Black Copyright Aff Neg - Michigan 7 2024 HHIRS

Affirmative
1ac
1AC --- Framing
Contention one is Framing. first is prioritization –
Ongoing violence outweighs.
Jackson 12 [Jackson Richard has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Canterbury and is Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Otago, Richard Jackson Terrorism Blog, “The Great Con of National Security” 8/5/12, https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/ RP]
It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you've been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons - among others. The facts are simple and irrefutable: you're far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called 'national security issues', the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of 'security theatre' designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats - such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious. And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won't notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won't notice how much structural violence there is in the world. More than this, they are hoping that you won't notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate. Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don't want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick - misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along. Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don't want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don't believe the hype: you're much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.
Second is risk-analysis –
Prioritize probability.
Kessler 8 [Oliver Kessler has a Ph.D. in IR, Professor of Sociology at the University of Bielefeld and is Professor of History and Theory of IR at the Faculty of Arts, Alternatives, Vol. 33, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics” p. 211-232]
The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity. ^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical condition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deterrence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastrophe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophes. In particular, catastrophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major implications for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "rationality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to preempt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastrophe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measuring dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" currency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main problem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what will constitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By constructing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Othello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very beginning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the main rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncertainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.
Each internal-link exponentially reduces the likelihood of the next.
Conetta ’98 (Carl; March 1998; Director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, Research Fellow of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, researcher and awarded author at the Pentagon, US State Department, US House Armed Services Committee, Army War College, National Defense University, and UNIDIR; PDA, “Dueling with Uncertainty: The New Logic of American Military Planning,” http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/conetta0398.html; RP)
Playing with Wild Cards Without doubt, simulations -- including nonstandard ones -- can aid planning. The question is: To what end? And to what effect? Exploring "wild cards" in order to identify warning signs or to define limits is one thing; using them to establish force structure or modernization requirements, quite another. Especially suspect would be using scenarios that are detached from declared US interests to define current requirements; this would put the military "cart" before the political "horse." Another, broader concern is how the effusion of improbable conflict scenarios affects public policy discourse overall. Conflict scenarios, both wild and tame, can gain more credibility in the telling than they deserve. Cognitive researcher Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini calls this the "Othello effect," referring to the trail of plausible but false suppositions that led Othello to murder his wife, Desdemona. Even the most farfetched scenarios comprise a number of steps or links each of which may seem plausible or even probable given the one that came before. Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. Omitted are the many branches at each step that would lead to a neutral or even positive outcome. The resulting snapshots, although numerous, offer a highly-selective view of what the future may hold. And the fact that only the negative outcomes are articulated and exercised can distort the general public impression of risk. Living with Uncertainty There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries -- just as turbulence in physical systems has discernable onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits. Despite uncertainty, statements of probability matter. They indicate the weight of evidence -- or whether there is any evidence at all. The uncertainty hawks would flood our concern with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of "non-zero probability." However, by lowering the threshold of alarm, they establish an impossible standard of defense sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite resources and competing ends, something less will have to do. Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities -- and priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what does not.
Third is no great power conflict –
International norms make it obsolete – unpredictability against great power actors creates uncertainty of retaliation.
Feltman 23 [Jeffrey Feltman is John C. Whitehead Visiting Fellow in International Diplomacy – Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Brookings, “War Peace and the International System after Ukraine”, 3/28/23, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/war-peace-and-the-international-system-after-ukraine/]
Today, when we talk about global order, we often lament the divisions inside the United Nations Security Council. This year marks the 50th anniversary of important unity: when the U.N. Security Council unanimously recommended German membership in the United Nations. The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany both entered the U.N. in September 1973.
Germany today is the U.N.’s fourth-largest financial contributor and has been elected to six different Security Council rotations. Germany, along with Namibia, is currently facilitating consultations for the U.N.’s 2024 “Summit of the Future,” to consider how the multilateral system should address old and new challenges.
My own career had two primary chapters: as a U.S. diplomat, mostly serving overseas, and then as the U.N. under-secretary-general for political affairs. Those two jobs put me in touch with different types of folks.
I will draw from both of those experiences in discussing the impact of the war on Ukraine in four areas:
First, an overview of the existing multilateral system and why Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is almost unprecedented in its breach of the “rules of the road” that have guided post-World War II interstate relations.
Second, for comparison, two examples from the 20th century of how the U.N. responded to earlier challenges to peace and security.
Third, my analysis of how the U.N. has reacted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (spoiler alert: so far, the U.N. response to the challenges created by that invasion has been better than I anticipated, despite our collective failure to prevent war).
Fourth, how we should think about the future of the U.N. and the multilateral system more generally, in light of the war on Ukraine? Russia’s invasion creates new challenges and exacerbates existing concerns about the global order.
First, the existing multilateral system. The multilateral system, or the global order, rests on a number of overlapping and intersecting mechanisms that work in tandem. We’ve inherited most of these from the post-World War II and Cold War periods: the U.N. with peace and security at its heart; the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; NATO; the European integration project that became the European Union; the World Trade Organization that evolved from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; the Helsinki process that eventually became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and others.
These institutions, treaties, and alliances have different purposes and governing structures, along with distinct yet often overlapping memberships. Some, like the U.N., have enormous bureaucratic reach. Others, like the Group of Seven, have no permanent secretariat. Their legal statuses vary considerably. But together, these comprise the so-called rules-based international order. “Guidelines” is probably a more accurate description than “rules,” as states choose voluntarily to sign up, out of recognition of reciprocal benefit.
Even if not always followed, these guidelines are more or less universally accepted as legitimate. In increasing predictability, they reduce risks for all. And the system has been sufficiently flexible to endure through three distinct geopolitical phases: the Cold War, the immediate post-Cold War years when the United States dominated the agenda, and the emerging more multipolar environment of today.
We all know examples where this international order has failed — Srebrenica and Rwanda, to name two notorious examples. But the system has succeeded at its most fundamental level: there has been no World War III. That is not nothing. Indeed, that was the primary objective in 1945 of the key architects of the international system.
But is that sufficient? Even before February 24, issues such as economic inequality, the climate crisis, and the pandemic prompted nagging questions about how effective institution

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