Patents require too much PC – other issues take precedent
Dan L. Burk 2012 - Dan L. Burk was a Chancellor's Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine School of Law and is a founding member of the law faculty. His areas of expertise include intellectual property, gene patenting, digital copyright, electronic commerce and computer trespass, ("Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/regulation/winter-2012-2013/patent-reform-united-states-lessons-learned)//CG
The first instinct in a democracy is to give responsibility for statutory adaptations to the institution with the greatest degree of public accountability, as well as the greatest capacity for information gathering. Typically this is thought to be the legislature. However, timely adaptation of patent statutes through legislative oversight is simply impractical. Enormous political capital is typically required to muster the votes needed to enact any new legislation. Given the many demands on the attention of a national legislature, it is not realistic to believe that such political will can be mustered year-in and year-out in order to update patent statutes. Indeed, among the myriad political issues surrounding transportation, health care, taxation, diplomacy, and law enforcement, repeated patent reform is unlikely to take precedence. It is simply not realistic to expect that the majority of a legislative body will continually update itself on the latest technological and economic developments facing innovators. And even were patent statutes to command the ongoing attention of the legislature, it might be better if they did not. As the saying goes, “No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe when the legislature is in session.” A vast literature on public choice theory, together with practical experience of the legislative process, warns that each new statutory enactment provides opportunities for rent-seeking by favored constituencies. Legislative proposals quickly become encrusted with special-interest provisions or are redirected to unexpected ends.