NFU doesn’t compromise deterrence or signal weakness – conventional deterrence is more effective than nukes.
Fetter & Wolfsthal 18[Steve Fetter is a professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland; Jon Wolfsthal is director of the Nuclear Crisis Group, a Global Zero initiative to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, and a nonresident fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University; “No First Use and Credible Deterrence”; April 9, 2018; https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2019-08/2018-jpnd-nfu.pdf]//araghvn
The fact that nuclear threats cannot deter most conventional attacks, and that there is no sensible use for nuclear weapons in response for such attacks, does not mean that conventional attacks cannot be deterred or prevented, or that the United States is not committed to do so. The United States and Japan must plan on deterring and defeating conventional aggression through conventional means. They cannot and should not rely on the magic of a nuclear umbrella, because the umbrella will not be effective under these circumstances. A pledge of no-first-use by the United States would not signal any reduction in the commitment of the United States to the security of Japan. Instead, by recognizing that nuclear weapons cannot deter most nonnuclear attacks, and by taking steps to acquire the conventional capabilities required to deter and respond to them, the security of both countries would be enhanced.