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Trefor Moss, "7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War," The Diplomat, 3-10-2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/02/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/-- 嘉玮

1. Beijing’s nightmare scenario. China might well win a war against Japan, but defeat would also be a very real possibility. As China closes the book on its “century of humiliation” and looks ahead to prouder times, the prospect of a new, avoidable humiliation at the hands of its most bitter enemy is enough to persuade Beijing to do everything it can to prevent that outcome (the surest way being not to have a war at all). Certainly, China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, does not want to go down in history as the man who led China into a disastrous conflict with the Japanese. In that scenario, Xi would be doomed politically, and, as China’s angry nationalism turned inward, the Communist Party probably wouldn’t survive either.

Nick Schifrin and Dan Sagalyn, "U.S. and Japan boost cooperation as Marines adapt controversial plan to counter China," PBS NewsHour, 1-13-2023, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/biden-japan-pm-agree-to-boost-military-spending-and-presence-in-asia-to-counter-china-- 嘉玮

And the U.S. is expanding its commitments. The U.S. now promises any attack in space would trigger a mutual defense provision. The U.S. and Japan will increase training on Japan's southwest islands, some of which are 1,200 miles from Tokyo, but just 100 miles from Taiwan's capital.

Rieko Miki, "Japan and China set up hotline to prevent maritime, air clashes," Nikkei Asia, 4-1-2023, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-and-China-set-up-hotline-to-prevent-maritime-air-clashes-- 嘉玮

TOKYO -- A hotline linking the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities has been completed, the Ministry of Defense here said Friday, part of an effort to prevent accidental clashes in the air and sea.

Jon Harper 23 [Jon Harper is a Managing Editor at DefenseScoop and has worked at Nation Defense Magazine and Stars and Stripes as a Pentagon reporter. He holds a BA in History from Yale University and an MA in National Security Studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service., "Biden nominates Marine Gen. Eric Smith, Force Design 2030 advocate, to be next commandant",2-10-2023, DefenseScoop, https://defensescoop.com/2023/05/31/biden-nominates-marine-gen-eric-smith-force-design-2030-advocate-to-be-next-commandant/, 1LEE]

Smith has been a strong advocate for transforming the Marine Corps through a variety of initiatives including Force Design 2030, Talent Management 2030, and the “stand-in forces” concept.

The world is now enduring greater stress than any time in recent decades, according to U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. And while humanity has so far avoided "the suicidal mistake of nuclear conflict," he said, tensions are hitting new highs at a time when many lessons of the past seem forgotten.

"Today, humanity is just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation," the world's top diplomat said at a U.N. conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in New York City.

Trevor Hunnicutt, Steve Holland and David Brunnstrom, "South Korea, US to share nuclear planning to deter North Korean threat," Reuters, 04-27-2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/south-korea-us-set-new-collaboration-deter-norths-nuclear-threat-2023-04-26/-- 嘉玮

WASHINGTON, April 26 (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday pledged to give South Korea more insight into its nuclear planning over any conflict with North Korea amid anxiety over Pyongyang's growing arsenal of missiles and bombs.

Dan Reiter, "Analysis," Washington Post, 5-24-2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/11/should-you-worry-about-a-u-s-war-with-north-korea-not-really/-- 嘉玮

North Korea, the United States and South Korea are actually pretty good at preventing miscalculation

Dan Reiter, "Analysis," Washington Post, 5-24-2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/11/should-you-worry-about-a-u-s-war-with-north-korea-not-really/-- 嘉玮

The U.S.-North Korean relationship is actually far more stable than most people think. Both sides understand that there is a very wide, bright line separating begrudgingly acceptable behavior from truly unacceptable behavior — the type of actions that might justify escalation to war:

Overall, the table depicts a moderately strong deterrence posture on the Korean Peninsula, yielding lessons and implications for U.S. defense policy and the U.S. Army in particular. From a diplomatic and messaging standpoint, two of the most important elements of this posture are ensuring and maintaining the close alignment between the United States and South Korea and their commitment to respond to aggressive gray zone actions. To the degree that these countries can present a unified front about

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Jakarta Post, "De-escalating South China Sea tensions," Asia News Network, 3-07-2023, https://asianews.network/de-escalating-south-china-sea-tensions/-- 嘉玮

What factors exist that can restrain both sides from engaging in full conflicts in the South China Sea are not too clear, if indeed there are any. Here, with the escalating tension, it could become a question of who blinks first. It is not an understatement to say if war were to begin between the two powers, dare we say the start of World War III, it would likely begin in these waters, rather than around Taiwan.

Rukmani Gupta, "South China Sea Conflict? No Way," The Diplomat, 08-23-2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/10/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/-- 嘉玮

Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.

Rukmani Gupta, "South China Sea Conflict? No Way," The Diplomat, 08-23-2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/10/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/-- 嘉玮

There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.

Nana Shibata and Bobby Nugroho, "ASEAN and China aim for South China Sea 'hotline' trial in 2023," Nikkei Asia, 3-10-2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/ASEAN-and-China-aim-for-South-China-Sea-hotline-trial-in-2023-- 嘉玮

JAKARTA -- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China are aiming to conduct an exercise on a security hotline this year in an effort to prevent an accidental collision from escalating tensions in disputed South China Sea, the bloc said on Friday after a meeting with officials from Beijing.

Chad De Guzman, "China Says It Doesn’t Want Conflict. Its Actions at Sea Suggest Otherwise," Time, 6-6-2023, https://time.com/6285005/china-us-taiwan-sea-territory-dispute/-- 嘉玮

Collin Koh, a regional security analyst from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the U.N. treaty hasn’t explicitly stated any limits on foreign military activities in those maritime regions, and this ambiguity is a “key crux” of the conflict between China and the U.S. in the waterway. “China will prefer a restrictive interpretation according to its rights as a coastal state, whereas the U.S. being the user state, will want to interpret it more broadly, that associates broader global interests,” Koh says.

Following the 2015 Ashton Carter statement which began this article, there was a substantive shift in the threat narrative delivered by American executive branch officials. According to the 2016 threat assessment: “Emerging trends suggest that geopolitical competition among the major powers is increasing in ways that challenge international norms and institutions” (S.Hrg.114-626 2016, 29). Although the international system was seen as still possessing opportunities for the United States, and even possible cooperation with Russia and China on certain issues, the threat narrative that emerged at this time was that an inflection point had been reached in which the global security order was fundamentally slipping away from the United States. Russia and China were depicted as increasingly confident and active in their goals of establishing spheres of influence through which they could “check U.S. appeal and influence in their regions” and then use them to act extra-regionally (S.Hrg.115-278 2018, 15). From this, they would be able to transform the international system contrary to American preferences. Consistent with securitizing moves, policymakers sought to make the case that these states now constituted an existential threat to American primacy, unipolarity, and the liberal-democratic world order. They did this in four ways.

First, the separate threats of China and Russia coalesced into a single narrative in which the United States was confronted by aligned, revisionist great powers throughout the Eurasian land mass. This newfound alignment was depicted as having a directly deteriorative effect on the international system itself and America’s position within it. The fears expressed in the 1998 threat assessment – of a shift in great power competition to the “military sphere” and “the formation of an anti-US great power alliance” – were now seen as coming to pass. The latter was highlighted as particularly important. Before, cooperation between Russia and China was mentioned largely in passing and depicted as not a threat to America’s global position. Following 2016, this was no longer the case: their revisionist goals were presented as having converged into a single, existential threat. Their opposition to the U.S. was described as increasingly coordinated and intense, and occurring across an expanded number of issueareas and geographic locations. During the 2016 Q&A session, the specter of the Cold War was directly referenced by the Director of National Intelligence as a touchstone for explaining the current international system (S.Hrg.114-626 2016, 71). In 2019, policymakers depicted a new Cold War-era bloc in an unambiguous comparison made between current China and Russia alignment and their alliance during the “mid-1950s” (Coats 2019, 4).

Biden’s approach brings antagonistic military forces into closer proximity, heightening the risk of preventable accidents that could spiral into conflict. It also threatens the leadership and nuclear arsenals of China and North Korea, incentivizing both to invest in improved military hardware that can hold U.S. forces at a greater distance. Predictably, Beijing and Pyongyang have embraced an arms-race logic, responding to U.S. posturing by expanding their own military forces, coercing U.S. allies and partners to halt cooperation with Washington, and attempting to project power farther from their borders.

China’s recent nuclear expansion is clearly a response to the gratuitous, unrestrained nuclear policies of the Trump administration. Even before the planned modernization and expansion of U.S. nuclear forces, the United States had 3,750 nuclear warheads compared with China’s 350 (at most). Given this enormous advantage, China’s nuclear advancements should be understood as an effort to catch up to and counter the United States—not to overtake it or launch a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack. Massively outgunned, China is acting rationally and predictably. Less rational is Washington sitting in a position of advantage, observing China’s clear track record of seeking to counter U.S. nuclear modernization, and then proceeding as if Beijing won’t do so in this case. By modernizing its nuclear force, the United States is giving China every reason to expand its own.

In national security, this combination of competition and shared interests mirrors the economics. Everyone knows the conflicts. They are very important. But also:

■ The world’s greatest threat of nuclear war is North Korea and there the Chinese goal of denuclearization overlaps 90–95 percent with ours. ■ Middle East stability matters even more to China than to us because China is far more dependent on Middle East oil. ■ The United States and China combine efforts to combat piracy. ■ The greatest long-run threats to us are environmental degradation and climate change. China is now the world leader in those areas. ■ The national security benefits of the global development created by Sino- American collaboration are never counted but they are vital.

Xi has transformed Chinese foreign policy, although not in the way that is usually understood in the West. Despite the frequent comparisons with Mao Zedong, he is no revolutionary seeking to overturn the global order and impose in its place a Chinese Brave New World. He is a revisionist in that he seeks to maximise China’s influence and status. But, like his predecessors Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and Deng Xiaoping, he aims to do so within the existing international system. In this connection, Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not the harbinger of an alternative world order. Its connectivity agenda is more prosaic: to improve China’s access to natural resources; open up new markets for its manufactured goods and services; extend Beijing’s economic influence across Eurasia; and ensure a friendly and secure neighbourhood. Even in these more limited aims, the BRI has underachieved.19 Similarly, Chinese actions in the Western Pacific are not about promoting a sinocentric hegemony, but reflect longstanding goals: power projection; acquiring control over resources; having a decisive say in regional security; reducing or containing American influence; and asserting authority over Taiwan. Such an approach is hardly comforting, but it is neither new nor radical.20

The real difference Xi has made is in the energy and clarity he has brought to the pursuit of these goals. Whereas previous leaders emphasised China’s limitations and its aspirations to become a ‘moderately developed country’, there is no such strategic cringe or dissimulation today. Beijing no longer cares to defer to the United States or to indulge Western sensitivities.21 It is much bolder in promoting China’s ‘core interests’ in the South China Sea and reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Xi speaks openly of a Chinese model of development and a ‘shared future for humanity’ in which China plays a leading role. Meanwhile, internal repression has increased markedly, as Beijing angrily rejects Western criticisms of its treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang and of the new national security law for Hong Kong.

It’s a hard thing to answer. China experts, the same ones, would tell you that China’s trajectory of deciding that it needed to be able to militarily deal with the United States is not designed to fight America, one on one, and instead is designed to be able to keep America at bay while China deals with a smaller actor in the region. China’s not trying to actually conquer the United States, it’s just trying to keep the United States out of its sphere of influence, in the worst-case scenario. China’s PLA [People’s Liberation Army] started out on that track after the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996. We made nuclear threats at that point, sort of subtly, and put an aircraft carrier in the area as a very veiled threat. They were aware of a military imbalance, basically, and that we have a conflict of interest over Taiwan. And so, they decided to set out on that track.

But those are defense decisions, just like America’s defense decisions to pursue primacy and all this stuff. They’re based on chasing shadows, but it’s in a reasonable, rational state of foreign policy that’s kept in its own silo—you don’t let that dominate the rest of the foreign policy agenda. Statecraft should not be reducible to what your military does; the military should be subordinate to a larger apparatus. And so, just because the PLA committed to that military track of balancing against us does not mean that we were off to the races, by any stretch. It doesn’t mean that China was a rival, but the neocons were plotting in the 1990s, and when they came on to George W. Bush’s campaign in 2001, they were trying to create great power competition back then and set on rivalry. But then the War on Terror happened and sidetracked everything.

It is not that the core of Wohlforth' s widely shared argument is wrong, how- ever: great power conflict is impossible in a unipolar world. Rather, his claim that unipolarity is peaceful has two important limitations. First, it focuses on great powers. But because unipolarity prevents the aggregation of conflicts in- volving major and minor powers into conflict between great powers, scholars must look beyond great power interactions when analyzing the structural incentives for war. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole' s only reason- able strategic option is defensive dominance. But given that unipolarity pro- vides the unipole with ample room for defining its foreign policy, offensive dominance and disengagement are equally plausible strategies. This requires a look at how these two additional strategies facilitate conflict.

After correcting for these two limitations, it becomes clear that unipolarity possesses much potential for conflict. Contrary to what Wohlforth argued, unipolarity is not a system in which the unipole is spared from any conflicts and major powers become involved only in peripheral wars. Instead, a unipo- lar system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers. That is the central prediction of my theory. To be sure, the unique historical character of the current unipolar era makes the task of building a general theory of unipolarity difficult. Particularly, it re- quires great care in distinguishing between those features of the post-Cold War world that are intrinsic to a unipolar system and those that stem from specific aspects of contemporary international politics. Two points deserve mention.