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2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – MMT

Monetary sovereignty assumes atomized, competitive nation-states

Kotilainen 21 — Konsta Kotilainen, a SYLFF fellow at the University of Helsinki in politics, economics, and philosophy, doctoral researcher, holds a M.A. and B.A in world politics with specializations in Global Political Economy and Global Governance and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki, 2021 (“A Cosmopolitan Reading of Modern Monetary Theory,” Taylor and Francis Online, March 19th, available online at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343, accessed 07-14-2023) //CD

My third MMT-inspired argument against leaving the exercise of monetary sovereignty solely to the nation-states relates to the wider political economy in which these states operate. As the neochartalists often stress, numerous institutional, judicial, and ideological factors, as distinct from “purely economic” ones, undermine the ability of monetarily sovereign states to take the full advantage of their currency privileges (Armstrong ; Sardoni and Wray ). Many such barriers are supranational by nature. Contemporary nation-states are rarely politically strong enough to coordinate sufficiently effective economic, social, and regulatory policies despite their in principle considerable capacities as monetary sovereigns. Few individual states acting alone are fit to fight the global institutional and ideological forces that constrain their exercise of monetary sovereignty. While even the smallest and poorest of nation-states are not always incapable of benefitting from their sovereign privileges to some limited extent, it is especially hard for them to bact alone against the prevailing global near-consensus on appropriate macroeconomic policy defined by the powerful states, governance organisations, and influential private actors on the scene. As Gill and Law (, 491) argue, transnational capital greatly benefits from the political division of the world into separate, competing, and mostly relatively weak, nation-states. In playing states against each other, economic elites routinely employ the age-old divide et impera strategy. As a result, long-term trends in global political economy are not easily reversed by any single state even within its own territorial borders. For instance, “new constitutional” neoliberalism (Gill , 116–142; Hirschl ), manifested in the evermore-stringent legal constraints on national policies from the 1990s onwards, probably cannot be effectively combatted without cross-border action for new, truly transformative forms of global constitutionalism (Kochi ).

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – MMT

MMT relies on the maintenance of monetary sovereigns, which is incommensurate with an ethos that is attentive to cross-border politics

Konsta Kotilainen 2022 [“A cosmopolitan reading on Modern Monetary Theory”; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/13600826.2021.1898343?needAccess=true&role=button ; Konsta Kotilainen holds M.A. and B.A. degrees in World Politics and a further degree in Theoretical Philosophy from the University of Helsinki. He’s also studied at the University of Cambridge.] ARL

Much of the recent IPE literature on monetary issues has tended to ignore “big” socially burning questions that initially were in the field’s focus of attention (Cohen2017, 675). Among such questions, the democratic legitimacy of monetary and macro-economic governance is rarely explicitly tackled, even if the groups of decision-makers and “decision-takers” rarely coincide within these traditionally technocratic domains. More generally, there is little dialogue between empirical IPE research and normative democratic theory (Agné2011).1 The normative aspects of global economic governance, less surprisingly, have been largely brushed aside also in macroeconomics. Economists’ accounts of democracy have traditionally remained implicit (Kurki2013). The pre-2008“new consensus” on the primacy of monetary policy and the merits of central bank independence took the democratic deficit in macroeconomic governance as essentially a virtue without engaging with political theory (for a partial exception, see Blinder1996; on the new consensus, seee.g. Goodfriend2007; Woodford2009). The post-2008 worries about “secular stagna-tion”, economic inequalities, and the ongoing Covid-19 havoc, have drawn some of the average macroeconomist’s attention towards the fiscal capacities of the state, but no explicit normative discussion on the long-term objectives or institutional basis of fiscal policy involvement has yet emerged within the mainstream of the profession. Even if one focuses on critical approaches to macroeconomic governance that are broadly sympathetic to strong democratic claims–as I will in this paper–it is difficult to find accounts that would build on normative political theory and economic inquiry in a balanced and engaged way (for one exception, see Patomäki and Teivainen2004). One-sided perspectives to political economy easily result in unfortunate incompatibilities between views that seem promising in their own right. An important task, then, is to cross-examine such views in order to find ways to save and synthesize what is valuable in them and disregard what is not. There appears to be such an incompatibility between the increasingly influential neo-chartalist Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) emphasizing the macroeconomic role of the nation-state, on the one hand, and cosmopolitan calls for supranational democratic economic governance, on the other. While both accounts endorse the general idea that democratic macroeconomic governance in service of the “public purpose” should be the objective, their proponents reach conflicting conclusions about the desirability of national self-determination in economic affairs. MMT is primarily an economic theory and cosmopolitanism an ethico-political theory, but their concerns overlap to such an extent that clear mutual tensions can emerge. The neochartalists (Kelton2011; Mitchell, Wray, and Watts2019; Wray2012) argue that the contemporary “monetarily sovereign” states are far more able to pursue autonomous macroeconomic policies than what is commonly believed. According to the neo-chartalists, a national control over currency allows these states to pursue independent monetary and fiscal policies. In case a sovereign state also happens to be democratic, its substantial autonomy, in effect, opens up room for democratic governance. In contrast, cosmopolitans and global democrats4(see e.g. Hale, Held, and Young2013, 113–188; Hale and Held2017; Held2010, 107–110; Patomäki and Teivainen2004; Scholte, Fioramonti, and Nhema2016) are convinced that an economic governance framework organised largely around sovereign nation-states and their unilateral policy decisions cannot deliver truly democratic outcomes. Many IPE and legal scholars doubt whether there even exists genuinely monetarily sovereign states in the globalized political economy (Cohen2008, 205–310; Zimmermann2013, 5). Cosmopolitans raise further questions about whether any category of states enjoys much substantial auton-omy to resist global economic imperatives. And to the extent that such autonomy exists, cosmopolitans argue that it should be exercised only within certain ethical bounds that take the cross-border ramifications of national policies into account (Held2010, 107–110, 167)

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – Generic

Formation of politics around national identity is inherently exclusionary – the national self is inevitably constructed in reference to the non-western other

Scott Watson 11, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Victoria, “Back Home, Safe and Sound: The Public and Private Production of Insecurity,” International Political Sociology, Volume 5, 2011, pp. 160-177

The reproduction and maintenance of national boundaries demonstrates that insecurities associated with international anarchy are not natural and inherent to an anarchic system, but have a history and are the product of human agency. But it is not clear that this anarchic system is ‘‘what states make of it’’ (Wendt 1992), as much as it suggests that differentiated nation-states require a dangerous and disordered anarchic international realm to necessitate the production of domestic order and security. Exclusion is an essential feature of such a system, and as Douglas contends ‘‘it is only by exaggerating the difference between within and without, above and below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created’’ (1966:4). Playing slightly with Douglas’ contention, this article has shown that it is only by exaggerating the differences between within and without that disorder is created, and the attempt to create order necessitated. Anarchy and state identity are mutually coconstitutive; states and private actors rely on and reproduce international anarchy through the maintenance of collective boundaries and national identities.

The regulation of human movement and health are two fields of practice through which the international ⁄domestic is actualized, and which reinforce the moral bases of exclusion fundamental to the nation-state. These twin concerns have been an integral element of the growth of the nation-state as the pre-eminent form of political community. The Canadian case demonstrates that the identity of the national self has been constructed in difference to the unhealthy, non-Western, and undeserving outsider, while simultaneously relying on and reproducing the state as a safe, secure and ordered space in an anarchic and disordered international realm. These constructions are reproduced through the regulation of human movement and healthcare by public and private entities that operate in the spaces created by and through these practices.

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – Generic

The project of protecting and expanding the national social safety net legitimizes exclusive conceptions of national identity – inclusion within the western welfare state is underwritten by those it excludes

Scott Watson, 11 — [Scott Watson, University of Victoria, “Back Home, Safe and Sound: The Public and Private Production of Insecurity,” OUP Academic, 5-18-2011, https://academic.oup.com/ips/article/5/2/160/1943030?login=true, accessed 7-12-2023; marlborough-mjen]

In Canada, potential migrants may be excluded for various reasons beyond fears of contagious disease—criminality, membership in a violent organization, physical/mental disorder, or insufficient financial support (CIC 2009). Each of these categories of difference reflects distinct moral bases on which Canadian national identity is reproduced and through which exclusion is necessitated. A number of these exclusions, such as those with insufficient financial resources and those with contagious disease, partially reflect a concern with the maintenance of the welfare state and the prosperity of the country. Foucault notes that this has been a concern of states since the eighteenth century and gave rise to health policing in that era (Foucault 1980; Turner 1997). Health, economic prosperity, and national security became intimately intertwined as the citizenry's health, wealth, and longevity emerged as the greatest resource of the state (Rosen 1953; Osborne 1997:177–178; Lowenheim 2007:205). Over time, the view of the healthy citizen as strategic resource for the state was supplemented by the view that citizens had a right to good health in the eighteenth century and thereafter, public health became the duty of the state and a proper area for intervention and control (La Berge 1992:16). Health and the provision of healthcare by the state as a marker of difference internationally blossomed with the birth and growth of the welfare state. Though contagion from foreigners continues to be understood as a threat to the health of society, it also increasingly reflects a concern with the protection and security of the public health system itself. To take one contemporary example, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) subjects certain migrants to health checks “to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to reduce and prevent excessive demand on Canada's health and social services” (CIC 2010c).

Protection of the social safety net in the modern nation-state is necessitated by the crucial role it plays in legitimizing the state (Beck 2002:40–41). In Canada, as in other Western states, the two dominant features of the welfare state are to protect citizens from poverty and disease,4 and these dangers are, in turn, associated with foreign spaces and migrants. Excluding poor and diseased migrants, who are expected to make immediate and costly demands on the welfare state, reproduces national subjects as legitimate recipients of such assistance and the perception that potential migrants are illegitimate recipients. The moral basis of exclusion incorporates beliefs about contagion as well as beliefs about just deserts based on contribution. Externally, the undeserving migrant is justifiably excluded through the representation of them as profiteers gaining benefits and security from the welfare system of a community to which they do not belong and have not contributed (Huysmans 2000:768). The internal manifestation of the just deserts moral basis of exclusion is the “welfare cheat” (see Cruickshank 1997; Moffatt 1999; Chunn and Gavigan 2004).

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – Generic

Economic redistribution is a tool for collective identity-building – the nation remains the underlying collective referent

Béland and Lecours 08 — Daniel Béland, a Director of the McGill Institute for the Study of Canada at McGill University and James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science, former Canada Research Chair for the University of Saskatchewan, holds a Ph.D in Political Sociology, André Lecours is a Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, holds a Ph.D from Carleton University, 2008 (“Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial Solidarity,” Oxford, 2008, available online at https://academic.oup.com/book/6828, accessed 07-14-2023)

Nationalism and Social Policy words, who should be included in the ‘social justice’ community,5 or put another way, to whom should social solidarity extend? Typically, the answer to these questions is ‘the nation’ or ‘members of the national community’. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, however, there exist different, often competing, national projects, the result of which is that ‘the nation’ refers to different communities, depending on who is asked. In these countries, thus, social policy, as both a mechanism and a symbol of territorial solidarity, has become intertwined with nationalist politics. The Nation, Territory, and Public Policy Despite the shadow cast over the state by global cultural, economic, and political processes, there is a growing consensus in both the sociological and the political science literatures that state institutions still matter a great deal, and that the territorial dimension of political and economic processes remains ever-present in the West as well as elsewhere around the world.6 Yet, despite this consensus and the proliferation of scholarship on federalism and decentralization, the changing political articulation between territorial identities and policy development remains an understudied issue that raises crucial theoretical questions about politics and policy-making. Scholars who seek to better understand the connection between territorial identities and public policies may consider at least two such questions. First, how do territorial mobilization and identities impact policy outcomes? Second, and inversely, how do existing public policies affect processes of territorial mobilization and identity formation? Systematic, theoretically informed accounts about 5 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (2000), 38. 6 For a critique of the ‘globalization thesis’ that considers that states and territorial politics have become increasingly irrelevant, see, among many other possible references, John L. Campbell, Institutional Change and Globalization (2004); John F. Helliwell, Globalization and Well-Being (2002); T. V. Paul, G. John Ikenberry, and John Hall (eds.), The Nation-State in Question (2003); Jan Aart Scholte, ‘What is Globalization? The Definitional Issue–Again,’ working paper no. 109/02, Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, GSGR, Coventry: University of Warwick, 2002. Even a contemporary Marxist theorist like David Harvey acknowledges that the territorial logic of the state remains a crucial aspect of the contemporary world order that exists alongside—and interacts with—global capitalism: The New Imperialism (2003).

Introduction the relationship between identity formation, territorial mobilization, and public policy are relatively rare, especially if one excludes scholarship focusing exclusively on federalism or other specific modes of institutional governance.7 Territory and public policy are joined as a result of the structure and organization of human communities. In one form or another, the territorial anchoring of public policy in advanced industrial societies involves the nation as a basic collective reference. Traditional thinking held that state policies were simply national policies in so far as they were designed for a nation by its elected representatives. From this perspective, education and economic development policies are considered instrumental in the political construction of nations,8 while the national community, once established, is viewed as the foundation for the development of an array of public policies. This straightforward, though often implicit, connection between national identity and public policy has been seriously challenged by the concept of multi-level governance.9 In federal systems, this connection has always been more complex than was the case in centralized unitary states, as the formal division of sovereignty typically allows for constituent units to design and implement policy independently of the central state.10 In the European Union, this complexity is even greater owing to the existence of an additional level of political authority and policy-making capacity. The reality of multinationalism presents a different type of challenge to the notion that state, national, and public policy all overlap. Public policies and territorial configurations were typically understood in relation to the model of the nation-state, where the state’s conceptualization of the nation remains virtually unchallenged. In some cases (Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States, for instance), the assumption of a conflation between state and nation is fairly unproblematic in so far as citizens recognize themselves as members of one nation that generally corresponds to existing international borders. There might be debates about the nature of the nation, but they do not extend to questioning 7 For an exception, see among others Jan Erk, “‘Wat We Zelf Doen, Doen We Beter;” Belgian Substate Nationalisms, Congruence and Public Policy,’ Journal of Public Policy 23 (2003): 201–24. 8 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983). 9 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-Level Governance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 34 (1996): 341–78. 10 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (1999).

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 2NC – Link – Generic

The aff’s redistribution along national lines is an implicitly nationalist project – welfare states are tools for constructing the identity of the nation

Clarke 5 — [John Clarke, the Open University, “Welfare States as Nation States: Some Conceptual Reflections,” Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2005, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2AD6A69C490E938FFC4991264DEB5F81/S1474746405002599a.pdf/welfare-states-as-nation-states-some-conceptual-reflections.pdf, accessed 7-12-2023; marlborough-mjen]

We can now consider the ways in which welfare states are national in a more constitutive sense. Rather than taking place in a national space, or reflecting national character or culture, welfare has been one of the means through which nations are formed and reformed (Lewis, 1998). Welfare states seek to produce a nation – a People. They attempt to reinforce or enforce certain ‘ways of life’; they regulate forms of being and behaviour; they classify and categorise the population (and deal differently with its segments); and they manage the relationships between the public and private realms. I stress ‘seek to’ and ‘attempt to’ above, because there is no guarantee that such projects succeed (Clarke, 2004). Welfare is enmeshed in the institutionalisation of conceptions of the nation, its ways of life, its needs and the complex socio-demography of its people and how they are to be governed (Chatterjee, 2004; Riley and McCarthy, 2003). States are one of the key agencies though which formations of difference are produced and one of the means by which those differences are reconciled into the imagined unity of a people. Catherine Hall’s observations on the relation of metropole and colony identify the importance of marking and mapping ‘difference’ (see also Lewis, 2003). In the articulation of class, gender, racialised, and sexualised identifications, she argues that

Marking differences was a way of classifying, of categorising, of constructing boundaries for the body politic and the body social. Processes of differentiation, positioning men and women, colonisers and colonised, as if these divisions were natural, were constantly in the making, in conflicts of power . . . The mapping of difference, I suggest, the constant discursive work of creating, bringing into being, or reworking these hieratic categories, was always a matter of historical contingency. The map constantly shifted, the categories faltered, as different colonial sites came into the metropolitan focus, as conflicts of power produced new configurations in one place or another. (2002: 17, 20)

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 1NC – Shell (L)

The alt is decolonial cosmopolitanism – the alt embraces radical openness to people imagined to be beyond the bounds of the nation-state, rooting political commitments in shared humanity rather than national belonging

Moyo and Dube 21 [Nathan Moyo (Great Zimbabwe University) and Bekithemba Dube (University of the free State), Decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship for a post-COVID-19 world: Towards a reimagined convivial planetary re-existence, 2021, . 7-14-2023; marlborough-mjen]

Reimagined decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship for convivial re-existence

The public failure of a cosmopolitan citizenship premised on global coloniality became manifest when the world’s response to COVID-19 was characterised by the “strengthening of exclusionary nationalistic messaging” (Estelles & Fischam 2020, p. 1), and not human solidarity and collaboration against the pandemic. We discuss three distinct ways through which such a cosmopolitanism citizenship can be reimagined for convivial re-existence. First, we recentre Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s 10 Ds of the decolonial turn (2020) as a broader framework for a critical cosmopolitanism that is radically different from the neoliberal cosmopolitanism of Euromodernity. Second, we draw on the principles of Ubuntu, as key to a robust mosaic that is sensitive to the convivial imperatives of a planetary re-existence in a post-COVID world – that is, Ubuntu becomes useful in reframing the normative underpinnings of a decolonial cosmopolitanism. And, finally, we explore how an inherent civic engagement in a decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship could enhance struggles for convivial re-existence in a post-COVID-19 world. Taken together, the three approaches outlined above illustrate how a de-colonial cosmopolitan citizenship that resists coloniality could promote a planetary conviviality that upholds an all-encompassing idea of humanity, to which we can all belong as equal beings. In order to put these issues into perspective, Table 1 juxtaposes the distinguishing hallmarks of a reimagined decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship against those of a Eurocentric neoliberal cosmopolitanism citizenship.

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 1NC – Shell (L)

Bounded understandings of political obligation cause extinction – only a radical openness to a politics beyond the nation state can resolve the risks inherent to reality

Mbembe ’19 (Achille, Cameroonian historian, political theorist, research professor in history and politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economy Research at the University of the Witwatersrand. May 18. “Bodies as borders”, https://www.fesjournal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2.Mbembe.pdf, accessed Jul. 14.)//max

The third mega process is what we should call the dialectics of entanglement and separation. All over the world, the combination of fossil capital, soft-power warfare, and the saturation of the everyday by digital and computational technologies has led to the acceleration of speed and the intensification of connections, creating a new redistribution of the Earth and of population movements. To be alive, or to remain alive, is increasingly tantamount to being able to move speedily. In the process, the human race has come up against terrestrial limits. Such limits are not only the consequence of the sphericality of the planet. They are also limitations on the expansion of life as such. As the planet increasingly seems bound to burn, it is not only the individuated bodies that are imperilled. It is earthly existence, the fate of everything on earth, the fluidity of life which is at stake (Pyne 1997; Parisi and Terranova 2000). Meanwhile, we are, more than ever before at any other time in human history, not only in close proximity to each other but also exposed to each other. This close proximity and exposure is experienced less and less as opportunity and possibility and, more and more, as heightened risk. But entanglement and exposure to each other are not all that characterize the now. Wherever we look, the drive is simultaneously and decisively towards contraction, towards containment, towards enclosure and various forms of encampment, detention, and incarceration. Typical of this logic of contraction, containment, incarceration and enclosure is the worldwide erection of all kinds of walls and fortifications, gates and enclaves. In other words, various practices of partitioning space, of offshoring and fencing off wealth, of splintering territories, of fragmenting spaces, saddling them with various kinds of borders whose function is to decelerate movement, to stop it in some instances, for certain classes of populations, in order to manage risks. Various reasons are mobilized to account for this renewed infatuation with borders taken as the best way to manage risks. Security and the preservation of one’s identity are some of these reasons. And as it happens, physical and virtual barriers of separation, digitalisation of databases, filing systems, the development of new tracking devices, sensors, drones, satellites and sentinel robots, infrared detectors and various other cameras, biometric controls, and new microchips containing personal details – everything is put in place to transform the very nature of the border in the name of security. Borders are increasingly turned into mobile, portable, omnipresent and ubiquitous realities. The goal is to better control movement and speed, accelerating it here, decelerating it there and, in the process, sorting, recategorizing, reclassifying people with the goal of better selecting anew who is whom, who should be where and who shouldn’t, in the name of security. As a result, borders are no longer merely lines of demarcation separating distinct sovereign entities. Increasingly, they are the name we should use to describe the organised violence that underpins both contemporary capitalism and our world order in general. But perhaps, to be exact, we should not speak of borders in general but, instead, of ‘borderization’, that is, the process by which certain spaces are transformed into uncrossable places for certain classes of populations, who thereby undergo a process of racialization; places where speed must be disabled and the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable are meant to be immobilized if not shattered. Whatever the case, the technological transformation of borders is in full swing. In a sense, one of the major consequences of the acceleration of technological innovations has been the creation of a segmented planet of multiple speed regimes. A key development, of late, is the extent to which border security practices have taken a keen interest in the connection between the human body and identity, as a means to achieve detailed control over movement and speed. This being the case, the question we must ask is the following: what precisely is at stake in the extension of the biometric border into multiple realms of social life and, in particular, the human body? In other words, what explains the migration from the border understood as a particular point in space to the border as the moving body of the undesired masses of populations? The answer is a new global partitioning between potentially risky bodies vs. bodies that are not. It is in the nature of risk to be hidden from view. That which is hidden from view is generally unknown. For it to be known, it must be visualized. The screening of bodies at border checkpoints aims at making visible “that which is hidden from view, opening up new visualizations of the unknown, potentially risky body” (Amoore and Hall 2009, 444). In such a context, biometric technologies are supposed to fragment the human body in order to recompose it for the purpose of securitization, of elimination and neutralization of the risk. This happens because the human body is seen as an indisputable anchor from which data can be safely harnessed or extracted. As a result, we are witnessing a gradually extending intertwinement of individual physical characteristics with information systems – a process that has served to deepen faith in data as a means of risk management and faith in the body as a source of absolute identification. In this sense, biometric technologies should perhaps be best understood as techniques that govern both the mobility and enclosure of bodies (see van der Ploeg 2003). They are perceived as infallible and unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person – the ultimate guarantors of identity. They are supposed to produce the identification of a person beyond question, and lend authenticity and credibility to all of the data that are connected to that identity. According to this logic, the world would be safer if only ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty could be controlled. These technologies are assumed to provide a complete picture of who someone is, to fix and secure identity as a basis for prediction and prevention, leaving people to dispute their own identity. The three mega processes I have briefly sketched are driving the movement towards what I have called ‘planetary entanglement’, as well as its opposite, that is, enclosure, contraction, containment, encampment, and incarceration. Once again, they are shaped by the alliance between military power, the industries that surround it (contractors), and tech giants. They are also driven by corporate elites increasingly detached from their countries of origin and who store most of their capital in tax heavens (see Davis 2019). These elites can no longer be ‘forced to account’ through traditional means such as elections or protests. They defeat citizens’ scrutiny via complexity and secrecy, often under the pretext of national security or via an economic rationale that puts capital first, before people. This movement is erratic, uneven. But everywhere it heightens uncertainty and insecurity. Everywhere it institutionalizes the risks inherent in the misfortunes of reality.

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 1NC – Shell (L)

Redistribution along national lines presupposes a bounded world – the aff relies upon an implicit national solidarity that pits “us” within the imperial metropole against “them” in the global south – only adopting an analytic that prioritizes the frame of the imperial state over the national state can reckon with the legacy of global inequality – turns case and externally causes global war

Bhambra 22 – Professor of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies in the Department of International Relations in the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex.

Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Relations of extraction, relations of redistribution: Empire, nation, and the construction of the British welfare state,” The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 73, no. 1, 2022, pp. 5-14, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-4446.12896.

2 | RELATIONS OF EXTRACTION

2023 DDI Kritik
Neg › 1NC – Shell (S)

Redistribution along national lines presupposes a bounded world – the aff relies upon an implicit national solidarity that pits “us” within the imperial metropole against “them” in the global south – only adopting an analytic that prioritizes the frame of the imperial state over the national state can reckon with the legacy of global inequality – turns case and externally causes global war

Bhambra 22 – Professor of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies in the Department of International Relations in the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex.

Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Relations of extraction, relations of redistribution: Empire, nation, and the construction of the British welfare state,” The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 73, no. 1, 2022, pp. 5-14, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-4446.12896.

2 | RELATIONS OF EXTRACTION

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — No Heg !

Alt causes to loss in heg – Patronage over small states

Larison '20 [Daniel Larison is a former senior editor at TAC, where he also keot a solo . He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, World Politics Review, Politico Magazine, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Lancaster, PA, 04/23/20, ‘Please Tell the Establishment That U.S. Hegemony is Over’, , The American Conservative]

The core of the book is a survey of three different sources for the unraveling of U.S. hegemony: major powers, weaker states, and transnational “counter-order” movements. Cooley and Nexon trace how Russia and China have become increasingly effective at wielding influence over many smaller states through patronage and the creation of parallel institutions and projects such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They discuss a number of weaker states that have begun hedging their bets by seeking patronage from these major powers as well as the U.S. Where once America had a “near monopoly” on such patronage, this has ceased to be the case. They also track the role of “counter-order” movements, especially nationalist and populist groups, in bringing pressure to bear on their national governments and cooperating across borders to challenge international institutions. Finally, they spell out how the U.S. itself has contributed to the erosion of its own position through reckless policies dating back at least to the invasion of Iraq.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — No Heg !

Heg is already and unavoidably dead

Larison ‘20 [Daniel Larison is a former senior editor at TAC, where he also keot a solo . He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, World Politics Review, Politico Magazine, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Lancaster, PA, 04/23/20, ‘Please Tell the Establishment That U.S. Hegemony is Over’, , The American Conservative]

The truth is that decline was never a choice, but the U.S. can decide how it can respond to it. We can continue chasing after the vanished, empty glory of the “unipolar moment” with bromides of American exceptionalism. We can continue to delude ourselves into thinking that military might can make up for all our other weaknesses. Or we can choose to adapt to a changed world by prudently husbanding our resources and putting them to uses more productive than policing the world.

There was a brief period during the 1990s and early 2000s when the U.S. could claim to be the world’s hegemonic power. America had no near-peer rivals; it was at the height of its influence across most of the globe. That status, however, was always a transitory one, and was lost quickly thanks to self-inflicted wounds in Iraq and the natural growth of other powers that began to compete for influence. While America remains the most powerful state in the world, it no longer dominates as it did 20 years ago. And there can be no recapturing what was lost.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — Alt Causes to Inequality

Decline in unions specifically increase inequality – defense doesn’t assume globalization

Polacko 21 (Matt, is a comparative political scientist researching political inequality. 10-20-2021 “Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality – An Overview” https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/spp-2021-0017/html?lang=en)//BH-NB//

Trade unions have typically been viewed as an important force for moderating income inequality. They “contribute to wage compression by restricting wage decline among low-wage earners” and restrain wage surges among high-wage earners (Checchi and Visser 2009: 249). The mere presence of unions can also drive up the wages of non-union employees in similar industries, as employers tend to give in to wage demands to keep unions out. Union density has also been proven to be strongly associated with higher redistribution both directly and indirectly, through its influence on left party governments (Haddow 2013: 403).

There had broadly existed a ‘social contract’ between labour and business, whereby collective bargaining establishes a wage structure in many industries. However, this contract was abandoned by corporate America in the mid-1970s when large-scale corporate donations influenced policymakers to oppose pro-union reform of labour law, leading to political defeats for unions (Hacker and Pierson 2010: 58–59). The crackdown of strikes culminating in the momentous Air Traffic Controllers’ strike (1981) in the US and coal miner’s strike (1984–85) in the UK, caused labour to become de-politicised, which was self-reinforcing, because as their political power dispersed, policymakers had fewer incentives to protect or strengthen union regulations (Rosenfeld and Western 2011). Consequently, US union density has plummeted from around a third of the workforce in 1960, down to 11.9% last decade, with the steepest decline occurring in the 1980s (Stiglitz 2013: 81).

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — Alt Causes to Inequality

Globalization - it makes inequality inevitable it’s a key alt cause the aff doesn’t solve

Polacko 21 (Matt, is a comparative political scientist researching political inequality. 10-20-2021 “Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality – An Overview” https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/spp-2021-0017/html?lang=en)//BH-NB//

One of the earliest, and most prominent explanations for the rise of income inequality emphasised the role of globalisation (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992; Revenga 1992). Globalisation has led to the offshoring of many goods and services that used to be produced or completed domestically in the West, which has created downward pressures on the wages of lower skilled workers. According to the ‘market forces hypothesis,’ increasing inequality is a response to the rising demand for skills at the top, in which the spread of globalisation and technological progress have been facilitated through reduced barriers to trade and movement.

Proponents of globalisation as the leading cause of inequality have argued that globalisation has constrained domestic state choices and left governments collectively powerless to address inequality. Detractors admit that globalisation has indeed had deep structural effects on Western economies but its impact on the degree of agency available to domestic governments has been mediated by individual policy choices (Thomas 2016: 346). A key problem with attributing the cause of inequality to globalisation, is that the extent of the inequality increase has varied considerably across countries, even though they have all been exposed to the same effects of globalisation. The US also has the highest inequality amongst rich countries, but it is less reliant on international trade than most other developed countries (Brown 2017: 56). Moreover, a recent meta-analysis by Heimberger (2020) found that globalisation has a “small-to-moderate” inequality-increasing effect, with financial globalisation displaying the largest impact.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — Alt Causes to Inequality

Alt causes to inequality the aff doesn’t solve

Horowitz & Kochhar 20 (Juliana Menasce Horowitz is the associate director of research at Pew Research Center. Rakesh Kochhar is a senior researcher at Pew Research Center and is an expert on trends in employment, income and wealth. 01-09-2020 “Trends in U.S. income and wealth inequality” https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-wealth-inequality/)//BH-NB//

The rise in economic inequality in the U.S. is tied to several factors. These include, in no particular order, technological change, globalization, the decline of unions and the eroding value of the minimum wage. Whatever the causes, the uninterrupted increase in inequality since 1980 has caused concern among members of the public, researchers, policymakers and politicians.

One reason for the concern is that people in the lower rungs of the economic ladder may experience diminished economic opportunity and mobility in the face of rising inequality, a phenomenon referred to as The Great Gatsby Curve. Others have highlighted inequality’s negative impact on the political influence of the disadvantaged, on geographic segregation by income, and on economic growth itself. The matter may not be entirely settled, however, as an opposing viewpoint suggests that income inequality does not harm economic opportunity.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — AT: China !

Their arg. is nonunique, America has already lost hegemony and China doesn’t want to take it. Hegemony doesn’t have an impact – people are resilient and flexible to change, it doesn’t matter which nation is in power

Freeman Jr. ’10 [Chas W. Freeman Jr. Charles "Chas" W. Freeman Jr. is an American retired diplomat and writer. He served in the United States Foreign Service, the State and Defense Departments in many different capacities over the course of thirty years, 1/20/10, ‘China's Challenge to American Hegemony: Remarks to the Global Strategy Forum’, , Middle East Policy Council]

America has already lost its global political hegemony. But, for all the reasons I have mentioned, China is neither inclined nor capable of succeeding to this role. The Anglo-American financial model is much tarnished by recent events. But no alternative to it has yet emerged. It seems certain that whatever does replace it will be crafted by many hands, only some of which will be Chinese. American consumption is no longer the sole driver of the global economy. The China market has come to play an important part in sustaining world growth. But China is not the only economy that is rising. In some areas of global trade and investment, China will be a dominant factor. In others, it will not be. In the military arena, even if fiscal limitations force retrenchment, the United States will, for many years to come, remain the only power with global reach.  Americans will find it difficult to adjust to a world in which we are no longer all-powerful in all spheres. But we are a flexible and resilient people who can and will accommodate change. Neither we nor the Chinese will cease to pursue our national interests as we see them. In many instances, these views will more or less coincide. On such matters, if others agree, there will be global progress. Where we disagree, we will come under pressure from others to search for common ground. Neither of us will be so powerful that we can ignore such pressure. 

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — Populism inevitable

Populism is inevitable.

Bernhard & O’Neill 22 (Michael Bernhard is Professor of Political Science at Penn State University. Daniel, is researcher and teacher who’s interests are principally in the history of political thought. 09-2022 “Populism Revisited” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/C29D15DAC20348925CA3B1DE5448E09A/S1537592722002018a.pdf/populism-revisited.pdf pg.782)//BH-NB//

On the one hand, populism in government has become increasingly commonplace as the host of examples above attests, but the question remains whether the current wave of populism will be ephemeral or whether it will change the nature of contemporary rule in a more permanent fashion. It may become permanent by changing the party system. In many places established party systems have collapsed. The most recent example of this is the French party system, where the long-established political parties—conservatives, socialists, communists, and Gaullists—are shadows of their former selves or even gone. And in this sense, the remaking of the Italian party system anticipated what has occurred in France. In France, the last two presidential elections were contested by a novel centrist, Emmanuel Macron, and Marine Le Pen, the scion of a far-right post-fascist party which until recently had been seen as marginal. In the long-established American party system, which is locked into a permanent two-party alternation due to its plurality electoral system and a series of institutional privileges that the two parties have written into law to advantage themselves, the Republican Party has been taken over by the Trump faction and the radicalized base of the party. The United States is now lodged in a pattern where it seems inevitable that we will have alternating periods of right-right populist and non-populist rule, and periods of power-sharing between them. Thus, the question remains whether democratic party systems can endure permanent competition between populist and non-populist actors.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — AT: ! - Populism

The electoral system in the US ensures populism is defeated.

Hawley 22(George, is an Associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. “The stillborn revolution: the failure of right-wing populism in the United States,” Global Resurgence of the Right: Conceptual and Regional Perspectives, eds. Gisela Pereyra Doval and Gastón Souroujon, Routledge 2022, pp. 267.)//BH-NB//

The electoral system of the United States also poses a challenge to rightwing populism. The plurality rule, single-member district electoral system of the United States virtually assures a two-party system (Duverger, 1954). This largely closes off third parties as a viable option to promote a political agenda. Anyone who wishes to enter the political arena and win election must work within the confines of the Democratic or the Republican Party. Anyone seeking to change one of these parties’ ideological foundation will thus face an uphill battle against institutional inertia and established leaders uninterested in fundamental change. This is not the case in many European democracies, where small ideological parties can enter government with relative ease. In Europe, new right-wing populist parties, disconnected from long-standing centre-right parties, have enjoyed great success. This is unlikely to occur in the United States, where third parties have an abysmal record.

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — AT: ! - Populism

Populism fails the US checks and balances make democracy resilient.

Weyland 21 (Kurt, is Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts in the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 12-06-2021 “Why US Democracy Trumps Populism: Comparative Lessons Reconsidered” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/D6EFD45DC709C4D27742C99992FF9417/S1049096521001876a.pdf/why-us-democracy-trumps-populism-comparative-lessons-reconsidered.pdf pg.481-482)//BH-NB//

In López and Luna’s scenarios, one condition that could create risks of a “democratic breakdown” in the United States is “the possibility of economic and security crises occurring in the US,” which “some scholars might claim…is already” the case “due to the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the insurrection by Trump loyalists” (López and Luna 2021, 424–25). However, these crisis claims are questionable. The January 6 takeover of the US Capitol was far from involving 5,000þ insurgents fighting the state, as I defined a security crisis (see my 2020 online appendix, p. 4). The massive guerrilla insurrections in Colombia and Peru qualified but not the much more limited, less lethal violence of the —undeniably disturbing—US militias. Contrary to the Andean fighters, the heterogeneous, fragmented US groupings lacked any plan for an armed seizure of the government; after invading the building, they soon withdrew. Regarding the economy, crises do not tend to become very severe in advanced countries such as the United States, which, moreover, dispose of ample resources for compensatory spending (Wibbels 2006). Even after the dramatic economic collapse caused by COVID-19, a powerful recovery—fueled in part by compensatory spending—quickly erased most damage. Consequently, real GDP in 2020 fell by only 3.5% (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2021), less than my -5% threshold for an economic crisis. Thus, even under the exceptional circumstances of 2020–2021, the United States did not suffer an economic or security crisis, which limits the persuasiveness of López and Luna’s scenarios. Moreover, in my theory and coding, COVID-19 did not constitute a crisis-as-opportunity for Trump but rather a vexing, not easily solvable problem that defied his charismatic claim of salvation. After all, the pandemic did not precede Trump’s election (cf. my 2020 online appendix, p. 4) but irrupted during his term, and there was no quick fix that could have boosted his support (cf. Weyland 2022). COVID-19 provided an opportunity for only his—nonpopulist—successor. The resilience of US democracy, which withstood the unusual turbulence of 2020–2021, corroborated my emphasis on the longstanding solidity of US institutions as reliable safeguards against populist suffocation. This fundamental institutional strength is anchored in an age-old, rarely amended constitution, which has survived all socioeconomic, demographic, ethno-racial, and cultural transformations and which therefore is immune to López and Luna’s endogeneity concerns. This institutional solidity—in my terms, the absence of “paralegal change” and “high instability,” which enabled some Latin American populists to strangle democracy (Weyland 2020, 394–99)—cannot be simply disregarded, as López and Luna do in their scenarios. This institutional strength played a crucial role in foiling Trump’s typically populist attempts at self-perpetuation. Trump’s sustained pressures put judicial, administrative, and political institutions to a distressingly serious test—yet, overall, they passed. The US populist achieved nothing with dozens of court challenges against election results across the country. Furthermore, even Republican election officials stood firm and properly counted all votes. Famously, Brad Raffensperger refused to “find” the 11,780 votes that the incumbent was so desperately seeking. Moreover, Trump’s own vice president faithfully oversaw the Senate’s certification of the election results. Similarly, despite widespread Republican sympathies, the military—which power-hungry Latin American populists use as a decisive support base—complied with professional rules and avoided participating in Trump’s machinations (Brooks 2021). Thus, the US institutional framework held and sealed the populist’s defeat. These institutions are not “easily changeable” because of resilient checks and balances and a firm constitution; neither are they vulnerable to significant “paralegal change” or do they suffer from “high instability.” Thus, US institutions are immune from the three types of institutional weakness that—in specific combinations with conjunctural opportunities—are required for the populist asphyxiation of democracy

2023 DDI Negative
Case › 2NC — UBI Doesn’t Solve

UBI doesn’t solve poverty --- multiple warrants

Sumner 19 (Scott, is an American economist. 08-31-2019 “A UBI will not eliminate poverty” https://www.econlib.org/a-ubi-will-not-eliminate-poverty/)//BH-NB//

Bryan Caplan recently gave Charles Karelis an opportunity to offer some thoughts on poverty. Karelis had this to say about a Universal Basic Income program:

UBI has negatives too. It would be way, way more expensive, pushing US tax rates into the middle of the EU pack. There would be no positive substitution effect, since it’s not work-contingent. The pros are that it would eliminate the class antagonism inherent in EITC, since everybody would get it. What’s more it would be easy to administer and receive. Above all, it would eliminate poverty, which is a miserable condition and an embarrassment to a rich country like ours. And as a cash program, it would get government out of the business of telling people what their spending priorities should be. People could spend their money on health care, or education, or leisure, or whatever they themselves thought was most valuable.