Realist academic training is key to defeat Putin---their IR models are flawed because they underestimate the importance of unipolarity for peace

(Robert, “The Return of the Problem-Solvers,” http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/19/the-return-of-the-problem-solvers/)

A caveat here is that I began as a historian and turned into a political scientist, though I have indicted my field in the past for its ignorance of history, especially in theory-building. I have also had the benefit of working in academia, policy, and now in the think-tank world, so I have insights into all three. Schindler is correct to point out that academics typically make lousy policy-makers, especially in modern IR. IR has become a field more focused on sociology and philosophy than one interested in real world events and policy. This has been evident in the current crisis in Ukraine when everything the Putin regime has been doing has challenged the predominant assumptions in IR as it currently exists. Imagine the shock of IR scholars when Putin failed to recognize that we live in a “post-sovereign” world where “states don’t invade other states anymore” and “complex interdependence” deters states from that outdated Cold War thinking because of liberal economic links. Oops.∂ Where I would disagree with Schindler is that I would say not all IR experts, political scientists or historians are meant to be, or want to be, policy-makers. I have not met many postmodern IR scholars itching to write a policy brief on military procurement – for which I am thankful because it would likely be 200 pages of Derridian discourse analysis.∂ Schindler does have a point in noting those currently making US foreign policy are totally lost. However, I do not believe they “know nothing” – in fact, I think the senior officials in the Obama Administration know a lot. The problem is that what they know is premised on flawed assumptions about the way the world actually works, making them ill-equipped to deal with difficult foreign and defence policy issues.∂ Appointing a group of utopians who call for humanitarian intervention (or worse yet, R2P) at every turn, who believe democracy can be imposed and grown, who believe war is somehow obsolete, and whose assumptions are premised on cooperation, cosmopolitanism and solidarism is highly problematic. It was equally as problematic during the Bush Administration when foreign policy was being driven by neoconservative beliefs in pre-emptive strikes and American divine superiority. In essence, no foreign policy establishment is ever going to function well, especially in times of crisis, if it is stacked with like-minded political cronies. The most effective groups are those that are comprised of individuals with varying areas of expertise or ideological preference. A good leader wants to hear from realists and liberals, political scientists and historians, etc and make decisions that encompass the best knowledge possible.∂ When it comes to educating the next generation of policy-makers, there is a problem facing the academy and the crises in Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that. The assumptions that now dominate IR emerged in the unipolar era without seeing major war and the ugly side of great power politics but as the system begins to shift and international politics continue to evolve, those pesky realists need to be dusted off and brought back into the conversation, even if they are not leading the discussions.∂ I do not believe that every academic needs to do policy-oriented work and that there is a place for what Robert Cox would call “critical theories”. At the same time, I think recent events demonstrate the pressing need for traditional, problem-solving understandings and the less the academy produces experts in those approaches, the more the Putin’s of the world will continue to make the US (and other western states) look as inept as they currently do.