The aff’s epistemic diversity fragments the ability to exert national interests in diplomacy.
Ronfeldt & Arquilla 18 (David, Independent Analyst, retired analyst for the RAND Corporation. John, phD in political science from Stanford University, Faculty at US Naval Postgraduate School, coined the concept of “netwar.” “The Continuing Promise of the Noösphere and Noöpolitik — Twenty Years After.” May 2018. p 11-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259425 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259425 //shree)
The noosphere concept carries a set of standards for strategy. This is clearest if strategy is understood not only as an art of relating ends, ways, and means, but also as an art of positioning for spatial, temporal, and actional advantages. Then, valuing the noosphere strategically means thinking and acting in global/planetary ways (spatially), while minding long-range future end-stakes (temporally), and creating new means or forms of agency to shape problems and opportunities at all scales (actionally).
Indeed, the noosphere concept, like the biosphere concept, has long implied an end to Westphalian realpolitik-type thinking that nation-states are the most important actors and that material factors matter most. Now, in the information age, other actors and factors increasingly matter more. Reflecting this, proponents of the noosphere helped inspire the establishment of “noospheric institutions” such as the United Nations and UNESCO, as well as Green Cross International, and a range of activist civil-society NGOs (Samson & Pitt, p. 184-185). The time may come, as we propose in Section VI, when aspects and/or parts of the noosphere are defined as belonging to the “global commons” (and vice-versa).
All these points about the noosphere apply to our vision of noopolitik. In a grand sense, the purpose of noopolitik is to prepare the way advantageously for the age of the noosphere, while also protecting the biosphere and geosphere. In a more practical sense, our early definition of noopolitik still reads well, even in light of our updated analysis of the noosphere concept:
“In sum, noöpolitik is an approach to diplomacy and strategy for the information age that emphasizes the shaping and sharing of ideas, values, norms, laws, and ethics through soft power. Noöpolitik is guided more by a conviction that right makes for might, than the obverse. Both state and non–state actors may be guided by noöpolitik; but rather than being state–centric, its strength may well stem from enabling state and non–state actors to work conjointly. The driving motivation of noöpolitik cannot be national interests defined in statist terms. National interests will still play a role, but should be defined more in society–wide than state–centric terms and be fused with broader, even global, interests in enhancing the transnationally networked “fabric” in which the players are embedded. While realpolitik tends to empower states, noöpolitik will likely empower networks of state and non–state actors. Realpolitik pits one state against another, but noöpolitik encourages states to cooperate in coalitions and other mutual frameworks. In all these respects, noöpolitik contrasts with realpolitik.” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1999; Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 2007)
While all this implies that the noosphere begs for strategic thinking, we’ve seen arguments that a key component of the noosphere, cyberspace, is “ill-suited for grand strategic theories” — the challenges it poses and the technologies it rests on are said to be changing too rapidly and uncertainly for such thinking, at least for the time being (Libicki, 2014, p. 33). Do such arguments also apply to the noosphere? We think not. By comparison, the noosphere is a more complex, vastly larger, indeed cyberspace-encompassing “space” — and it too is evolving uncertainly, if perhaps less rapidly. And the noosphere is even more difficult to pin down than cyberspace. Yet, our view, along with the views of others we discussed above, is that the noosphere does require grand strategic thinking. In our case, that means advancing the concept of noopolitik.
Besides, let’s notice that U.S. strategy has long aimed to “assure access to and use of the global commons” — its sea, air, and space domains — and cyber has lately been added to that set of domains (Denmark & Mulvenon, 2010; Jasper, 2012). Thus, cyberspace now seems increasingly headed for grand strategic theorizing. It makes sense to expect the noosphere, in at least some respects, to eventually be deemed part of the global commons. Starting to see the noosphere from a global-commons perspective may even help with framing and specifying what noopolitik is all about, as we further discuss in Section VI.