Reject links about non-intellectual property regimes—they’re fundamentally non-analogous.
Menell, 16—Koret Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Peter, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Social Justice: Mapping the Next Frontier,” Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference Journal 5 (2016): 147-196, dml)
As a result of these fundamental differences between tangible and intangible resources, we must be especially cautious in extrapolating positive and normative precepts and ramifications from the realm of tangible resources to the analysis of intangible resources. Simple rules, such as full ownership and automatic injunctions, do not presumptively "carry over" to intangible resources. Policy analysis must address the protection of intangible resources based upon the underlying economic, social, and human effects. More complex tangible property rules--such as nuisance, servitudes, and trespass to chattels--provide some useful models for intellectual property regimes. Conventional property rules and institutions provide insight and useful metaphors, but they cannot substitute for detailed analysis of the particular characteristics of the resources; the human, cultural, social, technological, and historical dimensions of the communities in which the resources are situated; and the attributes and limitations of the full range of available institutions.