The court doesn’t listen to the SG’s recommendation.
Winston et al ’15 [Clifford, Jia Yan, Quentin Karpilow; February; Senior Fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Economic Studies program, Ph.D. in economics from U.C. Berkeley; “Comparing the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts’ Ideological Preferences Toward Business Accounting for Case Selection,” https://s3.wp.wsu.edu/uploads/sites/308/2015/04/Behavioral-Political-Economy.pdf] dedeepya
On rare occasions, the Court will solicit the perspective of the SG’s Office on the certworthiness of a petition through a call for the views of the Solicitor General (CVSG). Extant research suggests that the CVSG is another information-gathering tool that the Court uses to take advantage of the SG’s independence and objectivity (Days (1994), and unmatched expertise in federal policy and complex regulatory matters. For example, Thompson and Wachtell (2009) find that 91% of the CVSG cases reviewed between 1997 and 2004 involved complex regulatory and statutory schemes, while only 7% involved significant issues of constitutional law. This statistical breakdown is consistent with the Justices’ competence in dealing with questions of constitutionality, their relative unfamiliarity with regulatory systems, and the SG’s obvious comparative advantage in advising the Court on issues related to federal regulation. The authors also observe that, although the SG’s response to a CVSG is almost always accompanied with a suggestion for how the Court should rule on the case (assuming the petition is accepted), the Court’s ultimate decision on the merits is uncorrelated with the SG’s recommendations. Finally, Thompson and Wachtell point to a plethora of anecdotal evidence that decouples the CSVG from any political motivations, further supporting our treatment of the CSVG indicator as exogenous to the final votes in our case-outcomes model. 27