No US-China war.

Even if China is willing to fulfill its mission by launching a war with the U.S., can China afford it? First, the top Chinese leader is not ready for war with U.S. China will not be able to take a risk without internal coordination and support. The voice of China’s foreign policy comes from different departments. They are not well coordinated and lack a strategy with a long-term vision. China does not have a system for making consistent and workable foreign policy, and the top leader has not gained sufficient power to manage foreign relations. China is facing a mountain of domestic problems, including corruption in the military. The Chinese government has learned the lesson that a combination of internal violence and external conflict can contribute to the collapse of the regime. Now Xi Jinping is more likely to focus on China’s domestic issues especially the pandemic and its consequences in economic and financial areas. Xi’s top priority before the 20th Congress of the CCP is to carefully manage the power balance among factions in the party, attempting to ensure his third term of presidency. After the 20th Congress, Xi will take some time to reorganize the system and put new policies in place. It is not wise for the CCP to take military risks in dealing with territorial disputes with various countries at the same time as it tries to maintain domestic social stability. China cannot afford to fight against multiple countries at the same time because the U.S. has military treaties with several allies in the region. Taking military actions could possibly destroy Xi’s China Dream, his lifelong presidency, his domestic agenda and China’s global ambitions eventually. Considering all these challenges, Chinese leaders may continue their efforts to rebalance the relationship between China and the U.S. while boosting the economic growth and preparing the unification with Taiwan after the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022.

Second, China has understood that any conflict between China and the U.S. would be a global disaster, especially between the two nuclear powers.78 A war between the two giants is unthinkable.79 It could be a Third World War if the U.S. had a war with China.80 China now has 260 nuclear weapons in its stockpile, while the U.S. has 4670 or more. China promised that it would implement a “No first use” nuclear policy, implying that the country possesses nuclear weapons only to deter other states from a nuclear attack and expresses the purely self-defensive nature of China’s nuclear strategy. More fundamentally, it has demonstrated a viable path toward international nuclear disarmament.81 Many China experts “appear not to be worried by China’s rapidly growing nuclear capabilities, because Beijing’s official policy promises that China will not be the first to employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Beijing promises that its nuclear forces are for deterrence and retaliation only, not for aggression.”82 However, China continues to develop its nuclear weapons. China is likely to double the size of its nuclear stockpile in a few years.83 U.S. military leaders are not as naïve as academics about China’s “no first use” pledge. Charles Richard, chief of U.S. Strategic Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he could “drive a truck through China’s ‘no first use’ policy, because China’s unprecedented rapid expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities is not consistent with a belief in ‘minimum deterrence’ and ‘no first use.’”84 In January 2022, five global nuclear powers who are the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., the UK, Russia, China, and France, signed a joint statement and agreed to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading and to ensure a nuclear war would not happen. The agreement itself is a positive sign, indicating that nuclear deterrence is working and there will be no massive war between China and the U.S.85 Practically, it is hard to trust a dictator’s words. In March 2022, Putin already put nuclear deterrent forces on high alert and attacked Europe’s largest nuclear plant just a month after Russia signed the joint statement.

Third, the Chinese economy and military are not strong enough to support war with the U.S. China will unlikely enter to war if it cannot win because the CCP cannot afford a loss. China will wage war when it sees itself winning at least cost. China is the fastest-growing economy in the world but there are many more statistics that come to the front of arguments, which question the size of the Chinese economy and its actual economic situation. The economic and social consequences of zero-case tolerance policy are clearly serious and far-reaching. China is still a developing country. China does not rank among the 100 richest nations based on per capita. Among 1.4 billion people, about 50% of Chinese people live in rural areas, 400 million people live on less than $2 a day, and 200 million people live on less than a dollar per day. Even if China will continue its economic growth for years, it may never surpass the U.S. because it faces many obstacles.86 U.S. military spending grows as policy shifts to “prioritize China” with $813.3 billion in 2022 while China’s military spending has reached $230 billion in 2022. China’s military budget is only about 28% of the U.S. The PLA has approximately 975,000 active-duty personnel, the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of approximately 355 ships and submarines, the largest aviation force in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2800 total aircraft of which approximately 2250 are combat aircraft. China develops new intercontinental ballistic missiles, continues to increase its inventory of road-mobile DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), and has its first operational hypersonic weapons system, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). China is determined to build a “world-class” military by the end of 2049.87 However, the comprehensive power of the PLA still lags far behind the U.S. If China learned a lesson from Russia’s failures in the invasion of Ukraine, it should never take on the U.S. head even when fully modernized. Although China’s navy, ground troop, and air forces have developed rapidly in the past two decades, considering the quality and overall strength of the military, as well as the strength of military alliances, China would lose the war if it launched a war with the U.S. Any war with the U.S. will be near its shores where the U.S. will have a decisive winning advantage.88

Fourth, China will feel difficult to justify a war with U.S. Military strength is the basis for consideration if China goes to war. If China’s military power is at an absolute advantage, it still lacks the pre-conditions for war with the U.S. If China’s military power evenly matches with the U.S., it should be cautious about starting a war. China has not arrived at the stage to initiate a war. Military power is not simply about military budget and weapons. Real war experience must be taken into consideration. China does not have real military experience to win a modern war with the U.S. After the establishment of the PRC, China went to conventional war several times, including the Korean War, the war with India (1967), and the Vietnam War (1979). It cannot rule out that China will follow the same pattern to go to war in the future. However, the Iraq war and the 2022 War between Russia and Ukraine indicate that contemporary war is completely different from traditional war. Chinese military power is untested in the contemporary military war. Moreover, the CCP has not faced an immediate military threat from the U.S. Military experts’ research projects on when and why Beijing uses force have reached a similar conclusion: China attacks not when it feels confident about the future, but when it worries its enemies are closing in. Thomas Christensen, the director of the China and the World Program at Columbia University, points out that the Chinese Communist Party wages war when it perceives an opening window of vulnerability regarding its territory and immediate periphery, or a closing window of opportunity to consolidate control over disputed areas. This pattern holds regardless of the strength of China’s opponent.89 The Biden Administration has made it clear that the U.S. does not intend to change the Chinese regime while competing with China on various fronts. When China does not face a direct military threat from the U.S., the CCP does not have reason to take risk of going to war.

Fifth, it could be a suicide mission if China decided to go to war with the U.S. before improving its military quality. The quality of military commanders is the key to win or defeat in wars. The quality of fighters and the wisdom of commanders are inseparable. Wise commanders should be capable of planning and deploying a variety of plans before the war starts. Even if Chinese military power cannot match the U.S. as long as they can carry out military strikes at a right time and at a favorable location, China can still win. Overall, Chinese military commanders do not possess such a quality. Soldier qualities include military skills and knowledge, actual combat and decision-making capabilities, physical endurance, and psychological qualities. Since the war between China and Vietnam in 1979, China has been no war with other countries for more than 40 years. China’s active military personnel grew up in peacetime and enlisted in a peaceful environment. During the forty years of reform and opening-up period, the military is inevitably influenced by the peaceful lifestyle. Although China has dramatically increased military expenditures and speeded up its military modernization, the PLA obviously lacks sufficient actual combat exercises, involving the integration of sea, land, and air battles. In recent years, China has tried to improve its military combat effectiveness, but the Chinese military has a long way to catch up with the U.S.’ experience of real war. The one-child policy seriously affects the quality of the military. China’s active military personnel have grown up in a relatively superior environment, and men will be particularly favored regardless of whether they come from the city or the countryside, so they lack self-care ability, communication skills, patience, and endurance. Their personal character is very fragile and is likely to collapse on the battlefield.

Sixth, the morale of the Chinese army is low. The morale of the army is the spiritual pillar in the war; morale makes the war invincible under certain conditions; and the army would be a mess without morale. Morale is not an empty political slogan, but it is courage and determination when they face the enemy. Morale is not injected by propaganda but is nurtured by faith and the example of officers and actual interests. Under the one-party system and the rigid censorship system, Chinese soldiers like all Chinese citizens have been brainwashed by communist ideas. The injected so-called communist belief without faith could be suddenly collapsed during a real war in a real world. In addition, China’s corruption is systematic, and the military is no exception from the top to the bottom of the military system. By January 2015, sixteen senior military officers were under investigation for accusations of corruption. These officers are at the corps level or above. They include one general, four lieutenant generals, nine major generals, and one senior colonel. After Xu Caihou, former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, was caught in 2014, the CPC began to investigate Guo Boxiong in 2015, the second former top military officer on suspicion of corruption. Fang Fenghui, China’s military chief of staff was jailed for life for corruption in 2019. Military corruption deadly threatens China’s security and degrades China’s military capability in protecting its nation. One of the causes of the Nationalist government’s defeat was corruption, which destroyed the morale of the military. Chinese soldiers have witnessed systematic corruption in the post-Mao era, so they will not be willing to sacrifice for corrupted Chinese military leaders. To regain morale, China must reform its political system, clean up corrupted military officials, change the compulsory military service system, and improve Chinese soldiers’ salaries and benefits.

Seventh, peaceful resolution to resolve territorial disputes remains the first choice for both sides. The goal of diplomacy is to persuade your enemy to surrender without a fight. A weak country does not have diplomacy. National comprehensive power determines diplomatic confidence; and military power and popular support provide the precondition for winning war. If a country’s comprehensive power is insufficient, it can only deal with territory disputer through unequal diplomacy. If the military is powerful and the people’s aspirations are strong, military force deterrence should cooperate with diplomatic means. If a country is not ready, it must not advocate war. Otherwise, the government would lose its credibility at home and abroad. China and the U.S. still have sufficient time to take diplomatic measures to fulfill their mission without any cost. In addition, a possible war over the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait is not a conventional land war but sea-air warfare. If war occurs over the region, the U.S. superiority in the ASB is still absolute and China’s military attempts would fail although China has massive ground troops and the largest size of navy force in the world.

Eighth, Russia could be a negative equity for China on the global stage and will not help China win war with the U.S. after Russian invasion of Ukraine. China has very few allies whereas American allies in the Pacific include Japan, Australia, and South Korea. While China is losing its neighboring friends, the U.S. has been strengthening its alliance with China’s neighboring countries, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and India. Other countries, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Myanmar are drawing closer to the U.S. The Chinese government views the regional tension as the outcome of Washington’s “returning to Asia” policy. Under this circumstance, China needs help from Russia to avoid escalating confrontations with multiple neighboring countries. In a global context, Russia has played a considerable role in China–U.S. relations since the Cold War. The recent development of China–Russia relations has once again raised American concerns about the implications of Beijing–Moscow relations. Many experts believe that China’s motive for deepening its relations with Russia is anti-America. According to the joint statement between Russia and China released before the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games, the two countries’ relationship has no limits and there are no forbidden areas. Now there are two parallel geopolitical conflicts—the Ukraine–Russia war and China–U.S. tension over the Taiwan Strait. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed that the China–Russia partnership is solid as stone and the Sino-Russian partnership continues, no matter how serious the international situation is. China’s current stance seems that China has fully thrown itself into a de facto alliance with Russia.

China and Russia are almost impossible to form a solid partnership. Superficially, the top leaders of the two countries can get along but their personal relationship cannot be automatically translated into foreign policy and military alliances. The restoration of the friendship between Beijing and Moscow is mainly driven by their domestic pressures and security concerns. A stable relationship between the two countries will relieve the financial burdens in support of the hostility along the sizeable border. Beijing and Moscow also have common interests to work together. Beijing demands more oil and natural gas from Russia and needs more advanced military weapons supplies, including submarines, warships, and aircraft. Russia wants more investments from China to speed up the development of the Russian economy. Arguably, China does not really need military technologies from Russia. For example, the Chinese J-20 fighter is more advanced than Su-35, equivalent to Russia’s T50 and the U.S. F-22. The purpose of China to purchase 24 Su-35 is not to bridge the gap between Chinese and U.S. military power, but to show its sincerity to consolidate its ties with Russia by offering economic incentives. Strategically, they believe that the two nations face similar strategic challenge posed by the U.S. and its allies: NATO expansion for Russia and the U.S. conflicts with China over the Taiwan Strait. On the global stage, they stand against American hegemony with sovereignty and non-intervention as their core values.90

China’s quick move closer to Russia has not convinced the Russian people to believe that China is trustworthy in part because of the inconsistency of Chinese foreign policy. China aligned with Russia in the 1950s and with the U.S. in the 1970s but implemented a nonaligned policy in the 1980s. In recent years, the Russian protests against the Chinese economic invasion have taken place from time to time. The most recent Russian protests took place in March 2019, which were triggered by a China-funded project to bottle water from Russia’s Lake Baikal that has caused environmental problems and made Russian people very angry. The Russian protests indicate that the China–Russia tie is fragile.91 China’s move closer to Russia has received a lukewarm response from public opinion in China. The Chinese people also have reasons to doubt Moscow’s sincerity. China is not happy that Russia has maintained close military ties with and sold advanced weapons to India and Vietnam, both are locked in territorial disputes with China.92 From a historical perspective, Russia occupied China’s territories totaling more than four million square kilometers from 1689 to 1898, forced China to sign the Yalta Agreement for recognizing Outer Mongolia as an independent country in the 1940s, and stopped all financial and technological aid during the Chinese economic crisis in the 1960s. Finally, Zhen Bao Island military conflict in Heilongjiang Province broke out in 1969. Although in 1991 Russia acknowledged that the island belonged to China, the tension between the two countries along the 2500 miles long border remained high until the Chinese military troops retreated 500 km in 2008. In addition, China cannot forget that Russia took the territories in northeast China more than 100 years ago. On 2 July 2020, the Russian embassy in Beijing posted a video of a party celebrating the 160th anniversary of the founding of Vladivostok, which means “ruler of the east” in Russian and was annexed from China by the Tsarist empire in 1860. The video reminded the Chinese emotions over historic wounds and prompted an online backlash with the posts such as “Today we can only endure, but the Chinese people will remember!” “This ancestral land will return home in the future!”93 In comparison with China–U.S. relations, the U.S. never had a single territory dispute with China, so the Chinese people have not had a similar historical complex toward the U.S. The mutual distrust between China and Russia partially explains why Chinese students do not enthusiastically choose to study in Russia. According to Russian media, in 2020, only about 48,000 Chinese students studied in Russian universities while 20,000 Russian students were in Chinese universities.94 By contrast, more than 317,000 Chinese students enrolled in U.S. institutions in 2020/21 regardless of Covid-19 spread across the country. The list of other favorite destinations for Chinese students does not include Russia, but Britain, Australia, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Singapore, and South Korea. As a result, Russian culture has little impact on Chinese society and intellectual circle while American culture is very popular in China. The future of Sino-Russia relations will be tested by public opinion in both countries. It is expected that it would be difficult for both countries to continue drawing closer without the support of the public opinion.

For now, the status of Sino-Russia relations is not a full-fledged alliance, but a quasi-alliance. It seems that China and Russia are closer than ever. Although a close relationship between China and Russia could help China to get more advantage in bargaining with the U.S. to smoothly solve its territorial disputes with neighboring countries, in the long run, China will gain less but lose more in the great power competition when China moves closer to Russia. Moscow and Beijing are on their honeymoon now, but it may not last long. On the one hand, China’s initial move closer to Russia reflects that Chinese leaders lack confidence in dealing with potential regional crises alone. Beijing does not necessarily have the intention to save Russia, but it must save the Putin’s regime in order to retain Xi Jinping’s power and the one-party system. On the other hand, Russia will not satisfy with its lower position under Xi’s umbrella after Russia becomes significantly weaker because of the failures of Putin’s war with Ukraine. Russian ambassador already made it clear that Russia does not seek an alliance with China. If China unilaterally pursued the goal, the result would be poor. Therefore, it is un-matured to predict that China and Russia will become alliances in a decade. According to Schell-Shirk China Task Force, “China’s alignment is not set in stone. There are significant ways in which China’s long-term national interests are not, in fact, aligned with Russia’s, and deft U.S. diplomacy might still be able to find ways to temper Beijing’s alliance with Moscow.”95 In the long term, Beijing and Moscow might have more potential conflicts than cooperation and could become main competitors or rivals down the road. It is not wise for Chinese leaders to distance themselves from the U.S. by overplaying the “Russian card.” Essentially, China–U.S. relations will continue to be the top priority of China’s foreign policy, when the CCP carefully balances the triangle relations between China and the U.S. and Russia.