Chevron caps the courts from interjecting their own policy preferences.
Dubner et al. 23 [Jeffrey Dubner is a Chief Counsel at the Office of Commissioner Kotagal, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a Legal Director at Democracy Forward Foundation, , a nonpartisan, national legal organization; *Kaitlyn Golden is a Senior Counsel at Democracy Forward Foundation; ** Skye Perryman is president and co-founder of Democracy Forward Foundation; On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; No. 22-451; 9/22/24; “BRIEF OF SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS”; https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-451/280229/20230922133356720_Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Small%20Business%20Associations.pdf; Accessed 6/29/24]//maikle
2. Chevron likewise restricts the judiciary from imposing its own policy preferences on agency decision-making. A core objective of Chevron itself was to ensure that the branches of government accountable to the people (i.e., the legislative and executive branches) are entrusted with making policy, not the judiciary’s or a particular judge’s “personal policy preferences.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). As the Court emphasized in Chevron, agencies, unlike courts, are more accountable to the people, and therefore “it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.” Id. at 865-66. Empirical analysis demonstrates Chevron is a successful tool for curbing adjudication that is overly ideological.
Data analysis of every published circuit court decision between 2003 and 2013 discussing Chevron or Skidmore deference—1,382 cases in all— demonstrates that Chevron has served an important function in achieving predictability and curbing a regulatory environment based on judicial policy preferences.31 These data show that when an agency issues an ideologically conservative interpretation of a statute, an ideologically liberal judicial panel using Chevron deference agrees with the agency’s statutory interpretation about 51 percent of the time.32 When not applying Chevron, that number drops to about 18 percent.33 Ideologically conservative judicial panels respond similarly when addressing liberal interpretations of a statute. When faced with a liberal interpretation by an agency, an ideologically conservative panel applying Chevron deference will agree with an agency’s statutory interpretation about 66 percent of the time.34 When not applying Chevron, that number likewise drops to 18 percent.35