Automation causes mass populism.

From a theoretical perspective, the general idea behind studies linking structural economic transformations to support for populist and radical-right parties is pretty straightforward: Economic processes such as globalization and technological change create aggregate welfare gains, but with winners and losers. Such distributional consequences, through the ensuing perceived economic distress, are then politically consequential. What is not straightforward—and still underdeveloped, according to ref. 7—is the theoretical understanding of the mechanisms through which automation-driven economic distress, in particular, may translate into higher support specifically for radical-right parties. In this respect, we propose several non-mutually-exclusive channels.

First, it is well understood that economic discontent may lead to disaffection with mainstream parties and the political establishment at large. In this context, radical-right forces provide an appealing option for dissatisfied voters, as, in most cases, they can credibly cast themselves as an antiestablishment alternative to mainstream parties (1, 5, 19). Such an antiestablishment advantage can extend to radical-left parties, as we discuss below.

Moving beyond the simple antiestablishment motivation, a second advantage that is specific to radical-right parties may stem from their economic nationalist platforms. These are particularly alluring in the wake of structural transformations of the economy, as they offer a very generic promise of protection. This crucially involves the broad idea of “taking back control” of the country from global impersonal forces—such as those behind globalization and technological change (20)—which are perceived to be detrimental to economic prosperity by distressed constituencies. In reality, it might be very hard for people to disentangle precisely the causes of perceived economic hardship; these are difficult to identify even for researchers. Different causes of economic distress may be conflated; for instance, there is evidence that the same type of workers may be more exposed to both international competition and automation (21). Moreover, situations of economic hardship may be misattributed; in particular, there is evidence that people may misattribute to immigration and international trade economic distress that is actually due to automation (22, 23). This phenomenon may be reinforced by political entrepreneurs who find it easier to provide responses to immigration and trade rather than to automation (24, 25). In addition, even when explicitly primed about hypothetical layoffs being caused by automation in experimental contexts, people still demand more trade protectionism as a policy response (26). All this may fuel support for radical-right parties, which are strongly protectionist, antiimmigrant, and in favor of a broad concept of workers’ protection (6).

Third, and relatedly, besides the economic platforms, the idea of taking back control is often combined with the defense of a traditional way of life that supposedly characterized the nation before globalization and immigrants—but also computers and robots—had a disruptive impact on society. Evidence shows that nostalgia for a mythical (recent) past plays a significant role in radical-right support (27–29). The nostalgic rhetoric typically involves an emphasis on traditional family structure, with a strong role for the male head of household empowered by a well-paid and stable job (30, 31). Intuitively, the nostalgic appeal to a bygone era is particularly attractive for individuals whose relative standing in society is threatened or declining, in line with recent findings by refs. 32–34. As the authors of ref. 24 effectively summarize, “rightwing populist parties’ promises to turn back the clock seem to strike a chord with routine workers’ fears of social regression.”

Fourth, a growing literature shows that structural changes such as automation have not only economic, but also social and psychological, consequences. There is accumulating evidence that economic vulnerability and inequality lead to increased authoritarianism and nativism (e.g., refs. 35 and 36). Recent work in psychology directly documents a robust association between concerns for automation and nativism; in addition, experimental subjects propose to shed more immigrant workers when layoffs are motivated by automation, as opposed to generic “company restructuring” (37). These types of reactions naturally push voters toward radical-right parties, whose platforms feature strong authoritarian and nativist elements (38, 39).