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All that said, the actual risk of imminent Chinese military action against Taiwan remains low. Beijing always flexes military muscle when highest-level U.S. and Taiwanese officials meet face to face. Yet, though Speaker McCarthy’s visit with Taiwan’s president marks the highest-level U.S.-Taiwan meeting on US soil since 1979, China’s latest response was less militarily threatening than its reaction to last summer’s visit to Taiwan by then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi – and Beijing is well aware that Washington will notice that. More importantly, Xi is spending considerable energy these days on playing a larger role on the global stage, particularly as a peacemaker. He has offered a 12-point peace plan for Ukraine he hopes will encourage others to see China as a global mediator, even if this particular plan has no chance of success. This past weekend, Xi welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission Chairman Ursula Von der Leyen to Beijing for discussion of the Ukraine war and the future of China’s relations with Europe more broadly. Though Xi didn’t promise his European guests to lean harder on Russia, the Chinese and French governments issued a joint statement pledging they would work together to bring Russian and Ukrainian negotiators to the bargaining table. This follows the remarkable visit to China of the foreign ministers of Middle East rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, where they agreed under China’s mediation to improve their historically contentious relationship. Most importantly, just days ago, Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou became the first current or former Taiwanese leader to visit the mainland since Taiwan broke away in 1949, and during his visit he spoke of the “common inheritance of blood, language, history and culture” between the two sides, raising hopes in Beijing that reunification can still be achieved without risking a potentially catastrophic conflict. In short, Xi Jinping wants to be (at least perceived as) a peacemaker, and though Taiwan’s future remains of far more importance to him that any of these issues, China’s president is unlikely to reverse all these diplomatic victories by stumbling into a costly war. There are more basic reasons why China is unlikely to move against Taiwan soon. Xi has watched carefully as Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has provided a vivid demonstration of just how unpredictable, costly, and humiliating an ill-conceived war can be. Taiwan, backed with generations of sophisticated and powerful American weapons, has been preparing for a possible Chinese invasion even longer than Ukraine has prepped for a full-frontal assault from Russia, and given the complete lack of Chinese combat experience over the past 44 years, Xi understands that the risks of Pyrrhic victory – or even of defeat – are real. At a time when China is emerging from the world’s most draconian lockdown and its worst economic slowdown in decades, Xi is likely to be extra careful about the fights he picks. At least for now. There’s also the critical issue of semiconductors. About 90 percent of the world’s most sophisticated computer chips are made in Taiwan. Aware of the risk this creates, China, the U.S., and others are working as quickly as possible to lessen the risk of economic catastrophe that would result if that production were dramatically slowed or even halted, but self-sufficiency in chip production is years away for every country. China is loath to risk conflict that would leave its economy without access to the 21st century’s most important economic resource.

"Security," in other words, has to be read through the lens of national security. Of course, "security" has an everyday meaning (being secure, safe, not threatened). Quite separate from this, though, the term "security" has acquired a number of connotations, assumptions, and images derived from the "international" discussion of national security, security policy, and the like. But, in these discussions, the conceptualization of security has little to do with application of the everyday meaning to an object (nation or state), followed by an examination as to when the state is secure (as if "security" possessed an independent, stable, context-free meaning that could be added to another stable, independently defined object, the state). Rather, the label "security" has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific field of practice . Security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on. Security, moreover, has not been a constant field; it has evolved and, since World War II, has been transformed into a rather coherent and recognizable field. In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier times has been diminished--it is, in a sense, always there, but more and more often in metaphorical form, as other wars, other challenges--while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense have remained central. If we want to rethink or reconstruct the concept of security, therefore, it is necessary that we keep an eye on the entire field of practice. This is contrary to the now-standard debates on "redefining security," inasmuch as those who want radically to rethink the concept generally tend to cancel out the specific field. The concept is thus reduced to its everyday sense, which is only a semantic identity , not the concept of security. Of course, both choices are completely legitimate, but this question of language politics depends ultimately on what we wish to accomplish. If our intent is to determine when we are secure, the investigation can address many levels. If, however, we want to add something new to ongoing debates on "security" (in strategic studies) and national interests, we must begin with those debates, taking on that problematique, so that we can get at the specific dynamics of that field, and show how these old elements operate in new ways and new places. The specificity, in other words, is to be found in the field and in certain typical operations within the field (speech acts--"security"--and modalities--threat-defense sequences), not in a clearly definable objective ("security") or a specific state of affairs ("security"). Beginning from the modality of specific types of interactions in a specific social arena, we can rethink the concept "security" in a way that is true to the classical discussion. By working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with military matters by applying the same logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to society (as I shall show, below). With this, we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and codes from the field of "security" as it has evolved and continues to evolve. To start instead from being secure in the everyday sense means that we to the now-standard debend up approaching security policy from the outside , that is, via another language game. My premise here is, therefore, that we can identify a specific field of social interaction, with a specific set of actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field. In international society, for example, a number of codes, rules, and understandings have been established that make international relations an intersubjectively defined social reality possessing its own specific laws and issues.8 National security is similarly social in the sense of being constituted intersubjectively in a specific field,9 and it should not be measured against some real or true yardstick of "security" derived from (contemporary) domestic society. An alternative route to a wider concept of security is to broaden the security agenda to include threats other than military ones. When widening takes place along this axis, it is possible to retain the specific quality characterizing security problems: Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political "we" from dealing with any other questions. With this approach, it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense. Historically, of course, the military sector has been most important.10 Strategic studies often focused on the military aspects of security, whereas the realists and neorealists of International Relations seldom a priori defined military threats as primary. Indeed, Morgenthau, Aron, and many others took the position that, to ensure its security, a state would make its own choices according to expediency and effectiveness, and these might not always involve military means. A state would make threats in the sector in which the best options were available. A response (security policy, defense) would often, but not always, have to be made in the same sector, depending on whether one sector might overpower another, and military means simply were often the strongest available. Logically speaking, the means to security should be secondary to the ends--that is, a conflict and the political decisions involved, as Clausewitz pointed out--and, thus, it has seemed a viable strategy to expand security in terms of sectors while keeping the state focus. Indeed, this is not only an academic option, it is also, to a large degree, what has taken place in political discourse, as the name of the field has through this century changed from war to defense to "security." Still, what ties all of this together as security? When Buzan moves from his discussion of security in military terms to security in the political, economic, ecological, and societal sectors, the logic clearly says that security begins as a military field that is increasingly challenged by these new sectors. The question remains, however: What made the military sector conspicuous, and what now qualifies the others to almost equal status? While Buzan does not squarely address this question, he does hint at an answer. Military threats have been primary in the past because they emerged "very swiftly" and with "a sense of outrage at unfair play"; if defeated, a state would find itself laid bare to imposition of the conqueror's will.11 Such outcomes used to characterize the military sector. But, if the same overturning of the political order can be accomplished by economic or political methods, these, too, will constitute security problems.12 From the discussion above, it follows that the basic definition of a security problem is something that can undercut the political order within a state and thereby "alter the premises for all other questions." As Buzan shows, the literature largely treats security as "freedom from threat," both objectively and subjectively.13 Threats seen as relevant are, for the most part, those that effect the self-determination and sovereignty of the unit. Survival 14 might sound overly dramatic but it is, in fact, the survival of the unit as a basic political unit--a sovereign state--that is the key. Those issues with this undercutting potential must therefore be addressed prior to all others because, if they are not, the state will cease to exist as a sovereign unit and all other questions will become irrelevant. This, then, provides us with a test point, and shows what is lost if we "de-compose" the state by individualizing security. With the approach I have suggested here, even if challenges can operate on the different components of the state, they must still pass through one focus: Do the challenges determine whether the state is to be or not to be?15 When a specific issue is turned into a test case, everything becomes concentrated at one point, since the outcome of the test will frame all future questions. This logic is spelled out most clearly, perhaps, by Clausewitz, who shows that, although politics has to be prior to military, the logic of war--the ziel of war, victory--replaces the logic of politics--the specific zweck . To enter a war is a political decision, but once in, one has to play according to the grammar of war , not politics, which would mean playing less well and losing the political aim, as well. Rousseau put it thus: "War is not, therefore, a relation of man to man but a relation of state to state, in which individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of the homeland, but as its defenders."16 Rousseau's argument is presented here in terms of literal war, but the observation applies to "metaphorical war" that is, to other "tests of will and strength."17

Below, I explore these questions in the context of four different security agendas. First, I look at European security between 1960 and 1990, the period of change and détente, which provided the framework for developing the speech act interpretation of security. During this period, the main issue was whether political and social change could be de-securitized even as the basic political structure of the region was kept frozen with major help of the security instrument. How much could be de-securitized and how was a major question, as is why and how change suddenly took on a new and different character in 1989. In the second part, I deal with a very different case: Environmental security. Here we see not an instance of de-securitizing an essentially securitized field but, rather, the potential advantages and disadvantages of securitizing a new area that, perhaps, should be addressed via other thematizations. In the third part, I take up the issue of societal security. This topic is presented in a fashion somewhat parallel to the preceding one, but I also ask the following: If we start using the concept of societal security in order to understand certain new dynamics, especially in post-Cold War Europe, what differences are there between a traditional, alternative security approach as opposed to a speech act approach to security? In the final part, I analyze the major new attempts to apply the concept of "security" in Europe, with particular reference to the notion of "European security." Change and Détente: European Security 1960-1990 A peculiar feature of the Cold War system in Europe was the almost total exclusion of unwanted change, a guaranteed stability of the status quo. Raymond Aron once described it as a "slowdown of history" (but then went on to discuss the iron law of change that would ultimately upset this strange situation).26 Security became the means whereby this slowdown was effected. The speech act "security" is, of course, more than just a word, since one must have in hand the means to block a development deemed threatening. For example, if a foreign army walks across the border or tries to intimidate a country, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to have adequate military strength to resist; or if social unrest, caused from within or without, is the problem, one must have a sufficiently repressive apparatus, ideological cohesion in the core group that allows the apparatus to be mobilized, and the legitimacy to use it that avoids the escalation of public opposition. For a long time the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was such that, where nonmilitary issues were concerned, it was always possible for the regime to control things--in extremis , with the help of friends with tanks. In Cold War Europe, moreover, military threats could also be fenced off because of the general nuclear condition. As the late Franz Josef Strauss once put it: "In the present European situation there is no possibility of changes through war, but neither through revolution or civil war."27 Change seemed impossible without some consent by the power-holders; it had to take place through a negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization and destabilization. And so it happened. The central issue of the debates on European détente--and the mechanism that actually worked in them--was the logic of change through stabilization . In particular, as Willy Brandt explained, German Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik were very explicit about the necessity of "stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome the status quo." Only by removing some threats to, and thereby some excuses for, the regimes in the East, would it then become possible to push back the securitization of East-West relations and change domestic conditions in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the field of human rights evolved into an attempt to develop new rules of the game in the nonmilitary arena. "Human rights" became the label for a specific political struggle/negotiation over the border between security and politics, intervention and interaction. This theme generated a great deal of controversy in the mid-1980s, especially where efforts by West German Social Democrats (SPD) to revive détente were concerned.28

The Copenhagen School’s position on desecuritization – or, perhaps, more accurately, Waever’s position on it – outlines three possible options with regard to how to desecuritize. The first is simply not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place. The second is that, once an issue has been securitized, ‘to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals’ (Waever, 2000: 253). And, finally, the third is to move security issues back into ‘normal politics.’ Dealing with the second and, by extension, third strategies, Waever points out some difficulties. He begins by noting in the societal sector of secu-rity (that which concerns threats to ethnic/national identities), ‘securitiza-tions have a particularly strong self-reinforcing character.’ This is because security action on the behalf of identities typically decreases the seense of security even for those defended because problematizing the security of an identity and triggering attempts to define and compete it tend to expose its contingency, incompleteness, and impossibility and thus lead to further action (Waever, 2000: 253). In other words, the very nature of collective identities creates propitous con-ditions for so-called societal security dilemmas (see, for example, Roe, 2002). I will return later to the question of societal security and desecuritization. For the moment, though, it is sufficient to mention Waever’s claim that the goal is not to construct ‘societal security policy’ but rather policy that ‘attempts to avoid the triggering of societal security concerns in the first place’, leading him to conclude that 'securitization studies are thus likely to lead to a special interest in strategies that pre-empt or forestall securitization rather than those that solve already pre-existing security problems (Waever, 2000: 254). For Waever, then, the best - indeed, perhaps the only- way forward is to prevent issues from being framed in terms of security in the first place. But this all seems rather unsatisfactory: to desecuritize surely implies exactly that - to take the security out of security, to move it back to normal politics. Set against this, Waever's suggestion can better be described as non-securitization, where there is simply no security to begin with. To be sure, although in some cases very much desirable, by its very nature non-securitization nonetheless avoids having to deal with the tricky question of “emergency politics.”

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.

In Elizabethan theater, “alarums and excursions” was a stage direction calling for actors to rush about the stage in a chaotic clamor suggestive of battle. In American politics, threat inflation has a similarly theatrical role: it tries to confuse and excite an audience to win its support for some policy, often military excursions of some sort. This chapter explains why U.S. defense politics is especially prone to such behavior—why, that is, U.S. leaders serially exaggerate the nation’s vulnerability to national security threats. The explanation, in a nutshell, is that power gives the United States the opportunity to adopt expansive foreign policy goals. “Expansive” here refers not necessarily to attempts at expansion in the sense of territorial acquisition but to a militarily active and interventionist grand strategy. To heighten support for those goals, U.S. leaders exaggerate their contribution to domestic security. Over time, expansive foreign policy also generates societal interests tied to its survival. Those interests, most prominently national security organizations, inflate threats to protect their prerogatives. Educated amid that cacophony of threat inflation, new political leaders learn to echo it, either because doing so seems politically safe or because they believe it. Assertions of insecurity become a cultural habit of American elites. The chapter begins by defining threat inflation and describing how U.S. leaders use it. It then reviews political science and economics concepts showing how special interest groups dominate debates about risk. The second section shows how the growth of U.S. power distributes the costs of expansive foreign policies, thus undermining the formation of interest groups opposed to such policies. The next shows how power concentrates the benefits of those policies, forming interests that promote themselves with threat inflation. The last section discusses conditions that make for more balanced debate about threats and how to foster them. In explaining U.S. threat inflation, the chapter sheds light on which security threats are especially prone to exaggeration; on why reactions to new threats are often slow; on why fears tend to outlast the dangers that brought them; and, more generally, how debate fails to purge myth—how the democratic marketplace of ideas fails. Threat inflation is speech that gives an exaggerated sense of danger. It need not involve lying. U.S. leaders, for example, often threat‐​inflate by abusing worst‐​case scenarios—highlighting a dangerous possibility and omitting its probability. Shorn of context, the possibility implies more danger than reality merits. If you tell someone skiing bunny slopes in New Hampshire to beware of avalanches and illustrate the danger with tales of heliskiers buried by snow in the Canadian Rockies, you are not lying. But you have failed to point out that the danger of an avalanche in the White Mountains is remote. You are inflating skiing’s danger. Of course, in national security politics, exaggeration is rarely so blatant. It can be difficult to separate the prudent warning from threat inflation, especially when the speaker’s job is to warn. In the Semi‐​Sovereign People, E. E. Schattschneider imagines democratic politics as a street fight watched by a crowd. The fight’s outcome, he tells us, depends on the extent of the crowd’s involvement. So the brawlers may try to involve the crowd, depending on its disposition and on how the fight is going. In politics, he argues, beneficiaries of the policy status quo will seek to keep conflict narrow, whereas those seeking change will often try to broaden it. Activists frustrated by local politics might try to involve state government, and statewide combatants may look to the federal government. The full Congress can reverse its committees’ actions. The secretary of defense might reevaluate an army decision, and the president, driven by public opinion, might overrule him. In U.S. politics, threat inflation is often a shout of “danger!” meant to socialize conflict, an effort to energize public opinion. The U.S. system, according to Theodore Lowi, is especially prone to such appeals. Compared with dictatorships or even parliamentary governments, power in the United States is diffuse: spread among branches of government, committees, agencies, and private interest groups. Those entities are potential points of resistance to policy change. They create a powerful bias toward the status quo. Crises and wars unify public goals, overcoming the typical stasis. Invocations of insecurity attempt to create a similarly unifying sense of crisis that removes parochial barriers to collective action. Because policymakers always struggle to implement their proposals, alarmism is a regular feature of U.S. policy debate. It rarely works. But as with most shouts for help, the absence of initial success is likely to produce louder shouting, not quiet. Threat inflators are searching for arguments that win with the public. Another species of threat inflation defends the status quo. Advocates of security organizations and policies naturally defend them by references to the dangers that they confront. Such defenses shade easily into exaggeration, especially as the relevant threat lessens. The considerable academic literature dealing with how states misunderstand and mismanage danger generally focuses on errors of perception—psychological bias, ignorance, intelligence mistakes, and other communication and comprehension problems that prevent the state from correctly interpreting information. So the Nazi threat mounted without a proper response because nations slept, blind to its menace. The 9/11 attacks resulted from a “failure of imagination.” The United States invaded Iraq because it overestimated Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction arsenal. The solution to misperception is to see more clearly—correct for predictable biases, collect better intelligence, improve analysis of it, share information faster, and use better theory about enemy thinking.

Realist Perspectives on the Rise of China While there are different types of Realism,[6] proponents such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans J. Morgenthau agree on the pessimistic assumption that human nature is selfish and the international system is anarchic.[7] That is, it lacks a governing authority above and beyond the state. This lacuna leaves self-interested sovereign states—the central actors in world politics—competing for power and security.[8] This competition is a zero-sum game in that states seek to take advantage of any possible means to achieve relative gains. Since states often fail to cooperate in the Realist “self-help system”,[9] survival depends on the struggle for power and security, which can ultimately lead to conflict.[10] In a world where perceptions matter,[11] China’s actions are in some quarters perceived as Realist. Those who argue a realist perspective when interpreting China’s rise look to several distinctive examples. Two of these will be analysed in this paper: military expansionism and historical analogy. Realist interpretations have been bolstered by Xi Jinping’s declaration of a “China Dream” resulting in the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,[12] as well as retired People’s Liberation Army Colonel Liu Mingfu’s directives that China needs to “take over from the United States as the world’s greatest military power”.[13] However, through a comprehensive illustration of these two facets of Realist concern (military expansionism and historical analogy), we will see that Realism cannot fully account for them. China’s unprecedented economic growth has been coupled with the “world’s largest military build-up”[14] via a huge expansion of military spending and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to “change the international system” and “obtain global hegemony”.[15] Statistics compiled by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm China’s dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the period 2003–2012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed in SIPRI’s Yearbook[16]. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that China’s annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2008 (when it became the second largest military spender) to almost $170 billion in 2010. Furthermore, estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, China’s military spending could overtake America’s after 2035.[17] In addition, China’s military expansion has led it to be more confident in its military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law.[18] Furthermore, Jia Xiudong’s[19] comment in response to Taiwanese independence—“We will use whatever means we have to prevent it happening”[20]—shows China’s military capabilities go “well beyond Taiwan”, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of China’s rise. A Pentagon senior defence official’s opinion that “the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favour” supports this.[21] Nevertheless, solely Realist interpretations of China’s rise through a military perspective would constitute an oversimplification and exaggeration of reality. As SIPRI figures show in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, China’s (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3 per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, “As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.”[22] In addition, data listing military spending as a percentage of the world share shows China’s 5.5% representing spending of 89.8$bn remains significantly behind the United States’s 45.7% representing 739.3$bn [23]. While China’s increased military assertiveness has been highlighted, it is also important to note its diverse role in the international community. Figure 1 For example, China’s troop deployment for UN Peacekeeping Operations has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000,[24] and in 2012, China’s troop contributions to peacekeeping operations outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.[25] While there may be vested interests at stake for China, the level of cooperation and integration exhibited by its increasing role in UN peacekeeping missions—which seek global peace and security—suggests states are not only ‘self-interested’, as Realist theory would advocate. Hence, to use only Realist interpretations of China’s rise provides too narrow a view, as it does not explain the full extent of China’s rise through military aspirations. Another important empirical illustration of the Realist interpretation of China’s rise is the United States’ response to China’s military expansion. US Defence Department figures evidence the considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific—a region blighted by territorial rights and surrounding resource-rich waters[26]. As part of a response which the United States calls a “pivot” or “rebalance”[27] towards the Asia-Pacific region, there have been efforts to bolster America’s military presence in the region. This has resulted in increased naval assets in Singapore, a full marine task force in Australia planned by 2016, increased troop and hardware deployment in South Korea, a new military access agreement with the Philippines, and a commitment that 60 per cent of US Navy assets will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.[28] The pivot or rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region seems to align with the Realist ‘Thucydides Trap’ cited earlier. As Thucydides puts it, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.”[29] In other words: “The dynamic inherent when a rapidly rising power (China) becomes more confident, a ruling power (US) fears losing its edge, and entangling alliances on each side drive the parties towards war.”[30] History seems to support the tendency for war: “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivalled a ruling power, the outcome was war”.[31] If we consider John Mearsheimer’s argument valid, China will respond to the American build-up by pushing the United States out of Asia, in “much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere”.[32] One view is that China will “come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine as Japan did in the 1930s”.[33] However, it is problematic to use the Thucydides Trap and Mearsheimer’s predictions to assess China’s rise through Realist interpretations. Although former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ comments that the US ‘pivot’ “isn’t about China at all”, his clarification that “it is more about our relationships with the rest of Asia” suggests a much more balanced approach then Realists would claim.[34] In addition, President Obama compliments the positive role that China can play: “from reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula to preventing proliferation” [to] “seeking more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing” [which will include] “greater communication” [between militaries in order to] “promote understanding and avoid miscalculation”.[35] This weakens the case for the use of Realist interpretations in relation to the rise of China—not entirely, but enough to conclude that a fully Realist interpretation of China’s rise is inadequate. Elements highlighted by Mr Bates and President Obama, “cooperation”, “communication” and “reducing tension”, in addition to the actual visit of China’s top military commander General Chen Bingde to the United States in order to improve military ties,[36] decrease the likelihood of falling into the Thucydides Trap. It can be argued that Mearsheimer’s arguments, based on historical analogies, are too weak to hold merit in this discussion. How can historical analogies from an American experience predict what China, a country with a contrasting and unique history and culture, will do today? Analogical arguments are “not causes or explanations”; they

Are the United States and China destined for war against each other? Growing tensions between the two countries in recent years have led to fears that their differences might result in war and bloodshed, but several factors suggest otherwise. First, the background. While countries have put forward competing claims for territory in the South China Sea for centuries, tensions over the disputes have escalated in the past few years. China has built artificial islands and started naval patrols to defend its expansive claims, drawing the ire of US officials such as Admiral Harry B. Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Command, who said in February 2016 that China’s actions in the South China Sea were undermining the region’s stability and security. On the trade front, experts believe that the frontrunners of the ongoing US presidential election – Mrs Hillary Clinton for the Democrats, and Mr Donald Trump for the Republicans – might take stronger stances against China if elected to office, worsening the US-China relationship. Mrs Clinton was the architect of the US’s pivot to Asia, which has been widely seen as a move to contain China’s economic rise. Mr Trump, on his part, has promised to impose hefty tariffs on Chinese exports to the US in his quest to “make America great again”. The case against war Despite these worrisome signs, however, war between the two countries is unlikely, according to experts at a recent panel discussion on the US-China relationship, organised by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Nuclear deterrence The main deterrent is the threat of nuclear retaliation. While clashes between ruling powers and rising powers – as the US and China are now, respectively – have led to war in the past, these instances occurred before the nuclear age. Mr Gideon Rachman, who is the chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, noted that both the US and China now possess nuclear weapons. He said: “The stakes were much lower in the past. The leadership of both countries are rational, and neither wants a conflict – one hopes that because they are both nuclear powers, that it won’t come to war.” Mr Rachman said, however, that the tensions between the two countries were unlikely to lead to war: “Rising powers do tend to clash with established powers, and this has led to war in 12 out of 16 cases since the 1500s. But these instances were before the nuclear age, when the stakes were much lower. One hopes that because both China and the US are nuclear powers, it won’t come to war.” Consensus for war is unlikely China’s economic rise has also increased its interdependence with the US. China is the US’s largest goods trading partner, with US$598 billion (S$825 billion) in total, two-way goods trade in 2015. China was also the US’s third-largest goods export market in that year, as well as its largest supplier of goods imports. The multi-faceted relationship between the two countries reduces the likelihood that either side can achieve an internal consensus for war. Even if territorial disputes lead to growing tensions, the financial interests of both countries in maintaining a good relationship might trump such disagreements. “China’s rise has diversified the US’s interests to such an extent that it’s difficult for any US leader to strike a consensus-based China policy,” said Professor Huang Jing, who is director of the LKY School’s Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and the Lee Foundation Professor on US-China Relations. “That gives me hope that the interdependence between the US and China is unprecedented in such a way that you cannot reach a strategic consensus for launching a war against the other side,” he said. Foreign entanglement fatigue The US’s other foreign entanglements and priorities may also dissuade it from war with China. Mr Rachman noted: “The Chinese may have overstepped the mark (in the South China Sea), but they have been quite intelligent in making each move small enough to make it hard for the US to respond aggressively. “The US also has all these other things going in the Middle East, including its fight against ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a terrorist group).” Cooperation, not conflict In fact, the US and China have shared interests that might encourage cooperation rather than conflict. In 2014, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a historic US-China agreement to combat climate change. The two countries also worked together, and with others, to forge the global climate agreement in Paris in late 2015. Terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear threat are other common concerns. Dr Tim Huxley, executive director of The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia, said: “Both the US and China agree that there should be more cooperation and intelligence-sharing in the security sphere.” The tensions between the two countries may worsen in the short term, but is unlikely to lead to outright war. Prof Huang summed up their relationship: “They might have a messy engagement with each other, with constant negotiation, but they both want to optimise common interests and manage conflicts. If they both see that they are very close to a fight, they will step back.”

Dr. Henry Kissinger has a fear. He warned a few days ago that America is "at the edge of war with Russia and China." Singapore also shares this fear. Singapore's next prime minister Lawrence Wong warns that the US and China may "sleepwalk into conflict." Many more countries have similar feelings. The reason is that the genetic information of war is embedded in the genes of Western capital power. The US has been spiraling upward in its all-encompassing containment of China, and there seems no high point at which it will stop and take a break. It is like a runaway horse running wildly to the precipice of war. The question is related to what exactly Washington wants. In fact, what Washington wants is not a fight to the death, but how to profit from a war, or rather how to profit from someone else's war. Only if the interests of US capital are satisfied, it will not go to war with its adversaries. Ultimately, what Washington wants is the global market, to maximize its profits. Washington is not unaware that China does not have a plan to go to war with the US, and even the most anti-China people do not think that China will initiate a war against the US. But Washington sees China as an enemy because it has moved the US cheese. JPMorgan chief Jamie Dimon recently said that the US government should take a stand by trying to match China's efforts to build soft power in the developing world. He told JPMorgan's clients, "If we don't do trade with Western allies, China is going to cherry pick every nation… They'll give them 5G equipment for cheap. They'll negotiate deals, lend money. They are trying to do it in Latin America. Our backyard." The fears of Dimon, who could be called a representative of American capital interests, are the real reasons behind why the US has launched a series of containment actions against China. If we put together the changes in US policy toward China from the Trump era until now, almost every time when there was an increase in anti-China sanctions, there was a "far-sightedness" to squeeze China out of the global market and manufacturing chain. In the latest move, Pelosi and several US lawmakers went to Taiwan to stand up for "Taiwan independence." One of the main aims is to create tensions and further pulling Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company into the US chip siege against China. Those so-called reasons of ideology, human rights, etc., are all to serve US capital control of global services and show us the capital competition for markets is brutal and ruthless. According to 2019 data, the US share of the global economy has nearly halved since 1960. America's nominal GDP in US dollars is $21.4 trillion in 2019, or about 24 percent of the share of global economy. Although China accounted for over 18 percent of the global economy in 2021, the number is rising rapidly. One of the most important things is not just that Chinese manufacturing is going global, but that Chinese capital is also starting to go global. Chinese capital, by being "Chinese," does not change those fundamental properties of capital that Marx analyzed, so the management of capital has always been a difficult issue in national governance. The Chinese government has no plans to encourage Chinese capital to seize others' territory or resources through war. In contrast to the historical path of Western capital's global expansion, there is a logic of "common development" behind Chinese capital going abroad. You might find the reasons from China's political system. However, this does not matter to US capital. If we follow the logic of capital development as they see it, what matters is that Chinese manufacturing will eventually push them out of the global industrial chain, leaving them with no money to make and no work to do. So, the first thing they want to do is to maximize their share of the Chinese market, including acquiring quality Chinese companies. And once that market is not so easily accessible, or Chinese companies are not as open as they would like them to be, the expansion of US capital power in China is constrained. Then, the next thing to do is inevitably to implement a global stranglehold on Chinese capital and Chinese manufacturing. History tells us that the option of war is an inherent part of US capital export and expansion, and that Washington is often easily manipulated by the impulse of capital power. In fact, whenever Washington wants to strengthen its ability to govern, it borrows from the military-industrial complex, which is the most dangerous aspect of this great contest of capital power.

The Covid-19 pandemic will intensify technological competition between China and the U.S., shifting their rivalry from a traditional geopolitical tussle to one for tech supremacy, a prominent Chinese international relations expert said. Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, said in an interview with Caixin that the U.S. and China will compete over the coronavirus vaccine and digital technology, including advanced telecommunications networks. "The more fierce China-U.S. tech competition gets, the less likely it is that they will resort to proxy wars for dominance on natural and geographic terms," Yan said. "It's not because they don't want to use the proxy war strategy, but because it's not a feasible way to compete in a digital era." As a result of the shift, Yan, who is also the general secretary of Beijing-based annual international security conference the World Peace Forum, believes that the world's two largest economies won't go to war over East Asia's hotspots, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, despite high tensions. "It's less likely that there will be a military mishap in those areas," he said. "Even if it happens, the relevant parties will be able to swiftly contain it and avoid letting it escalate into a war." China has long protested the U.S. military's "freedom of navigation" operations and fly-overs in the South China Sea, and the U.S. Navy's operations in the Taiwan Strait. Military mishaps have previously occurred in the South China Sea. In 2001, southeast of China's Hainan province, a U.S. Navy plane on a surveillance mission collided with a Chinese PLA Navy jet. The U.S. plane's crew was detained by Chinese authorities after an emergency landing on Hainan, while the pilot of the Chinese jet was never found and was later declared dead. In late September 2018, a Chinese warship reportedly came within 41 meters of a U.S. destroyer sailing near the Spratly Islands, known in China as the Nansha Islands. Yan said now "the three parties including the U.S., Chinese mainland and Taiwan region have all had their military activities under strict control." None of the parties would intentionally engage in a conflict in either the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, he said. Meanwhile, the Covid-19 pandemic, which has infected over 4.3 million people and killed over 300,000 globally, will drive the two countries to focus on technological dominance. Yan argued that the country that develops a working Covid-19 vaccine first will have a psychological advantage. But the vaccine race will only last three years at most, he said, while competition in digital technology will rumble on for 20 years at least. As China is already leading in 5G technology, the U.S. will choose to focus its competition on the next generation of network technology, 6G. "But the U.S. wants to stall our 5G advancement by creating obstacles," Yan said, referring to Washington's domestic ban on Chinese 5G telecommunications equipment and its global campaign to convince its allies to follow in its footsteps. Yan further suggested that China should shift its overseas competition strategy from a focus on traditional infrastructure expansion to digital network construction. Cross-border infrastructure including roads and railways should not be prioritized in an era dominated by digital technology, he said.

China’s continued incursion into the West Philippine Sea and the inability of the Philippine government to stop it bring to fore the question: In the event, China invades the Philippines, will the United States, under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951, go to war with China? This is important as everyone appears incapable of stopping China from its aggressive expansion policy. Under the 1951 MDT, the United States is obligated to come to the defense of the Philippines. Even President Duterte admits we are incapable of defending ourselves. My gulay, if ever China decides to take over the country, there’s nothing we can do but surrender within 24 hours, even less! The United States keeps on saying that the MDT makes it obligatory for the US to defend the Philippines — but, will it really? I am no maritime expert, much less a military defense analyst. So I will rely on the insights of those who have been in the thick of discussions, like former Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile. He also spent many years as secretary of national defense under the Marcos administration. During our last two Zoom meetings for the 365 Club, I asked Enrile whether he thought the US would really wage a war against China on our behalf. His answer: A big No. This comes from his consultations with US military and defense officials who he claims were party to the ratification of the treaty, as well as his views of the present situation. First of all, according to Enrile, the MDT speaks of the US-Philippines relation as a Pacific ally. The treaty does not include the South China Sea, where the West Philippine Sea and the Philippine EEZ are located. Secondly, JPE cited the historical basis of China’s claim on the West Philippine Sea. The Chinese say this is covered by the so-called nine-dash line. The Permanent Court of the Arbitration ruled in the Philippines’ favor nonetheless. The problem is that China does not recognize this ruling. There are, of course, other factors which make the United States unable to wage war against China. One of them is the possibility of a global nuclear war since the US knows quite well the nuclear capability of China and the existence of its allies, like Russia and other Middle East countries that also have nuclear capabilities. If this happens, God forbid, it will be the end of civilizations. The US certainly doesn’t want this. Santa Banana, there’s also the fact that American investments in China amount to billions of dollars. This affects the US substantially, my gulay! From the point of view of the United States, the Philippines is no longer as strategic as it was when the Subic Naval Base and the Clark Airbase were still existing. I hate to say this, but despite what the United States is saying that it will come to our defense, the fact is that the Philippines is no longer as important to the US as it once was. And then there is the fact that the President of the United States cannot wage war on his own without getting the consent of the US Congress. And, my gulay, we all know how divided the US Congress is between the Republicans and Democrats. Thus, I agree with the analysis of JPE. *** Of all the most stupid and idiotic statements coming out from Malacanang is that a Sara Duterte-Bong Go would be an unbeatable team for the 2022 elections. Remarks like these coming from Malacanang can only make people think of the political dynasty of the Dutertes in Davao City. Aren’t there others outside of Davao? Yes, I agree that Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio is a winnable candidate for President in 2022. But, to have a Sara-Bong Go as candidates both for the national leadership seems to imply that there are no other personalities capable of leading the country.

Until recently, many dismissed the view that the United States and China could go to war as outlandish. Many people pointed to the fact that the two countries maintain robust economic ties. Others contended that China would never be powerful enough to truly challenge America’s primacy. Still others argued that a great power war is simply unimaginable in the modern era of globalization. I never subscribed to this view point. While not completely without merit, the arguments put forward to dismiss the possibility of a war are not overly persuasive. For instance, while it is true that China and the United States have a strong economic relationship, Germany and Britain were each other's largest trading partners before World War I. Similarly, even if China grows old before it grows rich, that doesn’t mean it can’t challenge America militarily. In the run-up to both world wars, Germany was poorer than Great Britain (and roughly equal to France) yet it nearly conquered Europe on two separate occasions. This was in large part because Germany had a larger population than Britain and France, which translated into a larger economy. China has a population four times the size of the United States today, meaning its GDP can be twice the size of America’s even if it’s citizens are half as rich. And the idea that the human race has outgrown great power war was famously in vogue in the years prior to World War I for nearly identical reasons as one hears today. In recent years, many observers have woken up to the fact that a war between the United States and China is not unthinkable. Although this is true, there are still strong pacifying forces. Two factors strike me as the most important. The first, and most obvious one, is that both sides maintain secure nuclear arsenals. As Thomas Schelling and others have pointed out, nuclear weapons are not a game-changer simply because of their massive destructive capabilities. The speed and certainty of nuclear retaliation is just as important. These two characteristics simply aren’t present with conventional weapons. Leaders can delude themselves into thinking their conventional forces, however improbably, will end up victorious in battle. In any case, the consequences of being wrong are far in the future. For instance, Imperial Japanese leaders knew it was a tremendous gamble to take on the United States. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese admiral who planned Pearl Harbor, warned his civilian leadership beforehand: “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain I will run wild and win victory upon victory. But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.” After the American economic embargo, however, Japanese leaders were only faced with bad options: capitulating in the face of American pressure or fighting a more powerful enemy in a likely futile effort. In these circumstances, Tokyo decided to gamble. After all, it was conceivable that America would be so exhausted from fighting Nazi Germany in Europe that it would ultimately sue for peace in Asia, especially in the face of fierce Japanese resistance. While the outcome of conventional wars hinges on a number of unknowable factors, nuclear retaliation is certain. And, unlike with conventional weapons—especially before airplanes and missiles—one doesn’t have to defeat the other side’s military to wreak havoc on its cities. Nuclear weapons can do so immediately. Moreover, as Robert Jervis points out, when two countries with secure, thermonuclear arsenals go to war, “the side that is ‘losing’ the war as judged by various measures of military capability can inflict as much destruction on the side that is ‘winning’ as the ‘winner’ can on the ‘loser.’” This changes the calculation of leaders, and makes it inconceivable that rational leaders would opt for total war. This is not foolproof of course— there is still the possibility that miscalculations, gradual escalation, or the “threats that leave something to chance” will produce an outcome neither side wanted— but it is a strong incentive for peace. While it is widely recognized that nuclear weapons make a U.S.-China conflict less likely, the pacifying effect of geography is often overlooked. Geography works to attenuate tensions in two interrelated ways. First, both China and the United States are massive countries that would be extremely difficult to conquer and occupy. Second, both are separated by the largest ocean on earth, and it is extremely difficult to project power over large bodies of water. As John Mearsheimer has written: “When great powers are separated by large bodies of water, they usually do not have much offensive capability against each other, regardless of the relative size of their armies. Large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies.” These two geographical factors reduce the intensity of the so-called security dilemma. Despite all their disputes over issues like Taiwan and the East and South China Seas, China and the United States generally do not have to fear that the other side will seek to invade and conquer them. This has usually not been the case for rising and ruling powers that went to war. In many of these instances, the rivals were located on the same continent or even shared a border, which generated significant insecurity and led to conflict. As Mearsheimer again explains, “Great powers located on the same landmass are in a much better position to attack and conquer each other. That is especially true of states that share a common border. Therefore, great powers separated by water are likely to fear each other less than great powers that can get at each other over land.” Just like nuclear weapons, these geographical factors are not an absolute guarantee against conflict. Japan and the United States went to war despite being separated by the Pacific Ocean, and so did Spain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. Still, China and America’s large land size and separation are both conducive to peace, and—combined with nuclear weapons—provide hope that they can avoid conflict.

Ideology in China is itself malleable, rather than a rigid cage that determines policy and has been continually tweaked to justify the maintenance of one-party rule through decades of great change. Under Mao, for instance, capitalists were persecuted as “counterrevolutionaries.” But under President Jiang Zemin the Chinese Communist Party abandoned a core Marxist belief in 2001 by accepting private entrepreneurs as party members. China’s economy today is more capitalist than Marxist and highly dependent on access to world markets. Assessments of China based on cherry-picked phrases from party propaganda overlook the frequent gap between rhetoric and reality. In 2018, for example, China cracked down on Marxist student groups and labor organizers, possibly because — as the labor scholar and sociologist Eli Friedman has noted — the young activists embodied “the Marxist principles the C.C.P. has long since abandoned in practice.” Likewise, Beijing has for years emphasized the sanctity of national sovereignty and noninterference in a country’s domestic affairs, yet has provided diplomatic cover for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Leading Chinese intellectuals openly acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling what China says with what it does. “Even we don’t believe much of what we say,” the Chinese economist Yao Yang, who is known for his pragmatic views, has said. “Our goal is not to defeat liberalism, but instead to say that what we have can be as good as what you have.” Jiang Shigong, a legal scholar and apologist for Mr. Xi’s political philosophy, has written that “‘socialism’ is not ossified dogma, but instead an open concept awaiting exploration and definition.” China’s long-term ambitions are difficult to know with certainty, and they can change. But it is far from clear that it can — or even seeks to — replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Mr. Xi and the C.C.P. apparently see the United States as trying to keep China perpetually subordinate and vulnerable, opposing whatever China does or advocates in an international system that Beijing believes favors the United States and developed democracies. But at a minimum, China seems more intent on modifying aspects of a system under which it has prospered — making it safer for autocracy — rather than replacing it. Mr. Xi often couches this effort in his political slogans like the “China dream” and a “shared future for humankind.” But there is continuing debate in China over what these visions really mean and what costs and risks China should accept in seeking global leadership. China’s overseas development largess, for example, is limited by the imperative of addressing its own persistent development needs at home, research by the scholar Min Ye has shown. Same for other key Chinese strategies for widening its influence: Its efforts to internationalize the renminbi and reduce dollar dominance are constrained by the tight grip it keeps on the currency’s value, as well as other capital controls. These policies help stabilize its economy and prevent capital flight, but they limit the renminbi’s global appeal. Editors’ Picks Help! I Signed Up for a $4,800 Bird-Watching Trip but the Company Shut Down. Why My Father Called Me Son, Daughter, He, She and It Gretchen Whitmer Would Like You to Meet ‘Governor Barbie’ U.S. concerns often center on the legitimate fear that China could attack Taiwan. But despite menacing Chinese military exercises meant to deter the self-ruled island from moving closer to formal independence, many experts believe that Beijing still prefers to achieve its longstanding objective of “peaceful reunification” through measures short of war. China could lose in a war and face international sanctions and supply chain disruptions. These would be economically and politically devastating, jeopardizing Mr. Xi’s prime objectives of regime security, domestic stability and national rejuvenation. Doubts are growing that China, facing economic headwinds and a shrinking population, can achieve its goal of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest economy, let alone other metrics of global leadership. There is broad recognition in China that it remains militarily, economically and technologically weaker than the United States and that further modernization depends upon continued access to international technology, capital and markets within a stable economic order. “It is impossible for America to contain the rise of China,” the influential Chinese scholar Huang Renwei has noted, “and it is equally impossible for China to quickly surpass America.” Chinese rhetoric about global governance reform has resonated in many developing countries that also see international institutions as tilted against them. But there is little reason to believe that the C.C.P.’s self-serving, nationalist ideology will captivate the world, especially as Mr. Xi feeds mistrust with his authoritarian ways, coercive tactics against foreign businesses and trading partners, and policies that increasingly smack of paranoia. China tends to be viewed more favorably in parts of the developing world. But that owes more to economics than to ideas, and its overseas investments have often been criticized for lacking transparency, saddling poor countries with debt, as well as environmental and other concerns. The United States must continue to discourage and hedge against more threatening Chinese behavior, including bolstering Taiwan’s capacity to resist coercion. But Washington should resist being guided solely by fear, which threatens the openness and dynamism responsible for American technological and scientific leadership. Policymakers should pair deterrent threats with more robust efforts to seek a constructive relationship with China, while also protecting the core values and interests of an inclusive international order and calling on Beijing to offer more credible reassurances of its intentions. There is no doubt that China — whatever its trajectory — poses a huge and complex policy challenge for America. But exaggerating fears of an “existential struggle” increases the likelihood of conflict, crowds out efforts to tackle shared challenges like climate change and creates a with-us-or-against-us framing that could alienate the United States from allies and much of the world. Worse, reflexively maneuvering to outcompete or thwart China only validates hard-liners in Beijing who believe that America is implacably hostile and that the only response lies in undermining the United States. By continuing on that road, the world’s two most powerful countries may end up turning each other into the enemies that they fear.

Why Regional Hegemony Is (Nearly) Impossible to Achieve Regional hegemony may be desirable in theory, but history suggests that it is an elusive goal. As Jonathan Kirshner points out, several different great powers have launched bids for regional dominance in the modern era and all but one of these attempts ended in disaster. France failed under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, Germany was beaten decisively in both world wars, and Japan’s attempt to establish a hegemonic order in Asia ended in total defeat as well. Only the United States managed to pull off becoming the sole great power in its region. In the modern world, in short, the success rate is less than 20 percent. Furthermore, the failures were not just minor setbacks: They were unmitigated disasters for the countries that made the attempt. Perhaps a million Frenchmen lost their lives in the Napoleonic Wars, and Bonaparte died in exile on a remote island in the South Atlantic. Germany suffered mightily in both world wars and ended up divided into separate states for more than 40 years. Japan was firebombed in World War II, had two cities destroyed by atomic bombs, and its political order was remade by a foreign occupier. Being a regional hegemon might be desirable, but trying to become one almost always makes a state less, rather than more, secure. Bids for hegemony fail for two main reasons. First, as defensive realists have long emphasized, there is a powerful tendency for major powers to balance against threats. When a powerful state is nearby, when its military forces seem tailored to project power against others, and when it seems to have revisionist ambitions, nearby powers typically band together to deter or defeat them. If a would-be hegemon reveals its aims by starting a war, balancing behavior becomes even more pronounced and effective. The second barrier to regional hegemony is nationalism. As Napoleon discovered when he invaded Spain, as the Soviet Union and United States both learned in Afghanistan, and as Moscow is now being reminded in Ukraine, local populations will make enormous sacrifices to repel invaders. Even nations that have been temporarily vanquished often remain restive and eager to throw off an aspiring hegemon’s yoke. The dissolution of the European colonial empires during the 20th century further illustrates how the spread of nationalist doctrines has strengthened resistance to foreign dominance. The United States is the one exception to this recurring tendency: It is the only regional hegemon in the modern era. Other would-be hegemons faced coordinated opposition from formidable and well-organized nation-states, but the United States was an ocean away from the other great powers and able to expand across North America without having to fight another major power or overcome a balancing coalition. The Indigenous population tried to resist, but it was weakened by its susceptibility to European diseases and divided into many loosely organized tribes and nations. Although Indigenous opposition to American expansion persisted until the late 19th century, the native tribes faced insurmountable collective-action problems and a dwindling population and were eventually swamped by an irresistible demographic tide. To put it plainly, the United States got lucky. Could China Become a Regional Hegemon Today? The conditions that allowed the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere and exclude other major powers do not exist in Asia today. China may be stronger than any of its neighbors, but several of them are major industrial powers with considerable potential to check Chinese power, and the world’s other major power—the United States—remains committed to helping defend them. India’s population is now larger and significantly younger than China’s and its economy is growing more rapidly. Many of China’s neighbors are already balancing more energetically: Defense budgets are rising sharply, and Australia, India, and Japan are coordinating with each other and with the United States. The greater their fear of Chinese hegemony, the more vigorous such responses will be. In addition, India already has a nuclear arsenal and Japan or South Korea could acquire a nuclear deterrent if the need arose. Officials in Tokyo and Seoul have previously made it clear that they see this as a viable option should circumstances require, and possessing their own deterrent would further limit China’s ability to intimidate them. If China does not want more of its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, it should limit its ambitions and make such a step unnecessary. Nor are Asian powers likely to be swayed by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s suggestion that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” Such statements are obviously intended to make the U.S. role in Asia seem less legitimate, but the belief that a shared “Asian” identity will override each individual state’s self-interest ignores the power of modern nationalism, which did not exist when the pre-modern, Sino-centric tributary system was in place. Nationalism is a powerful force in China, of course, but also in India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. It is hard to imagine any of these states preferring subordination to Beijing to national autonomy. Lastly, modern surveillance and communications technology makes it much easier for states to identify threatening powers and coordinate defensive responses. A Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia would be impossible to disguise, and states threatened by this attempt could share concerns, pool resources, and formulate a collective response quickly. As the rapid and vigorous Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates, countries facing a common danger can act with surprising swiftness when necessary. If Regional Hegemony Is Not an Option, What Then? If China’s prospects for regional hegemony are limited, then what do the United States and China have to fight about? Each is a vast country populated by hundreds of millions of patriotic citizens. They have large and sophisticated economies that no outside power could successfully strangle, powerful conventional military forces, and second-strike nuclear capabilities. An enormous ocean separates them, and neither side could possibly mount a successful invasion of the other. Coexistence is not merely desirable; it is unavoidable. Yet China’s leaders could still decide to choose the same risky path that other would-be hegemons have followed. If they believed the regional balance of power heavily tilted in their favor, that nearby states could be bullied into neutrality, that one or two triumphs would render subsequent resistance impossible, and that other states in Asia would eventually regard Chinese primacy as legitimate, then the risks of a hegemonic bid (however ill-advised) would rise. In the worst case, Chinese leaders could convince themselves that conditions temporarily favored a bid for regional hegemony while at the same time fearing that the balance of power could turn against them decisively if the opportunity was not seized. This combination of wishful thinking and paranoia is that textbook condition for preventive war; precisely the logic that convinced German and Japanese leaders to launch unsuccessful bids for hegemony during the first half of the 20th century. The implications for the United States and its Asian partners are clear. On the one hand, they should work to mitigate the various factors that can impede effective balancing and could lead Beijing to erroneously conclude that a bid for hegemony might succeed. At the same time, however, the United States and its allies need to make it crystal clear that they not trying to threaten China’s independence or territorial integrity, undermine the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, or crash the Chinese economy. Reassurance is needed so that China’s leaders do not conclude that they have no choice but to pursue hegemony even if the odds of success are small. Consistent messaging will be essential. Although recent speeches by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen were clearly intended to reassure Beijing about the scope and purpose of U.S. export controls and other economic measures, efforts to give NATO a strategic role in Asia and the more confrontational closing statement issued after the G-7 summit meeting earlier this month send a different signal, one that cannot help but heighten tensions On several occasions over the past three centuries, a great power concluded that its security required it to establish a dominant position over its neighbors. All but one of these attempts failed catastrophically. China would be unwise to make the attempt, but the United States and its allies would be equally unwise if their own actions unwittingly convinced Beijing that a risky bid for hegemony was still its best option.

Many Americans are nervous about looming future competition with China. One¶ business man returning from a visit to China “came away acutely perceptive and fearful¶ of whether America is willing and able to compete with a nation so focused, so¶ energetic, so willing to do what it takes to prosper in this new century.”83 Senior Fellow,¶ Jonathan D. Pollack, of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution,¶ says that “China looms large in the American consciousness.”84 Adding to the¶ nervousness are several books indicating tension in US-Chinese relations. For¶ example, Aaron Friedberg recently wrote China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery¶ in Asia. Other titles include Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China by Benjamin Page and Tao Xie and Superpower Struggles: Mighty¶ America, Faltering Europe, Rising China by John Redwood. Several recent journal¶ articles speak to the same subject. For instance, the National Defense University¶ publication, Joint Force Quarterly, published five articles specifically addressing USChinese¶ relations between the 4th Quarter 2011 and 1st Quarter 2012 issues. Military¶ leaders also feed public concerns, last fall, Admiral Robert Willard, the new head of¶ United States Pacific Command, noted that “in the past decade or so, China has¶ executed most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability implying that¶ maybe the alarmists are on to something.”¶ 85 It is apparent that “there is deep strategic¶ mistrust between the two countries. China’s rapid economic growth, steady military¶ modernization, and relentless nationalistic propaganda at home are shaping Chinese¶ public expectations and limiting possibilities for compromise with other powers.”¶ 86 Many Americans simply are not comfortable with a growing and influential Communist China. In July 2011 “John Birch Society members passed out literature and held up signs on the sidewalk in front of the National Governors Association Conference opposing new coziness with Communist China.”87 As we decipher whether the United States is helping to construct a future environment of high tension with China, we must remember that our speech acts highlighting Chinese “violation” of norms, as we interpret them, might only exacerbate the problem and alienate China further. According to TIME Magazine’s Michael Schuman, “Simplistic sloganeering that goes on in the United States about China only intensifies those problems and makes them harder to resolve.” 88 21 Understanding constructivism in an international theory context, and understanding that speech acts create rules and norms about how actors view issues, sets the foundation for understanding that the United States is helping to make an enemy out of China. Our numerous defense policy documents, combined with speech acts generated by our nation’s senior leaders, only fuel the negative image of China among the American people. This process becomes self-feeding and self-perpetuating. Interpretation of these speech acts and ideas is not a one sided event. While the United States domestic population interprets ideas about China, Chinese leadership and the Chinese people are doing the same. Constructivist theory predicts that when two sides continuously refer to one another in hostile and wary terms, they will “construct” a scenario in which they become enemies. The United States arguably has painted China as an enemy and security threat while at the same time identifying it as an economic competitor on the world stage. Actions by the United States decision-makers, and speech acts by United States leaders, are creating an environment of increasing hostility and mistrust. As we survey documents, speeches, and media, we can see that the constructivists may well be right. We may be “constructing” our enemy of the future.¶

Irrespective of one’s approach to the study of present and future Sino-American relations it seems clear that their interactions in the early 21st century have been mostly based on cooperation. Certainly, instances of tension have occurred. However, as Ikenberry (2010) argues, China has yet to show any signs of wishing to disrupt current international structures or to challenge the US. Tellingly, tensions over issues such as the Dalai Lama’s meeting with Barack Obama, American arms sales to Taiwan and the alleged undervaluation of the renminbi have not prevented cooperation. In fact, a bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue is in place. In addition, both countries have been working together in multilateral efforts to curb the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, the US and China have recently been cooperating to manage the threat of proliferation of WMD. China and the US have worked together to contain the effects of the recent global financial crisis as well. Finally, Washington and Beijing officials met several times to reach an agreement on climate change, leading to the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009. The above would serve to prove that socialization of China has worked so far. Material considerations on the part of Chinese leaders have led them to pursue integration within the current international system. Beijing is increasingly willing to take its share of responsibility in managing the system in return for material gains. Meanwhile, American elites wish to help China integrate in the existing world order. This would reinforce the existing order, which reflects American interests. Peaceful integration of China would also avert the costs of Cold War-style bipolarity. Hence, socialization of China is a win-win situation for Washington and Beijing. However, the argument that Sino-American relations are defined¶ purely in materialistic terms seems incomplete. Ideas do matter in the¶ conduct of foreign policy (KEOHANE, 1993). From this follows that they¶ also matter in the study of bilateral relations between states – in the case of this article, relations between the US and China. The notion that nonmaterial factors matter in IR is of course not new. However, constructivism has been the main driving force behind the move beyond material explanations of IR phenomena over the past two decades. In this article the author draws from constructivist accounts of how socially constructed identities and interests shape actor behaviour. The author will argue that US-China cooperation in the period between 2001 and 2012 is partly explained by each country’s self-image and the interests associated with it. Even though material considerations are important in understanding relations between China and the US, their identities are a key driver behind cooperation between them. What the author seeks is to elaborate on American and Chinese corporate and social identities to show how Sino-American cooperation is to a certain extent the byproduct of ideas, culture and history.

Plato, the author of the ‘Republic’, would never consider International Relations (IR), as a discipline, as science. For Plato’s definition of knowledge assumes it has to be something certain and indubitable. [1] Neither of those conditions, however, is met by IR. There are many theories of how international political arena works, i.a. realism, liberalism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, social constructivism, Marxism, feminism, green theory, post-structuralism and many others variations of those, and all of them are equally feasible. [2] That means there is some merit to all theories, yet all of them are flawed to a certain extent. A very popular metaphor states that international relations should be understood as a set of lenses; each lens allows us to see only a fragment of the whole picture, hence we cannot limit ourselves to only one theory.  The problem arises, however, when we realize that some of these “lenses” are incompatible with each other. For instance, it is impossible to bring reconciliation between realism, that assumes constant struggle between states, and liberalism, which concludes something very opposite, meaning the possibility of peaceful and just relations. Consequently, there is a dispute between academics regarding which theory offers the most accurate explanation of the IR system. One of the most basic problems of IR is how to explain the phenomenon of war. At first it seems a very simple question – war is a military conflict between two, or more, parties. However, difficulties arise when we reflect on why wars break out. While a would say that elites in wealthy states wage wars to exploit the poorer people, a realist would argue that war is connected with human behavior, so wars are naturally occurring phenomena. Additionally, a neo-realist would assume that the absence of higher authority in international arena results in anarchical system and hence state of war.[3] Basically, Marxist each theory has its own explanation, although it does not imply that those explanations are equally accurate. Therefore the aim of this essay is to evaluate the usefulness of two theories, realism and constructivism, in accounting for war. The analysis will hopefully reveal the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. The theories of IR differ solely because they are built on different premises. Realism operates under the assumption that states are the only actors on the political stage, also known as ‘statism’ [4] and ‘individualism’[5]. Additionally, the states work in an anarchical system, meaning in the absence of higher, trans-governmental and universally recognizable authority no rules are applied in the international realm. The other assumption is that politics is driven by law of human behavior- the mix of urges like the drive for powers, will to dominate, self-interest and ambition.[6] How does all of this help us understand war? Realism offers a rather cynical explanation: we are destined to wage wars, for all politics is a struggle for power and survival. Wars may be fought either to protect or expand security of the states (both the aggressor and the attacked may fight to protect their security- one to defend its country directly, the other by eliminating the threat the other country poses to its security or interests). A clear example would be the Second World War and events that preceded the outbreak of the war. Hitler’s violation of Versailles Treaty, Anschluss of Austria and incorporation of Czechoslovakian Sudetenland may be perceived as a direct way of securing Germany’s survival as a state. Starting war with Poland and Western Europe should be perceived as purely ideological move, though war with Russia (known as Operation Barbarossa) was aimed at securing oil resources in Baku and Caucasus. The reference to law of human behavior is probably the strongest argument of realists. For it is undeniable that in the history of mankind there were many leaders or generals that fought battles for the sole purpose to feed their personal ambitions, i.a. Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Therefore realism seems as a very feasible and reasonable theory. The cynicism of realism comes from the assumption that war is unavoidable and a constant element of our nature, while ideas and ideologies are of no importance. That is ideologies serve the purpose of arguing in favor of war using various arguments at different times. We might feel insulted by this view, and yet whether it is Alexander calling his soldiers to fight for Greece, Attila the Hun persuading his to plunder the cities of Western and Eastern Rome, Napoleon fighting under the cloak of French Revolution and freedom, or Khrushchev pretending to care about working people- one thing remains constant- we fight wars.  So even though it seems as there is some development in human thought, the true intentions remains the same through ages, and wars remain an extension of politics. It is hard not to appreciate realism and its account for war, since history seems to favor it. Constructivism, on the other hand, represents much more complex approach. It views the priority of ideas and human consciousness[7], hence the core assumptions: holism[8] and idealism[9]. The striking difference between realism and constructivism lies in the approach to ideas – the latter demands that we take seriously the role of ideas in world politics, while the former completely disregards it. However, we already saw that realism has much historical evidence in its favor, so is it even possible to defend social constructivism? Not only it is possible, but constructivism even offers a much more accurate account for war. To start with, statism is a flawed concept, for history has ample evidence that state power is being challenged from both above and below. [10] The American War of Independence, French Revolution, or even the struggle between Huguenots and Cardinal Richelieu pose a certain problem for realism. Also, the logical consequence of the absence of world government is not the state of war. It is rather an option that people have selected.[11] As the 20th century has shown, the trends changed and some attempts to create a world government, or at least regional governments, have been made. The United Nations, International Monetary Fund and European Union are the main examples of this. These problems are not encountered by constructivism. That is because constructivism understands IR as a social construction: a social theory that focuses on analysis and evaluation of various elements, such as culture, society, law, ethnography, economy etc. All these issues are of the highest importance to social constructivist, for they constitute differences between states and societies across historical and geographical context.[12] Simply put, social constructivism is capable of explaining all the wars by referring not to their common elements, but distinctive features and identity. The conquests of Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar and Napoleon may be perceived as embodiments of the same cultural legacy[13] And yet, it would be an oversimplification; it is necessary to place those leaders in the context of history, for it happens that some of them were actually devoted ideologists – like Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini, Mark Aurelius or even Charles the Great. So ideas, rather than political cynicism constituted those people. Constructivism’s advantage is evident in that by focusing on social factors and by stressing the importance of context, it is capable of addressing the current civil war in Mexico between the government and narcotic cartels, which is not in the scope of realism. Constructivism is therefore to be appreciated for its accuracy, while realism may be deemed oversimplified in comparison. The essay has attempted to prove the superiority of social constructivism over realism in accounting for war. Realism, although flawed with oversimplification and inability to address various issues concerning war, remains the dominant theory of international relations. That is because although the domestic realm in many countries and across cultures has experienced a certain degree of progress, which is an unaddressed issue by realism, the international arena seems to be ruled by the balance of power. The European Union and United Nations, the organizations that are supposed to secure peace, might be understood as a realistic way to balance power. Also, politicians all over the world seem to embrace purely Machiavellian approach. As Machiavelli put it: “You ought never to suffer your designs to be crossed in order to avoid war, since war is not to be avoided, but is only to be deferred to your advantage!”[14] And so, it seems that engagement of EU and USA in Libya in 2011 was not driven by humanitarian impulse, but because the war (at least at the time) seemed to propose enormous economic and political advantages (including winning additional votes in popularity polls, as the intervention was generally welcomed by European citizens). In theory, social constructivism offers the more detailed and accurate account for war not only than realism, but than any other theory. Its focus on social factors and importance of ideas allows it to address problems that are not even in the scope of realism. Additionally, the example of liberalism, Christianity and socialism, among others, prove that ideas and ideologies can really change the world. The superiority of constructivism may be explained in a way that it is capable of explaining realism, while realism is not capable of returning the favor.

The well-known RCT scholars Shepsle and Bonchek humorously note that while it might not be “rocket science,” the study of politics should be scientific.46 Others, especially postmodernist critics, argue against the notion of political science and IR as science. A Deweyan pragmatist approach would suggest that this debate is not useful. By that, I mean that what IR is or is not is not nearly as important as what it achieves. So the question should not be whether IR is scientific, but rather, how scientific does it need to be to get the job done? To this, there are many answers, but I suggest a line of reasoning: the scientific method in the most general sense is useful in helping to explain how and why, all else equal, causal processes work. Put differently, if we want to know how and why some states go to war and others do not, it would be more useful—in the sense of getting logically coherent, empirically verifiable answers—to analyze historical cases systematically than it would be to consult with a shaman or use a crystal ball to obtain an answer. This is not say that there is not an important role for textual interpretation in the process of studying war and other international phenomena. Indeed, I elsewhere argue that interpretation of historical texts is crucial to making valid claims about wars.47 But the main point here is that interpretation is a means toward an end, namely, the process of coping with the world via human experience. Toward that end, interpretation is necessary and useful, but it is not the end itself. A second point is that there is clearly a pragmatic and justifiable need for certain types of quantitative methods, namely, statistics, though not necessarily formal models, in some segments of IR. Taking a simple example for illustrative purposes, if one wished to study the effect of speed limits on motor vehicle fatalities, the use of aggregate data statistically analyzed would be far superior to standing on the corner waiting for an accident to observe or reading several diary accounts of individual accidents. The key point here, however, is not that statistical methods are inherently better, or more “rigorous” than any other type of method. Rather, the use of statistically analyzed data to find answers to problems of highway fatalities creates knowledge that if properly applied, would alleviate “concrete human woes,” which is to say it would help to save lives. That is pragmatic political science.48 What Is a Problem? Many political scientists believe in the idea of having a “problem orientation” for the field. For example, Atul Kohli asserts that there is a strong consensus among leading experts “that comparative politics is very much a problem-driven field of study.” “What motivates the best comparative politics research are puzzles of real-world significance,” writes Kohli, in “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium.”49 Similarly, Ian Shapiro, responding to the question of what would be a better alternative than RCT asks the question: “What is the phenomenon to be explained?… The formulation of alternative explanations, in other words, should be a problem-driven activity.”50 This is clearly consistent with Deweyan pragmatism; in fact, it is inherently pragmatist. “A Deweyan pragmatic approach to political inquiry,” writes Maurice Meilleur, “would transform political science from a discipline, based on a set of methods, into a profession, based on a set of problems.”51 But what, more specifically, is a “problem orientation?” First, it is clear that Kohli and his colleagues mean an empirically driven problem orientation. That is, the study of politics should be driven by empirical, not theoretical or methodological problems. Careful not to push this point too far, a Deweyan pragmatist would suggest that theorization is an important activity, but it must not lose its link to problems of human experience, which is to say empirical problems. However, Kohli and others advocating an empirically driven problem orientation have little to say about how to identify and value problems. After all, there is a limitless supply of political problems only a fraction of which can be studied. In response, I would argue that some problems are more significant to the detection and response to human suffering and thus more deserving of study, than others. This is itself a tricky ethical problem, for who is to say what is or is not a “real problem?” One reader of this manuscript suggested that “What is really going on here, when one scratches the analytical surface, is not that IR theorists aren't discussing problems; it's that they are discussing problems that the author does not feel are worthy of attention. But why should we accept that the author's “problems” are more important or privileged? Why does the author get to decide what a “real” problem is?” This is a good question but it is a misreading of the argument. Nowhere does Dewey or this author imply that any individual could or should decide or dictate which problems matter and which do not. To the contrary, the question of “who decides” is a public deliberation problem, a subject Dewey addressed exhaustively in his classic The Public and Its Problems.52 According to Dewey, problems are the direct outcome of a public's determination of its common good. A full analysis of how this works, or in some cases, fails to work in practice is beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to note that there is no argument here for the privileging of one private individual's notion of what constitutions “real problem” versus that of another. That is for the public to decide. Human Woe and Issues That Matter The final point to be made about reconstruction stems directly from the previous discussion: some problems matter more than others with regard to the alleviation of concrete human suffering. Which issues matter the most in our world? Ultimately, per Dewey's political philosophy touched on above, that is for the public to decide. Assuming that there ever could be a “common good,” we can hypothesize that people might choose to focus on issues that affect them daily, issues such as climate change, poverty, health care, education, racism, and sexism, as well as war and peace, all issues that are of grave importance to humanity. IR, especially in its American form, with its disproportionate emphasis on global security and great power war, has given scant attention to too many other issues, and when attention is given to the “lesser” topics, they are relegated to sub-sub-specializations within the discipline, “Gender and IR,” for instance. More problematic from the standpoint of pragmatism, the approach-driven wing of the discipline is more concerned with which paradigm has scored more points in the epic contest for paradigmatic supremacy than with the matter of how the world could or should respond to climate change or why hundreds of million of children lack basic nutrition and medical care. The interpretivist/linguistic wing, in contrast, is more concerned with how texts are interpreted in graduate seminars than with the fact that children in inner cities cannot even read a text at all.53 Many IR scholars are still fighting over whether and to what extent “unit-level variables” should be taken into consideration in understanding international politics (and if so, whether one might still rightly be accepted in the club of realism).54 Others are trying to demonstrate that IR constructivism is really “liberalism in disguise.”55 This is not a stab at “why realism is (yet again) wrong.” It is a critique of the self-definitionally obsessed, paradigm-driven culture of academic IR. I would not go so far as to claim that there are no scholars who study everyday politics; many clearly do.56 Rather, the problem is that that the incentive structure to contribute to the “big debates” of the discipline, namely, those at the paradigmatic level, is a project that drifts ever afar from the problems of “concrete human woe” that affect the other millions of people who happen

Eurocentrism in IR Is a Form of Intellectual Racism By Karen Smith, a lecturer in international relations at Leiden University and an honorary research associate at the University of Cape Town, is the co-editor, with Arlene Tickner, of International Relations From the Global South: Worlds of Difference. In the same way that international relations has neglected race, the discipline has been both ignorant and dismissive of alternative ways of thinking about the world that do not, according to a Eurocentric understanding of history, originate from the West. Ideas from outside the West have been deemed inferior in the field of IR and lacking in value because of their geographic origin, because they are not couched in the theoretical language regarded as legitimate by the gatekeepers of IR or do not appear in forms—such as recognized academic journal articles or books—that are considered to be appropriate sources for the study of IR. In addition, scholars from beyond the West have, in a way that reflects the global economy, been relegated to the role of providers of raw material—in the form of empirical evidence—while the transformation of these facts into more advanced, abstract forms of knowledge has been regarded as the prerogative of the West. For example, Western scholars often assess African states according to criteria developed by European theories of statehood and rely on local scholars to provide the relevant data, instead of considering alternative African understandings of the state. As a consequence, the majority of what students read about in IR continues to be written by a minority of the world’s people. The presumption that all worthwhile ideas originated in the West is not only exclusionary but false, as scholars such as Pinar Bilgin and Siba Grovogui have argued—and should be acknowledged as constituting a form of intellectual racism. The exclusion of scholars and ideas from outside Europe and North America has resulted in a field that does not provide those who study it—and often go on to practice it as, for example, diplomats and politicians—with the necessary diversity of perspectives to fully grasp the dynamics of the contemporary global system. Perhaps most significantly, it has constrained the discipline’s ability to imagine a different world.

It seems that most discussions of Beijing’s growing prominence draw on China’s historical experience in order to make inferences about its future directions. Yet, as the contributions to this special issue indicate, while welcome, such analyses are often problematic both because they project a particular territorialized idea of China into the past and treat China as a homogenous and unchanging constant. Consequently, the strategic calculations that such analyses make are suspect as they rest on and reify a stylized and idealized vision of what China is and how it interacts with others. For instance, Shih and Hwang argue that the simplistic framing of China’s rise in terms either of conformism or revisionism overlooks a variety of other possibilities as well as denies the heterogeneity of strategic cultures interacting on the world stage. Instead, meaningful observation needs to heed the nuances of specific space-time dynamics and interactions (Shih and Yu, 2015). With this in mind, Pan proposes a framework for ‘holographic transition’ to articulate the contingency of assemblages such as China and world affairs. For instance, in the case of China, the possible trajectories of its rise are embedded in the plurality of ‘holographic reflections’ of the multiple worlds with which China is inextricably bound up. Thus, China’s rise and its global implications are not linear, but contingent on its dynamic and reciprocal relations with its multiple worlds. And Nordin and Smith remind us, taking mutuality and connectedness as a point of departure for our assessments discloses more relevant depictions of global life than those premised on antagonism and disconnection. The contributions by Kavalski and Nordin and Smith suggest that the direction and future trajectories of China’s rise would be shaped in the context of international interactions – such relations provide a socially organized context within which world political effects emerge. Drawing on insights from Advaita and Daoist teaching, Ling outlines a five-rank protocol for reappraising China’s rise. While these suggestions might not be particularly palatable for the bullet-pointpreferences of foreign policy analysts, the contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate that only by acknowledging the multiple sites, voices, and faces of global affairs can we begin a meaningful conversation not only on the implications of China’s rise, but also a much-needed reconsideration of key concepts of IR (such as power, identity, security, strategy, and history).