Loss of tech competitiveness causes nuclear war

How will states use such a newfound advantage? Technology rarely fundamentally changes the nature or objectives of states. More often, states use technology to advance preexisting geopolitical aims. Moreover, enhanced power can result in greater ambition. Given the geopolitical landscape described, it is likely the United States and its Allies and partners at the core [end page 66] of the international system will behave differently with new military technologies than will revisionist powers, such as Russia and China.

The spread of new technology to the United States and its Allies and partners would likely serve, on balance, to reinforce the existing sources of stability in the prevailing international system. At the end of the Cold War, the United States and its Allies and partners achieved a technological- military advantage over its great power rivals, with the US using its unipolar position to deepen and expand a rules-based system. They also employed their military dominance to counter perceived threats from rogue states and terrorist networks. The United States, its Allies, and partners did not, however, engage in military aggression against great power, nuclear-armed rivals or their allies.

In the future, these status quo powers are apt to use military advantages to reinforce their position in the international system and to deter attacks against Allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These states might also employ military power to deal with threats posed by terrorist networks or by regional revisionist powers such as Iran and North Korea. But it is extremely difficult to imagine scenarios in which Washington or its Allies or partners would use newfound military advantages provided by emerging technology to conduct an armed attack against Russia or China.

Similarly, Moscow and Beijing would likely use any newfound military strength to advance their preexisting geopolitical aims. Given their very different positions in the international system, however, these states are likely to employ new military technologies in ways that are destabilizing. These states have made clear their dissatisfaction with the existing international system and their desire to revise it. Both countries have ongoing border disputes with multiple neighboring countries.

If Moscow developed new military technologies and operational concepts that shifted the balance of power in its favor, it would likely use this advantage to pursue revisionist aims. If Moscow acquired a newfound ability to more easily invade and occupy territory in Eastern Europe, for example (or if Putin believed Russia had such a capability), it is more likely Russia would be tempted to engage in aggression.

Likewise, if China acquired an enhanced ability through new technology to invade and occupy Taiwan or contested islands in the East or South China Seas, Beijing’s leaders might also find this opportunity tempting. If new technology enhances either power’s anti-access, area-denial network, then its leaders may be more confident in their ability to achieve a fait accompli attack against a neighbor and then block a US-led liberation.

These are precisely the types of shifts in the balance of power that can lead to war. As mentioned previously, the predominant scholarly theory on the causes of war—the bargaining model—maintains that imperfect information on the balance of power and the balance of resolve and credible commitment problems result in international conflict.52 New technology can exacerbate these causal mechanisms by increasing uncertainty about, or causing rapid shifts in, the balance of power. Indeed as noted above, new military technology and the development of new operational concepts have shifted the balance of power and resulted in military conflict throughout history.

Some may argue emerging military technology is more likely to result in a new tech arms race than in conflict. This is possible. But Moscow and Beijing may come to believe (correctly or not) that new technology provides them a usable military advantage over the United States and its Allies and partners. In so doing, they may underestimate Washington.

If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commitments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces.

Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt-out-of-the-blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy.

In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could retaliate against any Russian nuclear “de-escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low-yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56

There are similar risks of nuclear escalation in the event of a US-China conflict. China has traditionally possessed a relaxed nuclear posture with a small “lean and effective” deterrent and a formal “no first use” policy. But China is relying more on its strategic forces. It is projected to double—if not triple or quadruple—the size of its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade.57

Chinese experts have acknowledged there is a narrow range of contingencies in which China might use nuclear weapons first.58 As in the case of Russia, the US Nuclear Posture Review recognizes the possibility of limited Chinese nuclear attacks and also holds out the potential of a limited US reprisal with low-yield nuclear weapons as a deterrent.59 If the nuclear threshold is breached in a conflict between the United States and China, the risk of nuclear exchange is real.

In short, if a coming revolution in military affairs provides a real or perceived battlefield advantage for Russia or China, such a development raises the likelihood of armed aggression against US regional allies, major power war, and an increased risk of nuclear escalation.

Implications

Future scholarship should incorporate geopolitical conditions and the related foreign policy goals of the states in question when theorizing the effects of technology on international politics. Often scholars attempt to conceptualize the effects of weapons systems in isolation from the political context in which they are embedded.

Studies treat technology as disembodied from geopolitics and as exerting independent effects on the international system. But technology does not float freely. Technology is a tool different actors can use in different ways. Bakers and arsonists employ fire in their crafts to strikingly different ends. In the current international environment, Russia and China would tend to employ technology toward advancing revisionist aims. Technological advances in these countries are therefore much more likely to disrupt the prevailing international order and nuclear strategic stability.

This approach also suggests the potential threat new technology poses to nuclear strategic stability is more pervasive than previously understood. To undermine strategic stability, new technology need not directly impact strategic capabilities. Rather, any technology that promises to shift the local balance of power in Eastern Europe or the Indo-Pacific has the potential to threaten nuclear strategic stability.

This understanding of this issue leads to different policy prescriptions. If the technology itself is the problem, then it must be controlled and should not be allowed to spread to any states. In contrast, the framework outlined here suggests a different recommendation: preserve the prevailing balance of power in Europe and Asia. Technological change that, on balance, reinforces the prevailing international system should strengthen stability.

Leading democracies, therefore, should increase investments in emerging technology to maintain a technological edge over their adversaries. Export control and nonproliferation measures should be designed to deny emerging military technology to Russia and China. Arms control should be negotiated with the primary objective of sustaining the current international distribution of power. Making progress in these areas will be difficult. But the consequences of failure could be shifts in the international balance of power, conflict among great powers, and an increased risk of nuclear war.