Even if TK protections could do something good they would need to be of – infinite duration, and we would need to acknowledge that these methods often do not bring much economic viability to the tribes
Munzer* and Raustala**09 *Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. **Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Director, Ronald W. Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA. (Stephen R.*, Kal.*, “The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge”, Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, Vol. 27 (2009), pp. 37-97, 2009, UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 09-16, https://www.cardozoaelj.com/wp-content/uploads/Journal%20Issues/Volume%2027/Issue%201/Munzer.pdf, DOA: 6/29/24)//LFS – LMH
Two main points circumscribe our discussion. First, we take as central that a justification for TK rights should support rights of indefinite duration. We do so because TK advocates routinely stress indefinite duration and often point out that precisely in this way should normative TK differ from other IP rights. Indeed, it is implicit in the very concept of "traditional knowledge" that the knowledge in question is fairly old, and in many cases would, as a result, fall outside the bounds of ordinary IP rights.53 The practical terms of the current debate over TK thus lead us to view indefinite duration as central. Second, arguments based on distributive justice lie outside the scope of this Article, for two reasons.54 One is the impossibility of examining such arguments in depth within a single article even of substantial length. There are many such principles, even among those limited to distributive justice within a given society or nation-state. There are even more if one examines principles designed to work internationally, as the burgeoning literature on global justice makes plain. A different reason is that the practical impact of principles of distributive justice on IP rights in TK is doubtful. There may be many grounds for redistributing resources to indigenous peoples. Yet it is far from obvious that robust IP rights in TK would be an effective means for doing so, for the economic value of these rights is apt to be highly variable across indigenous peoples. Many such rights, even if vigorously enforced, would likely have little economic value.