That risks a full nuclear exchange

If a non-state group realized that the possession of nuclear weapons could trigger a total catalytic war between two or more major nuclear-armed states, what possible situations might set these dynamics in motion? The potential success of a catalytic nuclear detonation by a terrorist group during a crisis between two nuclear-armed states (i.e., the original target of the nefarious attack and the victim of a subsequent inadvertent retaliatory strike), when tensions are running high, and a heightened state of alert is in place – at a nuclear or sub-nuclear level – would likely be amplified. That is, a broader nuclear exchange would likely occur. Moreover, a non-state actor might exploit a tense situation by making provocative false claims that its attack had been sanctioned by the state with which the victim of the attack was already in a crisis, or worse still, nuclear brinkmanship. Against the backdrop of fear, acrimony, and paranoia – when decision-makers are more susceptible to misperception and misunderstanding – any denials or assurances would fall on deaf ears.24 If a repeat of the 1999 Kargil crisis or the more recent Indian-Pakistani stand-off in 2019, a non-state nuclear detonation (or the credible threat of one) could spark an accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange. 25 Thus, any confidence Indian or Pakistani has in their ability to manage a conflict below the nuclear-level would likely be unreliable in the event of a non-state nuclear attack. Absent unambiguous and incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, an unprovoked non-state attack may compound mutual suspicions about the other side’s intentions and behavior, and in turn, confirm worst-case scenario assessments. 26