It’s not just US and China
Dr. Michael Raska & Richard Bitzinger 23. Ph.D. from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Assistant Professor in the Military Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, member of the expert advisory group for the Global Commission on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain; Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. April 2023. The AI Wave in Defence Innovation, “Introduction,” Ch. 1. gautam
The starting assumption underlying this book is that the diffusion of AI systems appears to be fundamentally different from past experiences, notably the diffusion of information technologies (IT) into defence during the 1970s–2010s. This period, often called IT-driven Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), was characterised by Western (primarily the US) superiority in the research and development of advanced military technologies, which in turn were gradually and selectively diffused, in varying paths and patterns, to allies and strategic partners, including small and middle powers in Europe and East Asia (Raska 2016). For the first time in decades, however, the United States is facing a strategic peer competitor – i.e., China – with its own advancing military capabilities, backed by novel technologies, that is challenging US military-technological primacy (Mahnken 2012). In doing so, the margins of military-technological advantages between great powers are narrowing, accelerating the strategic necessity for “disruptive” defence and military innovation. This intensifying strategic competition in advanced military technologies is embedded in the broader systemic competition over technological “leadership” in areas such as AI systems, robotics, cyber, additive manufacturing, advanced materials, synthetic biology, quantum computing, directed energy, space technologies, and many others. The ability to innovate is synonymous with international influence and national power – generating economic competitiveness, political legitimacy, military power, and internal security.
However, contrary to previous decades, which, admittedly, utilised some dual-use technologies to develop major weapons platforms and systems, the current AI-enabled wave differs significantly in terms of the magnitude and impact of commercial-technological innovation as a key source of military innovation (Raska 2021). Large military-industrial primes are no longer the only drivers of technological innovation; rather, advanced technologies with a dual-use potential are being developed in the commercial sectors and then being “spun on” to military applications. In this context, the diffusion of emerging technologies, including additive manufacturing (3D printing), nanotechnology, space and space-like capabilities, artificial intelligence, and drones, is not confined solely to the great powers (Hammes 2016). The proliferation of AI-enabled sensors and autonomous weapons systems is also reflected in the defence trajectories of select advanced small states and middle powers such as Singapore, South Korea, Israel, Australia, and Japan, among others. These states have the potential to develop niche emerging technologies to advance their own defence capabilities and economic competitiveness, political influence, and status in the international arena (Barsade and Horowitz 2018).