Congress will adjust before any impact.
Levy ’13 [Marin; 2013; Associate Professor of Law at the Duke University School of Law, JD from Yale Law School; University of Chicago Law Review, “Judging the Flood of Litigation,” vol. 80]
Now, it is important to recognize that counseling Courts against considering caseload volume in this kind of decision making does not mean that there is no recourse when it comes to docket concerns. Our system provides several ways to relieve caseload pressure short of the courts not recognizing causes of action or deciding not to hear particular sets of cases. Specifically, our constitutional system gives Congress the authority to adjust laws so as to stem that flow. 305 And Congress has indeed exercised that power. As noted earlier, Congress passed the Supreme Court Case Selections Act 306 to alleviate the Court's then "unmanageable workload" by eliminating most of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. 307 With respect to the rest of the federal court docket, Congress has repeatedly enacted targeted legislation to reduce frivolous filings. For example, Congress passed the PLRA precisely as a way of "addressing a flood of prisoner litigation in the federal courts." 308 Similarly, part of the purpose of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 309 was to limit frivolous securities claims. 310 This is not to suggest that Congress could not do more in this vein; rather the point is simply that there is still a branch of government that has the clear authority to take the courts' caseload into account in substantive decision making and has done so repeatedly in the past.