Social formation is prior to both action and being—only a social ethics predicated on role ethics can overcome systems of antiqueerness. Ontological frames lock in those systems of hatred while Confucian theorizing creates new pathways for social growth that can overcome them.

Alternatively, one might think of groups as associations. Associations, such as clubs, churches, political parties, or teams, are formally organized institutions (Young 1990: 44). But these rely on a voluntary, contractual model of relations, where individuals exist as complete persons prior to group membership. If car owners were to organize as a group in need of political representation or social accommodation, they might form such an association. As with the aggregate model, this model for group identity is unable to adequately account for those group memberships I am identifying here as sociopolitically constitutive of the self. If an oppressed identity is a voluntary association (as many antiqueer spokespeople in fact assert with the use of terms like “lifestyle”), then one’s oppression is one’s own fault; one’s identity is supposedly a choice. Neither aggregates nor associations adequately capture the experience of group oppression, nor do they capture the constitutive nature of social groups (Young 1990: 43). A social group is defined instead by a sense of identity—a self-identification with a social status and its common history—that is not exclusively the product of one’s volition (Young 1990: 44). Young writes that group identification is a matter of encountering another collectivity whose cultural forms, practices, and way of life differ from one’s own and where one’s own are shared with some others. One will share a sense of identity with those who share one’s way of life because of similar experiences, such as coming out, homophobia, racism, xenophobia, erasure, misogyny, and so on (Young 1990: 43). Social groups, therefore, are neither arbitrary nor voluntary. Moreover, insofar as a social group’s relationships to other groups and the individual experiences constituting the shared sense of identity of its members constitute that social group’s identity, any given social group is defined contextually and provisionally. The description Young offers mirrors the notion of role-relational constitution from earlier. First, there is no preexisting core self who then adopts these social group identities. Instead, one’s process of individuation is partially shaped by these social groups. Second and third, just as one is born into a matrix of unchosen familial relations, one is born into a constellation of unchosen group identities (e.g., ablebodied, Chinese, cisgender, bisexual, and so on). Thus one’s individuated person is a unique focal integration of these various different group identities. Fourth, these social groups are relationally defined. Just as what it means to be a parent depends on what it means to be a child, a grandparent, and so on, what it means to be cisgender depends on what it means to be transgender, gender nonconforming, and so on. Finally, these social group identities are underdetermined. What it means to be Chinese today continues to evolve, just as what it means to be lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, pansexual, and so on continues to evolve with each generation. In these ways, Young’s ontology of social groups is analogous to the role-relational ontology in Confucian role ethics in that both see identities as unique, multifaceted, in-process, and contextually forged. Moreover, both see the ideal society as one that appreciates the differences among these various identities. This conception of social groups explains the phenomenon of chosen families detailed above. If elements of one’s identity are cocreated with others insofar as one needs others to affirm that identity and also to educate one in the history, cultural forms, practices, and ways of life of that identity, then finding and developing kin relations to do just that is a matter not just of flourishing but of survival itself. This is particularly interesting for Confucian ethics because the Confucian focus on family relations as the root of personhood (as necessary for survival and flourishing) is in a sense affirmed by the queer construction of chosen families. These are not simply circles of friends, predominantly queer neighborhoods, or online forums. Queer persons are often forming kin relations to establish themselves and to flourish as members of their social group, a social phenomenon that is consistent with the role-relational ontology of Confucianism but thus far not discussed by Confucian scholars. Moreover, the particular example of contemporary queer life in the United States requires both models of social constitution for a complete explanation.