U.S. nuclear superiority doesn’t undermine crisis stability or cause arms racing

This book addresses not only the benefits of a robust nuclear posture but also its costs. Critics of US nuclear strategy have argued that the pursuit of a robust nuclear arsenal is not only pointless but also risky, futile, dangerous, and costly. They have claimed that pursuing a lasting nuclear advantage is risky because imbalances in power can lead to first-strike incentives and an increased chance of nuclear war;21 futile because adversaries will react quickly to close any gaps, resulting in unnecessary arms races;22 dangerous because it will encourage other nations to develop nuclear weapons, undermining international nonproliferation efforts;23 and financially costly, draining the national budget.24 These criticisms, however, point to a contradiction similar to the one posited earlier. Presumably, Washington would not have pursued and maintained these enduring elements of its nuclear strategy for decades if the downsides were truly so severe.

The second part of the book, therefore, explores the alleged disadvantages of nuclear advantages. The book finds that there are, indeed, costs to the maintenance of a robust nuclear force, but that they are less steep than many claim. Turning first to strategic stability, it shows that theoretical logic and available empirical evidence suggest that nuclear superiority, not nuclear parity, contributes to more, not less, strategic stability. Next, to examine nuclear arms races, the book presents a new theoretical argument about the origins of “underkill.” It explains why states are often unable or unwilling to match the nuclear capabilities of competitors and demonstrates that, empirically, nuclear arms races are uncommon and the United States has often achieved lasting nuclear advantages. This is followed by a study on the relationship between US nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. This study shows that there is not an observable link between a large US nuclear arsenal and the proliferation and nonproliferation policies of other states. Finally, an examination of the US nuclear budget explains that a robust nuclear force is indeed costly, but also affordable. If one believes, therefore, as then–US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter argued in 2016, that nuclear weapons are the “bedrock of our security,” and the “most important mission of the Department of Defense,” then it is also a good value.25