Game theory proves unanimity overcomes opposition.

Finally, we must consider the effect of Court curbing under the two configurations of Court-Congress alignment. Again, to do this, we must consider the net effect of Court curbing by taking the linear combination of the coefficients from Table 1. When we do this, we find that the net effect of Court curbing when only one Court-curbing bill is introduced is <<EQUATION OMITTED>> when the Court and Congress are aligned and <<EQUATION OMITTED>> when the Court and Congress are not aligned. We see a similar pattern when many Court-curbing bills (25) are introduced. In this case we find <<EQUATION OMITTED>> when the Court and Congress are aligned and <<EQUATION OMITTED>> when the Court and Congress are not aligned. What does this tell us? Very clearly, this result indicates that the effect of Court curbing on judicial decision making is strongest when the Court and Congress are ideologically aligned and weakest when the Court and Congress are ideologically opposed. This is precisely what was predicted by the theoretical model (Hypothesis 4). Because Congress has an increased incentive to “bluff” when it disagrees with the Court over policy, the Court will have a weaker incentive to respond to Court curbing from its ideological opponents than from its ideological allies.