Solicitor general consultation changes the agenda-setting stage---screening, vetos, and negotiation proves.
Black & Owens ‘10 [Ryan and Ryan; December 22; Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University and a faculty affiliate with the MSU College of Law, Professor of Political Science and Affiliate Faculty in the Law School; Sage Journals, “Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court,” vol 64.] dedeepya
The SG is highly successful. During the Rehnquist Court era, the SG won over 62 percent of all cases in which the United States was a direct party and over 66 percent of cases in which she participated as amicus curiae (Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, and Walker 2007). Numerous additional studies provide systematic confirmation of the SG’s success (e.g., Deen, Ignagni, and Meernik 2003; Segal 1990; Segal and Reedy 1988). Whether trying to persuade the Court to hear (or not hear) a case at the agenda-setting stage or winning a case at the merits stage, the SG usually gets what she wants.
Still, scholars present various assorted theories on why she so commonly succeeds. The longest-standing view argued that much like a “Tenth Justice,” the SG serves as an agent of the Court (Caplan 1988). She plays a special role for the Court, screening cases and advocating positions that advance the goals of the Court as an institution (Salokar 1992). As one former clerk told us, the SG is expected to “play as an honest broker of the facts” when communicating with the Court. Perry’s (1991, 132) seminal text likewise is replete with comments from justices who assert that the SG aids the Court:
Every solicitor general . . . has taken this job very seriously . . . not to get us to take things that don’t require our attention relative to other things that do. They are very careful in their screening and they exercise veto over what can be brought to the board.