It decreases patent application and innovation
Ryan Lampe and Petra Moser 15, Ryan Lampe is a professor of economics at California State University, Petra Moser is a professor of economics at Stern School of Business at NYU, 8-3-2015, "Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal", OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article/32/1/1/2579509//susu
For pool technologies, patent applications declined after the creation of a pool, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative definitions of the control. In pool subclasses, patent applications declined from 2.54 per subclass and year before the creation of a pool to 2.40 afterwards (Table 2), and from 2.80 to 2.48 within a 10-year window before and after the creation of a pool (Figure 1). In cross-reference subclasses, patent applications increased from 2.70 before the creation of a pool to 2.94 afterwards (Table 2), and from 2.94 to 3.02 within a 10-year window (Figure 1). In the broader control group that includes all subclasses in the same class, patent applications increased from 1.00 per year before the creation of a pool to 1.11 afterwards (Table 2).