“United States” excludes sub-federal actors.

Claimants argue that the statute's broad, “pre-civil war” definition of “United States”—meaning the several states and territories—when applied to subsection (f)(1), gives Rhode Island a cause of action. Claimants also argue that the provisions in subsection (f)(4), measuring liability to include costs incurred by a state government, and subsection (f)(5), requiring a state's authorized representative to act as a trustee to recover costs of restoration, confirm that states have standing under section 311 of the FWPCA to sue the shipowner.

2 But this selective reading of the statute misses more direct language that only supports a cause of action by the federal government. The language of the statute must be given its ordinary meaning, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980), and this Court must be chary of reading into the statute any remedies that are not expressly stated there, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14–15, 18, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623–24, 2625, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). A common-sense reading of the statute compels the conclusion that states have no standing to sue under section 311. Subsection (f)(1) plainly makes shipowners and operators liable only “to the United States Government” for costs incurred during the removal of oil. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988). The last sentence of this section adds: “The United States may also bring an action against the owner or operator of such vessel....” Id. “United States Government” and “United States” mean the federal government.

The broad definition of “United States” in subsection (a)(5)—which includes the several states but conspicuously leaves out the federal government—would make little sense if it were applied to this context, as Claimants propose. To apply the broad definition set forth in subsection (a)(5) wherever the term “United States” appears in section 311 would be folly. For example, “district court of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B) (1988), can mean nothing but the federal district courts. The meaning of “United States” in this context is obvious, and no one would suggest that it includes the states.

The broad definition in subsection (a)(5) relates, not to the courts empowered with jurisdiction or the sovereigns that have standing to sue, but to the geographical scope of potential liability under section 311 of the FWPCA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a)(10), (a)(11), (a)(15), (a)(16), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3), and (b)(4). Thus, an oil spill in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands may touch the “United States” and create liability under the FWPCA, but the Trust *724 Territory of the Pacific Islands must rely on the “United States Government”—the appropriate federal authorities—to bring suit under Section 311.

Congress could have given the states explicit, separate authority to bring suit under section 311, but it did not. In other parts of this section, Congress recognized a distinction between the “United States” and “a State or political subdivision thereof.” E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(4) (1988). This distinction indicates that, subsection (a)(5) notwithstanding, Congress did not intend to include the several states every time it used the words “United States” in section 311. When Congress intended to include the governments of the several states, it explicitly spoke of states in addition to the “United States.”

Additional linguistic clues support this conclusion. Congress conferred this right of action on a capitalized and singular United States “Government, ” instead of the lower-case and plural “governments.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988). Had Congress used the word “governments,” this arguably could have suggested an investment in the states of authority to bring suit under the FWPCA. But Congress chose a more restrictive word. Other usage of “United States” in section 311—such as the phrases “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” “United States citizenship,” and “international agreement to which the United States is a party,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(17) (1988)—provides even more evidence that Congress assigned “United States” its ordinary meaning, except when describing the geographic scope of liability under section 311.

While ambiguity may exist, “United States” and “United States Government” can mean only one sovereign in the context of subsection (f)(1), and that is the federal government.