Agencies at risk of capture by special interest lobbying too
Burk, 13 --- Chancellor’s Professor of Law at the UC Irvine School of Law (WINTER 2012–2013, Dan L. Burk, “Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned; The new America Invents Act resolves some old issues, but it creates some worrisome new ones,” https://www.cato.org/regulation/winter-2012-2013/patent-reform-united-states-lessons-learned#innovation-oversight, JMP))
Courts and agencies each have their own institutional plusses and minuses. Administrative agencies have somewhat greater ability to gather facts, although the evidence‐gathering capacity of a court system is typically very substantial. Agencies tend to suffer from the problem of capture, often developing too cozy a relationship with those they regulate. Agencies may also be subject to the same lobbying that afflicts legislatures; indeed, they may be under considerable political pressure from the legislature that controls the agency budget. Courts are not free from these problems, but they can largely be insulated from influence peddling by mechanisms such as life tenure. This of course means that they are also insulated to some degree from popular sentiment, making them often the least democratic option.