Specifically – the plan undermines military benefits
Asch 19 [Beth J.; Senior economist at the RAND Corporation. Her areas of study include labor economics and defense manpower. She has led numerous studies on compensation design in the military and in the federal civil service, on the workforce implications of state and local pension reform, and on military recruiting and personnel supply to the armed forces. Her most recent work includes analysis and redesign of the military pay table, military retirement reform, state and local pension reform, enlistment supply and recruiting resource effectiveness, and retention and compensation in the federal civil service. Asch's research has been widely disseminated as reports, briefings, and journal articles among the policy community, the media, and the academic community - Ph.D. and M.A. in economics, University of Chicago; B.A. in economics, University of California, Los Angeles. 2019; "Navigating Current and Emerging Army Recruiting Challenges"; RAND; https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3107.html;]//LASA-بيلال
Studies estimate a pay elasticity of between 0.70 to 1.15 for the Army (Table 1). Elasticity is defined as the percentage change in high-quality enlistments associated with a 1-percent change in a given variable—in this case, military pay relative to civilian pay. Using FYs 2000–2008 data, Asch et al. (2010) estimated an elasticity of high-quality contracts with respect to relative military pay of 1.15. This implies that if the level of military pay was to rise by 10 percent relative to civilian wage opportunities, enlistment of high-quality youth would rise by 11.5 percent. Consistent with the trends shown in Figure 5, it is unsurprising that studies consistently find a relationship between high-quality contracts and the civilian unemployment rate, all else being equal (Table 1). For example, Knapp et al. (2018) estimate an elasticity of high-quality contracts with respect to the unemployment rate to be about 0.3 using Army data from 2012 to 2015, implying that halving the civilian unemployment rate (e.g., from 10 to 5 percent) would reduce high-quality enlistment by 15 percent, all else equal. On a base of 50,000 high-quality enlistments annually in the Army, that would mean about 7,500 fewer individuals would need to be recruited. The range of estimates in the table reflects different time periods, analytic approaches, and unit of analysis.