The 1AC relies on War on Terror logics to construct threat scenarios which cause ontological anxiety and violence---that turns case and veils the imperialistic sentiment the aff relies on

Formation of the Risk-Societies and the Sliding Signifiers of the Precarious Self Through the mobilisation of fear alongside the unsettling display of formidable sovereign power in envisaging the pleasures and risk with the uncanny elements of the crony capitalist economy, Western liberal democracies with the end of the Cold War and biopolitical power adhere to the uncanniness of the “war of terror”. Assessing what it might mean to the politics of precautionary risk to its circulation value and the articulations of risk and “risk consciousness” (Beck 1992: 34) under the rise of liberal traumatised subject within the context of the “War on Terror”, Jean Baudrillard aptly contends regarding the September 11, 2001: “The fact that we have dreamed of this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree – is unacceptable to the Western moral conscience” (Baudrillard 2002:5). What Baudrillard professes is the unconscious sincerity—the flurry of dreams and the important insights into the unconscious consciousness of risk and the “War on Terror”. And the shift to Risk Society from the Industrial one with the political and industrial narratives, Ulrich Beck harbours on the fallacy of the historical past in paving the way for the “European global domestic policy” and “ecological enlightenment” (Beck 1999: 69–70). The “War on Terror” with its ontological anxiety, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen finds, palpably present in the Western consciousness in the 1990s and the lack of clear revelation from al-Qaeda on the purpose behind the attack on the Twin Towers construes the framework of globalisation that influences the Western framings of post-Cold War world order and the Western anxieties. Here Rasmussen’s version of justification is worth quoting: This way of constructing 9/11 shows the reflexive nature of security policy in the late modern age. The new reflexivity manifested itself in the conclusion that even the U.S. had become a vulnerable ‘risk society.’ […] Terrorism is regarded as an inherent risk in modern sociability because it is constructed as the negative consequence of the globalization process. The very process by which the West is believed to be transcending the modes of conflict and production of the 20th Century thus entails the creation of new threats and new modes of conflict. (Rasmussen 2002: 327) Rasmussen’s framework of the declared and undeclared and the known and unknown which forms the crux of globalisation with imperialist consciousness makes a sense of breach between the knowledge of “structural risks” and the apprehension of these risks about the subject at risk. As Baudrillard and Rasmussen establish a sense of foreboding risk before 9/11 under the global political order of variable power relations, the “globalization” process emerged out of the innumerable phenomenon linked with the end of the Cold War finds a bodily tension in the proclamations of Western leaders as President Bush after the 9/11 attacks announced that the “barbarians had declared war” (Rasmussen 2002: 333) only to create “us” and “them” with the gloomy side of globalisation and cultural convictions of superiority. Phenomenologically, the shifting realms of “us” and “them” attracts the essence of the popular refrain—“Why do they hate us so much?” And this is explicitly showcased by Mohsin Hamid in The Reluctant Fundamentalist (2007) with the disorientation between the fantasy and the substantiality of globalisation under the rubric of terror/fear. With Changez we can palpably feel the racialisation and segregation, as the narrator in the text recapitulates his life and times in New York, It was a testament to the open-mindedness and – that overused word – cosmopolitan nature of New York in those days that I felt completely comfortable on the subway in this attire [“a starched white kurta of delicately worked cotton over a pair of jeans”]. Indeed, no one seemed to take much notice of me at all. (Hamid 2007: 55) Hamid also begins his narrative: “I was a New Yorker with a city at my feet. How soon that would change!” (51) to suggest the shifting frames of paranoia with the fetishised harnessing of strange and visceral emotions. Here, the repercussions of global politics of fear as a repressed unconscious risk proffers the calculus of anxiety/risk—reinvigorating the sign of imperialism, as Ahmed argues that Bush “turns the act of terror into an act of war, which would seek to eliminate the source of fear and transform the world into a place whereby the mobility of some capital and some bodies becomes the sign of freedom and civilisation” (Ahmed 2004: 73). The affective and shared phenomenological inclination to the joy of killing the aliens with the pleasures of risk, or what Žižek has succinctly put as the “unknown knowns” (Žižek 2006: 52), becomes a strange imperative. Drawing on Žižek’s foregrounding of anti-Semitism, it can be argued that fundamentalist activities in proximity to Islam has been “invested with our unconscious desire” and this particularities transport us “to escape a certain deadlock of desire” with the threatening of all substantive bonds of liberal democratic essence, what he finds as the “pathological stain” of democracy, that fail to deliver its belonging and subscription to a nation-state unprejudiced. (Žižek’s 1989: 48). The desire-machine works in tandem with the spectres of modernity—it embodies a duality and irresolvable aporia at the heart of the project of the western nation-state. In his State of the Union address in the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush said, “Freedom is at risk and America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it” (“Text of President Bush” Washington Post 2002). Here the rhetorical explanation of the narrative between the people’s freedom and the terrorists’ hatred of it finds a structural alterity in his other address to an anti-terrorism summit of Central and Eastern European leaders held in November 2001. Bush categorically exhorts the dangers inherent by proclaiming that “given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilization itself” (“Transcript” Washington Post 2001). Bush’s narrative about Islam and the Western civilisation stands as a totem of the “pleasures of risk” (Lacan 2006: 52) in the Lacanian “jouissance” with the unconscious fantasies under the structures of desire of the “post-political biopolitics” (Žižek Violence 2009: 34) as the central concern of politics. Žižek has expounded the crisis of liberalism at the end of the Cold War in the same way Francis Fukuyama laments the passing of ideology, identity and recognition in the age of post-politics, The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism, will be replaced by an economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-history period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. (Fukuyama 1989: 17–18) The official rhetoric and disastrous provocations of state leaders weaponise the stakes of the War on Terror by validating the ceaseless war narrative of civilisation and the civilised. Mohsin Hamid in “Discontent and Its Civilizations,” unsettles Samuel P. Huntington’s pre-9/11 postulation that civilisations adhered by religion and ethnicity rather than political ideology of nation-states, will define the essence of global politics in the 21st century. These notions of civilisations “are illusions, but these illusions are pervasive, dangerous, and powerful. They contribute to globalisation’s brutality. They allow us, for example to say that we believe in global free markets and, in the same breath, to discount as impossible the global free movement of labor” (Hamid 2015: 8). Representationally conflated with Huntington as what they (both Bush and Huntington) uphold the values of Western civilisation, the disavowal of cultural realm under civilised/ uncivilised construction of civilisational taboo that enforces the hate of the other smouldering as a cultural legacy of late-modern Europe testifies to a shift in the orientation of the assimilative forces of secular modernity.