Denying the sociocultural basis of morality is not only wrong but an active form of intellectual imperialism

As representatives of post-Enlightenment theories, the liberalist and positivist principles of morality propagate a universalist set of rules and regulations to judge moral matters that set out to be value-free and universal (Curchin, 2007;Hsiung, 2021; Smith, 2021). This difference-ignoring approach is criticised for appearing as justice on the surface while in reality, it reflects the positioning of the white Western male and the alienation and belittling of non-Western cultures and domestic minorities (Xu, 2012). Therefore, liberalist and positivist principles actually are a form of particularism disguised as moral universalism, a covert endeavour to practice cultural hegemonic power. The very concepts of human being, freedom, humanity, and individuality are considered as Euro-centric mechanisms of repression (Beck & Sznaider, 2011). It is apparent that both moral universalism and cultural particularism (or cultural pluralism), advocated by some Foucauldian theorists, have their limitations. An ontological clarification away from both post-Enlightenment moral universalism and cultural particularism (or cultural pluralism) is perhaps needed. First, cultural particularism presumes all cultures have equal value—which is not to say that all artistic and creative elements within a culture have equal realistic value (Mead, 1934). Moreover, to be considered a ‘culture’, its elements and practices must nurture a complete society for an extended period of time, and every culture goes through peaks and troughs. This dynamic conceptualization of culture does not suppose any simplistic equality between cultures. Therefore, I argue that the specific matter of morality must be verified through targeted research and intercultural dialogue (Taylor, 2003). If it is decided, without thorough research and dialogue, that all cultures hold equal realistic value, cultural differences are predetermined and hardly worth acknowledging. A culture needs to be treated with meaningful respect instead of condescension, and therefore notions of cultural equality should be more nuanced and thought through, rather than be shaped by blindly following the liberalist approach. The second clarification, just as Foucauldian theorists advocated, is that the rational and reasonable individual, on which liberalism (or at least, procedural liberalism) and positivism are based, cannot exist prior to the social; indeed, the individual is embedded within the social (Xu, 2012). If Foucault’s perspective on disciplinary power is applied to the self in its cultural context, ‘the self’ ceases to be defined as an object of respect but rather as a member or representative of cliques and factions. This definition derails the discussion of morality and ethics; according to Foucault (1979: 135), all value judgements that are imposed on the individual through disciplinary power share the aim of producing human beings that could be regarded as ‘docile bodies’. As Taylor (1991) suggested, the self is formed within social inter-action and thereby is inevitably shaped by cultural and linguistic contexts that include the exertion of disciplinary power. However, this does not mean that an individual merely obeys cultural norms and traditional practices (Butleret al., 2018). Although they cannot escape the influence of social context, an individual has the capability of reflecting on moral matters (Callero, 2003).