Their own author advocates against banning examples

All of this strongly argues for reform. Banning fictional experiments in patents is an attractive solution, given the findings herein, but likely too drastic an institutional change (for now). Instead, I argue that we should not think about fictional experiments as prophecies – a name that carries of ring of accuracy and infallibility – but rather as hypotheses – testable predictions that may or may not turn out to be correct. 41 The shift from prophecies to hypotheses has several practical implications. First, it would reverse the current legal presumption that prophetic examples are enabled (i.e. that they work as written), since, as I show empirically, there is simply no reason to assume accuracy. Second, we should give inventors a grace period after filing to test their hypotheses and update prophetic examples with real results. Finally, we should require prophetic examples to be clearly labeled and to include some explanation about why the inventor expects the experiment to work. These changes all reflect that the predicted results are possibilities, not inevitabilities, and the shift can preserve what value such speculation has, while mitigating the clear harms that now prevail.