The aff challenges shareholder maximization. That prevents capture.

What are states to do? In cases where technological breakthroughs have occurred as a result of targeted state¶ interventions benefiting specific companies, the state should reap some of the rewards over time by retaining ownership of a small proportion of the intellectual property it had a hand in creating. The prospect of state ownership in private corporations may be anathema to many parts of the capitalist world, but given that governments are already investing in the private sector, they should earn a return on those investments. The state need not hold a controlling stake, but it could hold equity in the form of preferred stocks that get priority in receiving dividends. The returns could be used to fund future innovation. In short, rather than worry so much about the problem of picking winners, we should focus on how to reward winning investments so they can cover eventual losses and also raise funds for future investments. Alongside these efforts, we also need to rethink how public investments are accounted for in national income accounting. Investments in innovation should not be thought of as current expenditures. When setting limits to fiscal deficits, it is therefore necessary to distinguish public debt contracted for value-creating investment in R&D and infrastructure from public debt contracted for public or private consumption. In this sense, financial and accounting reforms should be regarded as a prerequisite for any successful smart and inclusive growth plan. Finally, acknowledging the role of government as a primary risktaker and source of wealth creation will require a decisive break with the theory of shareholder value maximization, which treats company shareholders as the most significant risk-takers and¶ emphasizes short-term returns in the form of boosted stock prices. The widespread influence of this theory underpins the exorbitant rewards earned by senior executives in recent years and has been a key driver of the economic inequality between the top 1 percent of income earners and the rest. Combatting short-termism and speculative forms of corporate governance will require aggressive reform of finance and corporate governance as well as more fundamental rethinking of the models of wealth creation upon¶ which they are based. What are some possible concerns with the approach we advocate? One involves the setting of missions and the direction of market¶ shaping. Clearly governments can and do become captured by particular interest groups, which limit their ability to establish missions and follow through on them. The failure of climate change policy and escalating inequality are obvious examples. Government subsidies continue to favor vested interests (such as fossil fuel energy firms), while taxation policy favors labor-saving (increasing¶ unemployment or underemployment) over resource saving (supporting decarbonization). And, of course, democracy is no¶ guarantee that social missions—such as climate change—will be adopted globally, as the Trump and Bolsonaro administrations in¶ the United States and Brazil have demonstrated. These are important concerns, but arguably result from governments not doing enough to shape markets to support social policy goals in the first place. It is by adopting a mission-oriented approach that we can best meet the challenges before us.