China rise isn’t a threat.

If the Chinese government expects resistance from a militarily strong United States and several mid-sized US security partners, Beijing is unlikely to fight for hegemony. There is a discernable pattern of caution in China’s behavior— China consistently seeks cheap gains while avoiding costly consequences. This pattern is in keeping with traditional Chinese strategic culture, which calls for indirect approaches to counter the moves of a strong opponent and eschews Pyrrhic victories. Despite consistently tough talk in recent years about a commitment to fight for Chinese territory,19 Beijing’s actions have been relatively risk-averse. The recent Chinese actions that some characterize as bold or assertive have remained below the line likely to trigger a military response from other countries. The Chinese government, for example, correctly assessed that the United States would not attempt to physically prevent the construction of Chinese military bases in the South China Sea. The patrols by PLA ships and aircraft around Taiwan and near Japanese islands are menacing signals, but they are clearly not attack runs. In disputed seas, firing on foreign vessels to disable or drive them away would likely bring retaliation in kind, so the Chinese have employed the less provocative but often effective tactic of ramming or threatening to ram. Chinese vessels have repeatedly damaged and occasionally sunk the boats of rival claimants in the South China Sea through intentional collisions, and in 2013, a Chinese ship maneuvered into the path of a US Navy cruiser and then stopped in an effort to drive the US ship out of the area. Beijing attempts to enforce its claims in the South China Sea with fishing boats or with white-hulled Chinese Coast Guard or maritime enforcement vessels, keeping PLA Navy ships on the sidelines unless needed for backup. Beijing specifically criticized the Philippines for breaching this etiquette by calling in a gray-hulled Philippine Navy vessel to arrest Chinese fishermen at Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Despite fears and expectations to the contrary, the Chinese government has not declared an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, likely because Beijing believes interference in commercial traffic is a red line for China’s potential adversaries. As Singapore-based analyst Alan Chong observes, China wants to avoid “driving ASEAN into the arms of the United States.” 20 Many analysts contend that, given China’s fragile economic and domestic political situation, the CCP leadership fears a war with the United States could put the survival of the regime at risk. Therefore, Beijing will be cautious about engaging in a conflict it does not consider politically necessary.21 Even on the issue of preventing Taiwan independence, unquestionably a core interest for Beijing, the CCP government refrained from attacking as Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian repeatedly stated in public, “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country.” 22 Beijing may want to be the strongest power in the region, but not badly enough to go to war for it. For the foreseeable future, both China and the United States can maintain formidable military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region that will discourage either country from starting a war against the other. Both countries also maintain large and survivable strategic nuclear forces. Thus, China is not poised to wield its newfound military power to impose Chinese domination upon the region. Rather, the former condition of previously unmatched US supremacy is evolving toward a rough military balance that could last decades. China will enjoy increased security over the territory it indisputably owns, but Chinese moves to capture either disputed or unambiguously nonChinese territory by force will remain prohibitively risky for Beijing.