Loss of legitimacy causes diversionary war and escalation.

In 2018 Xi Jinping shattered longstanding norms within the regime’s inner circle. In positioning himself to rule for life, Xi created enemies among the ruling elite, who were already deeply displeased by his politically motivated anti-corruption campaign. Xi now confronts profound threats from senior members of the elite. His central task is to survive them. To do so, I argue, he will craft a foreign policy that embraces diversionary aggression. That is, he will initiate international conflicts in order to build the sort of public nationalism that makes it difficult for elites to challenge him. The result will be a more aggressive, destabilizing, and unpredictable foreign policy.

China’s “rise” is among the great challenges of the 21st century, in part because China’s domestic politics compel risky behavior on the international stage. Xi’s attempts to consolidate power have made diversionary foreign policy more likely, but China’s political system itself incentivizes this behavior. Indeed, my research suggests that diversionary aggression may account for as much as 40 percent of all conflict that the Chinese government initiates with the United States.

It is critically important for U.S. policymakers to distinguish between diversionary aggression, which evaporates with the resolution of China’s domestic tensions, and revisionist aggression, in which China seeks to permanently reshape the strategic landscape in East Asia. For the United States, responding to diversion as though it were revision risks antagonizing China precisely when Xi is trying to appear tough on foreigners. This risks creating a spiral of escalating conflict. Yet responding to revision as though it were diversion also carries risk: allowing China to expand its influence in East Asia unchecked.

When does China employ diversionary aggression? How can U.S. policymakers recognize it? And how should Washington respond? Fortunately, China’s diversionary aggression emanates at specific moments and has key distinguishing features, which I discuss below. Ultimately, the U.S. government should respond to diversion with strategic restraint, and to revisionism with containment.

THE REASON

Why would tensions between Xi Jinping and senior government officials compel the Chinese government to initiate conflicts with the United States? Understanding this requires understanding China’s domestic political struggles, which are competitive, factional, and ubiquitous. Deng Xiaoping ousted Mao’s successor in a bloodless coup in 1978. The Bo Xilai affair scandalized the regime in 2012. And today, rumors of assassination attempts against senior leaders are common. Accordingly, Chinese presidents take steps to insulate themselves from the conspiracies of regime insiders. This is how China’s diversionary foreign policy should be understood.

Scholars have long believed that autocrats can employ popular support to inoculate themselves against elite conspiracies. This dynamic was first observed by Machiavelli, who wrote that “one of the most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people.” When a conspirator “can only look forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such a course.”

Machiavelli’s observation has special implications for China, where the population is widely regarded as nationalist. Citizens express high support for the government in international conflict scenarios. For instance, when presented with a hypothetical dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Chinese survey respondents overwhelmingly support not only Chinese defense of the islands against Japan, but even Chinese invasion of the islands. International crises enable leaders to showcase their competence and cue an “us-versus-them” dynamic that fosters national solidarity and, in turn, domestic support. Domestic support protects Xi against dissatisfied elites, who recognize that toppling a popular leader would invite a backlash.

In short, diversionary aggression is an investment. When elites are dissatisfied, Xi can employ diversionary aggression to cue nationalism among Chinese citizens and so inoculate himself from elite conspiracies.