No spillover---China will not attempt a direct predatory challenge to the US.

(Joshua, “The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 43)

This framework carries large implications for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand China’s strategy as its power grows and US relative power declines. As noted, many analysts fear that a rising China will embark on a predatory course designed to push the United States down or from the great power ranks. Although it is difficult in the abstract to describe what the particular elements of Chinese predation may entail, the general concern seems to be that China will adopt steps that will rapidly shift the distribution of power its favour by enacting policies that are increasingly costly for a relatively declining United States to overcome, pushing the United States to exhaust itself competing or to surrender the issues at stake, and thus imperil the United States’ position as a great power. Elements of this approach might involve Chinese efforts to engage in economic warfare by hindering US economic competitiveness and limiting American economic opportunities; adumbrate US military advantages; undercut US credibility and prestige; and weaken US alliances in East Asia or beyond.55 Furthermore, recent Chinese actions in and around East Asia seemingly give credence to such concerns. After all, the last decade has witnessed China take an increasingly assertive stance in its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas56 ; enact an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea57 ; make political and economic inroads into Central Asia and Africa58 ; influence the domestic politics of Asia-Pacific states to favour pro-China policies; and expand its defence budget.59 Concurrently, trade tensions with the United States are rising, and the Chinese government has tried to buttress its authority by cracking down on domestic opponents.60

China’s current strategy: Mixed

It is too early, however, to declare Chinese predation a fact, just as there are reasons to question whether Chinese predation is likely in the future. On one level, and consistent with research by scholars such as Avery Goldstein, Alastair Iain Johnston and others, there are less-competitive elements embedded in current Chinese strategy.61 Chinese land reclamation and military deployments in the East and South China Seas, for instance, have mostly involved territories previously claimed by the Chinese government – China has not expanded its maritime claims so much as taken a unilateral approach towards resolving existing disputes.62 Similarly, China’s ADIZ move came after Japan expanded its own ADIZ and began consolidating control over the disputed Senkaku Islands.63

It is also important to recognise that there are steps China could plausibly have undertaken in recent years yet chose not to. Despite concerns over a Chinese military build-up, for instance, China did not increase the share of state wealth allocated to military spending; military expenditures have remained at 1.9 per cent of Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) since 2009.64 Likewise, China has sustained a minimalist nuclear deterrent even though this force is vulnerable to disruption.65 Above all, China has not tried to form an anti-US alliance in East Asia – in fact, there is some evidence that China has sought to keep the United States engaged in East Asia rather than exclude it.66 For example, not only did Chinese President Xi Jinping tell US President Barack Obama in 2014 that the ‘Pacific Ocean has ample space to accommodate our two great nations,’ but China’s Xinhua news agency greeted Donald Trump’s election – after a campaign marked by calls for a reduced US role in the world – with a warning against US isolationism.67 These moves are not consistent with a predatory campaign: China is pursuing a mixed strategy that blends both cooperative and competitive elements.

Of course, it is possible that Chinese strategy may give way to predation in the future. Still, the approach developed above highlights that China’s future course will ultimately depend upon China’s threat environment and the constraints and opportunities this imposes. And on this basis, a series of quantitative and qualitative indicators provides room for cautious optimism that China will at worst continue its mixed strategy vis-à-vis the United States. As importantly, there are reasons that China may – under certain conditions – adopt a supportive strategy. The logic here is simple: not only is China’s threat environment such that it is far from clear whether the PRC would be able to systematically challenge the United States without significantly harming its security, but China faces competitors besides the United States. Combined, these factors should give China pause before pursuing a predatory course, and may even offer ground for supporting the United States.