The CP re-establishes Chevron. Deference is a prerequisite to aff solvency.

Yet, as criticism toward the patent system has grown, so too have the challenges to this unusual power dynamic.6 An increasing number of commentators believe this lopsided institutional structure is the root cause of the patent system's systemic failures.7 [footnote 7 text: 7. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1075 (2011) (noting that courts have struggled with patentable subject matter inquiries and that the state of jurisprudence could be improved by granting the PTO rulemaking authority over patentable subject matter); Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, ADMIN. L. REV., Winter 2011, at 31 (arguing that the courts should take a more deferential approach in determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural, the result of which would leave the PTO with ample discretion to manage the prosecution process); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) ("The ostensibly discrete problems of our patent institutions stem from an initial mistake in institutional design."); Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831, 839-40 (2012) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's overly narrow view of the PTO's rule-making powers "has impeded innovation and the express goal of Article I of the U.S. Constitution to promote 'the Progress of Science and useful Arts"' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 420-29 (arguing that the structural relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit has inflated the boundaries of patentability)./end footnote 7 text]. An even larger contingency of scholars support reforms that would shift greater power to the PTO.8 The cries for institutional reform culminated in 2011 when Congress enacted the historic LeahySmith America Invents Act (AIA).9 The AIA provided the first major overhaul to the patent system in sixty years and undeniably increased the stature of the PTO by granting the Agency a host of new responsibilities, such as fee-setting authority" and the ability to conduct new adjudicatory proceedings in which patent rights may be obtained or challenged.1' This Article contends, however, that commentators have generally failed to recognize the extent to which the AIA alters the fundamental power dynamic between the Federal Circuit and the PTO. Although scholars acknowledge that the AIA bestows a glut of new powers upon the Agency,12 they have nearly uniformly concluded that "Congress stopped short of allowing the PTO to interpret the core provisions of the Patent Act-those that affect the scope of what is patentable."'" Though Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have observed that certain congressional bestowals of adjudicatory authority may entitle the PTO's legal interpretations of the Patent Act to strong judicial deference,14 [footnote 14 text: 14. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 327-28 (2007) ('The various postgrant review proceedings that have been proposed would be trial-type procedures on the record that bear the hallmarks of formal adjudication-most notably, a proceeding before an administrative judge at which the parties present evidence and cross-examination, with the judge's decision based on the record. Such proceedings would have sufficient formality to satisfy Meads test for application of Chevron deference. Thus, if Congress created these procedures and said nothing more, Chevron deference would seem to apply to them." (footnotes omitted)); Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1280 (2012) ("In fact, the executive branch could also use the postgrant-review authority conferred upon the PTO by the AIA to go one step further. As a doctrinal matter, under current Supreme Court precedent interpreting the contexts in which Chevron applies, the government could ask for Chevron deference toward decisions made in postgrant review proceedings."). However, neither of these articles analyzed the language of the AIA, applied or acknowledged the three-way circuit split on when formal adjudications are triggered, or performed any analysis of when a grant of formal adjudicatory authority carries the ability to speak with the force of law./end footnote text] this Article provides the first indepth exploration of whether the actual powers granted by the AIA would result in the PTO becoming the primary interpreter of the core patentability requirements. This Article concludes that the AIA rejects over two hundred years of court dominance in patent policy by anointing the PTO as the chief expositor of substantive patent law standards. In general, the patent system has historically suffered from a lack of serious engagement with administrative law,15 even though Supreme Court intervention in 1999 made clear that standard administrative law norms-including the Administrative Procedure Act-apply to the PTO. 16 Applying administrative law principles to the AIA provides that the PTO's legal interpretations of the Patent Act, as announced by its new adjudicatory proceedings, are entitled to the highly deferential standard of review articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 7 As this Article argues, this deference is a normatively desirable outcome.18 Making the PTO the primary interpreter of the core patentability standards ushers the patent system into the modern administrative era, which has long recognized the deficiencies associated with judge-driven policy. 9 This provides the institutional foundation for infusing economic policy into the patent system, enabling the tailoring of patentability standards to advance the system's constitutionally mandated goal: the promotion of innovation.