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2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS UBI + Reparations Neg 23 › Unpayable Debt K

The impact of fiscal redistribution is an increase in racialized surveillance. Dependence on fiscal redistribution allows white people to further control black lives, whether it’s regulating the type of food we can eat, invading black homes or infringing on reproductive rights.

Roberts ‘12 [Law Prof at Northwestern, Dorothy, “Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship,” http://racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1256:welfare01-2&catid=56&Itemid=179&showall=1&limitstart=]

The stratification of our welfare system that distributes benefits according to race and gender also differentiates between two classes of inhabitants -- citizens and subjects. Citizens receive welfare as an entitlement: Government has an obligation to support citizens as compensation for their social contribution or as a prerequisite to their full participation in political and economic life. For example, the government pays citizens Social Security benefits that are unencumbered by behavioral conditions, caseworker investigations, or social stigma. Subjects, on the other hand, receive inferior, inadequate, and stigmatizing relief at the government's discretion. Poor mothers who receive AFDC, for example, are considered unworthy of government assistance; their benefits, set below the poverty level, are conditioned on conformance to behavioral rules and submission to government inspection. This surveillance of welfare recipients' everyday lives is so contrary to the government's respect for citizens that it unmistakably marks these families as government subjects. Black organizers who agitated for relief entitlements during the Depression suggested that the investigation of applicants' morals was a violation of citizenship rights. One complained: "Your Administrators here in Baltimore take it upon themselves to inquire into the morals of the applicant. . . . The writer does not believe that the letter of the Relief law, or even its spirit gives the Administrators that authority. May I mention that in France, to hold a moral inquest upon the applicant for aid is forbidden by law." Given this connection between citizenship and entitlement to welfare, it is not surprising that current welfare reform proposals include the elimination of public assistance for undocumented immigrants. The critical difference between these two forms of welfare lies in their relation to individuals' autonomy. While welfare for citizens enables them to be self-ruling persons, welfare for subjects enables the government to rule them. Gordon makes this distinction in her defense of welfare entitlements: "Citizens have rights to which they are entitled by law, and losing this understanding endangers the republic. . . . Moreover, the feeling of entitlement is also vital to the republic. It is the attitude of citizenship, the essence of independence; without it we would have subjects, not citizens." The very relegation of subjects to inferior programs that supervise and humiliate them reinforces their lack of citizenship qualities while bolstering the virtues of the citizens who receive dignified entitlements. Citizens' compensation by social insurance makes them appear independent and self- sufficient; subjects' receipt of charity makes them appear dependent and irresponsible. Current welfare reform rhetoric condemns mothers who receive AFDC for transmitting a pathology of "welfare dependency" to their children. According to this view, reliance on this form of welfare reflects a lack of work ethic and leads to a myriad of social problems, including crime, unwed motherhood, and long-term poverty. Yet Americans do not view reliance on Social Security as "dependency" at all, despite the program's strong redistributive effects and the millions of nonworking wives and children who in fact depend on its benefits for subsistence. Gordon gives the following example of the downward-spiraling process that results from stigmatizing welfare recipients: The stigmas of "welfare" and of single motherhood intersect; hostility to the poor and hostility to deviant family forms reinforce each other. The resentment undercuts political support for the program, and benefits fall farther and farther behind inflation. The resulting immiseration makes poor single mothers even more needy and less politically attractive. The economic downturn of the last decade has deepened both the poverty and the resentment, and created the impression that we are experiencing a new, unprecedented, and primarily minority social problem. Thus, Black single mothers' inferior status in the welfare state has intensified their political and economic marginalization, making them even less worthy of citizenship rights. By casting their need for public assistance as "dependency," welfare reform rhetoric suggests that these women lack the independence required to be citizens, entitled to dignified government support. B. Welfare as a Waiver of Privacy One of the key differences between welfare extended to citizens and welfare extended to subjects is the degree to which each conditions its benefits on government intrusion into recipients' privacy. Public relief for single mothers is structured to permit bureaucratic supervision of clients in order to determine their eligibility based on both means and morals testing. Citizens avoid these impositions because they receive their benefits in the form of entitlements that are not subject to the discretion of caseworkers, supervisors, or administrators. Since welfare's inception, states have conditioned payments on mothers' compliance with standards of sexual and reproductive morality, such as "suitable home" or "man in the house" rules. More recently, welfare mothers have been required to undergo mandatory paternity proceedings involving state scrutiny of their intimate lives. Over the last three years, at least thirty states have applied for federal waivers allowing them to change their welfare programs to incorporate a form of behavior modification. Means testing and morals testing allow welfare bureaucrats to place recipients under surveillanceto check for cheating or lapses in eligibility. Such testing also forces recipients to assume a submissive stance lest offended caseworkers cut them from the rolls. A Black domestic's experience with poor relief in the 1930s remains typical of welfare recipients today: "The investigators, they were like detectives, like I had committed a crime. . . . I had to tell them about my life, more than if I was on trial . . . the investigator searched my icebox . . . I was ashamed of my life . . . that's how you're made to feel when you're down and out like you're nothing better than a criminal." Privacy doctrine does not shield from state intrusion people who receive welfare as subjects; rather, their acceptance of government benefits constitutes a waiver of privacy. Because families are not entitled to government support, the Supreme Court has reasoned, the government may force them to open up for inspection, shrink, rearrange, or break up in order to qualify for benefits. Courts sometimes find egregious invasions of poor families' privacy to be unconstitutional, but most of the day-to-day decisions of family life remain vulnerable to legitimate state supervision. While poor single mothers (subjects) must endure government surveillance for their paltry benefits, "self-sufficient" traditional families (citizens) receive huge public subsidies -- Social Security, tax breaks, and government-backed mortgages -- without any loss of privacy. The Supreme Court invalidated early welfare eligibility requirements, such as AFDC's "man in the house" rule, designed to "legislate morality" of recipients. Other precedents, however, affirm the state's power to condition eligibility for benefits on conformity with majoritarian family norms. In Dandridge v. Williams, for example, the Court upheld Maryland's regulation that placed an absolute cap of $250 monthly per family, regardless of the family's size or financial need. The Court found that the state's interest in encouraging employment was a sufficiently rational reason to defeat recipients' equal protection challenge. The Court rejected the objection that some families had no employable member on the ground that "the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Nor do welfare recipients fare well under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which provides that the government may not condition the conferral of a benefit on the beneficiary's surrender of a constitutional right, although the government may choose not to provide the benefit altogether. The Court has avoided the unconstitutional conditions problem in cases involving public assistance to the poor by distinguishing between direct state interference with a protected activity and the state's mere refusal to subsidize a protected activity. The former, the Court concedes, raises a constitutional issue because it involves state action, whereas the latter is a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. For example, the Court refused to require the state or federal governments to pay the cost of abortion services for poor women, even though they pay for the expenses incident to childbirth, reasoning that "[a]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation." By regarding welfare benefits as an undeserved subsidy, the Court allows the state to treat recipients as subjects whose behavior may be modified to fit current social policy.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS UBI + Reparations Neg 23 › Cosmo K

The alt is decolonial cosmopolitanism – the alt embraces radical openness to people imagined to be beyond the bounds of the nation-state, rooting political commitments in shared humanity rather than national belonging

Moyo and Dube 21 [Nathan Moyo (Great Zimbabwe University) and Bekithemba Dube (University of the free State), Decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship for a post-COVID-19 world: Towards a reimagined convivial planetary re-existence, 2021,. 7-14-2023; marlborough-mjen]

Reimagined decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship for convivial re-existence

The public failure of a cosmopolitan citizenship premised on global coloniality became manifest when the world’s response to COVID-19 was characterised by the “strengthening of exclusionary nationalistic messaging” (Estelles & Fischam 2020, p. 1), and not human solidarity and collaboration against the pandemic. We discuss three distinct ways through which such a cosmopolitanism citizenship can be reimagined for convivial re-existence. First, we recentre Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s 10 Ds of the decolonial turn (2020) as a broader framework for a critical cosmopolitanism that is radically different from the neoliberal cosmopolitanism of Euromodernity. Second, we draw on the principles of Ubuntu, as key to a robust mosaic that is sensitive to the convivial imperatives of a planetary re-existence in a post-COVID world – that is, Ubuntu becomes useful in reframing the normative underpinnings of a decolonial cosmopolitanism. And, finally, we explore how an inherent civic engagement in a decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship could enhance struggles for convivial re-existence in a post-COVID-19 world. Taken together, the three approaches outlined above illustrate how a de-colonial cosmopolitan citizenship that resists coloniality could promote a planetary conviviality that upholds an all-encompassing idea of humanity, to which we can all belong as equal beings. In order to put these issues into perspective, Table 1 juxtaposes the distinguishing hallmarks of a reimagined decolonial cosmopolitan citizenship against those of a Eurocentric neoliberal cosmopolitanism citizenship.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS UBI + Reparations Neg 23 › Cosmo K

Bounded understandings of political obligation cause extinction – only a radical openness to a politics beyond the nation state can resolve the risks inherent to reality

Mbembe ’19 (Achille, Cameroonian historian, political theorist, research professor in history and politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economy Research at the University of the Witwatersrand. May 18. “Bodies as borders”, https://www.fesjournal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2.Mbembe.pdf, accessed Jul. 14.)//max

The third mega process is what we should call the dialectics of entanglement and separation. All over the world, the combination of fossil capital, soft-power warfare, and the saturation of the everyday by digital and computational technologies has led to the acceleration of speed and the intensification of connections, creating a new redistribution of the Earth and of population movements. To be alive, or to remain alive, is increasingly tantamount to being able to move speedily. In the process, the human race has come up against terrestrial limits. Such limits are not only the consequence of the sphericality of the planet. They are also limitations on the expansion of life as such. As the planet increasingly seems bound to burn, it is not only the individuated bodies that are imperilled. It is earthly existence, the fate of everything on earth, the fluidity of life which is at stake (Pyne 1997; Parisi and Terranova 2000). Meanwhile, we are, more than ever before at any other time in human history, not only in close proximity to each other but also exposed to each other. This close proximity and exposure is experienced less and less as opportunity and possibility and, more and more, as heightened risk. But entanglement and exposure to each other are not all that characterize the now. Wherever we look, the drive is simultaneously and decisively towards contraction, towards containment, towards enclosure and various forms of encampment, detention, and incarceration. Typical of this logic of contraction, containment, incarceration and enclosure is the worldwide erection of all kinds of walls and fortifications, gates and enclaves. In other words, various practices of partitioning space, of offshoring and fencing off wealth, of splintering territories, of fragmenting spaces, saddling them with various kinds of borders whose function is to decelerate movement, to stop it in some instances, for certain classes of populations, in order to manage risks. Various reasons are mobilized to account for this renewed infatuation with borders taken as the best way to manage risks. Security and the preservation of one’s identity are some of these reasons. And as it happens, physical and virtual barriers of separation, digitalisation of databases, filing systems, the development of new tracking devices, sensors, drones, satellites and sentinel robots, infrared detectors and various other cameras, biometric controls, and new microchips containing personal details – everything is put in place to transform the very nature of the border in the name of security. Borders are increasingly turned into mobile, portable, omnipresent and ubiquitous realities. The goal is to better control movement and speed, accelerating it here, decelerating it there and, in the process, sorting, recategorizing, reclassifying people with the goal of better selecting anew who is whom, who should be where and who shouldn’t, in the name of security. As a result, borders are no longer merely lines of demarcation separating distinct sovereign entities. Increasingly, they are the name we should use to describe the organised violence that underpins both contemporary capitalism and our world order in general. But perhaps, to be exact, we should not speak of borders in general but, instead, of ‘borderization’, that is, the process by which certain spaces are transformed into uncrossable places for certain classes of populations, who thereby undergo a process of racialization; places where speed must be disabled and the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable are meant to be immobilized if not shattered. Whatever the case, the technological transformation of borders is in full swing. In a sense, one of the major consequences of the acceleration of technological innovations has been the creation of a segmented planet of multiple speed regimes. A key development, of late, is the extent to which border security practices have taken a keen interest in the connection between the human body and identity, as a means to achieve detailed control over movement and speed. This being the case, the question we must ask is the following: what precisely is at stake in the extension of the biometric border into multiple realms of social life and, in particular, the human body? In other words, what explains the migration from the border understood as a particular point in space to the border as the moving body of the undesired masses of populations? The answer is a new global partitioning between potentially risky bodies vs. bodies that are not. It is in the nature of risk to be hidden from view. That which is hidden from view is generally unknown. For it to be known, it must be visualized. The screening of bodies at border checkpoints aims at making visible “that which is hidden from view, opening up new visualizations of the unknown, potentially risky body” (Amoore and Hall 2009, 444). In such a context, biometric technologies are supposed to fragment the human body in order to recompose it for the purpose of securitization, of elimination and neutralization of the risk. This happens because the human body is seen as an indisputable anchor from which data can be safely harnessed or extracted. As a result, we are witnessing a gradually extending intertwinement of individual physical characteristics with information systems – a process that has served to deepen faith in data as a means of risk management and faith in the body as a source of absolute identification. In this sense, biometric technologies should perhaps be best understood as techniques that govern both the mobility and enclosure of bodies (see van der Ploeg 2003). They are perceived as infallible and unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person – the ultimate guarantors of identity. They are supposed to produce the identification of a person beyond question, and lend authenticity and credibility to all of the data that are connected to that identity. According to this logic, the world would be safer if only ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty could be controlled. These technologies are assumed to provide a complete picture of who someone is, to fix and secure identity as a basis for prediction and prevention, leaving people to dispute their own identity. The three mega processes I have briefly sketched are driving the movement towards what I have called ‘planetary entanglement’, as well as its opposite, that is, enclosure, contraction, containment, encampment, and incarceration. Once again, they are shaped by the alliance between military power, the industries that surround it (contractors), and tech giants. They are also driven by corporate elites increasingly detached from their countries of origin and who store most of their capital in tax heavens (see Davis 2019). These elites can no longer be ‘forced to account’ through traditional means such as elections or protests. They defeat citizens’ scrutiny via complexity and secrecy, often under the pretext of national security or via an economic rationale that puts capital first, before people. This movement is erratic, uneven. But everywhere it heightens uncertainty and insecurity. Everywhere it institutionalizes the risks inherent in the misfortunes of reality.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS UBI + Reparations Neg 23 › Cosmo K

The aff’s attempt to resolve domestic inequality mask and legitimate global inequalities – redistribution within national bounds requires “looking the other way” in the face of global violence

Beck 11 – Ulrich Beck, former professor of sociology @ the University of Munich and one of the most cited social scientists in the world; “We do not live in an age of cosmopolitanism but in an age of

cosmopolitisation: the ‘global other’ is in our midst,” Irish Journal of Sociology; 2011;; //ghs-eo

Studying the cosmopolitisation of social inequality – and, indeed, across the globe inequalities seem to have increased – it is less clear that social class is the principal unit of analysis and investigation. I rather provocatively developed the argument that ‘social class’ is too soft a category to study social inequalities in the twenty-first century.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS UBI + Reparations Neg 23 › Cosmo K

Redistribution along national lines presupposes a bounded world – the aff relies upon an implicit national solidarity that pits “us” within the imperial metropole against “them” in the global south – only adopting an analytic that prioritizes the frame of the imperial state over the national state can reckon with the legacy of global inequality – turns case and externally causes global war

Bhambra 22 – Professor of Postcolonial and Decolonial Studies in the Department of International Relations in the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex.

Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Relations of extraction, relations of redistribution: Empire, nation, and the construction of the British welfare state,” The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 73, no. 1, 2022, pp. 5-14, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-4446.12896.

2 | RELATIONS OF EXTRACTION

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cap K

Alt fails--Their approach of sweeping decolonial critique and pure negation precludes consideration of practical strategies and re-entrenches the status quo.

Vickers’19[Edward Vickers is professor of comparative education and holds the UNESCO Chair on Education for Peace, Social Justice, and Global Citizenship at Kyushu University in Japan.] Edward Vickers, Critiquing coloniality, ‘epistemic violence’ and western hegemony in comparative education – the dangers of ahistoricism and positionality, 12 Sep 2019, RCMS

The empirical and theoretical flaws of this approach are intertwined with the problematic language in which its arguments are typically couched. Historical and anthropological scholarship on East Asia and other regions amply demonstrates that colonialist or neo-colonialist attitudes and strategies of domination are not and have never been a Western monopoly. But decolonial theory posits the more or less uniform victimhood of non-Western ‘others,’ deriving claims for the moral superiority of ‘authentically’ indigenous perspectives. Debating the validity of such claims is complicated by an emphasis on ‘positionality.’ Readers are exhorted to judge an argument less by standards of evidence or logic (often portrayed as camouflaging a Western ‘will to power’) than on the basis of the writer’s self-identification or ‘positioning.’ The language of ‘epistemic violence,’ ‘secure spaces,’ ‘epistemological diffidence,’ ‘border thinking’ and ‘location’ suggests an image of the critical scholar as revolutionary guerrilla, valiantly sniping at Western hegemony from his or her marginal redoubt. In so far as this reflects a desire for a more just, tolerant and sustainable society – one that values diversity as a resource for mutual learning – it is admirable. However, if we seek to combat oppression, in the educational sphere or beyond, it is incumbent on us to pick our enemies, and our language, carefully. Aiming a blunderbuss at the supposedly illegitimate or self-serving ‘universalism’ of ‘modern Western social science,’ while ignoring how calls for indigenisation and ‘authenticity’ are used to legitimate highly oppressive regimes across Asia and elsewhere, is to risk undermining those universal social and political values (freedom of expression, civil liberties, rule of law) upon which critical scholars themselves rely.

An embrace of ‘opacity’ or ‘epistemological diffidence,’ advocated by several of the CER contributors, threatens to be similarly self-defeating. While they share an admiration for the Argentine theorist of ‘decoloniality,’ Walter Mignolo, the work of his brilliant compatriot, the writer, poet and essayist Jorge Luis Borges, is far worthier of attention. Borges’ famous fondness for ‘labyrinths’ and the paradoxical was combined with a sharp eye for gratuitous obfuscation and circumlocution (see, for example, his story The Aleph, in Borges 1998, 274–286). Offering his own critique of the fashion for opaque jargon in mainstream social science, the émigré Polish sociologist Stanislav Andreski wrote acerbically that ‘one of the pleasures obtainable through recourse to confusion and absurdity is to be able to feel, and publicly to claim, that one knows when in reality one does not’ (1974, 95). ‘Opacity’ in imaginative literature may intrigue or entertain, but in interpreting and explaining unfamiliar societies, cultures and education systems, comparativists especially ought to write in clear, accessible language. And while all social scientists can understand the lure of the sweeping generalisation, we should generalise with extreme caution, especially when categorising large swathes of humanity.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cap K

Social Security has no capitalist origins – capitalists didn’t want the Social Security Act

Amenta and Parikh ’91

[Edwin Amenta is an American sociologist best known for his study of social policy, social movements, and the New Deal. Sunita Parikh is Associate Professor of Political Science. Her primary areas of interest are comparative politics, race and ethnicity, institutions, comparative methods. She has published a book on the institutional development of affirmative action in the United States and India, using comparative historical and rational-choice methods. She has also written on law and politics, education, social movements in the United States and India, and federalism. Amenta, Edwin, and Sunita Parikh. Capitalists Did Not Want the Social Security Act: A Critique of the “Capitalist Dominance” Thesis, www.jstor.org/institutionSearch?redirectUri=%2Fstable%2Fpdf%2F23001661.pdf&refreqid=excelsior%3Ac518398b4f38e53cd75a1fb0f4fe8474. Accessed 13 July 2023.]

"Virtually all politically active business leaders and organizations strongly opposed social insur- ance and state-level pensions" (Skocpol and Amenta 1985). JB quote this phrase three times and label it an empirical "error." But that does not make them correct. The fact remains: The vast majority of capitalists opposed the Social Secu- rity Act. Before 1935 they opposed old-age pen- sions and unemployment compensation, and by 1936 few supported the New Deal. American capitalists in the 1920s and 1930s knew that the benefits of public social provision would accrue to workers and that taxes would be needed to pay for them. Capitalists believed that new taxation would lower their profits, and so- cial insurance was a case in point, with its tax on employers' payrolls. Moreover, public programs would not prevent workers from joining unions, as private programs might (Dobbin 1988). For capitalists, public programs had the further dis- advantage of being compulsory. Thus, most comparative research sees capital and its politi- cal representatives as key opponents of social spending (see Shalev 1983; for U.S. states, Hicks 1986); the "welfare capitalist" thesis has little currency outside the United States. The 1931 Groves bill in Wisconsin tests the argument that capitalists supported unemploy- ment compensation. The bill was relatively le- nient on employers, allowing each employer to pay into an individual reserve and, as long as it remained at a specified level, an employer could avoid further payments. Still, only four of 32 employers testified in favor of the bill. Some opponents offered voluntary plans as an alterna- tive (Nelson 1969, p. 124). Moreover, peak busi- ness organizations in Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, and New York opposed unemployment com- pensation in the 1920s and 1930s (Amenta, Clemens, Olsen, Parikh, and Skocpol 1987). To aid their case, JB cite a poll taken in 1939, four years after the passage of the Social Secu- rity Act, seriously overstating capitalist support for the act. The poll found that only 24 percent of sampled business executives supported the act, whereas 89 percent of the general public in 1938 approved (Cantril 1951, p. 361; Schiltz 1971, chapter 2). One reason for this disparity is found in a 1940 survey of executives; the payroll tax was the most disliked of non emergency taxes (Cantril 1951, p. 854).

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cosmo k

Alt fails --Their approach of sweeping decolonial critique and pure negation precludes consideration of practical strategies and re-entrenches the status quo.

Vickers’19[Edward Vickers is professor of comparative education and holds the UNESCO Chair on Education for Peace, Social Justice, and Global Citizenship at Kyushu University in Japan.] Edward Vickers, Critiquing coloniality, ‘epistemic violence’ and western hegemony in comparative education – the dangers of ahistoricism and positionality, 12 Sep 2019, RCMS

The empirical and theoretical flaws of this approach are intertwined with the problematic language in which its arguments are typically couched. Historical and anthropological scholarship on East Asia and other regions amply demonstrates that colonialist or neo-colonialist attitudes and strategies of domination are not and have never been a Western monopoly. But decolonial theory posits the more or less uniform victimhood of non-Western ‘others,’ deriving claims for the moral superiority of ‘authentically’ indigenous perspectives. Debating the validity of such claims is complicated by an emphasis on ‘positionality.’ Readers are exhorted to judge an argument less by standards of evidence or logic (often portrayed as camouflaging a Western ‘will to power’) than on the basis of the writer’s self-identification or ‘positioning.’ The language of ‘epistemic violence,’ ‘secure spaces,’ ‘epistemological diffidence,’ ‘border thinking’ and ‘location’ suggests an image of the critical scholar as revolutionary guerrilla, valiantly sniping at Western hegemony from his or her marginal redoubt. In so far as this reflects a desire for a more just, tolerant and sustainable society – one that values diversity as a resource for mutual learning – it is admirable. However, if we seek to combat oppression, in the educational sphere or beyond, it is incumbent on us to pick our enemies, and our language, carefully. Aiming a blunderbuss at the supposedly illegitimate or self-serving ‘universalism’ of ‘modern Western social science,’ while ignoring how calls for indigenisation and ‘authenticity’ are used to legitimate highly oppressive regimes across Asia and elsewhere, is to risk undermining those universal social and political values (freedom of expression, civil liberties, rule of law) upon which critical scholars themselves rely.

An embrace of ‘opacity’ or ‘epistemological diffidence,’ advocated by several of the CER contributors, threatens to be similarly self-defeating. While they share an admiration for the Argentine theorist of ‘decoloniality,’ Walter Mignolo, the work of his brilliant compatriot, the writer, poet and essayist Jorge Luis Borges, is far worthier of attention. Borges’ famous fondness for ‘labyrinths’ and the paradoxical was combined with a sharp eye for gratuitous obfuscation and circumlocution (see, for example, his story The Aleph, in Borges 1998, 274–286). Offering his own critique of the fashion for opaque jargon in mainstream social science, the émigré Polish sociologist Stanislav Andreski wrote acerbically that ‘one of the pleasures obtainable through recourse to confusion and absurdity is to be able to feel, and publicly to claim, that one knows when in reality one does not’ (1974, 95). ‘Opacity’ in imaginative literature may intrigue or entertain, but in interpreting and explaining unfamiliar societies, cultures and education systems, comparativists especially ought to write in clear, accessible language. And while all social scientists can understand the lure of the sweeping generalisation, we should generalise with extreme caution, especially when categorising large swathes of humanity.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cosmo k

The Aff is a prerequisite. The first step to equality for Americans in the territories is a rejection of the Insular Cases through the overturning of Vaello-Madero

Weare 18, President and Founder of Equally American

[Neil Weare, President and Founder of Equally American, a non-profit organization committed to achieving equal rights for the nearly 4 million Americans living in U.S. territories. He worked for Guam’s non-voting Delegate to Congress prior to attending Yale Law School. "Why the Insular Cases Must Become the Next Plessy," Harvard Law Review, 3-28-2018, ] /RS

Underlying the current crises facing U.S. territories and the underwhelming federal response is a legal and political relationship that contradicts America’s most fundamental democratic and constitutional principles. The source of this un-American relationship is the Insular Cases, a series of controversial and deeply divided early 1900s Supreme Court decisions that validated the full extension of U.S. sovereignty to overseas territories without requiring the full extension of constitutional rights. As First Circuit Judge Juan Torruella recently explained in the Harvard Law Review Forum, these decisions allowed Americans in the territories “to be treated unequally from those in the rest of the nation solely by reason of their geographical residence.” Judge Torruella has become the most prominent critic of the Insular Cases, arguing forcefully that “the Insular Cases represent classic Plessy v. Ferguson legal doctrine and thought that should be totally eradicated from present-day constitutional reasoning.” Judge Torruella’s powerful words must serve as an inspiration to action.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cosmo k

Perm do the aff and decolonial cosmopolitanism – The aff is a concrete step in the direction of the hypothetical, utopian alt

Pendenza 17, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Salerno, Italy,

[Massimo Pendenza, “Societal cosmopolitanism: the drift from universalism towards particularism,” Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory, Feb 24, 2017, ] /RS

Grounding cosmopolitanism in the social means negating the mutual, conceptual and empirical independence of the ‘local’ (a belonging to a particular social environment) and of ‘cosmopolitanism’ (usually interpreted exclusively as membership of mankind). Hence, we also refute the following claims: (a) that only one’s own social milieu constitutes reality, while global unity is a mere utopia (methodological nationalism); (b) that only mankind has moral dignity, while local communities are deleterious to peace and the development of the human race (neoliberal cosmopolitanism1 ). We reject this dichotomy, and instead sustain the intrinsic relation between the two extremes. In sociological terms, only a combination of the two can shape reality. Numerous studies support this point of view, however the added value of societal cosmopolitanism lies in the conception of the social as a condition for the existence of cosmopolitanism. This construct is achieved empirically, in our view, either through incorporating cosmopolitanism (in line with Durkheim), or through cosmopolitanism transcending the social without annihilating it (in line with Simmel). We thus limit the universalistic nature of cosmopolitanism based on abstract ideas of the individual and of mankind, and instead link it to people’s lives. In this sense, societal cosmopolitanism is the expression of a dynamic tension that puts the

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Cosmo k

The pressing problem of our time is strategy and tactics: HOW do we get from here to there?

Heron and Dean’22 [Kai Heron, a lecturer in politics at the University of Manchester, and farmer Alex Heffron, based in the hills of southwest Wales, Jodi Dean is an American political theorist and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in New York state.]KAI HERON AND JODI DEAN, Climate Leninism and Revolutionary Transition, June 26, 2022, https://spectrejournal.com/climate-leninism-and-revolutionary-transition/HZ

Nonetheless, on one point at least we agree with the green capitalists, tech entrepreneurs, and imperialist world leaders who dream of a frictionless transition to renewable energy systems, high-yield vertical farms, lab-meats, and the decoupling of “growth” (capital accumulation) from material throughput: a transition of some kind is unavoidable. It cannot be said enough. Transition has become the question of our times, both for capitalism — as compounding ecological crises start to eat away at the fiction of capital’s compatibility with human and non-human flourishing — and for radical movements and revolutionaries.

ONE, TWO, MANY DISAVOWALS OF TRANSITION

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Popular Constitutionalism K

7 – Roe v Wade wasn’t public opinion it was a court choice means court is bad not public

Doherty et al. '22[Carroll;6-27-2022; Carroll Doherty is director of political research at Pew Research Center. He plays a leading role in developing the Center's research agenda and overseeing editorial content about long-term trends in political values, U.S. views on policy issues and priorities, and political knowledge and news interest. ; "Majority of Public Disapproves of Supreme Court’s Decision To Overturn Roe v. Wade," ]

A majority of Americans disapprove of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling overturning the Roe v. Wade decision, which had guaranteed a constitutional right to an abortion for nearly 50 years. Public support for legal abortion remains largely unchanged since before the decision, with 62% saying it should be legal in all or most cases. Nearly six-in-ten adults (57%) disapprove of the court’s sweeping decision, including 43% who strongly disapprove. About four-in-ten (41%) approve of the court’s decision (25% strongly approve).

Partisan differences on the legality of abortion have widened in recent years, and Republicans and Democrats are sharply divided in their initial views of the court’s decision.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Popular Constitutionalism K

4 – Legal formalism bad – and anti-subordination readings of the epc are key

Nurse '14 [Abagail; April 2014; Nurse is a lawyer in the civil rights division of the Justice Department in Washington. She graduated from the University of Michigan and received a law degree from N.Y.U. ; " ANTI-SUBORDINATION IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: A CASE STUDY," NYU Law Review, Vol. 89, p. 294-334//JJB]

Many scholars strongly believe that anti-subordination is a more accurate and preferable method of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause because of its emphasis on history and context.58 Engaging with historical context is important because history informs the present. It does this by “fram[ing] matters in such a way as to expose the real issues and thus be more likely to lead to the correct decision . . . .”59 This situation occurs because social identities, like race, are in part defined by their histories—we must engage the past in order to address the conflicts in the present.60 Anti-subordination principles allow equal protection jurisprudence to maintain its mission of equal treatment under the laws by incorporating the inequitable realities that exist in our society.61 Anti-classification fails to acknowledge the role that historical institutional and structural barriers play.62 As a result, that approach fails to acknowledge any difference in the discrimination felt by white people as compared with discrimination felt by people of color.63 Furthermore, an anti-subordination approach to the Equal Protection Clause acknowledges that individuals are grouped by hierarchical64 social categories (like race) that continue to have an impact on the lives of individuals in those groups.65 As a result, antisubordination is more appropriate because it takes into account an individual’s group identity.66 If it were the case that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect individuals, without attention to the groups they are in, then perhaps anti-classification would be appropriate. However, the precise purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect not merely individuals, but individuals who are also in social identity groups. 67 As discussed above, the Court is attentive to the prejudices against groups of people—including people of color and religious minorities—in Carolene Products and Korematsu. 68 Consequently, interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause should be attentive to the groups of which the individuals are a part.69 The biggest failure of the anti-classification approach is its efforts to ignore race and be “colorblind,” or “neutral.” The problem with purported neutrality is that the world is not neutral: Hierarchies continue to shape everyone’s existence, regardless of whether they are acknowledged or not.70 Therefore, an approach that attempts to impose neutrality will maintain the problematic power structures that are currently in place—the status quo will go uninterrupted.71 Instead, courts implementing the Equal Protection Clause should seek to improve the status of marginalized groups. To do this, given that each group comes from a different place in the hierarchy, classifications must not all be treated the same.72 Treating everyone alike perpetuates existing institutional barriers.73 An anti-subordination approach to the equal protection doctrine is a flexible solution to make laws more equitable.74 As discussed above, an anti-subordination approach provides a searching inquiry into the effects and context of a particular law. This is important because discrimination and racism change form over time.75 Antisubordination provides better guidance when discrimination and racism are unconscious76 or when a law is “benign.”77 Anti-subordination accomplishes this by allowing for a nuanced analysis so that one can determine when something may be “unfair” (for example, a white woman not getting into her university of choice)78 or “group disadvantaging” (for example, standardized tests having implicit biases that disadvantage people of color and low-income people)79. 80 Something that is “unfair” may not need the protection of the Equal Protection Clause in the same way as something that is “group disadvantaging.” That means, though, that not all harms will be remedied.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Legalism K

The alt can’t solve the aff - direct political organizing is crucial towards anticolonial resistance: Pelet del Toro 18 - Judicial Law Clerk United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

[Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, written while at Yale Law, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law & Policy Review, "Beyond the critique of rights: The Puerto Rico legal project and civil rights litigation in America's colony," Yale LJ 128 (2018): 792, ] /RS

In this Note, I will argue that the CLS critique of rights, though compelling in the abstract, falters in the political and historical context of Puerto Rico. Although it may appear that rights have failed Puerto Ricans, particularly after the hurricanes and the United States’ indefensible response, rights talk has historically provided a framework for effective organizing and community action. This Note counters the CLS intuition that rights talk has no value for Puerto Rico by focusing on the origins and development of the Puerto Rico Legal Project, an understudied but critical force for community development and legal advocacy on the island.34 By concentrating on the entitlements that rights are thought to provide, the CLS critique of rights ignores the power of rights discourse to organize marginalized communities. The critique of rights also overlooks the value of the collective efforts that go into articulating a particular community’s aspirations through rights talk, efforts that can be empowering and help spur further political action.35 Further, the critique of rights fails to provide a framework for interpreting shifts in political dialogue, such as the changes that occurred between the measured Vieques organizing and the recent protests against the U.S.- sanctioned oversight board.36

I argue in this Note that the critique of rights does not easily map onto Puerto Rico because the critique does not account for the role that rights talk can play for oppressed colonial communities. Part I provides a background on the critique of rights as well as Critical Race Theory (CRT) and LatCrit, the schools of thought that first responded to its implications. Part II elaborates on Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship to the United States to better explain the long history of legal and political repression in Puerto Rico. It also draws on original interviews with Puerto Rican and U.S. lawyers and community activists to reveal fissures in the critique of rights and to propose certain revisions to the CLS theory. Part III then uses the case study of the Project to illustrate how the critique of rights fails to provide a full account of the relationship between law and organizing in Puerto Rico. Finally, Part IV argues that, contrary to CLS’s predictions, civil rights litigation and rights talk have been successful in Puerto Rico. The Project and its progeny catalyzed community lawyering on the island and enabled Puerto Ricans to organize their own locally based movements. Instead of undermining community organizing, litigation and rights talk galvanized domestic reformers.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Legalism K

Independently reject the neg’s critique of legal work: Whether or not the aff makes a perfect world is irrelevant, what matters is that we make change. Rejecting reform condescendingly asserts the possibility of radical change is better than the certainty of real improvement.

Delgado ’87 - Delgado, Richard [teaches civil rights and critical race theory at University of Alabama School of Law. He has written and co-authored numerous articles and books], “The Ethereal Scholar:  Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?”, Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review, 1987 RC MS

Critical scholars reject the idea of piecemeal reform. Incremental change, they argue, merely postpones the wholesale reformation that must occur to create a decent society.38 Even worse, an unfair social system survives by using piecemeal reform to disguise and legitimize oppression. 39 Those who control the system weaken resistance by pointing to the occasional concession to, or periodic court victory of, a black plaintiff or worker as evidence that the system is fair and just.40 In fact, Crits believe that teaching the common law or using the case method in law school is a disguised means of preaching incrementalism and thereby maintaining the current power structure.41 To avoid this, CLS scholars urge law professors to abandon the case method, give up the effort to find rationality and order in the case law, and teach in an unabashedly political fashion. 42

The CLS critique of piecemeal reform is familiar, imperialistic and wrong. Minorities know from bitter experience that occasional court victories do not mean the Promised Land is at hand.43 The critique is imperialistic in that it tells minorities and other oppressed peoples how they should interpret events affecting them.44 A court order directing a housing authority to disburse funds for heating in subsidized housing may postpone the revolution, or it may not. In the meantime, the order keeps a number of poor families warm. This may mean more to them than it does to a comfortable academic working in a warm office. It smacks of paternalism to assert that the possibility of revolution later outweighs the certainty of heat now, unless there is evidence for that possibility. The Crits do not offer such evidence.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Legalism K

Link Turn: Only the aff can solve for the harms of tiered scrutiny. By overturning VM based on its violation of the Equal Protection clause, the aff reshapes the Supreme Court’s conceptualization to force them to face morally repugnant precedents head on. Independently, this radical reshaping shows that change is possible and the inherent contradictions throughout the K.

Rice 22 – Assistant Professor of Law U of A (also duke but)

Daniel B. Rice, Expert on Constitutional Law and impact of shifting cultural paradigms on US legal precedent, "Repugnant precedents and the court of history," Mich. L. Rev. 121 (2022): 577, 7/17/23, pp. 618-25 https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11248&context=mlr //MS

Note: Brackets represent outdates language.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Legalism K

Perm do the Aff and trace and investigate historical legal narratives. A rights and litigation frame is key – otherwise the alt gets crushed. This is because the perm does what the alt cannot: see the big picture. By using the overturning of VM as a locus to reimagine the constitution in addition to extralegal approaches, we enable people to finally balance an acknowledgment of the harms of law with a recognition of its power to create social change.

Pelet del Toro 18 - Judicial Law Clerk United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, written while at Yale Law, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law & Policy Review, "Beyond the critique of rights: The Puerto Rico legal project and civil rights litigation in America's colony," Yale LJ 128 (2018): 792, //penelope and margo

Adalina De Jesús, a Puerto Rican civil rights attorney who was part of the Instituto and later worked as Hey Maestre’s law-firm partner, shares Berkan’s concern. De Jesús argues that while rights discourse is important in that it both lets people know what they are entitled to and helps people make demands of the necessary authorities, this value is limited.289 De Jesús contends that having a community look solely to the legal system for relief might distract from a government’s broader “lack of commitment” to educate and provide for its own people.290 Meanwhile, Ramírez also agrees that the value of litigation can be narrow—it is specific to one moment, one client. He would not go so far as to say that people engaged in political organizing solely due to their relationship with the Instituto.291 These concerns echo Tushnet’s concern about lawyers overestimating the potency of a legal victory.292 In that way, the Project and its progeny might have forsaken community development to get their day in court. While it is important to keep those limitations in mind, one should not lose sight of the historical forces at play in Puerto Rico. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened to independentista and progressive causes on the island had Grant and the other union leaders not approached CCR and the Guild in the 1970s. The government-sponsored attacks against these groups would have likely continued to silence progressives and independentistas through court orders, threats, and outright violence. It is useful to recall Crenshaw’s take on rights discourse, and how she describes Black people’s decision to engage with the American legal apparatus, though stemming from a position of “self-defense,” as a radical, “calculated political act[].”293 Though the colonial context in Puerto Rico is not identical to the experiences of Black America, there similarly needed to be a legal response on the island as Grant and his colleagues indicated, and attorneys like Berkan, Schachter, and others later realized. Not doing so likely would have further compromised Puerto Ricans’ ability not only to defend themselves from these attacks, but also to fight back. Furthermore, in fixating on what the Project was or was not able to accomplish by engaging with the courts, one runs the risk of ignoring the community ties that the Project facilitated. For instance, people like Berkan, Colón Morera, Hey Maestre, Ramírez, and Vargas Acosta continued to collaborate with young Puerto Ricans. As advocates, professors, and mentors, they promoted the importance of working in the public interest long after leaving the Project and the Instituto. That being said, many of the Puerto Ricans whom I interviewed for this Note remain deeply skeptical of the power of litigation alone to achieve social change.294 Ramírez, for one, believes that “litigation does not change anything” on its own.295 Contrary to proponents of CLS, however, Ramírez considers that multifaceted advocacy—which includes community education, local forms of organizing, and litigation—has the potential to create the consciousness that can bring about social change. Ramírez’s view mirrors the legacy of the Project, and of rights discourse more generally, in Puerto Rico. Litigation and other forms of legal work were not only useful, but also necessary, to defend and support other forms of activism. Thus, Ramírez and others see what CLS does not: how litigation and rights talk can help educate and empower a colonized people.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT: Legalism K

Legal Education is critical for anti-racist policy

John et al. '21 [Christina; 08/15-16/2021; Christina John, New Jersey Appellate Division Law Clerk; " SUBVERSIVE LEGAL EDUCATION: REFORMIST STEPS TOWARD ABOLITIONIST VISIONS," FORDHAMLAW REVIEW, Vol. 90 Issue/No. 5 p. 2120-2121//JJB]

This Essay begins with reformist steps and ends with abolition of the existing system in favor of a democratic and participatory model of legal education. Our reformist steps join with Bennett Capers in opening the doors of law schools and ending law school as a White space. 151 At minimum, the discriminatory outcomes that pervade legal education and bar admission require rethinking every step in the established process. Or, rather than seek facially neutral justifications for racist policies, we should reject them altogether in favor of anti-racist policies that promote equality among racial groups. But reformist steps are only a temporary step toward a just society. Subverting injustice requires a world where the walls of law school and the organized bar do not obscure and monopolize legal knowledge and power. We do not claim to offer a blueprint for democratizing legal knowledge and power. It would be misguided to expect a law review essay-of all the available tools-to be such a vehicle. We imagine legal education beyond the existing walls of law school and the gates of the legal profession. We do seek to abolish law school as the only location for education and the profession as the only avenue for advocacy. 150. See supra Part II. 151. See Capers, supra note 14. 2120 [Vol. 90 SUBVERSIVE LEGAL ED UCATION Abolition requires "work in solidarity with others toward the world as they wish for it to be," 152 so we imagine building together. We imagine those traditionally viewed as experts sharing their platforms with those who are not. We imagine many more articles coauthored by lawyers passionate about social justice issues and those most directly impacted who have gained expertise through lived experiences. This is the pedagogy of "Nothing About Us Without Us"-all teaching and scholarship of law must include the participation and wisdom of those impacted by the law. As we model, abolition is a gradual, collaborative process requiring many perspectives, particularly of those most acutely impacted by racist and oppressive punishment mechanisms. Historically, the abolitionist movement has been a movement of growth away from morally unsustainable practices. 153 The abolitionist movement is concerned with repair, restoration, 154 and hope. 155 Abolition without addressing the social illswithout implementing creative, imaginative reforms to build alternative systems that prioritize healing and potential and that we create hand-in-hand with those most impacted by social ills-is irresponsible, only making already existing harmful mechanisms look all the more desirable. We imagine a world where other locations for legal education besides law school are robustly supported. So that police officers are not giving children their first lesson in the law, we imagine a cumulative development of legal education in grades K-12, when youth are taught their rights and discuss questions of accountability and repair. We imagine a world where legal education is well resourced in prisons and jails for as long as the carceral state exists. We imagine a system of legal knowledge that empowers community legal advocates, litigants partnering with trained legal services providers, and pro se litigants. To achieve abolition, we must practice imagination. With imagination, the master's tools can be repurposed; they can be democratized to be reclaimed as the people's tools. 156 152. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The Emerging Movement for Police and Prison Abolition, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2021), https://www.newyorker.con/news/our-columnists/theemerging-movement-for-police-and-prison-abolition [https://perma.cc/JRH4-K4UZ]. 153. See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2015) (defining prison abolition as "a transformative goal of gradual decarceration and positive regulatory substitution wherein penal regulation is recognized as morally unsustainable"). 154. See Taylor, supra note 152. 155. Id. ("Hope is a discipline. We must practice it daily." (quoting Mariame Kaba)). 156. See Lorde, supra note 4, at 1-2. Lorde's famous quote, "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house," is often misinterpreted to mean that the tools of institutions cannot be repurposed to achieve something other than what the master intended. Id. Using the master's tools in the way the master intended would mean that "only the most narrow parameters of change are possible and allowable." Id. But if the master used differences to "divide and conquer" and we instead used differences to "define and empower," we would find use for the tools. Id.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT K of Rights

Otherwise alt gets crushed / Rights and litigation frame key

Pelet del Toro 18 - Judicial Law Clerk United States District Court for the Southern District of New York Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, written while at Yale Law, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law & Policy Review, "Beyond the critique of rights: The Puerto Rico legal project and civil rights litigation in America's colony," Yale LJ 128 (2018): 792,  //penelope/

At the same time, for all that the Project accomplished, it was not without its drawbacks. CLS scholars would be correct if they asserted that the Project was not able to overcome the colonial structure at the root of many of the island’s problems. Indeed, some of the more militant independentistas would agree with this critique. Even though the decision to engage with U.S. courts was led by many progressives and independentista union leaders like Grant, “dissonant philosophical strains” coexisted while the Project was active.282 Details of this continued disagreement are scarce,283 but it should be noted that two of the “Vieques 21” arrestees, Pedro Baiges Chapel and Ángel Rodríguez Cristóbal, did not defend themselves against charges of trespassing on naval land because they did not recognize the jurisdiction of the U.S. district court in Puerto Rico.284 That debate, critical to larger discussions about Puerto Rico’s political status and future, likely had to be set aside in order to engage in rights discourse and work within the U.S. civil rights paradigm. The Project’s penchant for litigation arguably legitimized the United States’ hold over Puerto Rico, as several of the Project’s high-profile cases resulted in unfavorable judgments for the independentistas.285 Spending the Project’s limited resources on litigation that confirmed what Puerto Ricans already knew from experience could be seen as counterproductive at best. The Project’s prominent litigation also risked having people put too much faith in the legal system, which is one of Tushnet’s principal concerns in The Critique of Rights. 286 Although Berkan recognizes that much of the legal activity that occurred in the late 1970s helped amplify the response to the Vieques blockade, for instance, at the time she was troubled that the focus on litigation would “take the oxygen out of movements.”287 She did not want people to misconstrue the role of the legal system and have them believe that litigation alone had a totalizing power for sociopolitical change.288 Adalina De Jesús, a Puerto Rican civil rights attorney who was part of the Instituto and later worked as Hey Maestre’s law-firm partner, shares Berkan’s concern. De Jesús argues that while rights discourse is important in that it both lets people know what they are entitled to and helps people make demands of the necessary authorities, this value is limited.289 De Jesús contends that having a community look solely to the legal system for relief might distract from a government’s broader “lack of commitment” to educate and provide for its own people.290 Meanwhile, Ramírez also agrees that the value of litigation can be narrow—it is specific to one moment, one client. He would not go so far as to say that people engaged in political organizing solely due to their relationship with the Instituto.291 These concerns echo Tushnet’s concern about lawyers overestimating the potency of a legal victory.292 In that way, the Project and its progeny might have forsaken community development to get their day in court. While it is important to keep those limitations in mind, one should not lose sight of the historical forces at play in Puerto Rico. It is difficult to imagine what would have happened to independentista and progressive causes on the island had Grant and the other union leaders not approached CCR and the Guild in the 1970s. The government-sponsored attacks against these groups would have likely continued to silence progressives and independentistas through court orders, threats, and outright violence. It is useful to recall Crenshaw’s take on rights discourse, and how she describes Black people’s decision to engage with the American legal apparatus, though stemming from a position of “self-defense,” as a radical, “calculated political act[].”293 Though the colonial context in Puerto Rico is not identical to the experiences of Black America, there similarly needed to be a legal response on the island as Grant and his colleagues indicated, and attorneys like Berkan, Schachter, and others later realized. Not doing so likely would have further compromised Puerto Ricans’ ability not only to defend themselves from these attacks, but also to fight back. Furthermore, in fixating on what the Project was or was not able to accomplish by engaging with the courts, one runs the risk of ignoring the community ties that the Project facilitated. For instance, people like Berkan, Colón Morera, Hey Maestre, Ramírez, and Vargas Acosta continued to collaborate with young Puerto Ricans. As advocates, professors, and mentors, they promoted the importance of working in the public interest long after leaving the Project and the Instituto. That being said, many of the Puerto Ricans whom I interviewed for this Note remain deeply skeptical of the power of litigation alone to achieve social change.294 Ramírez, for one, believes that “litigation does not change anything” on its own.295 Contrary to proponents of CLS, however, Ramírez considers that multifaceted advocacy—which includes community education, local forms of organizing, and litigation—has the potential to create the consciousness that can bring about social change. Ramírez’s view mirrors the legacy of the Project, and of rights discourse more generally, in Puerto Rico. Litigation and other forms of legal work were not only useful, but also necessary, to defend and support other forms of activism. Thus, Ramírez and others see what CLS does not: how litigation and rights talk can help educate and empower a colonized people.

2023 DDI Affirmative
Ks › AT K of Rights

No deradicalization link.

Pelet del Toro 18 - Judicial Law Clerk United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

Valeria M. Pelet del Toro, written while at Yale Law, Editor-in-Chief, Yale Law & Policy Review, "Beyond the critique of rights: The Puerto Rico legal project and civil rights litigation in America's colony," Yale LJ 128 (2018): 792, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/beyond-the-critique-of-rights //ms

Although Puerto Rico’s colonial status remains unchanged after all of these efforts, as CLS would remind us, Vargas Acosta views this work as “a matter of survival.”273 Ultimately, one would aim to work on changing the colonial status through political action, and perhaps some human-rights forums.274 For the time being, however, Vargas Acosta believes that “you have to work on the reality of the people here.”275 This is at the core of what CLS’s critique of rights is missing when applied to Puerto Rico. CLS’s goal—to do away with the dependence on rights—omits the other reasons litigation or rights discourse might be necessary in a place like Puerto Rico. The Project and its progeny’s use of litigation and rights talk introduced a kind of space and stability that allowed Puerto Rican advocates to engage with the law and develop the work that their communities needed most.276 It is important to note that although litigation was the Project’s primary goal in Puerto Rico, the Project, and the Instituto that sprang from it, also became the cradle of movement lawyering in Puerto Rico.277 These efforts housed a generation of civil rights lawyers, progressives, and advocates who defined the fight for social justice in Puerto Rico for decades. CLS’s critique of rights, classifying rights as ineffectual, provides little, if any, space for the significance of that history and the mobilization it enabled.