targeted to their specific clientele. Third, networking can improve local community and state government support for city governments. Through greater engagement with the community, managers can mobilize support for tax increases, develop support for cutting spending for some services, or introduce new modes of service delivery that lower costs, among others. Managerial networking can also help managers to work in coalitions with other managers to advocate for an increase in state aid (Meier and O’Toole 2009; O’Toole and Meier 2004a). Fourth, networking can help managers buffer their organization from the effects of budget shocks (Meier and O’Toole 2003, 2009; O’Toole 1997). Managers who successfully develop ties with different stakeholders can protect their organizations from extensive micromanaging especially by elected officials, thus permitting managers to employ different buffering techniques (Meier and O’Toole 2001, 2003). To ensure that that the city government continues to perform its core task of delivering services during periods of fiscal distress, managers can employ buffering techniques including re-allocating budgets from less essential to core programs, controlling use of inputs including personnel, adjusting production based on peak demand periods, and rationing services, among others (Thompson 1967). Fifth, beyond buffering, managers can convince external stakeholders to provide them greater autonomy to implement more permanent organizational reforms. If the fiscal crisis is severe and prolonged, buffering will not be enough to improve fiscal health. Extensive organizational changes might be required including personnel downsizing, departmental consolidations, termination of programs or services, or closure of some facilities. Greater autonomy for managers enables them to carefully plan for these changes using their professional expertise and extensive knowledge of their organization’s strengths and weaknesses as well as clients’ needs (Meier and O’Toole 2003, 2009). Based on the previous discussion, it is expected that: H1: Managerial networking is associated with improving budgetary solvency.

The World Economic Forum issued the following news release on Jan. 24:

The 50th World Economic Forum Annual Meeting closed, a historic meeting bringing all stakeholders together to shape a cohesive and sustainable world.

Contemporary reforms to integrate performance information into budgetary decision making and resource allocation date back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the National Municipal League, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in the Unied States advocated the use of municipal statistics and cost-accounting information to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government spending and program operations (Fox 1977; Williams 2003, 2004). These municipal efforts later influenced U.S. federal budgetary reform in the 1930s, which called for more emphasis on economy and efficiency and for a more rational, systematic approach to administrative and budgetary practices (Kahn 1997; President’s Committee on Administrative Management 1937).1 The early reforms, however, did not provide a clear articulation of the linkage between program statistics, performance analysis, and budgetary allocation. It was not until the first Hoover Commission of the U.S. federal government during the late 1940s that the concept of performance budgeting was more formally defined (Lederle 1949).2 Since then, numerous reform initiatives have been implemented by federal, state, and local agencies in the United States (Burns and Lee 2004; Cope 1987; GAO 1997; Hayes et al. 1982; Lee 1991). Similar efforts were launched by other developed economies from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand as the leaders in piloting many key reform ideas (Rose 2003; Spiers 1975; UN 1965). For the past two decades, many international organizations have also advocated performance-budgeting reform in developing economies, even though the administrative capacities and institutional settings of these countries differ significantly from those of developed Western economies (Asian Development Bank 2006; Robinson 2007). By the turn of the twenty-first century, the idea of performance budgeting had been widely disseminated and practiced around the world, although the reform effort has faced varying degrees of success and many well-known challenges (Andrews 2005; Curristine 2005; Gupta 2010; OECD 2007, 2014; Raudla 2012; Robinson and Brumby 2005). This article examines the decades-long practices of performance budgeting and their associated challenges from a multilayered institutional framework and acknowledges that performance budgeting has not made a significant impact on the political appropriation process in many countries. Thus, this article suggests an array of strategies to address these institutional and organizational challenges. It also notes the need to reconceptualize the practice of performance budgeting as an executive-driven system Research Article From Performance Budgeting to Performance Budget Management: Theory and Practice 749 of performance budget management (PBM) so that theory is more aligned with practice. The key components of PBM are discussed, suggesting that multiyear budget planning, assessment of long-term financial risk, policy planning, stakeholder involvement, and regular spending reviews and performance audits should be integrated with the departmental and program budget cycles. This type of PBM is needed to address the long-term fiscal realities that many countries and subnational governments face and to respond to the public’s expectation that the government should do more with less

A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world would be worse. It would increase the risk of another collapse and extinction and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories (Beckstead, 2013). Totalitarian states are incompetent. They are bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters (Caplan, 2008).16 This can be seen most clearly in the great famines of Communist China and the USSR, in which millions died (Applebaum, 2017; Becker, 1996; Dikotter, 2010; Snyder, 2010). In comparison, functioning multiparty democracies rarely, if ever, experience famines (Sen, 2010). “Established autocracies” (or “personal”/“sultanist”) are particularly bad, as there are few checks or restraints on arbitrary rule and the whims and ideology of the single individual, even from other elites (Svolik, 2012). From the inside, the “inner circle” around Mao, Stalin, and Hitler seems incredibly chaotic, with elites strongly incentivized to conceal information and encouraged by the autocrat to squabble and feud—so they are divided (Conquest, 1992; Kershaw, 2008; Zhang & Halliday, 2006). If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems, then a world dominated by them would likely be worse at responding to risks of collapse and extinction. A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have major wars. States with near-universal adult suffrage rarely (if ever) go to war with one another (Barnhart et al., 2020), so a world dominated by democracies has fewer wars. Miscalculation might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate information, leading to well-known strategic disasters such as Hitler and Stalin’s blunders in World War II (Bialer, 1970; Noakes & Pridham, 2001), or at a smaller level, Saddam Hussein’s rejection of diplomacy (Atkinson, 1993). War makes collapse and extinction more likely, by raising the chance of weapons of mass destruction being used. Linked to this, totalitarian states are less cooperative than democratic states. While cooperation is possible (Ginsburg, 2020), their internal norms are characterized by paranoia and treachery, and their lack of transparency limits their ability to credibly commit to agreements. This is bad for all risks that require cooperation such as pandemics or climate change (Tomasik, 2015). Finally, continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of collapse and extinction. Social progress could reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could help address natural risks and climate change (Sandberg, 2018), differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019), and solve safety challenges in AI or biotechnology (Russell, 2019). However, as we will now discuss totalitarian states would likely inhibit social progress. A central question from a longtermist perspective is: Which values should shape the future? I would argue that we should prefer it to be shaped by liberal democratic values. This is not to say that the current democracy-dominated world is perfect—far from it. The fate of billions of factory-farmed animals or hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty makes that abundantly clear. However, democracies have two advantages. First, democracies have space for cosmopolitan values such as human rights, plurality, freedom, and equality. These are better than those that characterize life under totalitarianism: Fear, terror, subjection, and secrecy. Second, they have within themselves the mechanism to allow progress. In the last 100 (or even 50) years, the lives of women, LGBT people, religious minorities, and non-white people have dramatically improved. Our “moral circle” has expanded, and could continue to expand (Singer, 1981). The arc of the moral universe is long, but given the right conditions, it might just bend toward justice (King, 1968). A global society dominated by these values, and with the possibility of improving more, has a better longterm potential. A totalitarian-dominated world, on the other hand, would reduce the space for resistance and progress—distorting the human trajectory. We should be particularly concerned about “bottlenecks” at which values are particularly important—where there is a risk of “locking-in” some particular set of (possibly far from optimal) values. While they are currently far-off, future technologies such as artificial general intelligence, space settlement, life extension (of autocrats), or much better surveillance could enable lock-in (Caplan, 2008).17 Conditional on them avoiding new catastrophes, world orders dominated by totalitarians could be quite long-lasting (Caplan, 2008). Democracies can undermine authoritarian and totalitarian regimes through the following ways: Control, including conquest; contagion through proximity; and consent, promoting receptivity toward democratization (Whitehead, 2001). Democracies can actively undermine these regimes through war, sanctions, hosting rebellious exiles, or sponsoring internal movements. Passively, through contagion, they offer a demonstration that a better, more prosperous life is possible. For example, in the final years of the USSR, ordinary Soviet citizens were able to see that the West had a higher standard of living—more innovation, more choice, and more consumer goods. The elites were able to read books from the outside, and travel—Gorbachev’s contacts and friendships with European politicians may have made him more favorable to social democracy (Brown, 1996). Democracies can undermine the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2004). However, in a world not dominated by democracies, all these pressures would be far less. A world in which, say, totalitarian regimes emerged as dominant after World War II (for example if the USA was defeated) could be self-reinforcing and long-lasting, like the self-reinforcing relationship of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia (Orwell, 1949). Orwell’s fictional world is characterized by constant low-grade warfare to justify emergency powers and secure elites, and with shifting alliances of convenience as states bandwagon and balance, thereby preventing any resolution. A totalitarian-dominated world order could be rather robust, perhaps for decades or even centuries. A long-lasting totalitarian-dominated world would extend the period of time humanity would spend with a heightened risk of collapse or extinction, as well as increased potential for distortion of the human trajectory and the possibility that a “lock-in” event may occur. This example illustrates the possibility of a “negative recovery,” resulting in a trajectory with less or no scientific and social progress and a less favorable geopolitical situation, which would threaten the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.

This is likely not the last time we will see HHS introduce a version of the Sunset Rule. The repeal of the Sunset Rule is one more example of the divergence between the Trump and Biden Administrations, reflecting the significant impact presidential administrations and priorities can have on regulated industries. As HHS indicated when it published the Sunset Rule in 2021, what the Sunset Rule is proposing is not new; there are already executive orders, state laws, and other policies in place that allow the retrospective review of regulations. Retrospective review of laws and agency policies can provide various economic, social, and practical benefits. Through retrospective review, outdated laws and policies may be amended, improved, or eliminated, which may lead to cost savings and reductions in regulatory burdens. HHS under another administration may bring another retrospective review rule back to support its legislative priorities.

What is unique about this Sunset Rule is how quickly HHS completed the rulemaking; the process, from proposed to final rule, took less than three months. As noted in the Santa Clara lawsuit, the Sunset Rule “require[s] a resource-intensive and time-consuming effort on par with full notice-and-comment rulemaking, but at a pace 20 times faster than the Department has ever conducted retrospective review in the past – all without any guarantee that the Department will conduct such review.”

There are some shortcomings of sunset provision, particularly on investments and tax credits. For example, in United States, once this provision was included in the regulations on production tax credits to fuel investment in renewable energy and innovation. This provision was imposed on these tax credits for three years but it appeared to be insufficient and at least three to seven years were required for that project of energy.

Max Weber claimed that legal certainty is one of the pillars of capitalism since without sufficient legal stability and predictability, investment may be significantly discouraged.94 To wit, investors may not invest in new technologies, for example, if they fear sudden and disadvantageous legislative changes. According to this perspective, a capitalist system presupposes a sound degree of legislative certainty since uncertain rules, on the one hand, do not allow private actors to predict their rights and duties and, on the other, may grant unconstrained discretion to official decision makers.95 More recently, the EU Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation expressed similar concerns regarding a broad enactment of sunset clauses. Although this legislative instrument could be advantageous in a number of situations, it was equally acknowledged that sunset clauses could have a negative impact on the investment climate. If regulations designed to incentivize substantial investment in a determined technology expire within a beforehand known period of time, private actors may be more reluctant to respond to these incentives. This will be particularly true if the sunset period is shorter than the time span required for recovering the investment made. In addition, individuals might experience distrust in the protection granted by law and feel that the regulations imposing or stimulating them to invest in a new technology are not providing them with sufficient legal certainty upon which they can ground their investment decisions.96

The potential negative impact of sunset clauses on investments may particularly occur when legislators set fixed periods that disregard the development cycles of the regulated sector.97 An example comes from the United States: here a sunset provision was included in the regulations on the production tax credits which were deemed to fuel investment in renewable energy and advance clean energy innovation. Although the sunset provisions imposed on these tax credits could be renewed for a period of one to three years, this renewal appeared to be insufficient since at least three to seven years are required for the development of a wind farm. Under such circumstances, the uncertainty regarding the possible renewal of the tax credit slowed down long-term investment.98.

At the time the Sunset Rule was finalized, commenters had relayed numerous concerns, including that the Sunset Rule would cause significant regulatory uncertainty in the healthcare industry. Commentors feared that potential regulatory changes could create additional compliance and regulatory costs for healthcare providers and force them to adapt to a changing regulatory framework.

For example, the uncertainty created around the expiration of regulations, including those that guide eligibility for participation in Medicare and Medicaid, provider reimbursement, and certification of hospitals and clinics, could disrupt the efficient operation of critical safety-net programs, create regulatory gaps and inconsistent application of the law, and make accessing safety-net services for vulnerable populations even more complicated and difficult than it is today. Other commenters feared that it would be difficult to advise clients on how to comply with HHS regulations, given the risk for withdrawal.

Critics indict the sunset provisions as “the worst kind of tax policymaking because burdens are placed on taxpayers solely to accommodate political concerns that mean nothing to anybody 2006] SUNSETS AND THE TAX CODE 395 374 Id. 375 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 354, at 1184 (“The extensive use of sunsets creates uncertainty with regard to expectations about future tax policy.”). 376 See Sullivan, supra note 373 (stating that taxpayers faced with uncertain tax laws will fail to take into account possibility of future changes, and that tax cut may be more windfall than incentive to save). 377 See id. (noting that this diminishes potential benefit of tax cut). 378 Of course, one could predict that Congress, if prohibited from using sunsets, would simply shift its revenue games to other techniques, such as phase-ins, which may also negatively alter taxpayer incentives. outside of Washington.”374 The sunset provisions, they argue, create uncertainty.375 Uncertainty hurts economic performance by diminishing the incentive effects of the tax cut.376 In addition, uncertainty creates economic waste by increasing planning, administration, and compliance costs.377 In reality, taxpayers must always discount for the possibility of repeal or other legislative changes. The tax code, after all, is not etched in stone. Nonetheless, an expiration date provides an opportunity for legislators to remove a tax benefit without affirmatively acting and thus may increase the possibility of legislative change. Regardless, it is unarguable that sunset provisions complicate the Code.

The story of sunset provisions in the code chronicles how these “good government” reform devices are, in actuality, rent-extracting mechanisms that encourage budgetary sophistry. First, sunset provisions evade political constraints in the budget process whose purpose is to safeguard against congressional over-spending. The sunset provisions of the extenders and, much more dramatically, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts were enacted to underestimate the revenue losses of the provisions to which they apply. Second, sunset provisions further reduce the reliability of revenue loss estimates. Moreover, the existence of sunset provisions in the recent tax acts has created political conditions under which re-enactment of important budget rules, such as the PAYGO provisions, is very unlikely while sunset repeal is on the table.

Third, sunset provisions threaten the continuance of tax benefits and thus allow legislators more possibilities to extract financial and electoral contributions from the recipients of those benefits. Therefore, politicians have an incentive to perpetually endanger provisions that provide rent-extracting opportunities. The case of the tax extenders—in which many popular provisions, such as the R&D credit, were never made permanent—supports this hypothesis. Both EGTRRA and JGTRRA contain core provisions advantaging a narrow group of individuals and entities. These groups vie for the extension of benefits in their interest while legislators, by collecting rents, make the most out of the disagreement over the permanent enactment of the tax cuts.

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C). In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach. Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that *1290 no “precise mathematical formula” or “ ‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis. SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F.Supp.2d at 1329–30. Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.” SAA at 860. Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC's argument. The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993). It does not imply a specific number or cut-off. What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation. The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC's argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission's regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses. It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.” The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

Because the adverb “substantially” is defined as “in a substantial manner; so as to be substantial,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 2280, we look to the meaning of the word “substantial.”5 The parties agree that the word “substantial” should be interpreted in light of its common and accepted usage because the word is not defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.26. They also agree that the common and accepted usage of the word “substantial” is “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount or extent.” This definition from The American Heritage Dictionary is the same definition used by the court of the appeals in its opinion. Culver, 2018 WL 6837735, at *1. Based on the parties’ agreement and our independent consideration of the common and accepted usage of the word “substantial,” we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3), requires a deprivation of parental rights that is “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount or extent.”

The regulation reads, ‘a 2 x 2 inch guard rail should be installed at the extreme outer edge of these walkways', etc. (Italics added.) The question turns on the effect to be given to the word ‘should.’ One definition of that word is ‘Obligation in various degrees, usually milder than ought; as you should be obedient.’ Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary. As a reference to the cases cited in 39 Words and Phrases (Perm. ed.) 234 et seq., and Pocket Part 48, will illustrate, ‘should’ frequently implies a command, a duty or an obligation. But this is not always so. See *564 Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 98, 229 S.W. 741, 746; Godchaux v. Carpenter, 19 Nev. 415, 421, 14 P. 140, 142. Here, as in so many other instances, the meaning of the word and the intention to be ascribed to those who used it must be determined by the context. The provision in which it is found is one of several score safety regulations for the sawmill industry, most of which use ‘shall’, as, for example, 5.14(a), which immediately **843 precedes the provision in question and reads, ‘The vertical face of all green chains and sorting tables shall be boarded up to a height not less than eighteen (18) inches from the floor of the walkway.’ The occasional use of ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’ does not appear to be inadvertent but deliberate. Indeed, the entire code bears on its face evidence that it was prepared with great care and scrupulous regard to the right choice of language. We can only conclude that in those instances where departure is made from the mandatory ‘shall’ to the somewhat ambiguous ‘should’, the purpose was to express a different meaning—to convey the notion that the particular precaution was desirable and recommended, but not required. See, 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), 116, § 5821. In this view the regulation was not legally binding on the defendant and the instruction complained of was free from error.