Planks 1 & 2 stop the flow of counterfeits into DoD defense grids

1AC Campbell ‘23[Law School Professor and Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law “Debugging the Trademark Laws: The Lanham Act and Counterfeit Microelectronics,” 31 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211 (2023). Hein Online. Accessed via University of Michigan //DH]

C. Counterfeiting is a Lucrative Proposition Numerous explanations for the counterfeit electronics problem have been discussed. Profit has long been identified as the "primary incentive" for the sale of counterfeit parts.83 The internet and the rise of e-commerce platforms has made counterfeiting even more lucrative; "production costs are low, millions of potential customers are available online, transactions are convenient, and listing on well-branded e-commerce platforms provides an air of legitimacy."84 In addition, when the sellers of counterfeit goods are in another country, as is often the case, they are largely outside the jurisdiction of criminal prosecution by U.S. law enforcement and may be immune from civil liability to private parties. 85 Thus, the perceived risk is low.86 Further, the supply chain disruptions and chip shortages caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have only intensified the problem. Counterfeiters have "stepped up their game to swindle enterprises in dire need of the critical components."87 Reputable firms in need of chips have been enticed to order hard-to-find parts from risky sources, and they have received shipments that are improperly packaged, defective, or even nonoperational.88 According to the Wall Street Journal, "[t]he global chip shortage has created a gold mine for bad actors."8 9 Counterfeit semiconductors, including diodes, are being incorporated into mobile phones, tablets, and other privately used electronic devices, creating risks for consumers.90 Long manufacturing lead times for semiconductor chips have increased the willingness of distributors to go to the open market to obtain parts for customers in order to prevent manufacturing lines from sitting idle. 91 Government contractors and the DoD present a particularly attractive-and oftentimes willing-market for counterfeiters, largely due to the obsolescence of necessary replacement parts. 92 Unlike commercial products such as cellphones and laptop computers, defense systems are typically designed for long lifecycles. 93 Production of the parts contained in those systems will be discontinued when it is no longer cost-effective for the manufacturer, usually long before the systems themselves are taken out of service, leading to diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages (DMSMS) issues. 94 When production ends, parts may no longer be available from the original component manufacturer, an authorized aftermarket manufacturer, or an authorized distributor. 95 If sufficient end-of-life purchases were not made, 96 the DoD and defense contractors may be forced to purchase replacement parts from outside the authorized supply chain, including from brokers and independent distributors. 97 The DoD estimated that as much as 15% of all spare and replacement parts for military electronics are determined to be counterfeit. 98 The military's emphasis on using the lowest cost suppliers rather than focusing on the quality of parts obtained is another contributing factor. 99 Economic gain is not the sole motive for dealing in counterfeit electronics. As noted above, malicious counterfeits are making their way into the supply chain. 100 As an increasing number of devices are connected to the Internet of Things (IoT), "the potential for extensive economic and health and safety losses due to deliberately corrupted components increases by orders of magnitude. 101