Pools fail, internal issues and abusive ownership collapse pools inwards
Michael Renaud et al. 20, Michael Renaud is the chair of the Mintz’s IP division and has a JD in law from the University of Connecticut School of Law, 10-30-2020, "The Patent Pool Explained: An Effective Mechanism When the Burden is Shared," IPWatchdog, https://ipwatchdog.com/2020/10/30/the-patent-pool-explained-an-effective-mechanism-when-the-burden-is-shared/id=126859//susu
The market benefits of pools are not fully realized and, in some cases, entirely destroyed when the burdens are not shared equally. Expecting one party to shoulder all of the costs, such as requiring litigation-grade validity and essentiality checks, leads to an abusive market position, such as, e.g., hold-out. Such tactics frustrate the market benefits that pools are intended to foster, and drive parties into the very thing patent pools were designed to prevent: litigation.
In our next article, we examine some unfounded critiques of the patent pool system, and how these misunderstandings of patent pools lead to market inequities when parties refuse to entertain licensing discussions with a pool administrator.