Speed trades off with quality---patents are worse, which turns the case.

The implementation of the prioritization procedure, at least from a policy presentation perspective, appears to have positively shortened the examination period. However, of greater significance is whether this acceleration in examination speed will indeed impact the quality of granted patents. The literature on innovation speed and performance contributes to a nuanced understanding of this aspect, dating back to Stalk (1988), who emphasized that rapid innovation contributes to enhancing corporate profits and introduced the concept of “Time-Based Innovation” [46]. In the field of strategic management, speed has become another major source of competitive advantage following quality and price [41,46,47]. However, as research delves deeper, numerous studies indicate diminishing marginal benefits of speed on performance improvement. Scholars like Cohen et al. (1996) suggest a trade-off between shortening the time to market and optimizing performance [48]. For prioritized examination, policy implementation faces a “trade-off” between minimizing granting time and maximizing the precision of examination. According to the resource-based view, the scale of specific resources and integration efficiency are crucial for organizational operations [49]. Under the assumption of constant inputs, as speed increases, organizations gradually enter a state of resource and capability overload, making it challenging to guarantee the provision of high-level products or services [48,50]. In the context of this paper, if the prioritization institution does not entail the addition of dedicated examiners, there is a risk that, in order to complete examination tasks within specific timeframes, examiners may make hasty decisions regarding authorization after hurried assessments, increasing the risk of improperly examined patents. Consequently, the patent prioritization procedure may diminish patent quality.