Any reform takes tremendous amounts of PC.
Anderson ’14 [Jonas Anderson, JD from Harvard, is a professor at Utah University; 2014; American Law Review Journal; Volume 63 Issue 4; “Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit,” https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1919&context=aulr&httpsredir=1&referer=]//LASA-AB
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1919&context=aulr&httpsredir=1&referer=
D. Constitutional Competencies: Leveraging Expertise
To answer the normative question of whether the court’s new dialogic interaction with Congress is likely to benefit patent policy going forward, the respective competencies of Congress and the Federal Circuit in crafting patent policy must be examined. A tremendous amount of political capital is required to pass any new legislation. It is simply impractical to expect Congress to expend that capital every year in order to update the patent statute. Continual congressional oversight in other areas of intellectual property has resulted in statutes bloated with special-interest provisions. 358 As Dan Burk has noted, “The manifest impracticality of continuous legislative attention leaves courts and administrative agencies as the likely institutional stewards of statutory tailoring.”359