Delegation AND instructions solve.
Daniels ‘10 [Brigham; 2010; Professor of Law at S.J. Quinney College of Law; Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, “Credible Commitments, Credible Threats, and Environmental Policy,” vol. 1] jchen
As discussed above, one way to think about Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory nukes is to see it as attempting to make a credible commitment. In making that decision, Congress can attempt to increase its credibility by providing binding instructions of when the weapon must be used (Schelling, 1980/1960, 29). It can also increase the credibility of its threats by delegating the program to an agency that is viewed as committed to stringent enforcement (Moe, 1989). Congress might take it a step further and allow additional third parties to enforce the regulatory scheme. This is, for example, a large part of how environmental statutes are enforced today: Congress has given citizens and interest groups the right to sue for violations of the law and to force agencies to follow through with the role Congress assigned to them.