Chinese o-crime create violence and conflict through open warfare.

Southeast Asia’s criminal networks victimize millions of people throughout the world, but the burden is also borne by the people of Southeast Asia. They suffer in two main ways: from the networks’ negative impact on violence and conflict in the region, and from an array of economic and human costs of the scamming industry, many of which extend far beyond the costs faced by victim countries in other parts of the world.

The Impact on Violence and Conflict

The connection of these criminal networks to violence and conflict in Southeast Asia takes various forms. But most importantly, the ties are always a major source of enrichment for both state and nonstate armed actors, especially in authoritarian systems. The proliferation of criminal networks in Myanmar provides the starkest example. Official military and paramilitary forces are directly involved in hosting and protecting criminal compounds throughout the country’s eastern and northern borderlands, and the profits generated by those compounds are used to upgrade weaponry, consolidate influence, and prevent international law enforcement or other armed actors from disrupting the criminal activity.

In countries where open warfare is not a factor, the proceeds from the criminal networks facilitate the expansion of nonstate armed elements and criminal gangs that prey on the local population and trade in illegal drugs and arms. These networks promote criminality within both state and nonstate actors, undermining professionalism and reinforcing police-state tendencies. In Cambodia, by 2019, criminal gangs had become so confident of their power that one crime boss even released a video of himself on YouTube declaring that his “Chongqing gang” would determine whether Sihanoukville was stable.6 Meanwhile, all along Cambodia’s border with Thailand, forced-labor compounds have rapidly built ties with private security companies, local police, and even security forces from across the region. Things have reached the point where armed police operations struggle to gain access to many of these enclaves because their armed protection is so formidable. In both Cambodia and Myanmar, criminals have, with impunity, openly murdered trafficked victims who have attempted to escape compounds.

In many communities in countries where criminal scam syndicates and casino cities have emerged, the criminal networks have come to dominate the local economy and labor market. People from rural villages in Myanmar’s Karen State have few alternatives other than to work for one of the scam compound operators. Similarly, the poor residents of Oddar Meanchey Province in Cambodia have few better opportunities for work than Ly Yong Phat’s scam-trafficking megaplex O’Smach Resort and Casino.7 This reality undermines the resilience of local communities and renders them powerless to bear witness to atrocities and rights violations for fear of losing their livelihoods or even their lives.8 Although, as is widely understood, the governing authorities in places such as Myanmar and Cambodia actively repress the voices of civil society, the power of the criminal networks further reduces any ability for meaningful public dialogue.