Behavior is issue-specific. Rationalism explains state behavior
David A. Lake 17, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, with; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Stephan Haggard, and David G. Victor; 4/21/17, “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/behavioral-revolution-and-international-relations/C00E297DF5801C7A09F5334ABE40E54D
However institutions may also be designed and used precisely to correct individual bias or offset cognitive limitations, as Bendor and Hammond show in their influential critique of Allison.82 Bureaucratic procedures are often designed to collect and disseminate information, evaluate options, and study the consequences of choice more systematically and thoroughly than a single and especially “intuitive” decision maker can do. Contestation between rival departments can also lead to the airing and resolution of differing views, leading to more “rational” decisions. What appear to be slow, dysfunctional, and contentious procedures from a rationalist perspective may be quite effective and appropriate if we begin with the assumption that individuals working within complex organizations are vulnerable to cognitive biases, misperception, mistaken beliefs, and outright error. Bureaucratic procedures in effect transform possible System 1 decisions at the level of the individual into slow, agonizing, but more rational System 2 policies at the level of the aggregate. This suggests the counterintuitive possibility that policy can be more “rational” than any of the individuals involved, at least in settings where institutions successfully incentivize robust decision-making processes.